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Oh, the leaky boundaries of man-made states! 
How many clouds float past them with impunity; 
how much desert sand shifts from one land to another; 
how much mountain pebbles tumble on to foreign soil  
in provocative hops! 
... 
Only what is human can truly be foreign.  
The rest is mixed vegetation, subversive moles, and wind. 
 
(From Psalm by Wisława Zymborska, translated by Stanisław Barałczak and 
Clare Cavanagh) 
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Chapter 1 Points of Departure 
1.1 Introduction 
	  
I am not in the service of any state, regime or political movement, leader or 
organisation. I am a literary writer, who from the bottom of his heart 
perceives the grief and pain of the supressed and of victims, one who has 
made literature his world, who more than anything else attempts from grief 
and pain to create humanly relevant literary works. The central idea in my 
authorship is not ideological or political but humanitarian.  
(from Mehmed Uzun's defence of his position, published in the Swedish 
edition of his novel Light like Love, Dark like Death, released in 2003).	  
 
There he stood accused, defending himself. The Swedish-Kurdish author Mehmed 
Uzun had travelled from the city of Stockholm, in the country where he once had 
been admitted asylum, to plead his own case in the State Security Court in Istan-
bul, April 4, 2001. He was prosecuted together with his Turkish publisher for "in-
stigating separatist propaganda" in his book "Light like Love, Dark like Death".1 
The trip to Istanbul and the country from which he once escaped was a perilous 
one preceded by several intense months of solidarity actions and preparations for 
his defence. Human rights activists, well-known authors, journalists and the Swed-
ish honorary-consul in Istanbul where among those who followed the trial there. 
All the attention given to the trial, and the presence of the accused allegedly sur-
prised the judge and the prosecutor. Both the men were acquitted. In his defence 
speech Uzun emphasized the right to be an independendent writer and artist, ex-
press himself in his maternal tongue without being accused of terrorism or politi-
cal propaganda. Uzun was a Kurdish refugee from Turkey residing in Sweden 
where he had established himself, since many years back, as a Kurdish author. He 
                                                     
1  The original title of the book is Ronî mîna evînê-Tarî mîna mirinê. In Swedish the title is: Ljus 
som kärleken, mörk som döden, Ordfront: Stockholm.  
  
12 
had participated in the Kurdish movements that had emerged in Turkey during the 
decades preceding the military coup of 1980. It was a loosely organised current 
having its roots in conservative circles and nationalist oriented groups, as well as 
in the emergent left wing movement in Turkey. During this period, a new genera-
tion of Kurds took shape. It was a political one, not because they necessarily in-
tended to enter the political scene, but rather by virtue of their resistance, politi-
cally and symbolically, in the sense that they protested against the conditions un-
der which Kurds were living in that country, and in their attempting to extend the 
limits of the possibilities for people to express their Kurdish identities in Turkey. It 
was a generation that became politicized and radicalised, and took upon itself the 
organizing of resistance on an ethnic base.   
Another point of entry into the subject could be through the account provided 
by E, who expressed the sense of political marginalisation among the Kurds of his 
generation: 
 
And after that new discussions began, on initiatives taken during the time we were 
in prison, among young people and students, that the Turkish left still was oriented 
to Kemalism and still ... . They could not think of a change ... and accept the Kurds 
as a people. And give the Kurds the right to decide over their own country ... also 
the Marxists you see, these Marxists you know ... there were just a few Marxists sa-
ying: "Yes, this is a matter of course. If the Kurds wants there own country - do by 
all means!" There were very few Turkish Marxists saying that, several well-known 
Marxists were strongly against. More than the Kemalists had been." 
(E) 
 
E first belonged to the left wing movement in Turkey, broke with it and organised 
in one of the many groups that operated clandestinely but appeared in public  
through groups affiliated with the Eastern question. Following the coup September 
12, 1980, this current was eliminated, Kurdish activists who had participated in 
various forms of symbolic and political resistance were persecuted, arrested, sen-
tenced to long imprisonement and several of them were forced to leave the coun-
try. Many of them ended up in Sweden, where they came to articulate Kurdish 
beloningness and participated in the formation of a Kurdish diaspora. Through 
their activism in Turkey, they had learned about how to organise and perform po-
litically. This was at a time when they were still relatively young and in the forma-
tive period in their lives (Mannheim 1952 p. 364). In the diasporic context, their 
activism continued, but got new impulses and took on new ways. Their generation 
became the protagonist in a major political drama of our time. They were in a di-
lemma that they shared with other contemporary diasporic communities, in which 
generational experiences contributed to the dynamics and manifestation of identi-
ties. How are Mehmet Uzun and the people belonging to his political generation to 
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be regarded? Are they to be considered as being chased and persecuted victims or 
as being challengers present on the transnational political scene? 
1.2 Aim and Questions 
The present thesis deals with questions of how national identities are created and 
maintained in diasporic settings. More precisely, it concerns how the Kurdish na-
tional identities are constructed and are maintained in a political generation of 
Kurds who are residing in Sweden.  
In some respects, their stories are shared by many other people. Over and 
over again in history it has happened that generations take shape that resist the 
political and social conditions of their time, actively take part in contemporary 
social processes, and resist and organize protests politically and symbolically. 
Their repertoire of actions can be considered as representing responses to overall 
historical and social processes, and as challenging and aspiring to change existing 
conditions in society. Thus, in a sociological sense, political generations take 
shape and are moulded in relation to the surrounding society (Mannheim 1952; 
Heberle 1951 Chapter 6). It happens that political generations are defeated, ban-
ished and the people belonging to them forced to take refuge from their original 
home countries (Lundberg 1989). In diasporic settings then, their struggle is reor-
ganised and takes on new ways. 
Edmunds and Turner (2002) emphasize the fact of generations often having a 
crucial role to play in the formation of nationalist consciousness (ibid. p. 71), but 
that the "specific" contribution of generational change in these processes is often 
"neglected" by scholars (ibid. p. 93). To my knowledge too, the generational con-
tributions and specific stances taken in the formation of long-distance nationalism 
and diaspora that are manifested by refugees has not drawn much attention on the 
part of social scientists. However, generational contributions and experiences are 
certainly important for obtaining an understanding of the dynamism of such mo-
vements.  
Although a majority of the political conflicts and contentions that in recent 
decades have caused refugee movements can be classified as being "ethnic con-
flicts", it should be emphasised that there is no "ethnic factor" as such that serves 
as a driving force behind such conflicts. Rather, conflicts of this sort tend to be 
rooted in unsettled political disputes or in conflicts over economic, political, natu-
ral or social resources. A consequence of many protracted and violent conflicts 
between central powers and their populations, however, is that people are forced to 
leave their home countries and continue their lives as refugees in other parts of the 
world. In recent decades hundreds of thousands have been forced away from their 
original homelands, and have settled down in other parts of the world, where they 
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have formed networks and communities, and in many cases have continued their 
political resistance.  
The Kurds are one of the groups that in recent decades have established exile 
communities all over the world. Large number of Kurdish refugees have come to 
Western European countries and to other parts of the world following repression, 
forced displacement and persecution which they have been subjected to in the 
states of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey, where large Kurdish populations are resid-
ing. 
Turkey is the country in which assimilation policies towards the Kurdish po-
pulation have been most radical, its for many years having even been officially 
denied that the Kurds existed at all. Up until the present times the Turkish regime 
has remained consistently intolerant of any expression of Kurdish identity. When 
the Kurdish question has been touched upon in public, it has been addressed in 
terms of "banditry", "fundamentalism", "tribalism", "economic underdevelopment" 
and "foreign incitement", thus being alluding to fairly problematic issues (see, for 
example, Yeğen 2011 p. 67). For many years, there was no Kurdish resistance 
movement openly challenging the public discourse. In recent decades, however 
opposing narratives have emerged. Many of these alternative narratives have de-
velop in contexts outside of Turkey, in transnational arenas and among diasporic 
people.  
Sweden is a country in which important parts of Kurdish diasporic activism 
have developed. Many of the Kurds who became politically active in Turkey in the 
1960s and 1970s were accepted as asylum seekers in Sweden, where they have 
continued to express, expand and maintain their Kurdish national identities.  
The men and women belonging to the political generation of Kurds from 
Turkey who came to live in exile in Sweden are the main focus of the present 
study. Those taking part in the study were interviewed between 2001 and 2002, 
when most of them had been in exile for nearly two decades. 
The thesis concerns how this political generation of Kurds have narrated their 
national belonging and pro-Kurdish activism in a Swedish context and what they 
have become after two decades in Swedish exile.  
The study attempts to gain and provide an understanding of the formation in 
Sweden of a Kurdish political generation in a diasporic setting. The central aim of 
the study thus is to analyse and describe how narratives of Kurdish national identi-
ties are manifested in a diasporic context. More precisely, the aim is to describe 
and analyse the contents and the articulations of spoken and written expressions of 
Kurdishness, in terms of political and cultural belonging and exile, among differ-
ent actors within the political generation of Kurds from Turkey who are living in 
Sweden. 
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The following three sets of questions are the guiding ones in the thesis: 
 
First, there was a set of questions aimed at defining the Kurdish generation: 
 
How do the members of this political generation present themselves? What does it 
mean to the members of the generation to be a Kurd? How do they define who is 
and who is not a Kurd? 
 
Secondly, there are a number of questions concerning how the Kurdish generation 
is to be contextualised: 
 
How do they relate to their country of origin? How do they relate to the present 
Kurdish movement in Turkey? How do they relate to the Kurdish diaspora? How 
do they relate to their country of settlement? 
 
Thirdly, there are questions concerning the politicizing of a Kurdish generation: 
 
How do they narrate their political background? How do they refer to their role 
and activism in the Swedish diaspora? How do they perceive of their situation, as 
that of their being diasporic people? 
1.3 Why a Study of a Kurdish Political Generation from 
Turkey? 
The present research grew out of long-term personal contacts I have had with 
members of the Kurdish diasporic community in Sweden. Today, diasporic Kurds 
represent one of the most active refugee groups in Western Europe and in various 
other parts of the world. This is a situation people in most of the settlement coun-
tries are quite familiar with, though this has not always been the case. 
   I remember the first time I ever heard of the Kurds. This was during my 
high school years in the late 1970s. One afternoon, when one of my friends and I 
were sitting at a café that we often frequented after school, we occasionally came 
into conversation with three men who sat at the table next to ours. One of them 
was Lebanese, and the other two proved to be Kurds from Iraq. We soon became 
involved in lively discussions of international politics and the situation in "the 
Third World". The two Kurds seemed to be more and more frustrated as our dis-
cussions continued. My friend and I were both interested in politics and followed 
the latest news from Lebanon, and also from Latin America and from South Af-
rica. The Kurds, however, were a group we had never heard of before. The col-
lapse of the Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and the subsequent armed conflict between 
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the Kurdish guerrillas and the Iraqi regime was also something we knew nothing 
about. I am not quite sure that we believed in all of the suffering and the atrocities 
they told us of. At that time, in the 1970s, there were still only very few Kurdish 
political refugees living in Western European countries who stemmed from Tur-
key. Few persons in "the Western World", with the exception of certain Middle 
East experts and others especially interested in the region, knew much about the 
Kurds. Despite the dramatic developments and political unrest in their home coun-
tries, the Kurds were only seldom reported on in the media or in international fo-
rums. 
For my part, it was not before I moved to Gothenburg some years later that I 
in earnest became interested in the Kurdish question. My Kurdish acquaintances 
and my involvement finally in solidarity work for the Kurds provided me insights 
into their situation both in the Middle East and in countries in which they took 
refugee. I learned that the Middle Eastern countries that hosted large Kurdish po-
pulations differed from one another in terms of political space and possibilities for 
Kurds to organise (Chaliand 1979; Entessar 1992; Natali 2005). 
This was in the mid-1980s. At that time the Kurdish question was scarcely 
well-known to the public, either in Sweden or in any other of the countries receiv-
ing large numbers of Kurdish refugees. 
 Kurdish national identities seemed to develop in opposition to the national 
state projects of the countries in the Middle East that hosted large Kurdish popula-
tions. As Abbas Vali has put it: "Opposition to the denial of Kurdish identity and 
resistance to the imposed "national" identities remain the fundamental cause of 
Kurdish rebellions" (Vali 1998 p. 82). In each of the four countries - Iran, Iraq, 
Syria and Turkey - guerilla-styled resistance movements driven by nationalist 
sentiments developed in the decades following the Second World War. In each of 
those countries the movements that developed were conditioned by specific his-
torical, political, cultural and social developments in the country in question 
(Chaliand 1979; Entessar 1992; Gunter 1990). The Kurdish resistance movements 
within the states of Iraq, Iran and Turkey were not recognized by the authorities in 
these countries (Chaliand 1979; Entessar 1992; Natali 2005). In Turkey, an assimi-
lation policy directed against the Kurds, one so harsh that even the very existence 
of a Kurdish population in the country was denied, had been carried out against the 
Kurds since the founding of the Republic in the 1920s. The Kurdish question has 
continued to be a major challenge to the modern Turkish Republic over the years 
(van Bruinessen 1984, 1988; Gunter 1990; Eccarius-Kelly 2010; Entessar 1992; 
Natali 2005).  
From the early 1980s onwards, Kurds began to arrive in Western Europe in 
increasing numbers, due to the political turmoil in their home countries. Following 
the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War that commenced in 1980 and the 
military coup in Turkey in 1980, the attitudes of the homeland governments to-
wards their Kurdish populations hardened. First of all, these developments led to  
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an extensive internal migration of Kurds in the Middle East region, from the coun-
tryside towards the major cities inside and outside of Kurdistan.2 Secondly, an 
increased number of Kurdish refugees migrated to countries outside the Middle 
East,3 the Kurdish question gradually becoming internationalised and "deterritori-
alized" (van Bruinessen 1998 pp. 48ff.). The headlines reporting the news of po-
litical murders committed by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)4 in the 1980s 
were followed a decade later by headlines telling of violent Kurdish demonstra-
tions after the gas bombings of Halabja, of Kurdish migrants being involved in 
honour killings, of Kurdish refugees being stranded in the border areas between 
Iraq, Turkey and Iran, and of the spectacular abduction of the PKK's leader Abdul-
lah Öcalan from Kenya. 
It was also a time when reports on the Kurds were increasingly present on the 
front pages of the newspapers around the world. It was the actions of the PKK that 
drew the attention of the media and of journalists, not least of all in Sweden. 
Among the incidents the party was accused of being involved in was a murder of 
one of the party's defectors that took place in Uppsala, Sweden in 1984. The or-
ganisation was then labelled a terrorist organisation by Swedish authorities and 
nine of its members were held in "commune arrest" for several years (see Gunter 
1990 p. 104). After the assassination of the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in 
Stockholm in February 1986, the Stockholm Chief of Police at the time, Hans 
Holmer, pointed to the PKK and to the Kurds as perpetrators. Holmer offered va-
rious motives for why that particular group should have carried this out. All of this 
came to have negative consequences for a majority of the Kurdish refugees in 
Sweden. In the media generally, and in the newspapers, Kurds were described as 
being associated not only with the PKK, but also with political violence. For ex-
ample, there were headlines reading: "Now We Are Going to Chase Kurds with 
Soldering Lamps". Less often, reports appeared in the media concerning the cir-
cumstances which they were faced with in their home countries and the reasons 
                                                     
2  For a discussion of the socio-economic and demographic developments in Kurdistan, see Jafar 
(1976), van Bruinessen (1992 pp. 14-21); White 2000, Chapter 5. For an overview of migration 
patterns in the Kurdistan region see Geerse 2011 pp. 163ff. ; Jongerden 2007 pp. 78-89; Kurdish 
Human Rights Project ( KHRP) 1996. Nowadays, Istanbul is by many observers considered to be 
the largest Kurdish city in the world, with an estimated Kurdish population of 1-1,5 million 
(Gunter 1997). In Mersin, in the south-eastern Mediterrean region, the Kurdish migration is re-
ported to have caused a major demographic change such that the Kurds are now in the majority in 
the population.  
3  van Bruinessen 2000; Emanuelsson 2005. 
4  PKK is the Kurdish acronym for The Kurdistan Workers Party. In Kurdish: Partîya Karkarên-y-
Kurdistan. 
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why they were seeking asylum in foreign countries, as well as to their situation in 
the countries in which they settled.  
All of this contributed to nurturing my growing interest in the situation of 
Kurds in Turkey and the Kurdish resistance that had emerged there in the decades 
following the Second World War (Gunter 1990; Ibrahim and Gürbey 2000; Ec-
carius-Kelly 2010; Entessar 1992; Natali 2005). 
In the diasporic settings that now came into being, Kurdish activists found 
themselves in a transnational space in which they could establish relations to both 
their new countries of residence and their old home countries. In addition, new 
arenas in which Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan could meet developed. Follow-
ing the Gulf War in 1991, the Kurdish question gradually became recognised by 
the international community, resulting in the establishment of a "safe haven" for 
the Kurds in Northern Iraq (Cook 1995). Diasporic Kurds played at least some role 
in these changes (Emanuelsson 2005, 2008). However, as Natali (2005 pp. 160-
179) points out, the transnational spaces and diasporic settings were diverse, dy-
namic and complex in terms of recognition, political support and the possibilities 
present in relation to the countries of settlement as well as the countries from 
which they had once emigrated. Relations with and responses from diverse con-
texts such as homeland regimes, countries of settlement and transnational space 
can vary. The political generation that concerns us here had experience from Tur-
key, where they organised clandestinely, as well as on the transnational scene, in 
Sweden and elsewhere where they could manifest their Kurdish national identities 
openly. 
A particular repertoire of actions could thus develop in a specific political 
climate, which in each case gave the Kurdish Diaspora dynamics of a specific sort. 
In addition, diasporic settings are complex, diversified and dynamic in terms of 
recognition, political support and possibilities in relation to their settlement coun-
tries, the countries they left and the transnational spaces in which they were acting. 
They thus involve a myriad of jostling and competing identities. Diasporas are a 
complex phenomena, involving relations to the homeland and to the country of 
settlement, as well as to a transnational space. In a sense, diasporas are somewhere 
between being transnational and being exile. The men and the women belonging to 
the political generation the thesis is concerned with were once forced into exile 
and they should thus be considered more as diasporic than transnational (cf. Ema-
nuelsson 2005 p. 216; Tölölyan 2007 p. 652-654)). Accordingly, the creation of 
Kurdish diasporic identities and the emergence of a "long distance nationalism" as 
viewed from the perspective of this political generation from Turkey, are issues 
that merit close examination here. 
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1.4 A Kurdish Political Generation and its Constitutive 
Others 
In this section I will examine more closely the contexts in which the "self", Kurd-
ish diasporic identities, and "others" are created by the political generation. The 
men and the women in question were originally from Turkey, defined themselves 
as Kurds and participated in the loosely defined Kurdish nationalist movement that 
appeared in that country in the 1960s and the 1970s. Most of them came to Swe-
den or to other parts of Western Europe in the years around the time of the military 
coup of 1980, their commitment to the Kurdish issue continuing, and their being 
reorganised in line with a long-distance nationalism that developed in diasporic 
settings.  
Abbas Vali (1998) has pointed out that Kurdish national identities are af-
fected by the "political and cultural fragmentation" of being created in relation to 
four emerging national states in the Middle East. These condititons have contrib-
uted to that: "The dialectic of denial and resistance assigns a specifically transna-
tional character to Kurdish nationalism" (ibid p.82). Vali underscores the "speci-
ficity" of Kurdish nationalism, its being "defined in part by the changing relation-
ship of Kurdish identity to its 'others' " (ibid. p. 83). Thus, it seem plausible to 
assume that the long-distance nationalism emerging in diasporic settings is created 
in relation to the constitutive complexity of perceived "others" such as states in the 
original homeland as well as in the country of settlement. Thus, the contexts in 
which a given generation can be assumed to construct their "self" and "others" are 
crucial to our understanding of them.  
A fundamental principle within most shared collective identities is the claim 
that a distinction should be made between "us" and "them", implying that the con-
struction of the "self" is reflected in the "other" and that both of these need to be 
contextualised. Stipulating that for every "we" or "I" there must necessarily be an 
opposing "them", Chantal Mouffe (1992) writes: 
  
There will always be a 'constitutive outside', an exterior to the community that is the 
very condition of its existence. It is crucial to recognize that, since to construct a 
'we' it is necessary to distinguish it from a 'them', and since all forms of consensus 
are based on acts of exclusion, the condition of possibility of the political commu-
nity is at the same time the impossibility of its full realization.  
(quoted by Westlind, 1996, p. 72). 
 
Accordingly, imagining "others" is crucial to creating of the perceived "self". 
However, imagined "selves" and "others" are dynamic and in a flux. The political 
generation of Kurds we are concerned with here can be expected to share an ima-
gination of a Kurdish "we" that is created in opposition to "others", who can be 
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contextualised in terms of the time and the spaces in which they are acting (Wes-
tlind 1996 pp. 72, 80-84; Mouffe 1992; Mouffe and Laclau 1985).  
A Political Generation 
Regarding the existence of a political generation, a few words are in order first 
concerning why and how the men and the women of primary interest in the thesis 
came to constitute a political generation and how this can be understood as a so-
ciological phenomenon. In his seminal essay The Problem of Generations from 
1927, Karl Mannheim established the idea that by a sociological generation is 
meant, "a common location in the social and historical process" which thereby 
limits it to a specific range of potential experience, and a characteristic type of 
historically relevant action" (Mannheim 1952 p. 291). A "sociological" generation 
is different from a "biological" one, since people belonging to the former category 
are united not only by virtue of their age and date of birth, but in addition belong 
to this location (ibid.). To label people as belonging to the same historical commu-
nity as a sociological generation is the broadest use of the term. People of the same 
age who belong to the same "generation location" are not necessarily members of 
the same "generation unit". For example, not all Kurds in Turkey were politically 
active in the 1960s and 1970s, and not all of them took part in the pro-Kurdish 
currents that developed during that period, and there were also people who did not 
escape or attempt to escape the country. One crucial consideration here is that of 
how to define where a generation begin and where it ends.  
A sociological generation is dependent upon the biological calendar and 
rythm, but this does not follow through strictly. Instead, it is far more dependent 
upon historical-sociological processes, events and junctures. Thus, a sociological 
generation can be composed of many biological generations (Heberle 1951 pp. 
118-127). This is an extremely broad and general definition, however. A more 
precise discussion of why a given group of people constitutes a "sociological gen-
eration" is thus called for. In the emerging literature on the Kurds in Turkey, many 
argue that there was not simply one generation but that there were several genera-
tions that, in the course of time, emerged on the scene in these decades. This defi-
nition may be too narrow, however, to serve as a satisfactory analytical tool, espe-
cially since the thesis concerns in particular how the political generation appeared 
in diasporic settings in which there can be said to have been a first generation of 
immigrant political actors, one that perhaps at the beginning could not be consid-
ered to be composed of transnationals.  
The men and the women belonging to the political generation that concerns 
us here for the most part were born between about the late 1930s and the 1950s, 
the youngest one being born in the 1960s. They were too young to remember ei-
ther the Kurdish rebellions or the repression of the Kurds in the early years of the 
Turkish Republic. Yet they were old enough to become politically aware in the 
decades that preceded the military coup of 1980.  
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The generation considered here can be characterised as a "political" one in the 
sense that it became committed to and mobilised around issues that were political, 
even if some of the members of the generation did not perceive these issues as 
such. In my view, a political generation is the equivalent of what Edmunds and 
Turner (2002) term an "active" generation, since it consists of a number of persons 
who "make a generative contribution to a social community or polity rather than 
passively accept a given culture" (ibid. p. 16).  
The people belonging to the political generation was challenging and at-
tempting to extend the limits of their political space in Turkey, or in the words of 
Edmunds and Turner: "A generation that has a strong consciousness and maintains 
its social solidarity has the capacity to act in politics, and to meet contingencies 
and exigencies of its particular historical location" (ibid. p. 16). However, their 
repertoire of actions of resistance was not always aimed at becoming political. 
Mehmed Uzun, for example, fled his home country while awaiting a pending trial, 
his having been sued for being the editor of a journal in Kurdish (Uzun 1998 pp. 
37-38, 90-91, 2008 pp. 140ff.).  
A Kurdish Generation 
Since the men and the women the study concerns are Kurds born in different parts 
of the Kurdistan region or in other parts of Turkey, all of them having a relation-
ship to the Kurdistan region and having been championing the Kurdish cause, a 
brief presentation of the Kurds and of Kurdistan is in place. A majority of Kurds 
reside in the Kurdistan region, which extends across the borders of the modern 
states of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria and also has enclaves in Azerbaijan and Ar-
menia. Kurdistan has never been a state of its own5. Situated at the crossroads 
between Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, the Kurdish society came to 
emerge in the periphery of several historical empires. Throughout history, wave 
after wave of raiding armies - Arabs, Turkomans, Seljuqs and Mongols - swept 
over this area.  
Van Bruinessen has shown how the geopolitical position of Kurdistan, his-
torical developments in that area, and its topography, formed the basis for the de-
velopment of a diverse and heterogenous society (van Bruinessen 1992 pp. 15-25). 
The Kurdish society is varied and is intermixed in terms of political, cultural and 
religious affiliations. Approximately 75 % of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims, their 
also following the Islamic Shafi’i6 school of jurisprudence (McDowall 1996 pp. 
10ff.), whereas an estimated 15 % are Shia Muslims (ibid.). Further religious 
                                                     
5 Two independent Kurdish political entities in modern times can be mentioned: 1) the Kurdish 
Republic in Mahabad (Iran) in 1946, 2) the Kurdish de facto state in Northern Iraq from 1992. 
6 This differs from the Turks, a majority of whom follow the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. 
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communities that exist in the area, and that claim a Kurdish ethnic identity, are the 
Alevis, the Ahl-I Haqq and the Yezids7. In addition, there are other groups, such as 
Jewish, Zorastrian, Armenian and Chaldean Christian groups (see Entessar 1992). 
In addition, Kurdish society is, like most other societies, linguistically and ethni-
cally heterogeneous. Two main dialects predominate, these being Sorani, spoken 
mainly in Southern Kurdistan (mainly in present-day Iran and Iraq), and Kurmanji, 
which is dominant in Northern Kurdistan (mainly in present-day Turkey). Ale-
vism8 is a heterodox religion having a strong influence on Turkish society (White 
2000 pp. 41-42). Zaza (also known as Zazakî, Kirmanci or Dimli) is an Iranian 
language, often considered distinct from Kurdish (see McDowall 1996 p. 4; White 
2000 pp. 47-50). 
Although there is a marked overlap between Alevis and Zaza speakers, there 
are Alevis who consider Kurdish to be their maternal tongue, at the same time as it 
is also possible to find Sunni practising Zaza speakers as well. In addition, a sub-
stantial Yezidi population used to inhabit the Kurdistan region in Turkey, until a 
few decades ago. Yezidism is a highly syncretic religion that contains elements 
from such pre-Islamic religions as Zoroastrism, Sufi-Islam and Christianity (van 
Bruinessen 1992 pp. 23-25, McDowall 1996 pp. 10-13). Historically speaking 
there never was a Kurdish leader strong enough to gain a monopoly of power in 
Kurdistan. For a long time, Kurdish society was organised in terms of small prin-
cipalities ruled by local princes (mirs), their coexisting with tribal communities 
and with confederations of tribes that were nomadic, semi-sedentary or sedentary, 
living side-by-side with population groups without any tribal affiliations.9  
In the 16th Century the Ottoman and Safavid Empires contested for power in 
the area, a frontier line finally being agreed upon between the belligerent state 
powers that was formally recognised in the Treaty of Zulab in 1639. From this 
time on, the major parts of Kurdistan, were annexed to the Ottoman Empire. How-
ever, the Kurdish principalities were incorporated into the Ottoman state structure 
under conditions essentially favourable to them. In the aftermath of the First 
World War, the Ottoman Empire finally collapsed. The political map of the Mid-
dle East was then redrawn, several new state formations being created. In 1920 the 
peace negotiations first resulted in the Treaty of Sèvres. In accordance with the 
Treaty, the Ottoman territory was to be partitioned between France, Britain, Italy 
                                                     
7 A syncretic religion with elements of Zoroastrism, Manicheism, Nestorian Christendom, Judaism 
and Islam (www.britannica.com 2012-03-21). 
8 Alevism contain elements of Zorastrianism, Pre-Islamic religions, Turcomen shamanism and 
Shi'ism (see White 2003 Chapter 1). 
9  For a thorough description of the tribal and the political organisation of Kurdistan see van 
Bruinessen 1992. 
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and Greece. Section III of the Treaty included the articles 62-64, stipulating that 
independent Kurdish and Armenian states should be established, north of Lake 
Van in territories that presently belong to Turkey (Hurewitz 1956 p. 74).10 How-
ever, the Treaty of Sèvres remained unratified and was replaced in 1923 by the 
Treaty of Lausanne, which finally recognised the establishment of an independent 
Turkish state in the lands of Rumelia11 and Anatolia. In the new Treaty, all the 
promises of independence for Kurds and Armenians had been removed, the possi-
bility of creating an independent Kurdish state being eliminated for a long time to 
come. 
When the Treaty of Lausanne came into effect, the Kurdish population in the 
Middle East in practice became distributed among four states: Iran, Iraq, Syria and 
Turkey. Even today, from a Turkish point of view, the Treaty of Sèvres is regarded 
as a threat to the integrity of the Turkish Republic, reminding one of the fact that 
these lands were planned to be carved up into Greek, French and Italian entities 
(see, for example, Pope and Pope 1997 p. 55; Yapp 1996; Zürcher 2004 p. 147). 
The Kurds generally look at it differently. Nezan Kendal, a Kurd from Turkey 
residing in exile in France since 1971, and presently director of the Kurdish Insti-
tute in Paris, summarises this as follows: 
 
Sèvres had been humiliating for the Turkish people and deeply unjust to the Kurd-
ish people. Lausanne, in contrast, was undeniably a victory for the Turks, but for 
the Kurds it marked the beginning of a new phase of servitude (Kendal 1979a p. 
58). 
 
Following Jongerden (2007 p. 142) what henceforth is referred to as the Kurdistan 
region are the following 19 provinces (il) in south-eastern Turkey: Adiyaman, 
Ağri, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Erzincan, Elazığ, Hakkari, Iğdir, Kars, 
Malatya, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şirnak, Tunceli, Urfa and Van.  
 
Committed to the Kurdish Cause 
After the establishment of new states in the Middle East, the Kurdish national 
struggle became limited, essentially different Kurdish currents developing within 
states that hosted large Kurdish minorities (Entessar 1992; Natali 2005; McDowall 
1996 p. 416). In Turkey, a first cycle of open Kurdish resistance against the Ke-
malist regime took place in the early years of the Republic, when the political and 
                                                     
10 The text of the Peace Treaty is published in Hurewitz 1956 p. 74. 
11 Rumelia is the European part of Turkey. 
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ideological structures of the state were not yet fully established. The early resis-
tance that developed then culminated in three major rebellions. All of them were 
brutally crushed, this being followed by severe repression of the Kurds (see, for 
example, van Bruinessen 1992; Kendal 1979b; More 1984 pp. 64-66; Olson 1989; 
McDowall 1996 pp. 194-211; White 2000 pp. 73-89). 
The next cycle of Kurdish resistance took form in post-Kemal Turkey in the 
1960s and 1970s. This time the Kurdish resistance can be seen as a reaction to the 
repressive policies of the Turkish state (Bozarslan 1996, 2000; Gunter 1990; Gro-
jean 2008; McDowall 1996 Chapter 19, 20; Gürbey 2000; Kendal 1979b; White 
2000). A number of coinciding factors gave impetus to the emergence of a Kurd-
ish movement: the sweeping economic and political changes that took place, the 
introduction of a multi-party system, the country’s closer political relations with 
NATO that developed, initial attempts to to become integrated into the interna-
tional capitalist economy, and in particular the new constitution of 1960, which 
provided a certain degree of political freedom.  
After two decades of political turmoil a military coup was staged September 
12, 1980, this largely eliminating the political system in Turkey as a whole. All of 
the political parties and trade unions were suspended, several newspapers and 
publications closed down and extensive purges against people suspected to have 
been involved in subversive activities were carried out (Ahmad 1993 pp. 183ff. ; 
Pope and Pope 1997 pp. 152-153; Zürcher 2004 pp. 278-280). The country was 
then under direct rule by the military, and from 1983 on until the year 2000 the 
Kurdistan region was placed under Martial Law (Jongerden 2007 p. 53 n. 12). 
Many Kurdish activists were arrested, imprisoned and tortured (Amnesty Interna-
tional 1984; Gunter 1990), many of them belonging to the political generation that 
chose to leave the country. 
Refugees and Immigrants 
The political generation of particular interest here can be contextualised in terms 
of its consisting of refugees and immigrants residing in a diasporic setting. Migra-
tion, be it voluntary or forced, is patterned by various political and economic de-
velopments in the countries of origin and in the recipient countries, respectively. 
Throughout history, the ancient practice of banishment has been employed by 
many Middle Eastern rulers in order to punish undesirable persons or as a means 
of collective punishment. Examples of this include the Kurdish aristorcrats and 
landowners who the Ottoman authorities sent away from their Kurdish lands to 
Constantinople, and the tribes of Kurds that were forced away to the province of 
Khorasan in Eastern Iran during the period of the Safavid dynasty in the 17th cen-
tury. Thus, several Kurdish communities became established outside the Kurdish 
dominated lands in Western and Central Asia. Kurdish speaking communities are 
to be found today in Istanbul, Damascus, Bagdad and Teheran, as well as in Bei-
rut, Khorasan, Caucasus, Cental Anatolia and Central Asia. Several tributary peo-
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ple, not simply the Kurds, were subjected to the policies of banishment. Hence, the 
experience of exile is a theme that is to be found in Kurdish mythology and history 
writing, yet these exiles were not political refugees in the modern sense of the term 
(Lundberg 1989 pp. 21-23; Said 2000 Chapter 17). 
Only a few Kurds made their way to Europe and to the Americas in the pe-
riod prior to the Second World War. A majority of those who arrived were men 
belonging to the Kurdish aristocracy or to prosperous families who had been sent 
abroad for education. There were others who were exiles and who had been forced 
to leave the Ottoman territories because of their involvement in oppositional 
movements. Important figures of this type include, for example, members of the 
prominent Bedr Khan family who published journals in the Kurdish language in 
Paris and in Berlin, as well as Sherif Pasha, the Ottoman embassador to Sweden in 
1890s, who later became the principal representative of the Kurds in the peace 
negotiations following the First World War (McDowall 1996 p. 121). According 
to Alakom (2007), the first Kurdish refugee in the modern sense of the term who 
came to Sweden was a man named Alexander Suleiman Knutas. It is told that after 
a dramatic escape from Tonstra in Kurdistan he had been adopted by a family in 
the Swedish settlement in Ukraina and that he came  with them to the Swedish 
island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea in 1929 from the Soviet Union (ibid. p. 45). 
Between the Second World War and up to the early 1960s the few Kurds 
coming to Europe and to the US consisted mainly of male students (Sheikmous 
2000). From 1965 on, both the migration patterns and the social composition of 
the Kurdish migrants changed. This was at a time when the economies and the 
industrial sector in Western European countries were prosperous and expanding. 
There was a strong demand for labour, migrants being actively recruited from such 
Southern European countries as Greece, Italy, ex-Yugoslavia and Turkey (Castles 
and Miller 2009 pp. 97-101.; Johansson 2008). Among the considerable numbers 
of Turkish guest workers and labour migrants who arrived in Western European 
countries at this time were several Kurds. The exact numbers of them involved are 
difficult to determine, since the Kurds were registrated as Turks, their being Turk-
ish citizens. West Germany was the country that received the largest numbers of 
incoming Kurds during this period, its being estimated that there were between 
400,000 and 500,000 of them. A clear majority of the Kurds arriving in Sweden, in 
turn, originated from the area of Kulu in Central Anatolia (Berruti et al 2002; 
Khayati 2008; Sheikhmous 2000; Svanberg and Tydén 1998). 
From the mid 1970s onwards, immigration policies in all Western European 
countries became increasingly restrictive (Castles and Miller 2009 p. 97; Johans-
son 2008). The economic recession and increasing oil prices affected most West-
ern countries, this period of time contributing to the changing of policies. Labour 
migrants were not permitted, which in turn led to increasing numbers of people 
applying for family reunions or political asylum (Appelqvist 1999 p. 2; see also 
Appelqvist and Zettervall 2008; Johansson 2008).  
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The increasing flow of Kurdish asylum seekers was fostered mainly by the many 
political crises and the instability in their home countries. Kurdish refugees from 
Iraq arrived after the first Gulf War in 1980-88 and in the aftermath of the second 
Gulf War in 1991, when hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds escaped their 
homes and crossed the borders of Iran and Turkey (McDowall 1996 p. 372). Kurd-
ish refugees from Iran began to come after the revolution in 1979. In Turkey, it 
was the social transformations and the political turmoil in the 1960s and 1970s that 
culminated in the coûp d'êtats of 1971 and 1980, that led to major migration flows 
to Western Europe. Many of the refugees who arrived from Turkey after the coup 
of 1971 returned a few years later, just to escape from there for a much longer 
period of time after 1980. The military intervention of 1980 had lasting effects 
since the military regime carried out radical changes and produced a new constitu-
tion (Sheikhmous 2000). Since it became difficult, if not completely impossible, 
for many activists to return, 1980 must be considered a turning point in the life of 
many Kurdish activists of that political generation. 
As immigrants in Sweden, the Kurds were registered as Iranians, Iraqis, Syri-
ans or Turks, in accordance with their citizenship. Accordingly, it is not possible 
to establish, in any exact way, how many Kurds are presently residing in Sweden. 
Until 1965, according to estimates made by Alakom (2007), there were only a 
handful of Kurds residing in the country. That year, however, about 25 Kurdish 
immigrant workers arrived, and in the early 1970s there were about 100 Kurds 
living in Sweden (ibid. p. 66). When waves of Kurdish refugees were coming from 
the Middle Eastern countries, the numbers of Kurds increased considerably. 
Emanuelsson (2005) mentions there being between 25,000 and 40,000 Kurds liv-
ing in Sweden around 2000, these numbers being based on updated estimates 
made by the Kurdish Institute in Paris (Emanuelsson 2005 p. 83). Alakom (2007) 
discusses the difficulties and uncertainties connected with establishing how many 
Kurds are living in Sweden. In accordance with figures provided by the Swedish 
Migration Board, based on the numbers of immigrants that have come from their 
countries of origin, figures of between 40,000 and 50,000 seems plausible. How-
ever, Alakom also refers to a former Iraqi president's suggesting that there must be 
about 100,000 Kurds living in Sweden, given the increasing numbers of refugees 
from Iraq that have been arriving in recent years.  
Among the political refugees arriving from Turkey in the late 1970s and early 
the 1980s one finds those who belong to the generation of particular interest in the 
thesis. Like Mehmed Uzun, most of them ended up in the surbubs of Stockholm, 
Uppsala and other major Swedish cities. In Sweden, immigrant policies were 
guided until the early 1970s of the principle of assimilation. From 1975 on, Swe-
den then implemented a strategy of "multiculturalism" based on the principles of 
equality, freedom to choose and partnership. The idea was that immigrants should 
be given the same rights and obligations as Swedish citizens and equal access to 
the Swedish welfare system, and in addition should be given the freedom to 
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choose between on the one hand "incorporation", i.e be given the possibilty of 
maintaining "their culture", and on the other hand assimilation (Johansson 2008; 
Khayati 2008 pp. 182-187). Finally immigrants were to be given the right to vote, 
after 3 years of residence, in elections for municipalities, for the church and for the 
county they resided in (Johansson 2008; Khayati 2008).  
In order to promote "multi-culturalism", a set of reforms were carried aimed 
to facilitate the life of foreigners who settled down in Sweden, examples of this 
being the Mother tongue reform in 1976 and the decision to implement municipal 
immigrant offices. A number of laws aimed at protecting and supporting immi-
grants were enacted, among these the law against illicit discrimination, and the law 
against threat and agitation directed against some groups of people (Khayati 
2008). 
Diaspora Activism and Transnational Spaces 
Along with the globalisation process and increased numbers of political refugees 
moving in the direction from "South" countries to Western European and North 
American countries, the world has witnessed a proliferation of intra-ethnic com-
munities acting politically across state borders and through international networks. 
The Kurds constitute one of many diasporic communities in the world, other ex-
amples of active diaspora formations today being those of Palestinians, Circas-
sians, Somalis, Kosovo Albans, Tibetans and Cambodians, each of these formed 
and conditioned by specific historical, political and social circumstances. 
International migration and the occurrence of social formations consisting of refu-
gees are phenomena that affect society, both in the countries of residence and in 
their countries of origin (see, for example, Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Cohen 1997; 
Olsson 1999a; Povrzanovic-Frykman 2001; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001a, 2003).  
The Kurdish guest students in various European countries who arrived there 
in the 1960s and 1970s frequently became members of the association Kurdish 
Students Society in Europe (KSSE).12 This group was founded in 1956 and organ-
ised Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan and different political affiliations, the fact 
notwithstanding that, since 1975, a majority of its members sympathised with Bar-
zanî (More 1984 pp. 214ff.; Grojean 2008 p. 111; see also Emanuelsson 2005 pp. 
85ff.). In the 1970s the KSSE splintered due to internal conflicts. New groups 
emerged, organising the Kurds in Europe mainly along party lines or on the basis 
of local affiliations. Grojean (2008 p. 111) describes the Association of Kurdish 
Students Abroad (AKSA)13 as being the most influential of these, one that at-
                                                     
12 The Kurdish name of the organisation was Komela Xwendkarên Kurd li Ewropa. 
13 The Kurdish name of this organisation is Yekitiya Xwendevanên li dervayi Welat. 
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tracted in particular sympathisers to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK),14 In 
addition there were two associations that above all organised Kurds from Turkey. 
One of these was Hevra, (together) founded in Germany in 1965. A second group 
that Grojean points to is Bahoz15 founded in Sweden in 1970 by a former member 
the KSSE 16 (Grojean 2008 pp. 102; Grojean 2011 p. 184).  
In the course of time, a complex web of Kurdish organisation extending 
across continents emerged. The Kurdish diaspora activism of today is conducted 
through a number of different organisations, as well as independent NGOs, private 
individuals and political institutions. In North America, Australia and several 
Western European countries, Sweden among them, members of the Kurdish dias-
pora have actively sought to further their cause by means of political lobbying, and 
attempts to influence public opinion in the direction of politics regarding Kurds in 
the Middle East being changed. Khayati (2008) asserts that the "political perform-
ances of the diasporan Kurds in Sweden displayed the experiences of living across 
the state borders of several nation states" (ibid. p. 253).  
Thus, Sweden can be seen as having become an arena for transnational ac-
tivities. For instance, Kurds from Turkey residing in diasporic settings have pub-
lished widely in the Kurdish language, have actively participated in debates and 
actions concerning Turkish membership of the EU and human rights issues in 
Turkey, submitted reports to the Council of Europe on violations of Kurdish 
rights, and brought cases of human rights violations to the attention of the Euro-
pean Court (KHRP 1996; 1998). Emanuelsson (2005) has pointed out that transna-
tional networks have been established among the Kurds, ones that "involve actors 
at the sub-state, state and supra-state levels and accomodate 'unbounded' 
ideas/values in both territorial and non-territorial terms" (Emanuelsson 2005 p. 
215).  
These networks can be located in the countries of settlement, in the countries 
of origin or both. The political impact of diasporic networks has been disputed, its 
often being considered marginal, but it has prospects of increasing in a present 
globalised world. Although their impact should not be exaggerated, the diasporic 
Kurds have been challenging the fundamental principles that have guided the 
Turkish Republic (see, for example, Yeğen, 2011). As political or politicized ac-
tors, they also confront the regimes in the settlement countries with new dilemmas 
                                                     
14 In Kurdish: Yekyetî Niştîmanî Kurdistan. The PUK is one of the two dominant political parties in 
Iraqi Kurdistan. 
15 Hevra means together and Bahoz mean storm. 
16 According to Grojean (2008 p. 103) both of these associations appear not to have been active 
since 1975. 
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in terms both of international political relations and of the domestic political situa-
tion.  
Kurdistan Iraq and Transnational Space 
The diasporic networks extend from European countries to North America, and 
Australia and the Middle East, this also including the imagined homeland of Kurd-
istan. Once the Kurds were portrayed as "a people without a country", referring to 
the fact that they did not have a state of their own. This was essentially the situa-
tion when the political generation with which we are primarily concerned here 
began to organise politically in Turkey, and during its first decades of exile in 
Western Europe. Today, however, a de facto Kurdish state has developed in 
Northern Iraq. In the aftermath of the First Gulf War in 1991, a no-fly zone was 
created north of the 36th parallell, one encompassing a large part of the Kurdistan 
region in Iraq, after an estimated half million Iraqi Kurds had taken refugee near 
the Turkish borders out of fear of the regime. The Bush administration's appeal to 
the population of Iraq to rebel against its government lay partly at the basis for 
this. 
As Kurdish protests become organised, no support for them was provided by 
the US forces. In the internationally recognized "safe haven" that nevertheless 
developed, the Kurds have gained autonomy and "assumed a territorial identity 
apart from central and southern Iraq" (Natali 2005 p. 66). These developments 
have provided the Kurds new possibilities of mobilizing as a national group, as 
well as the opportunity of creating a democratic Kurdish state and society (Natali 
2005 pp. 64-69; Emanuelsson 2008 p. 31). Free and open elections were held in 
the Kurdistan region in 1992. These led to the establishment of a regional govern-
ment located in the city of Hêwler/Erbil, the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) (McDowall 1996; Natali 2005; Olson 2005).  
These positive developments were set back, however, by power-sharing 
agreements and by infighting between the two dominant political parties in the 
region: the KDP-Iraq and the PUK during the period between 1994 and 1998. 
Negotiations for reconciliation were initiated by the United States and were con-
ducted in meetings between the belligerent Kurdish parties that were arranged in 
various European capitals (Natali 2005 p. 164). Since the overthrow of President 
Saddam Hussein in 2003, Kurdish autonomy has continued and is now recognized 
in the Permanent Iraqi Constitution from 2005, the Kurdish region being seen as a 
distinct region in the federal state of Iraq (Olson 2010; Romano 2010). Relations 
between the two dominant parties have also normalised and improved. Nowadays, 
the following quotation by the Premier Minister Massoud Barzanî is, for example, 
to be found on the homepage of the KRG: "To ensure the defence of an autono-
mous Kurdistan, cooperation between the KDP-Iraq and the PUK is essential" 
(www.krg.org 2012-09-27).  
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Several rebuilding projects have been carried out since 1992 in areas that were 
partly destroyed by the Iraqi regime during the Anfal period17 in the 1980s and 
1990s, a number of laws having been passed to facilitate foreign investments, tour-
ism and the sale of natural resources in the Kurdistan region.  
The creation of the KRG did not attract much attention on the part of either 
the public or the governments involved either in the US or in Europe. However it 
did attract numerous civil society organisations, NGOs and donor agencies that 
later became active in the area. The Kurdish diasporic community has been in-
volved in the process of reconstruction in this area and in long-distance national-
ism in the region (Emanuelsson 2005; Khayati 2008; Natali 2005 pp. 163ff.). Di-
asporic Kurds have been playing the role of intermediaries between KRG repre-
sentatives, on the one hand, and politicans and governments in Western European 
countries, on the other. Many diasporic organisations have established close con-
tacts with the KRG and are involved in reconstruction projects, providing financial 
support, material sources, skills and ideologies and are involved in many cases in 
supporting their families in Kurdistan (Emanuelsson 2008 pp. 43ff.). 
Diasporic Kurds have actively sponsored activities in the areas of business, 
culture, education and human rights. Many Kurds returned to the region for sev-
eral reasons: to meet with friends and family, to participate in politics or in the 
reconstruction of the country, and in some cases to conduct business. A number of 
European Kurds have been elected to the parliament. Some Kurds returned on a 
permanent basis, whereas others chose to circulate between Kurdistan and Europe 
(ibid.). The process of building a democratic society in the Kurdistan region and 
aspirations regarding this have not been without problems, however, carrying out 
what has been needed having proved to be a long-term and difficult enterprise. At 
the same time, there has been considerable criticism directed at the KRG-
administration.  
The two dominant political parties have been critized by diasporic Kurds for 
their failure to create a democratic structure and civil society in the region (Kha-
yati 2008 p. 104). The situation for women is difficult, there having been various 
reported cases of "honor killings" and of "self-immolation" (ibid p. 104). Reports 
tell of corruption, social inequalities and human rights abuses. On the other hand, 
as Emanuelsson (2008) has put it: "Another big problem among the sceptics is that 
their expectations with regard to the Kurdistan Region are too high" (ibid. p. 46).  
                                                     
17 The Anfal campaign was conducted during the period between 1986 and 1989 in the Kurdistan 
region by the Iraqi regime, one that took on genocidal proportions and culminated in the gas at-
tack against the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988 in which 5,000 people were killed.  
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Developments in the Kurdistan region of Iraq have at least two major implications, 
I would argue, for the political generation the study deals with primarily. They 
have contributed to a changing geopolitical situation in the region, one that chal-
lenges Turkey. For Turkey the question of Kurdistan and of any prospects of inde-
pendence for the Kurds have been sensitive topics ever since the early years of the 
Republic. This is reflected in particular in Turkish policies towards its own popu-
lation. From a Turkish perspective, the Kurdish question has essentially been con-
sidered "a security matter", especially since Kurdish guerillas have operated from 
Iraqi territories. The prospects of an independent Kurdish entity in Northern Iraq 
has caused fears in Turkey that requests for, and measures aimed at political inde-
pendence will spill over to Turkey (Olson 2005; Romano 2010). In recent decades, 
formal relations between the Turkish regime and the KRG administration have 
been established. Turkey opened an Honorary Consulate in Erbil in 2010 and has 
become a main trading partner for the Kurdistan region in Northern Iraq 
(www.krg.org 2012-09-13). From a long-term perspective, this may have an im-
pact on its policies toward its own Kurdish population. 
Furthermore, developments in the Kurdish region in Iraq have countributed 
to an increase in the transnational space in which the two potentially opposing 
parties are acting. The Kurds in Turkey have never benefitted in the same way 
from transnational recognition and possibilities as the Iraqi Kurds have, even if 
conditions in Turkey have changed in recent years. Several highly active persons 
belonging to the political generation of major interest here have visited the region 
and been involved in developmental projects and transnational activities in the 
region. Some of those interviewed have referred to the region as "Kurdistan", 
which I understood as referring to "the existing Kurdish country".  
1.5 Previous Research 
For a very long time, research on Kurds was scarce, its only constituting a very 
marginal area, one in which only few scholarly works were produced. This has 
changed considerably in recent decades. Nowadays, a myriad of aspects of the 
Kurdish issue have engaged scientists from a variety of disciplines, resulting in an 
increased number of academic studies and books in the area. However, in Kurdis-
tan proper, research on Kurds is still scarce. Despite all the efforts that have been 
made in Turkey to live up to EU standards, publishing articles or books on Kurd-
ish issues remains a perilous enterprise in Turkey. The only part of Kurdistan in 
which the government so far have been positive toward research on Kurdish issues 
is in Iraqi Kurdistan.  
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1.5.1 Research on Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey 
A historical-sociological perspective is necessary in order to understand the emer-
gence of the political generation in Turkey. So as to provide a historical and socio-
political framework, the study draws on the rich body of scholarly literature avail-
able on the development of a Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey. This litera-
ture has been essential in illuminating the context in which the political generation 
emerged and was first organised. For a long time, most of the research regarding 
Kurds concentrated on the emergence of Kurdish nationalist movements. The 
Dutch anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen, who conducted long periods of 
fieldwork in all parts of Kurdistan in the 1970s, broke new ground with his mono-
graph Agha, Shaikh and State:On the social and political organisation of Kurdis-
tan from 1978. At the outset of his research, van Bruinessen was concerned with 
the reactionary features and strains in the tribalism he could discern in the Kurdish 
movement there and that he regarded as being different from other rebellious 
movements. Van Bruinessen points out that the social organisation of Kurdish 
society, dominated politically by feudal, tribal and religious leaders, is closely 
linked with and created by the political processes and structures in the states host-
ing large Kurdish populations. This argument is further illustrated in his analysis 
of the Sheikh Said rebellion18 (van Bruinessen 1992 p. 317). 
Another pioneering work on the early phases of Kurdish nationalism is Rob-
ert Olson’s The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism in the Shaikh Said rebellion 
from 1989, devoted primarily to the Sheikh Said rebellion. Olson’s' study also 
highlights geopolitical and geostrategic facets of the Kurdish question and the role 
played by the Great Britain in the political game in Kurdistan at the time. 
Due to the tough position that Turkish authorities take against all expressions 
of Kurdish of identity and against attempts to discuss the Kurdish question in pub-
lic, it has been extremely difficult to conduct research on Kurds in Turkey. Only 
very few academic works on the Kurds have been written by domestic researchers. 
Changes in this regard have been occurring in recent years, however. The first and 
for a long time the only researcher who wrote about the Kurds in Turkey is the 
sociologist Ismael Beşiçki. Because of his commitment to the Kurdish question,  
had to spend several years in prison, being given prison penalties of a length that 
took on absurd dimensions. In the work Kurdistan: An Interstate Colony, he ar-
gues that Kurdistan is an interstate colony partitioned between the state powers of 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. In that work he criticises the Turkish State ideology 
                                                     
18 The Sheik Said rebellion, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4, took place in Turkey in 
1925. It is generally considered as a watershed in the Turkish State formation process as regards 
Kurdish-Turkish relations. 
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and urges Turkish intellectuals to take their stand on the Kurdish question. In re-
cent decades however, many scholars in Turkey, including Yeğen (2011), Kirisçi 
(2010) and Cizre Sakallıoğllu (1996, 1998), have published works on the Kurdish 
question.  
Conclusions similar to those of  are arrived at in Majeed Jafar´s dissertation 
in 1976 Under-underdevelopment:A Regional Case Study of the Kurdish Area of 
Turkey. The study deals with socio-economic developments in Kurdistan in Tur-
key from the 1920s up to including the 1960s. The author found that a process of 
increasing inequality in terms of social welfare, income, investments and the likes 
between the Kurdish areas in the Southeast and the Western parts of Turkey took 
place during these years. Jafar found it to not only be the case that Kurdistan has 
remained an underdeveloped part of the country but that it has become more un-
derdeveloped since establishment of the modern Turkish Republic.  
The emergence of a modern Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey, its de-
feat following the military coup of 1980, and the ensuing revival of the PKK have 
been thoroughly analysed by Michael Gunter in The Kurds in Turkey:A Political 
Dilemma, from 1990. Gunter analyses the situation of the Kurds in Turkey in 
terms of "relative deprivation", suggesting that the conditions Kurds were living 
under in Turkey finally paved the way for the emergence of a militant Kurdish 
nationalism that was promoted by the PKK.  
The anthology The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey:Obstacles and Chances for 
Peace and Democracy from 2000, edited by Ferhad Ibrahim and Gülistan Gürbey, 
provides a number of analyses concerning the implementation of political violence 
in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey as well as prospects for a peaceful and democ-
ratic solution. The volume Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism from 
2003 and edited by Abbas Vali concerns the historiography and the epistemology 
of Kurdish history writing. Of importance for the present study is an essay by 
Hamit Bozarslan discussing Kurdish history writing in a Turkish context. 
The anthology The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s:Its Impact on 
Turkey and the Middle East (1996) edited by Robert Olson discusses further the 
development of Kurdish nationalist movements and the role they play in Turkish 
politics and in the Middle East generally, together with what new dilemmas and 
options they may offer. Of relevance for this study are the contributions by Gülis-
tan Gürbey, Michael Gunter and Hamit Bozarslan in which the emergence of a 
Kurdish movement, together with its possibilities and consequences, are illumi-
nated from different angles. 
In a study entitled Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers:The Kurd-
ish National Movement in Turkey from 2000, Paul White examines the Kurdish 
political leadership, in particular developments within the PKK. White concludes 
that the Kurdish leadership of today has changed considerably since the early 20th 
century, its having changed from being dominated by members of the traditional 
Kurdish agha and sheikh families, the primordial affinities this included and the 
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role that personal interests played standing in the way of the implementation of 
nationalist aims and goals, to this having largely been replaced today by a modern 
political leadership that gives priority to nationalist aims and purposes, his refer-
ring to those bringing it about as, "revolutionary modernisers". 
In her work Activist in Office from 2010, Nicole Watts has scrutinized the 
pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey and their interactions with the legal frame-
work of Turkish politics. Watts employs the institutionalisation movement as a 
key concept, showing that in semi-democratic or authoritarian political systems 
institutionalisation can result in more aggressive marginalisation and does not 
necessarily prevent prosecution or further marginalisation of the movement. She 
considers that due to the semi-democratic political structure in Turkey today, ef-
forts to institutionalise pro-Kurdish parties, have produced conflicts and at the 
same time a greater unity between moderates and radicals within the movement 
(see Watts 2010a; Watts 2010b).  
Watts asserts that the political space in Turkey makes it difficult for pro-
Kurdish parties to operate there for two main reasons. First, state institutions carry 
out coercive measures against legal pro-Kurdish parties (Watts 2010a p. 121). 
Secondly, the PKK did not recognize the development of a new party organisation 
(ibid. 176). Thus, Watts argues, the legal pro-Kurdish parties have been obstructed 
from developing a moderate alternative in Turkey. Hence, Watts contributes with a 
fresh explanation to the emerging radicalisation of pro-Kurdish activism in that 
country.  
Vera Eccarius-Kelly’s book The Militant Kurds: A Dual Strategy to Freedom 
from 2010, is devoted to the political organising of Kurds in Turkey, particularly 
that involving the rise of the PKK, as well as the international dimensions of the 
Kurdish question. Like Watts, she concentrates on developments in Turkey in  
recent decades, her analysis also including matters of the Kurdish transnational 
web, its political organisation, and the reactions and responses of Kurds in Europe. 
The works of both authors have contributed to my understanding of the radicalisa-
tion of Kurdish politics, of the complex factors behind it and how the current 
Kurdish movements have developed. 
1.5.2 Research on Diasporic Kurds 
As the numbers of Kurdish refugees residing in diasporic settings outside the Mid-
dle East has increased, research on transnationalism and diaspora among the Kurds 
has increased considerably as well. In his research van Bruinessen (1998, 2000) 
has noticed that national sentiments and the awareness of national identities have 
become particularly important in exile settings. This is probably particularly sig-
nificant of the Kurds from Turkey, who for the first time "dare to emphasise" their 
Kurdish identities openly. Van Bruinessen shows how Kurdish diasporic networks 
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are constructed and examines them in a context of global politics generally. He 
discusses the capture of the PKK-leader Abdullah Öcalan as pointing to the extent 
to which Kurdish nationalism had developed into a transnational phenomenon. 
Within just a few hours, the PKK activists had mobilised, protest actions regarding 
the kidnapping being organised at strategic sites all over Europe.  
In addition, the treatment of the PKK-leader shown again and again in TV-
programmes caused a general upsurge of national sentiments, also among the 
Kurds, who did not at all support the PKK. Such non-territorial Kurdish networks, 
as van Bruinessen calls them, contributed to the re-emergence of Kurdish actors on 
the international political arena after decades of the attempted integration of Kurds 
into the nations of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq. This was in many respects a new 
phenomenon, since while reorganising in the diaspora the Kurds also created new 
political structures and social networks (van Bruinessen 1998, 2000). 
In comparative studies of the mobilisation and organising that ocurred among 
Turkish-born immigrants in Germany, both of Kurdish and of Turkish origin, 
Østergaard-Nielsen (2001b) noted homeland politics to have found its way from 
demonstrations and solidarity actions in the streets into more formal actions and 
institutional bodies in the settlement countries. At the same time she points out the 
responsibility that the governments of the receiving countries should take to pre-
vent immigrant organisation from being marginalised. In addition Østergaard-
Nielsen demonstrates how organisations working on foreign soil tend to adapt 
their political agendas and repertoire of action to the political standards and values 
prevailing in the host countries as well as to the global political arena. She states: 
 
In my own research, patterns of dialogue between Kurdish and Turkish political or-
ganisations and German or Dutch political actors illustrate how transnational politi-
cal networks change their formulation of political agendas in order to comply with 
more internationally accepted discourses of human rights.  
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2001b p. 17).  
 
She notes a shift in the activities, strategies and goals of Kurdish organisations in 
Germany, for example from having been revolutionaries and radical left-wing 
politicians in the early 1980s, to their emphasis on human rights issues and on 
political dialogue in the 1990s. A similar shift in political strategies and goals in 
the Kurdish Diaspora has been noted by Sheikhmous (2002) and Emanuelsson 
(2005). 
A study entitled Kurdish Diaspora’s:a comparative study of Kurdish refugee 
communities by the sociologist Östen Wahlbeck (1999) is devoted to the situation 
of exiled Kurds in Finland and in Great Britain. Wahlbeck demonstrates how not 
only the idea of the lost homeland, but also the socio-political environment in the 
receiving countries contributes to a strong orientation to the homeland often being 
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found among the Kurdish refugees. Simultaneously however they orient towards 
new arenas in settlement countries and transnational spaces.  
Similar results are presented in Alinia (2004). In her dissertation Spaces of 
Diasporas:Kurdish identities, experiences of otherness and politics of belonging 
she demonstrates how the diasporic Kurds in Sweden shape their "Kurdishness" to 
be clearly opposed to the dominant national identities of the regimes in their home 
countries, and also in relation to their experiences within Swedish society, these 
involving on the one hand their possibilities of organising that democracy pro-
vides, and on the other hand their experiences of being confronted with everyday 
racism and exclusion. Although there is no strong movement to return in the Kurd-
ish diaspora, perceptions of "home" and of "homeland" are important for the Kurd-
ishness constructed in the diaspora. From her interviews with Kurds residing in the 
diaspora, Minoo Alinia concludes that their conceptions of "home" not necessarily 
linked to a specific territory. For the Kurds that she interviewed, "home" was lo-
cated in the diaspora: 
 
The centrality of homeland for diasporas is related to the forced migration and con-
ditions of exile and exclusion. It is a response to feelings of displacement, to expe-
riences of otherness and subordination, and to a need of identification and belong-
ing rather than an effect of any essential bond between people and territories.  
(Ibid. p. 320) 
 
Alinia points out that "their transnational networks and communities, social rela-
tions and activities regarding the politics of location have in this process become 
their 'home' " (ibid. p. 330), since diasporic Kurds are acting within various spaces, 
these ranging from their home countries, to their host countries and to transna-
tional spaces. She also underscores the complexities in terms of the social spatial 
composition of the Kurdish diaspora as regards such matters as class, gender, so-
cial education. 
In a dissertation entitled Global Diaspora Politics:Kurdish transnational net-
works and accommodation of nationalism that Emanuelsson (2005) wrote in Swe-
den, the global policies and the formation of transnational networks among Kurds 
were analysed. The study concerned eight Kurdish organisations, located in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Sweden and the United States.  
In the dissertation it is concluded that the Kurdish organisations working in 
the Diaspora since the 1990s have strengthened their transnational networks, par-
ticularly through accommodating their policies to the climate of opinion, existing 
at the times in the early 1980s their having been concerned in particular with the 
question of Kurdish independence, thereafter there being a shift in goals and in 
values, their since the 1990s being increasingly concerned with questions of hu-
man rights and cultural and political pluralism. Since Kurdish activists and organi-
sations are actively concerned with political developments in their new home 
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countries, in due course many of them commit themselves just as much to the po-
litical values and agendas in their new home countries as to those in their countries 
of origin. 
The role of the diaspora is discussed by Uçarlar (2009), who in a dissertation 
entitled Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic 
Rights in Turkey, investigates the struggle for Kurdish linguistic rights in Turkey. 
She shows that intellectuals in Europe, in their endeavouring to transfer cultural 
and linguistic "accumulation" from the diasporic settings to Turkey provides, "a 
basis on which a new generation of Kurdish intellectuals in Turkey can engender a 
kind of transformative resistance" (p. 276). Her work has been important in pro-
viding insights into the responses to diasporic activism among Kurds in Turkey.  
In a thesis entitled From Victim Diaspora to Transborder Citizenship?: Di-
aspora formation and transnational relations among Kurds in France and Sweden 
from 2008, Khalid Khayati challenges what he labels the traditional victim dis-
course among diasporan Kurds. In comparing various action modes that diasporan 
Kurds have adopted in France and in Sweden, respectively, Khayati maintains that 
Kurds residing in Sweden have adopted a more flexible diasporic discourse and 
generally are more integrated in their host society, which in turn appears to have 
had an impact on how they view themselves as migrants and on their participation 
in society and political life in the host country. The author found that in Sweden 
the Kurds are more socially diversified, there being a group of elite individuals 
there who successfully manage various transnational and institutional arrange-
ments.  
In his dissertation A Stranger in my homeland: the politics of belonging 
among young people with Kurdish background in Sweden Barzoo Eliassi (2010) 
draws attention, however, to the fact that life in Swedish society can be problem-
atic. He finds that young people of Kurdish origin in Sweden experience discrimi-
nation and stigmatisation to a considerable degree in many areas of society, such 
as in the labour market, in mass media, in the legal system and in the areas of 
housing and education. In his interviews with 28 young people of Kurdish origin 
residing in Sweden, a wide range of responses to the ethnic discrimination that 
they experienced was accounted for, such as the heightening of differences be-
tween "us" and "them", the occurence of name changes, violence, silence and 
strategies to coping with the racism and marginalisation that they as young immi-
grants were confronted with. 
Concerning research on Kurds in diasporic settings, somewhat differing re-
sults have been reported. Whereas one group of researchers note in particular that 
national identities grow stronger in exile (Alinia 2004 p. 331; van Bruinessen 
1998, 2000), others challenges this view noting that in the diaspora Kurdish na-
tionalism accommodates to "universal" values, assigning greater importance to the 
active role that Kurdish refugees come to play in the host society in which they are 
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residing (Emanuelsson 2005; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001a, 2003; Sheikhmous 2002; 
Wahlbeck 1999).  
1.5.3 Significance of the Study 
Previous research on diaspora has been extremely valuable to the present study. 
Many of the works presented in the section above have contributed in terms of 
insights into the development of a transnational network and diasporic organising 
among the Kurds. In addition the present study has benefitted from critical theo-
retical insights on diasporisation and what diaspora mean to people. Alinia, 
Emanuelsson and Khayati have demonstrated that a diasporic condition not neces-
sarily implies a state of constant "suffering" and "in-betweenness". Alinia and 
Eliassi in particular have problematised how home and homeland is perceived 
among diasporic Kurds. The result of their research shows that the authentication 
of home is a relational and social process. Home is about belonging rather than 
longing. 
This thesis, however, takes an approach somewhat different from the various 
studies concerned with the Kurdish diaspora referred to above.  
First, since it together with diaspora and nationality draw on the theoretical 
concept of sociological generations developed essentially by Karl Mannheim.19 
Sociological generations as a analytical tool explain how people sharing a com-
mon historical location come together in their formative years, are conditioned by 
and responding to the social and historic processes of their time as well as the spa-
tial context in which their repertoire of action is developed.  
Secondly, the methodological point of departure taken in this study is a narra-
tive one which I in my view can contribute to a more adequate understanding of 
the complexities of diasporic identities and politics. 
Third, the present study contrasts with the studies of Kurdish diasporas re-
ferred to above in that it concerns a clearly delimited group of Kurds and places 
their nationalism in a historical perspective that takes account of the "exit" and 
"voice" aspects of their migration that Østergaard-Nielsen (2003 p. 27) refers to. 
Eliassi has an emphasis different from mine. His being primarily concerned 
with younger individuals and people who are generally labelled as being a "second 
generation of immigrants". In addition his theoretical approach is different, his 
work being based on post-colonial theory, belonging and identity formation. 
                                                     
19 Mannheim (1952); Eyerman and Turner (1999); Edmunds and Turner (2002); Schatz (1989); 
Heberle (1951). 
  
39 
Wahlbeck, Østergaard-Nielsen and Emanuelsson, who differ in the analytical lev-
els they adopt, focus on the political practices and strategies of Kurdish diaspora 
organisations. Emanuelsson being concerned in particular with global diaspora 
networks extending between three different continents. Alinia and Khayati deal 
with, or deal partly with, diasporic Kurds in Sweden.  
Khayati has a comparative perspective his examining the tendency of exiles 
to become transnational citizens that is conditioned differently in different political 
and institutional frameworks. Alinia takes a different approach where she, analys-
ing as I do the narratives of Kurdish actors residing in Sweden, a difference be-
tween us however being that she has conducted interviews with Kurds from all 
four parts of Kurdistan. Thus, Alinias' study highlights the intra-Kurdish dynamics 
that in fact are a very important aspect of our understanding of Kurdish national-
ism and identity politics among diasporic Kurds. This is a similiarity of the present 
study. A difference, however, is that the present study deals with the narratives of 
diasporic Kurds, not only all residing in the same country, Sweden, but also hav-
ing emigrated there from the same country, Turkey.  
Thus the members of the group investigated in this study can be expected to 
have had similar experiences regarding the political structures and institutions and 
politics in the country of origin as well as similar experiences of the immigrant 
politics and the mechanisms of exclusion in the country of settlement. This makes 
it possible to study better in depth, and in a more detailed and concrete way how 
the Kurds tend to relate not only to the country of settlement but also to the coun-
try of origin and its politics, and sometimes as well to changing politics regarding 
the diaspora.  
Thus the study concerns specificially the emergence of a Kurdish diaspora as 
seen in relation to Turkish politics towards the Kurds, both domestically and in the 
diaspora. Considering only one rather specific group makes it possible to analyse 
both changes over an extended period of time and differences between various 
internal actors in a short term perspective, thus to obtain insights into internal divi-
sions and contrasting perspectives of the individual actors in their perceptions of 
Kurdish identities and long distance nationalism. The analytical perspective of 
differing generations in a sociological sense can help to deepen the understanding 
of the complexity, the contentions and the dynamics of diasporas, as well as of 
these persons political strategies and relations with the original home country and 
the country of settlement. The theoretical perspective of sociological generations 
can also contribute to an understanding of how time and place are intertwined in 
diasporic identities and actions. 
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1.6 Methodology: A Narrative Approach 
I find narrative analysis to for many reasons be a useful approach to in analysing 
the accounts of a given political generation here. First, a narrative is exploratory, 
its enabling the interviewees to express themselves very clearly and to associate 
freely. Thus, it provides insights into and explores the meaning that people are 
giving to their perceived belongings, nationalities, diasporic identities and so forth. 
Secondly, a narrative is sequential and explanatory, which means that it provides 
comprehensive stories about how people perceive certain phenomena. Therefore 
this approach seem suitable to the present research concerning people's percep-
tions of their national identities and of their pro-Kurdish activism. 
The term narrative is one that has been widely used in recent decades, the 
many applications in which it can be used making it difficult to arrive upon a clear 
definition of it. However there are obviously certain fundamental criteria for defin-
ing what a narrative is, since otherwise the concept itself would be wishy washy 
and of no use. In the sections that follow I will discuss use of the narrative as a 
methodology and its point of departure in the theory of science, will endeavour to 
point out both its limits and its potentialities, and will finally explain how a narra-
tive approach is employed in the thesis. 
1.6.1 The Discursive Field and "The Linguistic Turn" 
A narrative is created linguistically, and takes form in the interaction between the 
narrator and her or his authentic or imagined audience. This is complicated since 
language is not a neutral medium of expression. Rather it reflects the social con-
text, time and space in which the narrative is produced. 
Methodologically, the narrative approach emanates from what Winther and 
Jørgensen (2000 pp. 8ff.) has labelled as "the field of discourse analysis". Both 
these concepts have their origin in the philosophy of language and have in the 
course of time been influenced by a number of theoretical and methodological 
currents, such as linguistics, semiotics and psychoanalysis (Hall 1999; Silverman 
2001 p. 177; Westlind 1996 pp. 114-125).  
Michel Foucault (1993) operated with the term "discursive formations", with 
which he implied that discourses constitute "a group of statements providing a 
language for talking about - i.e. a way of representing - a particular kind of knowl-
edge about a topic" (Hall 1992 p. 292). Foucault rejects the idea of economic de-
terminism his instead emphasising the forms of power involved having changed in 
the course of history (Foucault 1976 pp. 28ff.). He underscores how practice, 
power and discourses are intrinsically bound together. When discourses are em-
ployed within a particular area, such as medical science or psychiatry, then in ef-
fect truths are created through the discourses that develop within these fields. This 
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in turn entails power relations being established and maintained through dis-
courses. The various discursive orders in Foucault's sense emerge in the form of 
practices that serve to regulate and determine not only what is expressed, but also 
when and by whom. Power in modern society, he asserts, emerges increasingly in 
what he characterises as a "capillary form", its neither being exercised from above, 
nor being fixed to a given source, but rather existing everywhere, throughout in 
society. Hence, power increasingly takes on the form of control of the subject and 
appears as a "disciplinary" function or in the form of individual "self-discipline" 
(Foucault 1976).  
Foucault concludes that there is no knowledge of any sort, scientific or oth-
erwise, that exists outside of discourses. Hence, Foucault rejects the importance of 
distinguishing between false and true knowledge. Rather, in his view, the implica-
tions of discourses are political, its being the historical effects of the "truth" pro-
duced in discourse that is of relevance. Foucault also objects to the idea of a "false 
consciousness", which means that he questions whether a concealed meaning at all 
can be revealed by discourses. Rather, in his view, meaning is revealed in the dis-
course itself (Foucault 1993 pp. 7ff.).  
Linguists and researchers engaged in conversation analysis commonly work 
with short texts, and sometimes also with fictive examples, in endeavouring to 
reveal what is concealed in language. Within the social sciences in contrast, dis-
courses are commonly analysed in a much broader perspective, are contextualised 
and cover much longer periods of time, as well as much larger bodies of text 
(Boréus and Bergström 2005; Jacobsson 1997). Hence, the mood of thinking be-
hind is that the social context constitutes the language at the same time as the lan-
guage constructs "the social". Within discourse analysis, various patterns are dis-
tinguished in what is expressed by language and by symbols, whether spoken, 
written or otherwise. The idea is to analyse how concepts are related and how to 
discern comprehensive patterns of thought and meaning.   
Within a post-structural framework in which both discursive and narrative 
analysis can be positioned, there are many common strands between the two. First, 
both of them imply a break with the idea of a "Grand Theory", their thus rejecting 
any overall and comprehensive theoretical modes of explanation. Instead local 
histories, experiences and accounts are emphasised. An important ingredient in the 
post-structural project is thus the attempt to give voice to what is repressed and 
kept silent, to construct opposing accounts that go against the dominant ones. Sec-
ondly, a primary concern is that of subject formation, the role of the subject in 
structure being emphasized. This leads us then third, to a matter more relevant to 
the present work, namely the central role that identities play in a post-structuralist 
framework. 
Foucault described subject formation in terms of practice instead of essence. 
His ideas later paved the way for an anti-essentialist view of identities. The post-
structuralist framework is embodied in the very use of the term discourse instead 
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of ideology, which in effect is an objection to the idea that identities are stable and 
unitary. In turn these ideas serve to question what has been considered a dominant 
"Western" and "ethno-centric" stance. Within a post-structuralist framework, the 
anti-essentialist view of the identity concept has been elaborated upon further, for 
example in the theorising of political identities by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe who draw on the hegemony concept developed by Antonio Gramsci, 
which laid the ground for a rethinking of the Marxist ideology concept. According 
to Laclau and Mouffe, the very existence of identities presupposes a “constitutive 
outside” ( Mouffe 1992; Mouffe and Lacalu 1985).  
1.6.2 The Narrative 
Let us return now to the question of what a narrative is. Narratives are produced 
within the field of discourse or within separate discourses, their being distinct and 
representing an approach in their own right. The term narrative is derived from 
narrõ, meaning "to account", or to narrate and the sanscrit term gnã which means 
"to know" (Collins English Dictionary 2000 pp. 1033 - 1034; Johansson 2002 p. 
41).  
In literature on methodolgy it is sometimes pointed out that narratives only 
rather recently were recognized as a valuable methodological positioning tool 
(Somers 1994). Narratives are often criticised for not being exact reproductions of 
what has taken place. The story of a certain event is never told in exactly the same 
way more than one time. As a result the relevance of narratives is often challenged 
with reference to their alleged lack of objectivity (Riessman 1993). Accordingly 
the claims of knowledge that can be made using a narrative approach are different 
from, and are not general in the same way as those made on the basis of a discur-
sive analysis, or methods attempting to reach exacting, objective truth about the 
conditions of the world. The nature and character of a narrative is useful, however 
through its contributing to our understanding of people's differing conceptions of 
the world and of the social conditions under which they are living. In this sense a 
narrative provides a view from the inside of various social contexts.  
Hence, a narrative is not only about storytelling but it refers in addition to 
knowledge. This has been noted by Labov and Waletzky (1997),20 two of the first 
who employed linguistic methods in analysing interviews, their defining a narra-
tive as "a particular way of reporting past events, in which the order of a sequence 
of independent clauses is interpreted as the order of the events referred to" (Labov 
                                                     
20 First printed in 1967 and then reprinted with comments in 1997. 
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2003 p.1). Thus, a narrative is not just "another story". Rather a narrative implies a 
structuring of time and place, although it can be organised in many different ways. 
A narrative analysis takes its point of departure in accounts people provide 
about their lifes, although the interest of the researcher is not limited to the content 
of what is presented by the narrator. Kohler Riessman writes: "Narrative analysis 
takes as its object of investigation the story itself" (Riessman 1993 p. 1). Hence, 
"the story itself" represents more than the content itself and is clearly broader than 
that. A narrative analysis can consider how "the story" is performed, or may in-
stead concentrate on its shape and structure, for example. To work properly, a 
narrative needs a beginning, a plot, and an ending. According to Labov, a "fully 
formed" narrative possesses six main properties: "beginning with an abstract, ori-
entation, an evaluation section embedded in complicating action, a resolution and 
a coda" (as quoted by Wästerfors 2003 p. 24). 
A narrative is sequential. It generally begins with a very brief summary 
which gives the listener a hint of what the story is all about. This is followed by an 
orientation in which the participants, as well as the time and the place in which the 
narrative takes place, are introduced and described, and in which such questions as 
those of who? when? where? what where they doing? are answered. The story 
teller then account for the course of events. There follows then an "evaluation 
clause" in which the story is evaluated and its main point is underscored. Finally, 
the narrative is rounded off with the help of a coda. In case the evaluation is an 
external one the storyteller turns to the audience. The evaluation may also be in-
tern (Labov 2003; Johansson 2005 p. 192). 
The definition and the properties of a narrative that are suggested by Labov 
are helpful in deepening our understanding of how a narrative can be organised in 
terms of clauses and sections. Two criticisms that have been raised against Labov, 
however, are that he does not consider the interaction between the storyteller and 
the audience, and that he does not pay attention at all to how narratives are per-
formed (Johansson 2005 pp. 203ff., 292).  
Narrative approaches are employed in a myriad of ways. One that I have 
found useful and inspiring is to emphasize the dramaturgy of the narrative, in par-
ticular since this is an approach that generates analytical perspectives. Indeed, the 
narrative of a generation of political refugees from Turkey can be understood as a 
drama of our time. Two theoreticians have served as major sources of inspiration 
regarding this, namely Erving Goffman and Kenneth Burke.  
Although Erving Goffman never made use of the narrative concept, his work 
has been pivotal to the development of dramaturgical perspectives in narrative 
approaches. He concerned himself with the ways in which people identify and 
present their selves. According to his dramatic perspective, the storyteller appears 
on a stage attempting to perform herself or himself as an acceptable participant in 
social life. On the basis of participant observations of dispriveleged people that he 
has made he distinguishes between different moral careers and different types of 
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stories that people tell and which mediates their self-concept. First, there is the 
success story which presents the picture of an individual guided by a positive per-
sonality who is looking forward to a successful future. Secondly, there is the tragic 
story of a defensive personality leading a life full of tristess and adversities. 
Goffman referred to these as "fictions" since they are "more solid than pure phan-
tasy" but "thinner than facts" (Goffman 1973 p. 112). I consider Goffmans' per-
spective to be somewhat instrumental and one-sided, since in reality people often 
move between different roles and positions throughout their lives. Nevertheless I 
found his dramaturgical perspective inspiring for the analyse I have carried out. 
In his work A Grammar of Motives the literature historian Kenneth Burke 
(1962) developed dramatism as a method for critically analysing language, one 
that proved to be useful in the interpretation of narratives and interviews. His point 
of departure is that in narrating stories people employ a set of grammatical re-
sources that can be described in terms of the following pentad: 1) The Act - an-
swering the questions of "What actions? What is going on?" 2) The Scene - an-
swering the questions of "Where is the act happening? What is the background?" 
3) The Agent - answering the questions of "Who is involved in the action? What is 
their role?" 4) The Agency-  answering the questions of "How do the agents act? 
By what means?" 5) The Purpose- answering the questions of "Why do the agents 
act?" (Burke 1962 p. 127; see also Cronqvist 2004 p. 49 ; Riessman 1993 p. 19; 
Wästerfors 2003). By posing these questions regarding a narrative, understanding 
each of them and how they work together, Burke suggests that one can reveal how 
a narrator convinces her audience, her motives and her worldview. The analytical 
approach provided by Burke is more comprehensive than that of Goffman, taking 
the complexity of human agency into consideration. Hence, his approach is a use-
ful complement to Goffmans' dramaturgy. 
1.6.3 The Political Counter Narrative 
Narrative research is employed increasingly for understanding not only peoples' 
personal lives, but also broader social and political phenomena. The thesis con-
cerns men and women who came to participate actively in the political processes 
of their time. The narratives collected and analysed are personal stories concerning 
in particular their political lives and views, or the parts of their lives that became 
politicised. Inspired by Molly Andrews (2007), I have employed the term "politi-
cal" in the sense of small "p" politics, referring to it since I am interested in rela-
tions between peoples lives and the social and political frameworks in which they 
are active. By political I mean activities through which people articulate, negotiate 
and amend the general conditions under which they live. As Andrews points out, it 
is important to find out "how people view the struggles in which they have partici-
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pated", and also to see "how they locate themselves in a wider political process" 
(ibid. p. 2) . 
Thus narratives are produced in broad perspectives, within and responding to 
the political grand narratives or discourses of their time. The perspectives on po-
litical identities formulated by Mouffe and Laclau have been applied to a Turkish 
context by Betül Çelik (2000), who analyses the changing Turkish nation building 
project in his study of the articulations of the "hegemonic" Kemalist state ideol-
ogy. 
Betül Çelik demonstrates how the space for accounts that oppose the domi-
nant state ideology has expanded in recent decades, a development that has been 
contemporaneous with the Turkish accommodation to a market economy and the 
attempts to advance politically in the direction of Western Europe, this setting the 
stage for the opposing stories that have been accounted within recent decades. For 
example the accounts of the Kurds, the Armenians and the Islamists are different 
from, and opposed to, the changing Kemalist ideology. One of the points of depar-
ture taken in this study is that Kurdish national identities are closely linked to the 
state formations in their home countries in the Middle East. Hence, it could seem 
reasonable to assume that the Kurds from Turkey construct their national identities 
exclusively in opposition to the Turkish nation building project.  
I see there being a risk here, however, of presenting too simplistic a view if 
only one "hegemonic outside" is defined. Rather, there can be seen to be a number 
of external and internal elements that interact in this process. 
The aim of bringing narrative analysis into this study can be seen as justified 
by the intention of providing a synchronous dimension, enabling one to analyse 
the different positions and contrasting views that Kurdish actors take toward mat-
ters of Kurdish identity politics and diasporic experiences, so as to distinguish the 
various issues that bind Kurds together, as well as their leading to controversies 
and challenging Kurdish national identities. The intention then is to reveal pat-
terns, contrasts and ruptures in the formation of Kurdish identities in diasporic 
settings, particularly in regard to how these are related to articulations of the self, 
the other, the country of origin and the country of exile. 
The first matter of worth one might consider is the standpoint that political 
identities must necessarily be treated as anti-essential. This is a point of departure 
for my thinking regarding national identities too. In theoretical debates on nation-
alism there are two extremes, the one being the instrumentalists/constructivist 
position (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983) which asserts that national identities are 
social constructions, the other extreme being the position of the primordialists, 
their essential view based on the idea that nations are built upon origins and kin-
ship relations people have in common (see, for example, Shils 1957). In modern 
theorising however, a vast majority of scholars reject the view that nations are 
based upon ties of kinship, even if such ideas often appear within ideologies of 
nationalism.  
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A second consideration of dimension of significance for the study at hand is the 
assumption made by Mouffe and Laclau (1985) that identities exist in relation to 
the "constitutive outside", a view that fits well with a discourse analysis of nation-
alism and national identities. As will be discussed in more detail in later chapters, 
a fundamental principle within all nationalist ideologies is the claim that a distinc-
tion should be made between "us" and "them". The existence of nations presup-
poses there being boundaries that encompass the people who belong to the nation 
and thus exclude others. I am convinced that national identities are essentially 
imagined and are based on the somewhat misleading idea that the borders and 
boundaries that divide people from one another are ultimately socially constructed. 
Still I consider their connection to the social context and the specific historical 
circumstances in which they took shape, to be important to consider, since it in-
deed means that national identities unlikely simply came "just out of the blue". At 
a first glance symbolic dimensions have often been found to be of great impor-
tance here. It is thus difficult to regard national identities as being entirely instru-
mental. Even if people cross national boundaries, for example through intermar-
riages and migration, most of us not likely change our national sense of belonging 
just overnight. 
1.7 On Method 
The thesis is based on interviews and written sources from which the narratives of 
a number of individuals belonging to the political generation of Kurds from Tur-
key were constructed. The interviews are the major primary source used. In the 
analysis written sources such as biographies, novels, pamphlets and written inter-
views having been taken account of as well. From the beginning the aim was to 
carry out a study concerning Kurds in diaspora settings across Europe and in Wes-
tern Turkey. All in all, 36 interviews were conducted in Sweden, Great Britain and 
Turkey, and in addition a number of shorter informal interviews were conducted 
with representatives for human right organisations, with scholars, with journalists, 
and the like. At the end of the process I realised, however, that it would be neces-
sary to narrow the scope of the study somewhat. Hence, the interviews conducted 
in Great Britain and Turkey were excluded, however interesting the perspectives 
on the Kurdish diaspora they could provide might be. These interviews may be 
analysed later on. In addition, there were 4 interviews carried out in Sweden that 
did not provide substance enough for the study as intended. There finally were 23 
interviews then that were selected for closer analysis. 
The selection of interviewees may need some explanation and justification. 
The criteria employed were that the interviewees were originally from Turkey, 
defined themselves as Kurds and had participated in the Kurdish movement that 
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appeared in that country in the 1960s and 1970s. It was never my ambition to ob-
tain a representative selection of informants, for example as regards gender, class 
background, maternal language, place of birth in Turkey, membership in political 
organisations and the like. Most of the interviewees came to Sweden or to other 
parts of Western Europe in the years surrounding the military coup of 1980. A few 
of them arrived earlier, and one of them remained in prison for more than a decade 
before being released and being admitted political asylum in Sweden. 
To find the interviewees was not always easy. My personal contacts with pe-
ople in the Kurdish diaspora community are essentially with Kurds from Iraq and 
Iran. Hence it took me some time to get in touch with Kurds who belonged to the 
circles that I was interested in exploring. I owe much to Mr. Omar Sheikhmous, 
then a researcher at Stockholm University, himself a Kurd from Syria and a highly 
respected and distinguished personality within Kurdish circles. He helped me with 
a first strategic selection of people who met the criteria employed. Thereafter, 
additional interviewees was added through use of a snowball method, some of the 
interviewees having recommended me further to other persons who could be 
suitable informants. Thus, Mr. Sheikhmous and other informants worked as the 
kind of gatekeepers who open doors, their helping me get in touch with the people 
I wanted to talk to. There were some people however who expressed suspicion or 
were not at all ready to help me further to new contacts. This could be for many 
various reasons. Informants could have been hesitant about where my sympathies 
were or about how I was going to deal with the information I got, or about my 
contacts with other interviewees, as well as with people belonging to the Kurdish 
community generally. 
There were also persons confessing that they were only ready to help me  get 
in touch with people they were sympathetic toward. One of the interviewees, for 
instance, commented the one person who gave me his telephone number in the 
following way: " Then I have to confess that he is a much better person than what 
I am. I would never have recommended you to speak with him." Thereafter, he 
explained to me that they had become enemies and would never talk to each other 
again. One interviewee wanted to meet with me several times and conversed with 
me informally about his political life and cultural activities both in Sweden and 
Turkey a great deal before he agreed to participate in an interview.  
Gender is an important matter to consider in a research project such as this. 
An overwhelming majority of the interviewees are men. Indeed this is a gender 
issue which is important to consider. This can be said to be due to the male domi-
nance in the Kurdish currents that appeared at the time of the political generation. 
Perhaps not surprisingly too, it was somewhat difficult to find female interview-
ees. Few of the people I asked said that they knew of any woman who had been 
politically active in Turkey. At last, however, I managed to find five women who 
were willing to be interviewed. This is not to say that women did not participate in 
the resistance movements. For example, many wifes of arrested political activists 
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organised protest actions outside police arrests, courts and prisons when their hus-
bands were in prison (Mojab 2001). Most scholars dealing with Kurdish issues 
have noted the absence of women in influential positions in Kurdish politics and 
their subordinate position within organisations and parties (Mojab 2001 pp. 12ff.; 
Watts 2010), although women indeed not should be considered as merely being 
passive, since they organize and take part in political life in various ways, or in the 
substantial parts of their lives support political activities. To my knowledge, there 
are no studies thus far however, considering these aspects of resistance or examin-
ing the role of Kurdish women in the political generation scrutinized here.  
Rather accounts of these currents tends to be essentially gender-blind (cf. for 
example, Chaliand 1979; Entessar 1992; Gunter 1990; Ibrahim and Gürbey 1996; 
Kutschera 1979; More 1984), with exception from an article by van Bruinessen 
(2001). Yet Kurdish women's role in politics has appeared as an emerging field of 
research in recent years (Weiss 2010), as has women's role in the formation of the 
Kurdish diaspora (Alinia 2004). I have considered gender aspects of the stories, 
since from the outset I decided to talk with both men and women, bearing this in 
mind both when the interview guide was made and in the analysis of the stories as 
well.  
It was above all in the analytical process however that my eyes were opened 
to the richness of the gender perspectives expressed, and not expressed, in the 
narratives. Nevertheless, in the chapters based on the literature and on previous 
reserearch, devoted to the historical background and the political processes in 
which the generation studied here emerged, questions of gender were not of cen-
tral concern in analysis of the area. The aim of those chapters was to provide a 
macro-perspective and a historical framework. Although those chapters could well 
have taken up gender perspectives to a greater extent in a different way this would 
have required a somewhat different focus on things and a consideration of sources 
not taken up here. I did not make use of such alternative approaches to macro-
analysis of the historical background at the outset of my research, and can only do 
so in future research.  
I was generally received with warmth and generosity and a curiosity about 
my project that was for the most part very pleasant. On some occasions I was 
asked about how other informants had answered a particular question, and some of 
the informants were curious to know whom else I had been talking to. Several 
times I was invited to people's homes for the interview. In some cases we had din-
ner together, and sometimes coffe afterwards, and I often had the opportunity to 
conversate with family members and friends of the interviewee as well. Although 
the interviews often took place in a room separate from the rest of the apartments 
involved, we were sometimes interrupted by telephone calls or by children. Ten of 
the interviews took place at people's offices or workplaces. Some of the partici-
pants wanted us to meet in public spaces, mostly at cafes of their choice, in central 
Stockholm. Meeting these people for interviews in public spaces turned out to be 
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much more convenient than what I first had expected, regarding sound recordings 
as well as concentration and focus during the interview. It happened only once that 
an interview was interrupted, although that only very briefly, by a friend of the 
interviewee who came up to our table to speak. Otherwise the interviews went on 
more undisturbed in these public settings than they generally did in people's homes 
and workplaces. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical questions are important to consider in all research. In recent years in Swe-
den ethical codes and guidelines in have become formalised in a way they were 
not at the outset of this research.21 However, the main principles that have become 
more clearly stipulated now have basically been accepted in practice among social 
scientists for many years. The interviewees were informed about the aim and pur-
poses of the research when contacted and about my affiliation with a university. 
They were also informed about how the data that was collected was going to be 
dealt with and published. They were informed that participation was voluntarily 
and that they could interrupt whenever they wanted to and could chose not to an-
swer certain questions.  
In order to respect the integrity of the interviewees, they have been anonymi-
zed in the text. This is for many reasons. First, since the thesis intends to explore 
the overall narrative of a particular political generation nothing could be gained 
anyway in revealing which account a given and named person has provided. Se-
condly, the men and women I conducted interviews with have all fled their origi-
nal home country for political reasons. There were different standpoints 
concerning anonymity among the informants, however. The interviews took place 
at a time when many of them did not think that they would ever be able to return 
to Turkey. When the question of anonymisation was brought up in the informal 
conversations we had before the interviews began it could happen that people 
laughed and said that it made no sense to be secret about things since they would 
never be able to go back to Turkey again anyway. One person was skeptical to-
ward anonymization with reference to the fact that he was not involved in any 
"illegal activities". When these lines have been written, the political situation in 
Turkey has changed so that many of them who said so indeed have returned to 
Turkey for longer or for shorter periods. However, it is still a risky enterprise to be 
involved in research on Kurdish issues or to become a pro-Kurdish activist. Since 
it is the responsibility of a researcher to be careful with the data I find it most sen-
                                                     
21 Ethical codes and guidlines for research conducted in Sweden are established by the Swedish 
Reserach Council. 
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sible that all the interviewees are kept anonymous as far as possible. One excep-
tion was made with a person holding a position that could not be anonymized. 
Particularly since I have analysed standpoints and positions they took about ten 
years ago. 
Position, Distance and Closeness 
The "insider-outsider dichotomy" is widely debated among scholars (Narayan 
1993; Raudvere 2002; Lundström 2007 pp. 32-37). For a long time there was an 
underlying assumption that insider positions are more advantageous and provide 
better insights and perspectives for gaining an understanding and drawing conclu-
sions. This idea implies there are "genuine natives" and takes on in practice an 
essentialist position that has been widely criticised in recent decades (Narayan 
1993; Lundström 2007 pp. 35-37). Narayan (1993 p. 673) argues that the "quality 
of relations" established in the field and the carrying-out of long-term field studies 
are much more relevant than if the researcher is an outsider or is an insider. She 
underscores the importance of multi-faceted relations between researchers and the 
people they are studying in an increasingly complex world: "In this changed set-
ting it is more profitable to focus on shifting identities in relationship with the 
people and issues an anthropoligist seeks to represent" (Narayan 1993 p. 682). In 
addition she argues in favour of "rethinking" the outsider positions attempting to 
"melt down other related divides" such as "walls" between narratives and theoreti-
cal analysis (ibid. p. 682). Despite not doing extended field work, I would argue 
that Narayan's reasoning corresponds to much of the experiences I have had in 
meetings with informants for the present research. This is not to say, however, that 
encounters with the men and women who were interviewed were not affected by 
assymetries and social divides of different kinds.  
Although I did not experience much of a "cultural distance" between me and 
interviewees in our meetings, through my being non-Kurdish I was certainly not 
considered as an "insider", or for that matter a "native", by the interviewees. 
Rather, the impression I got was that I was seen as an outsider, although in some 
cases "an informed outsider" (Emanuelsson cf. 2005 p. 27). I do not consider my-
self an "attendant" in the way that Lundberg (1989) considered himself in his re-
search on Latin American refugees. To some extent I think that my long-term 
close friendship with Kurds and my commitments to the Kurdish question created 
in many cases closeness, and facilitated the interviewees opening up. It was gener-
ally expected that my sympathies would be with the Kurds and that I would write 
accordingly. The solidarity committee I had been involved with was well known to 
some persons, whereas others seemed to have only a diffuse conception of it. My 
being non-Kurdish but writing on the Kurdish issue seem in one case to have in-
voked expectations of my "being more objective". It could have contributed in-
stead though to create a greater distance on my part, that could be regarded as a 
certain disadvantage. My role was different from that of Alinia (2004) who, being 
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Kurdish and writing on the Kurdish diaspora, considered herself as someone on 
the border between being an insider and an outsider (ibid. pp. 147-151). 
In some cases, the accounts were presented to me as if to someone well initi-
ated. In other cases, I had the feeling of the interviewees taking the role of "in-
forming" me about the Kurdish issue.  
Lundström (2007) underscores its perhaps being to simplistic to "rely on 
similarities" between oneself and the interviewee since it is not in itself a guaran-
tee of achieving a better understanding and more adequate knowledge. In fact, 
being a stranger or an outsider may be a strenght as well (ibid. p. 36). Outsiders 
are, for example, often less threatening to the persons being interviewed, since 
they are not involved in internal conflicts or arguments. People sharing an ethnic 
or class background may still differ in their experiences and attitudes. In research 
work, scholars generally hold a privileged position (Lundström 2007 pp. 34ff.). 
Being a researcher, a woman who was younger, but only a little bit younger, than 
the interviewees were other aspects of how I was positioned vis-à-vis the inter-
viewees. In some cases, my impression was that these factors could contribute to 
making me closer, although not as close as an insider, as well as to creating a dis-
tance between the two of us in the interview sessions. 
 One important matter to consider is that of language. All the interviewees 
that are included were conducted in Sweden with people who, in most cases, had 
been residing in the country for two decades or more at the time of the interviews. 
With one exception, all of the interviews were in Swedish. Most of the informants 
had good command of Swedish, and at first sight it could perhaps appear unprob-
lematic for the interviews to have been conducted in that language. The ability to 
manage Swedish varied, however, among the different participants. Many of them 
had long experience in expressing themselves in both spoken and written Swedish 
after the years they had spent here and had used the language very actively in eve-
ryday life, in work, studies, cultural life and politics.  
However, there were differences in their language skills, and it should be 
born in mind that there can be distortions when two or even more languages are 
involved, its being important to consider the fact that the maternal tongue of the 
interviewees was not Swedish, but rather Kurdish (Kurmancî or Kirmancî) or 
Turkish. It can be reasonable to assume that differences in language ability in 
Swedish can contribute to a sense of power assymetry between the interviewer and 
the interviewee. As Lundberg (1989) calls our attention to, it takes time to be flu-
ent in a foreign language, and languages can in fact be composed of many differ-
ent genres and nuances. In areas such as the humanities, the bureaucracy and the 
health care we find specific vocabularies which it take considerable time to learn. 
As Lundberg also points out, it may be "humiliating" for a person who is an intel-
lectual and uses language as a working tool to not be able to express her-
self/himself properly (ibid. p. 130). Also, even for a person with advanced skills in 
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a foreign language it may sometimes be difficult to find words to express certain 
phenomena, i.e. to find equivalent expressions in two different languages. 
On two occasions, other people were around who could be asked to help. 
Sometimes the interviewees put in Turkish or Kurdish words to express them-
selves and we took the time to sort out what they intended to say. It could also 
occur that an interviewee took a pause to find time to find the right word or precise 
expression in Swedish. 
In one case the interview was conducted with the help of an interpreter who 
translated between Kirmancî and Swedish. The difficulties in working through the 
use of interpreters have been discussed in many scholarly works (Arvidsson 2003; 
Lindberg 2001). Lindberg underscores there being distortions already in the com-
munication between two persons of the same tongue: "When a second language 
and a third person intervene between two interlocutors the potential for distortion 
can be magnified exponentially" (ibid. p. 70). This is a matter for the researcher to 
deal with as best as possible. A careful and initiated discussion of this matter is 
provided by Carlsson (1997) who points out the difficulties of controling exactly 
how data is created, since the questions and answers are in a sense interpreted first 
by the translator (see also Arvidsson 2003). The Kurdish I knew was not sufficient 
to follow the discussion between the interpreter and the informant. Things worked 
out nevertheless though the interviewee in question understanding and speaking 
Swedish to an extent but finding it difficult to express himself well enough to be 
interviewed in that language.  
An important ethical issue concerns the subjects, and the nature of the themes 
that the interviews evolved around, and the questions these posed. It is important 
to consider and handle adequately in the interview situation the feelings, associa-
tions and memories that the questions posed may bring to the fore and what these 
can mean to the interviewee. It could happen that informants became evasive or 
blunt in their answers, their responding only rather briefly, despite open-ended 
questions having been posed. Others opened up much easily and provided long 
and intricate answers their being very generous in sharing personal and sometimes 
difficult memories. This can be seen as positive in the sense of interesting and 
highly personal reflections being provided. However it can sometimes be difficult 
to foresight when a subject become too sensitive regarding communicating his or 
her thoughts to another person. Once it occurred, for example, that an interviewee 
opened up and became very committed in his story while telling it and then all 
suddenly burst out in tears and turned the recorder off since his account evoked 
memories of his family's destiny that turned out to be too difficult for him to talk 
about.   
Interview procedures 
An interview is not an everyday conversation. Although this may be very obvious, 
it is important to bear in mind that an interview can be a highly "constructed" con-
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versation created in a situation that can be considered to be almost "artificial" sin-
ce it is guided by the questions and aims of the researcher and would never have 
come about otherwise (see, for example, Lantz 1993). The process of data 
collection almost never turns out to be as neat as it is often described in methodol-
ogy books. Thus, it is important to take into consideration and report any difficul-
ties and problems that come up during interviews and research process.  
The present research aims at exploring the narratives of the political genera-
tion in question regarding their views and commitments to Kurdish identities. The 
aim, and what I find to be a strenght of a narrative approach, is that of learning 
about matters involved through the comprehensiveness of the accounts provided 
by the interviewees. Such interviews can be combined with content analysis to 
deepen the understanding of what is reported, although it is highly important to 
chisel out not simply what is reported but also how it is told. Doing this allows so 
the underlying content of what is told, or the agenda of the interviewee, which is 
revealed to be taken note of. In order to chisel out the comprehensive narratives 
each of the interviews was read and listened to several times. After that, the tran-
scriptions were organised in themes and sub-themes.  
Since I was very much interested in the personal views of the interviewees 
and their reflections concerning their belonging to and their commitments to the 
Kurdish cause, I found it appropriate to conduct the interviews in such a way that 
came close to conversations. Thus, I constructed the interview manuals themati-
cally, including a few open-ended questions, which are particularly likely to pro-
duce reflections and in-depth answers (see Riessman 1993 pp. 54ff.).  
The interviews lasted from half an hour to four hours. Most of them took ap-
proximately something between one and a half and two hours. The interviews 
were semi-structured and were designed in a way that was intended to make it 
possible for the interviewees to express themselves and associate freely. The dis-
cussions were concerned mainly with four themes: their commitments to the Kurd-
ish question, their Kurdish identity, their exile and the contemporary political 
situation of the Kurds. In the interviews one thing discussed was how and why the 
interviewees had become involved in the Kurdish question. By way of introduc-
tion, I asked them to present themselves and their personal background. We dis-
cussed their comittments to the Kurdish issue in Sweden and in the diasporic con-
text generally, and the contemporary situation of Kurds in Sweden and in Turkey. 
The situation for women, children and the next generation was often considered 
when the situation of Kurds in Sweden was discussed. It became obvious to me 
that each individual had his or her own way of dealing with all of these themes and 
issues.  
As always is the case in qualitative research, however, various questions 
were added and some questions were excluded in the course of the research proc-
ess. This flexibility I think brings with it both rewards and obstacles. A positive 
aspect of it is that new themes of relevance are brought up in the discussions and 
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that questions and themes to some extent can be adapted to the knowledge and 
interests of each of the interviewees. A problem this brings about, however, is that 
not all the themes are covered entirely in the interviews. It some times happened, 
for example, that an interviewee emphasised and incessantly returned to his or her 
political commitments in the 1970s, at the same time there were some inter-
vieweed who avoided such matters entirely.  
In the meetings with female interviewees, particular attention was directed at 
the situation of women. There were a few of the participants I talked with twice, 
with the aim of to making the interview results more complete. Regarding this it 
has been recommended that the qualitative researcher continue collecting informa-
tion until a state of saturation has been achieved, a process in which certain as-
sumptions can be confirmed and certain patterns may be repeated (Bertaux 1997 
pp. 186ff.). At the end of the data collection period I could distinguish a variety of 
patterns in the interviews, at the same time as I realized that always new topics 
were brought up in the conversations that could have been explored further if time 
had allowed. The research period could probably not have continued much longer 
since it was restricted by both time and budget constraints. 
As has been pointed out by Gubrium (2004) a research interview needs to in-
volve at least two active parties. As the researcher, I was the one responsible for 
structuring the interviews and posing the questions. The role that I took during the 
interviews was largely that of a listener, though not a passive one, but rather an 
attentive listener who supported the accounts the interviewees were providing by 
giving affirmations, brief comments, as well as posing attendant questions, so as to 
stimulate the interviewee to take her or his reflections further.  
In many respects there is an asymmetric relationship between the interviewer 
and the interviewee. This did not meant, however, that the interviewees were re-
duced to passive respondents to my questions. In fact from time to time it could 
happen that they were "talking back" (Yang 2010 pp. 121-127; Burcar 2005 p. 36; 
cf hooks 1989). For example there were interviewees who declined to answer 
some of my questions, and it happened that some of them made ironic comments 
to questions or to affirmations that I made, or challenged in various ways the per-
spectives I presented.  
I would emphasize the fact that one of the most important qualities of an in-
terviewer is surely that of being a good listener. Being an inexperienced inter-
viewer at the outset of the research period, I first had the idea that I should take 
notes during the interviews and did so relatively ambitiously in the first few inter-
views, until I developed better skills of listening and only wrote down the key 
words during the interviews.   
I recorded the interviews in those cases in which it was possible and was 
agreed upon with the interviewees. However, some of the interviewees declined 
having their interviews recorded, this being respected. On such occasions I took 
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notes carefully and made a reasonable written account of it immediately after the 
interview. 
There are a number of factors creating uncertainty that should be considered 
by the researcher. The issue of objectivity is a central feature in every scientific 
enterprise, although should be seen in relation to the aims involved and to the spe-
cific questions being posed. Kvale (1997) notes the fact that the meaning of the 
term objectivity can be highly diverse and emphasises that the qualitative inter-
view is sensitive to and reflect the "true nature" of the interviewee (Kvale 1997 pp. 
64-66). 
This is a comment that is highly relevant in relation to the present study, 
since the intention here is to reveal patterns that are recurrent in the accounts of the 
interviewees, and to elicit diverse and subjective experiences of theirs, together 
with contrasts and controversies in their constructions of their Kurdish identities. 
The interaction between the researcher and the interviewee is also of major 
significance. An interview is a special situation in its own right, and the researcher 
needs to be well aware of his or her aims in conducting an interview, as well as of 
the interviewee generally having his or her own motives in agreeing to participate. 
One thing that is important to consider is what kind of information the interviewee 
is prepared to provide the researcher with. Factors such as age, the gender of the 
researcher, and the status the researcher has in the eyes of the interviewee can 
partly determine the kinds of answers that are given. Once in Istanbul, for exam-
ple, a friend told me the following: "I have heard Kurds who change their view in 
accordance with whom they are talking to. For example, someone comes from 
Germany and they say that Kurds want a state of their own. Then, if someone co-
mes from Sweden, the same person says that the Kurds don’t strive for a state on 
their own. That is because Swedish politics towards Turkey is different from the 
German."  
On some occasions I was warned not to trust certain people, and not to en-
tirely believe all of the answers I got. This, I think, is a phenomenon that is very 
common and is something that all researchers have to deal with in interview situa-
tions. The informants' concerns regarding certain other persons provided informa-
tion too, for example concerning their various positions within the diasporic com-
munity. It opened my eyes to the occurrence of internal arguments and disputes 
within the political generation at hand, and reflected on the motives people could 
have for attempting to descredit others. Also it helped me see more clearly that not 
only the researcher, but also the interviewee, has, or may have, an agenda.  
Finally, it helped me to become more critical, and pose questions in my re-
search concerning why certain information was given to me and other information 
was not, and to look beyond what people expressed in the interviews and on what 
their motives were. 
Researchers have observed many times that people tell things differently on 
different occasions, people sometimes putting things and events in a specific order, 
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to serve a particular purpose as well as highlighting certain memories, events or 
facts and repressing others (Arvidsson 2003  pp.23-25; Lindberg 2001 pp. 66-70) 
for similar reasons. This can come about consciously or unconsciously, depending 
on what the interviewee remembers, who the interviewer is and the type of rela-
tionship established between them in the situation (Kvale 1997 pp. 39, 104, 118-
120). 
In addition, the memories of the interviewee should be considered critically. 
In the present study, for example, people were asked about why they became 
committed to the Kurdish question, the interviewees thus being asked about events 
that occurred many years before the interviews took place. Some memories fade 
away, whereas others tend to become stronger or even to become excessive. The 
researcher should therefore consider the distance in time involved, since forgetting 
and individual motives for obscuring facts which may develop over time can affect 
the answers given (Johansson 2005 pp. 223-224; Lindberg 2001). Reflecting over 
these matters in the analysis of oral histories, Lindberg (2001) writes: "Certainly, 
many stories purport to describe what 'actually' has happened in years gone by" 
and quoting Personal Narratives Groups add that people also "lie sometimes, for-
get a little, exaggerate, become confused, get things wrong. Yet they are revealing 
truths" (Personal Narratives Group, as quoted by Lindberg 2001 pp. 61-62).  
It is well known that many memories fade away over time and that inter-
viewees may adapt their accounts to the context of the interviews. Nevertheless, 
the associations and the statements they actually make reflect in some way how 
they perceive and relate to the issues they are asked about. Alvesson and Deetz 
write: "The accounts provide uncertain but often interesting clues to social reality 
and of ideas, imaginations, values and other 'subjective' aspects" (Alvesson and 
Deetz 2000 p. 86). 
A matter, which is important for the researcher to reflect upon is the question 
of who has the right to speak for other people? Who can represent a group? In 
studies of diaspora and other collective identities, the question of representation 
appears to be particularly crucial. One of my informants concerned himself a great 
deal with problems of this sort and asked me why I did not go to the cafes in the 
suburbs of Stockholm to talk with, what he termed, "ordinary people", i.e. Kurdish 
immigrants who never had been politically active and did not participate in the 
activities of Kurdish organisations. This is a comment full of insight I think. Nev-
ertheless, the present study is limited to persons who have been politically active, 
since their argumentation and their writings have an appreciable impact of the 
form Kurdish political activities take. Representation must be considered in the 
course of conducting interviews. In the analytic work that follows consideration 
must be taken of the number of options provided when questions are asked, which 
excerpts from interviews are selected for inclusion in the text, etc. The researcher 
is responsible for how people's voices are presented and in connection with this 
there is a need for caution when material is interpreted.  
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Analytical work 
The analytical work was the most time consuming step in the research process. 
This part of the work made me increasingly more aware of the power relations 
present in which the scholar has a very privileged position, and the creation of 
knowledge it results in (Lundström 2007 pp. 32-34). This emphasizes the impor-
tance of one's being able to keep a distance from the material, in some senses even 
becoming a stranger to it (Alinia 2004 p. 151). Being an outsider facilitates being 
able to take a step back, my sympathies with the Kurdish issue was sometimes a 
hindrance to overcome in the research process. It could be an emotional challenge 
my sometimes being "touched as a listener" or a reader when listening to tapes or 
reading transcripts althought I perhaps was never touched by material quite as 
deeply as Alinia (2005 p. 150) for example was, who shared many experiences of 
her own with those of her informants. A challenge for me here in the research 
process was that of becoming conscious of having my own opinions and precon-
ceived ideas about certain developments. 
The process that took place from the conducts of the interviews and the read-
ing of written material to production of the finalised manuscript, anchored both in 
a theoretical and an empirical sense in the literature, one that followed a rather 
windy road. The text presented is composed in part of stories from the material, 
selected, organized and analysed by the researcher. The analytical tools used by 
researchers create what can be seen as a discrepancy between what is said in inter-
views and what we as researchers see when employing our tools to see beyond the 
words that the interviewees have expressed.  
Working with observations and field notes Abu-Lugodh (1993 p. 41) asks 
whether results as analysed constitute in reality ‘a betrayal’ of the informants. 
Raudvere (2002) writing on female dervisches in Istanbul, concludes: "The dis-
crepancy between what I see with the help of my analytical tools and the way the 
women expressed their situation is striking, but it is also the very aim of analysis" 
(ibid. p. 59). Raudvere problematises the use of field work notes, basically after 
conducting observations, the citation above pointing to the challenge it can repre-
sent emotionally and intellectually, to take on the distance to the subject of re-
search that is required to conduct really trustworthy research. This is a process that 
requires both distance and what Mulinari (1999) terms as "qualitative researcher's 
intellectual responsibility" (ibid. p. 54), this being presented by Alinia (2004) as 
representing the importance of "daring to be alone with your material, your doubts, 
your uncertainties and, I would add, with your contradictory feelings" (ibid. p. 
151). 
As the interviews were to be transcribed, and read, interpreted and analysed, 
a myriad of options opened up. The responsibility of deciding which concepts and 
theoretical points of departure to be used, of organising and reorganising the mate-
rial, of deciding which narratives where to be included and to be excluded respec-
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tively, and finally of formulating the text is, after all, up to the researcher. This 
requires a great deal of both carefulness and responsibilty.  
Johansson (2005 p. 282) points out that the analytical work begins already in 
the interaction that take place during the interview sessions. This is an experience 
that I shared as many different conclusions were drown on my part, and as notes 
were taken and follow-up questions asked as the interviews moved on (see also 
Kvale 1997 pp. 171-172). I transcribed each of the interviews, yet the restricted 
time periods that I had in Stockholm made it impossible sometimes to transcribe 
each interview before conducting the next one. In transcribing taped interviews 
and making reasonable fair copies of my initial notes my ambition was to formu-
late the transcriptions literally. However, some minor adjustments had to be made 
here due to such factors as interviewees speaking with an accent, and the word 
order and the colloquial expressions they employed. It has sometimes been put 
forward by scholars as an ideal to let accents and popular expressions be revealed 
in quotations (Arvidsson 1998; Ehn 1993).  
My position, however, is that the aim and the research questions in a given 
study should be the guiding principles here. Ehn (1993) has pointed out the risk in 
making adjustments in transcriptions of people's oral expressions, since the very 
character of the person in question may be changed as a result. In the present the-
sis, given its aims and the questions it deals with, I think there is risk involved in 
not doing any adjustments in the transcriptions of the interviews. For example that 
the attention of the reader might have been directed to errors as regards the lan-
guage of the interviewees, rather than to what they were saying. Matters are also 
very complicated since all of this was translated into a third language.  
To some extent, non-verbal expressions, laughter, and the likes have been in-
cluded in the transcriptions (cf. Johansson 2005 pp. 300ff.; Kvale 1997 pp. 155ff.; 
Riessman 1993). As soon as an interview was transcribed, I reviewed and listened 
to the tape recordings a number of times. In a first step, I distinguished overall 
themes and, what Riessman refers to as narrative sequences (Riessman 1993; Jo-
hansson 2005 pp. 192-194). In narrative analysis "holistic" approaches which em-
phasize form and performance in narration are often given prominence (Johansson 
2005 pp. 288ff.). Riessman is interested in form and she advocates, as far as I un-
derstand, what Tuval Mashiach (2006 p. 252) has categorised as a "holistic-form" 
type of narrative analysis. As Johansson (2005) points out, however, this is in 
practice rarely done downrightly. I organised thematically the narrative sequences 
that were selected and identified new subordinate themes step-by-step. When these 
were finally organised thematically, I analysed the content of each selected se-
quence inspirated Burke's pentad: The Act, The Scene, The Agent, The Agency 
and The Purpose (Burke 1962 pp. 127ff.). Hence, my analytical approach adheres 
basically to the terminology of Tuval Mashiach characterised essentially as being a 
"categorical-content" approach to narrative analysis.  
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What further complicates matters is that many years have passed since I conducted 
the interviews that were analysed for the thesis. There are several reasons for this, 
which brings with it effects that are partly negative and partly positive. One nega-
tive aspect of it is that things have changed continuously since then which means 
that some of the data collected may have loosed its actuality. It has been a time- 
consuming process to repeatedly be "on again" and have to update information and 
the literature seen as relevant, each time with the use of lenses informed by new 
perspectives and insights about methodology, theory and the empirical field at 
hand. For example since conducting these interviews I have conducted numerous 
others, mostly for projects of evaluation. Perhaps it is both positive and negative in 
its connotations that these experiences have made me increasingly aware, each 
time I had the opportunity to go back to the earlier work I had done, of all of the 
deficits that are to be found in the interviews that were conducted for the thesis.  
On the positive side, the many and sometimes very long interruptions of the 
research process helped to make it easier for me to take a step back, become ana-
lytical and look at the material from a distance. It has been with new lenses each 
time. In the course of time I have reworked things, often in portions, and reinter-
preted the texts and interviews several times. Thus, the interpretations of the sto-
ries presented here are the ones that were arrived at the moment when it was fi-
nally decided that the work was to come to a halt. 
1.8 Disposition of the Thesis 
This study is in four parts. This introductory part, Part I, consists of two chapters. 
In Chapter 1 the aim, the basic questions posed, and the methodological concerns 
are presented, together with a general background account of the Kurds and Kurd-
istan. In Chapter 2 that follows, central theories and concepts used in the study are 
discussed. 
Part II then provides a historical background to the presentday events taken 
up and seen within the context of the early phases of the internationalisation and 
regionalisation of Kurdish nationalism. Chapter 3 analyses the formation of the 
modern Turkish Republic. Chapter 4 deals with Kurdish resistance in the forma-
tive years of the Turkish Republic and the repression that followed thereafter. The 
aim here is to describe the historical, political, social and cultural processes in 
which the Kurdish political generation and their parents were moulded. Chapter 5 
explores the emergence of the Kurdish political generation focused upon here, as a 
social protest movement during the 1960s and 1970s.  
Part III consists of two chapters in which the stories about being Kurdish, 
collected for the thesis are analysed. Chapter 6 is devoted to what could be labeled 
as backward looking stories. In this chapter two main types of stories are distin-
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guished. First, there is a set of stories dealing with experiences of suffering. Sec-
ondly there is a set of stories that can be seen as being national-romantic, often 
with a flavor of nostalgia in them. Chapter 7 deals with accounts that looks to the 
present and the future. This chapter focuses on stories of "re-orientation" and 
"challenges", thus dealing with the diasporic narrative from a different angle. In 
the chapter I will show that the interviewees perceive themselves being confronted 
with ambuiguities and challenges in the diasporic setting. Part IV consists of 
Chapter 8 and is the closing section in which the study is summarised as a whole, 
its main conclusions being presented and discussed.  
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Chapter 2  
Political Generation, Diaspora and 
Long-Distance Nationalism 
In this chapter the theoretical points of departure of the dissertation will be pre-
sented. Three main theoretical concepts will be employed in analysing how the 
generation can best be defined and contextualised, and for helping to demonstrate 
and understand the process of its politicization. In the first section these three con-
cepts, those of political generation, diaspora and long-distance nationalism, are 
briefly introduced. In the three sections that follow then, each of these concepts is 
discussed to some length. Reference here will be made back to the methodological 
points of departures presented in the introductory chapter. This pointed to a social 
constructivist approach that assumes diasporic identities to be continuously rene-
gotiated and reconstructed. In recent decades, post-colonial theories have become 
influential in both the field of diaspora and the field of nationality/ethnicity stud-
ies.  
Post-colonial theorising has undoubtedly contributed to broadening our un-
derstanding of assymetric power hierarchies and global inequalities (see, for ex-
ample, Eriksson et. al 1999; Kothari 2002). However the present work is not es-
sentially based on post-colonial theories. In line with criticism advanced by Bu-
ruma and Margalit (2004), I would argue that post-colonial theories mostly present 
and conceive of "the West and the rest" as a configuration rather than problematis-
ing their complexity and the interaction between the internal and the external 
forces involved, for example in the emergence of diasporas (see, for example, Hall 
1999, 2000). Neither do the post-colonial theories contribute in my view to any 
genuinely new perspectives on diasporas or to our understanding of them appre-
ciably (cf. Björklund 2011 pp. 128ff.; Sökefeld 2006). In the closing section I dis-
cuss similarites and differences between the three concepts referred to above, and 
present the analytical framework of the thesis. 
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2.1. Three Concepts 
The concept of political generation is the most central one of the three referred to. 
It draws on the sociological theory of generations developed by Karl Mannheim 
(1952). The thesis concerns specificially a group of people born more or less in the 
same time period who became politically active in the decades following the Sec-
ond World War. The narratives included in the thesis were told, however, by peo-
ple present in a diasporic setting, after many of the political parties found earlier 
had been reorganised or closed down and commitments to the Kurdish cause had 
taken new paths. 
Since the Kurdish currents that emerged in Turkey during this period had at a 
first glance many similarities with a social movement, the political generation 
concept may be a fruitful analytical tool here, though my choice of it calls for a 
more thorough explanation. Certainly, the movement involved was only a loosely 
organised one, its consisting of small political groups, independent intellectuals 
and writers. Since in many respects it can be described as a protest movement, 
social movement theory is also an optional that could have been considered. How-
ever the present study concerns specificially directed a limited group of persons 
and a limited period of time within the Kurdish diaspora, although it of course can 
be considered to be a part of a broader movement. 
Diasporas are dynamic phenomena, involving many different jostling stances, 
positions and stratetgies, and the assumed identities continuously being renegoti-
ated. In this dynamic process, the contributions of certain generations play an im-
portant role, as Edmunds and Turner (2002 p. 109) have emphasized. However 
generations are then to be considered in the sense of their being sociological phe-
nomena in the manner suggested by Karl Mannheim (1952). 
As Mandel (2008), for example, points out generation may be a problemati-
cal category, since the life trajectories of migrants not are linear, so that "first gen-
eration immigrants", for example, may have quite different experiences due to 
such factors as migration, gender, education and the fact that migration patterns 
need not be similar among people within a given generation (ibid. p. 12). Here is 
where a sociological understanding of the generation, as elaborated by Mannheim, 
makes particular sense. The present thesis concerns a group of men and women 
whose life trajectories converged at a particular historical moment, their sharing a 
particular location in history, as their repertoire of actions and their socio-political 
consciousness being moulded and developed on the basis of essentially the same 
historical, political, social, cultural and economic events and contexts. All of this, 
in turn, affected their contributions to the emerging Kurdish diaspora and its poli-
ticization and complexity. Thus I argue that the notion of a political generation 
serve the aims of this study rather well. 
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Diaspora is a notion at the centre of attention here and is one that has become 
widely used within the field of modern migration studies. It is often been used 
interchangebly with the term "trans-national community" that would have been an 
alternative term here. Both of these concepts relate to ties that migrants have to 
their countries of origin. It is thus recognized that migrants relate both to their 
countries of origin and their countries of settlement at one and the same time. They 
lead their everyday lives in the receiving countries, and therefore may be involved 
in political and economic life there, but they maintain their contacts with their 
countries of origin, remain committed to ongoing developments there and preserve 
relations with friends and with their family back home. Both of these concepts 
referred to capture the ongoing exchange and interactions across borders that can 
occur when migrants become dispersed to many different countries and parts of 
such countries.  
Thus, the concepts of "diaspora" and "trans-national community" are more 
convenient for use in the present study than such concepts that have tended to 
dominate the field of migration research like "migrants", "refugees", "emigrés" 
and the like, since the latter concepts presume that migration is a process that sim-
ply goes on in one direction and that refer only to their status in the migrant coun-
try. What is the difference then between a "diaspora" and a "trans-national" com-
munity? And what makes "diaspora" the more convenient concept of the two for 
the present study? In migration literature the notion of diaspora has broad applica-
tions (see, for example, Björklund 2011; Mandel 2008; Tölölyan 2007; Sökefeld 
2006; Brubaker 2005; Cohen and Vertovec 1999; Cohen 1997). Like "trans-
national community" it is used for designating communities of refugees, guest 
workers and voluntary migrants. Contrary to "trans-national community" however, 
"diaspora" is a historic concept that derives from the experiences of "victimiza-
tion'" of the Jews in dispersion, it makes more clear allusions to experiences of 
displacement and thus clearly pertains to exiled communities and to people with 
experiences of forced migration. I thus consider "diaspora" as a more suitable con-
cept for this study. 
Long-distance nationalism is the third concept considered here, one that con-
stitutes the main principle of political organisation today and has replaced most 
other forms of political belonging, such as religion and identities based upon local 
affinities. Also, "nationalism" has become the basis for legitimizing political inde-
pendence.  
A question that is often posed is whether the Kurds are really nationalists or 
are simply struggling for their human rights or to their equal rights in their home 
countries and as migrants. In a study of a political generation of refugees strug-
gling for their rights and their recognition, first in their home countries and then on 
foreign soil, alternatively "citizenship" could have been employed as an analytical 
tool as well. After all, in everyday speech "citizenship" is often equated with "na-
tionality". However, the latter concept has ethnic connotations while "citizenship" 
  
64 
rather is denoting the rights and responsibilities people have as members of a 
given state. The notion of "citizenship" has been frequently discussed in recent 
decades in relation to issues of migration and nationality (Bauböck 1998; Faist 
1999). Thus, "citizenship" can be related to efforts made by migrants to continue 
with their already existing political activities and their efforts to preserve their 
cultural identities, customs and networks. Migrants' citizenship rights are also an 
issue of prime concern both for the governments in their countries of origin and 
those in their countries of settlement. At the same time, the forms of recognition 
envisaged by "citizenship" is ultimately formal in character and is regulated by 
laws that are maintained by state powers. 
However, the concept of long-distance nationalism serves our purposes better 
than the concept of citizenship does, since the present study concerns a group of 
Kurds who are organised on an "ethnic basis" in terms of political parties and or-
ganisations. Such long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992) has often been en-
gendered, accommodated to and even strengthened among people living outside 
the borders of their home countries. In the present study, the formation and exis-
tence of national identities among people living in a diasporic setting is examined 
and with this the long-distance nationalism of a political generation. 
2.2 Political Generation 
2.2.1 Concept 
The notion of political generation employed in the thesis draws on Karl Mann-
heim's concept of "sociological generation", which will now be carefully expli-
cated. The term generation is derived from the Latin word of generare, which 
means "to bring forth". It gradually came to have the literal meaning of "body of 
individuals born in about the same period", which is how the term is generally 
used in everyday speech.  
A glance in the Collins English Dictionary (2000) indicates that the term has 
broad applications, extending from, "The act or process of bringing into being, 
production or reproduction, especially of offspring" to "All the people of approxi-
mately the same age especially when considered as sharing certain attitudes" and 
"Belonging to a generation specified as having been born in or having grandpar-
ents born in a given country i.e. a third generation American" (ibid. pp. 639f.), so 
that the concept of generation can be employed in a number of ways. First, the 
term can refer to a process of advancement and as such hold out the prospect of 
certain dynamism. Secondly, it also imply a time boundedness, or a biological 
rhythm, normally imagined to span a period of about 30-35 years. However, there 
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are no fixed time boundaries to it so that a generation can span a considerable 
longer period of time (Abrams 1982 p. 259; Heberle 1951 p. 121; see also Schatz 
1989 Chapter 1). Finally it can allude to ideological stances that belong to a par-
ticular time period. Thus, the term is complex and, alluding both to the calendar of 
some form of biological rhythms, and to the calendar implicit in a historical proc-
ess, it could at first glance appear somewhat contradictory.  
This complexity, in turn, reflects the broadness of the concept's applications 
and the difficulties to find exacting denotations when the concept is employed 
scientifically. Edmunds and Turner (2002) distinguish two main epistemological 
vantage points among scholars concerned with the phenomenon of generations. 
First, generations are commonly defined in terms of being cohorts consisting of 
individuals who are born at a given time. Secondly, generations are defined on the 
basis of the emergence of "cultural and political counsciousness" that evolves 
within a generation. In terms of this approach, date of birth is less important than 
the historical setting in which the generation takes shape (ibid. pp. 6-7). Genera-
tion is a concept that has been employed in a variety of ways, by social scientists. 
Although it is widely recognized that certain generations have made particular 
contributions to the emergence of different cultures and nations for example, the 
concept has neither been theorized very much about nor fully explored in other 
respects in scholarly studies. 
2.2.2 Generation as a Sociological Category 
A significant contribution to the theory of generations has been made by Karl 
Mannheim, who in his essay Das Problem der Generationen, first published in the 
Kölner Viertelsjahrhefte für Soziologie in 1928-29, outlines a social theory of the 
generation phenomenon. The essay is a fruitful and thorough theoretical elabora-
tion of the concept and also contributes to an understanding of its relevance as an 
analytical tool in studies of social change. The essay was part of a more compre-
hensive epistemological programme that Mannheim was working on, but also an 
expression of his aspirations of developing a theory of social change representing 
an alternative to the one based on materialist principles developed by Karl Marx 
(Eyerman and Turner 1999). 
In the introductory parts of the essay, Mannheim brings forward a critical di-
scussion in which he problematises "the positivist" and "the romantic-historical" 
stances, as he labels them, that both in his time and earlier were quite generally 
adopted by scholars in considering the phenomenon of generations. Mannheim 
points out that researchers taking a positivist position are inclined to "find general 
laws based on biological laws" (Mannheim 1952 p. 277), and hence to reduce the 
problem of generations into one that are defined in quantitative terms alluding then 
to the idea that human existence is determined by quantitative factors alone. 
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Mannheim points out that the opposite position, a "historicist-romantic" does not 
solve the problem either, its instead rather "inverting" it, since proponents of such 
a position tend to overemphasize generational unification on the basis of ideologi-
cal and idealist matters at the expense of gaining an understanding of the underly-
ing biological rhythms. Mannheim dismisses the idea of the existence of a "spirit 
of the time"22 that was imagined to impinge upon the agency and the political or 
ideological positioning of generations. Rather, he presents and supports theoretical 
arguments that he considers to account for how social processes work in the for-
mation of generations and to how individual and collective actors respond to these 
processes. 
The phenomenon of sociological generations is based, according to Mann-
heim's view, on "biological calendars and rhythms", his idea being that biological 
as well as anthropological data can help us to explain and understand the limits of 
reproduction cycles and peoples' life spans. He maintains however that such data 
"offer no explanation of the relevance these preliminary factors have for the shap-
ing of social interrelationsships in their historical flux" (ibid. p. 290). He thus con-
cludes that sociological generations are phenomena in their own right, with their 
own characteristics, and thus are not to be reduced simply to biological facts or 
historical locations. A crucial point that Mannheim makes is that the historical 
location involved is based on the biological rhythm of generations, although this 
needs to be integrated with a perspective of cultural and historic consciousness in 
order to provide a sociological understanding of the phenomenon. 
Accordingly, Mannheim dissociates himself from both of the aforementioned 
positions and sets out to elaborate on how generations can be conceptualised and 
understood as a valuable social category, a sociological generation not being sim-
ply a "concrete group". His arguments evolve around what the uniting principles 
of each category are and the extent to which people can move across the bounda-
ries of a given category. On the one hand, a generation is composed of individuals 
who are not so closely knitted together as they would be in  belonging to a com-
munity group or, in the terminology of Mannheim, within the sphere of the 
Gemeinschaftsgebilde. At the same time a generation does not have the openness 
that characterises the sphere of the Gesellschaftsgebilde such as "associations" or 
"organisations" created with a specific purpose or aspiration and which members 
can enter and leave freely (Mannheim 1952 p. 289). 
Instead, Mannheim distinguishes between "concrete groups", to which or-
ganisations and associations belong, and "locations", Lagerung, which could be 
described as "clusters of opportunities, life chances and resources" (Edmunds and 
Turner 2002 p. 10). Thus, he considers there to be an analogy between the phe-
                                                     
22 Zeitgeist is the term used in the English translation of Mannheim. See Mannheim 1952 p. 284. 
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nomena of generation and that of class. A class position, he argues, is based upon 
the existence of a "changing economic and power structure". Mannheim concludes 
that generations unite in a fashion that is reminiscent of class, which is constituted 
by a location in the economic structure, since, as he puts it, it is "constituted essen-
tially by a similarity of location of a number of individuals within a social whole" 
(ibid. p. 290). Hence, he argues that a sociological generation can be distinguished 
on the basis of its location in time and space and the common experiences ac-
quired by people who were born in the same time period: "The fact of belonging to 
the same class, and that of belonging to the same generation or age group, have 
this in common that both endow the individuals sharing in them with a common 
location in the social and historical process, and thereby limit them to a specific 
range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode 
of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action" 
(ibid. p. 291). 
Accordingly a generation is different from a class since the latter is united by 
economic and power positions in society, whereas the location of a generation is 
unified and defined by sentiments, actions, ideas and attitudes. The differences 
and similarities between class and generation have been considered by researchers 
who take an interest in the phenomenon of generations in society. Eyerman and 
Turner (1999), for example, draw on the theories of Weber stating that: "Genera-
tions, like social classes in Weberian sociology, are organized in terms of social 
closure to maximize access to resources of its members" (Eyerman and Turner 
1999 p. 247). A conflict perspective on generations is also developed by Pierre 
Bourdieu (1988), who emphasizes conflicts, for example in academia, often ema-
nating from struggles over resources, such as those of economic and cultural capi-
tal, between generations that are 'socially produced' within these conflicts: 
 
Contrary to what was thought and written at the time of the crisis of May 1968, the 
conflict which divided the faculties did not oppose generations understood in the 
sense of age but academic generations, that is agents, who, even when they are the 
same age, have been produced by two different modes of academic 'generation' . 
(Bourdieu 1988 p. 147). 
 
Hence, Bourdieu's assumptions about generations are in many respects reminiscent 
of those that Mannheim developed, for example as regards the attention both of 
them give to different belligerent generations within the same age group. 
 
 
 
  
68 
2.2.3 Historical Location, Actuality and Generation Units 
At first glance, it may seem as though generations were phenomena that appear 
preliminarily in a diachronic process in which one generation is nicely succeeded 
by the other. For example, Heberle (1951) writes in the introductory lines of his 
chapter on this issue that the discussion of generations is generally based on a 
"very basic principle" namely, "that younger people tend to differ from older peo-
ple in their outlook on life and consequently in their political views" (ibid. p. 118). 
However, as Mannheim underscores, "there is no epoch in which there is 
only for example a conservative/romanticist generation existing, however it might 
well be an epoch in which such a generation is dominating" (Mannheim 1952 p. 
310). Hence, Mannheim, like Heberle, draws attention to the importance of con-
sidering the synchronous aspects of the phenomenon of sociological generations.    
Thus, the historical location of a sociological generation is to be considered 
as the broadest form of a generational unit. Such a unit, however is not likely to be 
inclusive of all individuals who, for example, are born the same year. Mannheim 
argues that a generation may have "potentialities which may materialize, be sup-
pressed or be embedded in other social forces" (Mannheim 1952 p. 303). Hence 
people sharing the same historical location are "potentially capable" of sharing the 
same destiny or participating in the same protest movements, yet all people born 
the same year will not necessarily participate, or even if they do, not all of them 
will have exactly the same experiences. It is also important to note that there is no 
epoch in history entirely dominated by any single ideological stance. 
An additional matter to consider is that of there always being a particular po-
litical and social differentiation in every society. Thus, to form an "actual" genera-
tion it is necessary that its members co-exist, not only in time but also in the same 
"cultural and social region", so that its members are "exposed to the social and 
intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic destabilization" (Mannheim 1952 
p. 303) and are oriented to each other, however they may take antagonistic posi-
tions. Thus, in Mannheim's thinking there are three constitutive criteria involved in 
the creation of a sociological generation. First, there is a "generational location", a 
set of opportunities that a given generation has. Secondly, in this very location the 
generation emerges as an actuality, namely as a number of individuals who shares 
a set of historical responses to its location. Third, in every generation there are 
units to be found "which articulate structures or knowledge or a consciousness that 
express their particular location" (Edmunds and Turner 2002 p. 10).  
Mannheim underscores there being differentiations within generations as 
well. Not all individuals of the same age have the same experiences, not even of 
the same events. For example if people reside in different parts of a given country 
or in different parts of the world, they are unlikely to be affected by the same 
events, or it may be that they are affected by the same events but in a myriad of 
different ways. Mannheim exemplifies this by noting that "the young people in 
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Prussia" and "the people in China" do not "share the same generation location" 
(Mannheim 1952 p. 302). There is never only one mentality that pervades a whole 
society during a given period of time (ibid. p. 314). This is also noted by Heberle 
(1951), who exemplifies this with the remark that "rural youth and urban youth 
will experience the same war in different ways" (ibid. p. 118). Thus, in the view of 
Mannheim, every "actual" generation can be separated into a number of, often 
opposing and struggling, generation-units, such as conservatives and liberals for 
example.  
A generation unit "tends to impose much more concrete and binding ties" 
(Mannheim 1952 p. 307) on its members than what can be observed among the 
members of an "actual" generation or of a group of people within a given "loca-
tion". Since people belonging to a "generation unit" are more likely to share the 
same principles, ideas and values, a unit of this sort has a more socialising and 
formative effect than a location alone does. 
Finally, one should note that Mannheim considers the complexity of social 
structures and underscores the existence of alternative formative factors that im-
pinge upon the social process. Thus, he points out that a "formal sociological ana-
lysis" always needs to consider more than only one factor alone to explain and 
understand a given social process. He warns for and criticizes historical theories 
that single out one single factor for explaining a particular social process. 
2.2.4 Becoming a Political Generation 
Since the men and women who constitute the basic subject matter of the investiga-
tion carried out, are labelled for the purposes of this study as being a "political 
generation", this term merits an explanation.  
In his pivotal essay, Mannheim elucidated how generations are socially con-
stituted. His insights into the role that generations can play, socially and politi-
cally, are still of crucial importance to our understanding of the generation phe-
nomenon. At the same time, one should bear in mind that Mannheim's theorising 
concerning generations took place in the 1920s. In view of his interest in the de-
velopment of conservatism in Prussia, he very probably had that political land-
scape and the accompanying socio-political structures in mind in considering this 
issue. This was a time when the repertoire of political actions employed by genera-
tions, and by other political actors, were largely contained within the boundaries of 
nation states. Thus, he could not have foreseen the emergence of trans-national 
networks and of the global processes of today. Accordingly, as Eyerman and 
Turner (1999) and Edmunds and Turner (2002) have pointed out, the generation 
concept needs further elaboration if applied to the contemporary world. 
Mannheim contributes to one's understanding of generations as a sociological 
phenomenon, but has been criticized (see Schatz 1989) for not really exploring 
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how it comes about that generations develop generally, mobilize, and why certain 
generations becomes decidedly political. Drawing on Mannheims theorising, He-
berle (1951) discuss just how political generations are developed and become 
manifest politically. Heberle elaborates on the tentative concept of "decisive po-
litically relevant experience" (ibid. p. 122), which he considers to be based on the 
following "key elements": a) the general conditions of social life during the forma-
tive period, b) the important political issues of the period's controversies and the 
like, and c) the concrete internal and political struggles of the period in question; 
i.e. strikes, insurrections, revolution, civil war. 
Heberle emphasizes the importance of political socialisation and the impact 
of the formative years on one's world view and the repertoire of agency that people 
develop and maintain. For example, he describes Nazism as having been condi-
tioned by the experiences of people who were young during a period of political 
and social unrest in Germany in the early 20th Century and the Bolshevism condi-
tioned by the experiences of people who were young during the tsarist regime. The 
importance of the formative years of a generation has been implied in more recent 
empirically based scholarly studies (see, for example, Lundberg 1989, 1993). 
Exploring the cultural dimensions of generations, Eyerman and Turner 
(1999) consider the idea that a generation essentially "involves organisation of 
collective memory" (ibid. p. 247). Inspired by the occurrence of generations that 
manifested themselves culturally and in post-war Western society, the authors 
elaborate on a generation concept based on the idea that generations are "sharing a 
common collective culture" (ibid. 1999 p. 250), their defining time, temporal iden-
tity and collective memory as their key concepts. In so doing they develop a line 
of reasoning taking as its point of departure the development of culturally formed 
generations and generation units. A major source of inspiration to them is Pierre 
Bourdieu, and another is David Wyatts' study Out of the Sixties: Storytelling and 
the Vietnam Generation from 1993. In his work, Wyatt explores stories of the 
personal and the political as told by artists belonging to the generation that "was 
shaped by the war in Vietnam".  
The stories are reported to convey a cultural richness oscillating between an 
emphasis on the war and an appreciation of the counterculture that developed in 
the sixties. Wyatt bases his conception of a cultural generation on the idea that the 
generations developed following a common trauma. He summarizes this in the 
following points, concerning what he consider generations to be constituted by, a 
traumatic incident or episode, a set of cultural or political mentors who stands in 
an adversarial relation to the dominant culture,  a dramatic shift in demography 
that influences the distribution of resources in society, a privileged interval that 
connects a generation with a cycle of successes and failures, the creation of a sa-
cred space within sacred places, the notion of "the Happy Few" who provide mu-
tual support for individuals "who know and support one another" (Wyatt 1993 p. 
4; see also Eyerman and Turner 1999 p. 25) 
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From this cultural perspective, therefore, attention is payed to the various modes 
through which a generation embodies its collective identity in response to trau-
matic and formative events.  
Eyerman and Turner (1999) outline a theory of generations in which collec-
tive memory is a key concept. Inspired by Bourdieu and Wyatt, they argue that 
generations "embodies its collective identity in response to traumatic or formative 
events (wars, civil conflicts and other disasters)" (Eyerman and Turner 1999 p. 
251). In their argument they emphasize the importance of events associated with 
wars in the formation of generations during the 20th Century, as for example the 
First World War, the Spanish Civil War and the Vietnam War.  
Heberle (1951) argues that generations are formed in a process in which peo-
ple respond to certain "decisive, politically relevant experiences" (ibid. p. 122). 
His exemplifying with the Nazi movement in Germany, which was led by people 
whose political views were formed by their experiences from the First World War 
and its aftermath (ibid p. 121). I find the idea that generations can be conditioned 
by traumatic events very pertinent for the present study, since the basic subject 
matter is a generation of refugees. However, I think such a position should be 
problematised, since it may be difficult to point out one single event as being cru-
cial to the formation of a sociological generation.  
Rather I agree with Abrams (1982) who argues that it may be difficult to de-
termine exactly which experiences that are "decisive politically relevant" for a 
sociological generation to emerge (ibid. p. 259). In fact, generations may develop 
very gradually, evolve around several events and involve less traumatic conditions 
as well. In many cases therefore "the process of formation has the character of an 
accumulating sequence of events" (quoted in Schatz 1989 p. 26). Thus, the visibil-
ity and self-consciousness of a sociological generation may develop gradually. 
Schatz employs this perspective on the rise of generations in his study of a genera-
tion of Polish Jewish communists, his emphasizing that "a generation is about 
becoming and being and moreover that generations are time-bound and as such 
necessarily dynamic: it thus implies time dimensions of past, present and future" 
(Schatz 1989 p. 26). 
Mannheim asserts that generations rather than classes are of central impor-
tance in the production of knowledge. He also points out that generations often 
have a key role in processes of social change. In his view, it is largely generations, 
rather than classes, that have contributed to the currents of ideas - political, cul-
tural and ideological - that dominate contemporary society. Edmunds and Turner 
go further, elaborating on the thoughts of Mannheim, their putting forward the 
argument that "generational awareness" is of central importance in the creation 
and re-creation of national identities. These authors underscore "traumatic events" 
being critical in the formation of generations, these in turn being "fundamental" to 
the process of national identity construction and national consciousness (Edmunds 
and Turner 2002 pp. 115ff.). 
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Edmunds and Turner (2002) elaborate on Mannheim's reasoning, their suggesting 
that a political generation is "distinctive in its rejection of status quo and its at-
tempts to overturn current political values" (ibid. p. 7). They note the distinction 
between "active" and "passive" generations, and point out that active generations 
make a "generative" contribution to the society in which they live, rather than their 
passively accommodating to existing cultural and social conditions.  
Both of these scholars underscore the usefulness of distinguishing between 
active and passive generations, according to their terminology its being possible to 
divide active generations into various strategic generations, the latter having the 
capacity to, "capitalize on the resources and opportunities that are presented to 
them" (Edmunds and Turner 2002 p. 17). In his analysis of conservatism, Mann-
heim distinguished analytically between "forward-looking groups" and "back-ward 
looking groups". Drawing on this distinction, Edmunds and Turner find it useful to 
make a distinction between "utopian intellectual generations", on one hand aspir-
ing to change present conditions and on the other hand "nostalgic intellectual gen-
erations" who tends to look back to the past (ibid. p. 119). 
2.2.5 Summary of the Section 
I argue that the generation that is the particular subject matter of this thesis is to be 
defined as a political one. I find the discussion of generations being organized 
around collective memories that Eyerman and Turner put forward relevant for the 
study. I also find Schatz's insights into the importance that sequential considera-
tions and dynamic dimensions can have in the formation of generations to be im-
portant to consider in a study of a diaspora generation composed of individuals 
who have been transgressing state boundaries (Schatz 1989, Chapter 1). 
The generation under study needs for one thing, to be located in a Turkish 
context. All of the members of the group studied here, were, with one exception, 
born in the Turkish Republic, and all of them grew up there. They share the expe-
rience of having been politically active in clandestine organisations and parties in 
the decades between the Second World War and the military coup of 1980. During 
this period, the one-party system in Turkey was replaced by a multi- party system, 
at the same time as those parties that ran for election had to be approved by the 
military, in the amended constitution of 1960, a climate of relative political liber-
alisation taking shape and certain political liberties being introduced then (see 
Ahmad 1993 p. 129; Pope and Pope 1997 p. 96; Zürcher 2004 pp. 244f.). This also 
became a period of political instability and vacuum that made it difficult for the 
military to control the Kurdish areas as intensively as they had done in the previ-
ous decades. Thus, it became possible for the Kurds to organise politically, also if 
only clandestinely. This was something that had been impossible in the generation 
of their parents. Thus, they can have been limited by the oppressive circumstances 
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and the brutal reprisals following the Kurdish rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s 
that the generation of their parents experienced (McDowall 1996 Chapter 9; Chali-
and 1979 pp. 60-68; van Bruinessen 1992 pp. 281ff.; White 2000 pp. 73-83). In 
addition, they share the experiences of brutality and suffering that followed the 
military coup in 1980. 
In addition, the representations of this political generation that were studied 
need to be located in a Swedish context, sharing the experiences of their being a 
first generation of political refugee immigrants, as well as Swedish asylum, Swed-
ish immigrant politics and the institutional arrangements of Swedish society. As 
first generations of migrants, they may well have stronger ties to their country of 
origin than their children born and brought up in Sweden and socialised into 
Swedish society from the beginning, had. Thus this generation of Kurds can be 
contrasted with a) the generation of their parents, b) the second and still younger 
generations of Kurds, and c) their Kurdish contemporaries who did not participate 
in the political life in Turkey prior to 1980. 
2.3 Diaspora 
2.3.1 Concept 
The second concept is that of diaspora. This is perhaps the most ambigious one. In 
recent decades the concept has proliferated widely and has become debated vividly 
by scholars. "Diaspora" is originally a Greek word, comprised of the terms dia 
(across) and sperein (saw, scatter) and has come semantically to mean dispersion 
(Brah 2002 p. 181; Cohen 1997 p. ix), but alludes to "acculturation" as well 
(Björklund 2011 pp. 122-123, Brah 2002 ibid.).23 In antiquity, from 400 BC on, 
diaspora was a notion employed by the Greeks referring to the migration to, and 
colonisation of, Minor Asia on the Mediterranean coasts and the trade societies 
established and developed there (Cohen 1997 p. xi, p. 2; Björklund 2011 pp. 
122ff.; Povrzanovic-Frykman 2001). In these settlements, language and affiliations 
to Greece were preserved for centuries, or as Björklund (2011) has put it they, 
"remained 'greek' in terms of language, culture and social structure" (ibid p. 123). 
A few hundred years later there was a shift in the meaning of diaspora as the term 
gradually came to imply forced dispersion as associated with the Babylonian Exile 
(Björklund 2011 pp. 124-128; Cohen 1997 pp. 1ff.).  
                                                     
23 For a more thorough discussion of the etymological and historical roots of the diaspora concept, 
see Björklund 2011 pp. 121-128; Tölölyan 1991, 2007. 
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From then until rather recently, diaspora has been a notion addressing first and 
foremost the Jewish experience of exile (Cohen pp. 1ff.; Esman 1986 pp. 12-13; 
Vertovec 1999 p. 130), emphasizing such occurences as deportation from the 
homeland and the catastrophe, losses, trauma and dispersion that followed (Chali-
and and Rageau 1995).24 In line with this the meanings of "reproduction" and 
"acculturation" faded away. Diaspora was for long a notion reserved for a few 
"classical" cases, including the Jewish case depicted as the "paradigmatic case" 
(Brubaker 2005 p. 2), the Greek and the Armenian ones (Chaliand and Rageau 
1997; Vertovec 2009 p. 130).  
In recent decades, criticism of this view of diaspora, which was given priority 
in the Jewish case, has developed. First, it was considered too constrained, since 
there were many well-established migrant communities with experiences of dis-
placement and dispersion, such as the African, the Lebanese, the Chinese and the 
Palestinian, not encompassed by this concept (Tölölyan 2007 p. 648). Secondly, in 
addition as long as the Jewish case was regarded as the paradigmatical one, dias-
poras were generally considered to involve victimization (Wahlbeck 1999 p. 29; 
Brubaker 2005 p. 2). From this it follows that attention was drawn to the fact that 
the Jewish experience was far more multi-faceted and complex than what the em-
phasize on "catastrophe" and trauma implies. Several authors have attempted to 
portray a more diverse picture of the Jewish diaspora narrative. Boyarin and Boya-
rin (2003 pp. 11ff.), for example, shows how memories of family histories, every-
day practices, piety, education and the like contained in people's personal accounts 
seem in most cases seem to have been more relevant to many of them than a sense 
of doom and imaginations regarding catastrophy.  
Cohen (1997) provides many examples of the opposite, such as the advances 
in medicine, art, literature and science made by members of the Jewish diaspora in 
medieval Spain (ibid. pp. 23f.). Cohen's conception recognizes the complexity of 
diasporas and may help one to discern certain key features useful in analysing the 
conditions of people living in diasporic settings (see Povrzanovic-Frykman 2001 
p. 20). Thus, the conditions under which people in a diaspora live might very well 
be safe and flourishing, and be perceived as home (Alinia 2004 p. 320; Alinia 
2007 ; Cohen 1997; Tölölyan 2007 p. 649).  
 
                                                     
24 There are commentators who suggest that Galut is a better term for describing the Jewish experi-
ence. 
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2.3.2 Dispersion, Homeland Orientation and Boundaries 
As the concept of diaspora has become increasingly attended to by scholars new 
and broader definitions and conceptions of it have appeared in the field of migra-
tion research. Whereas some scholars have argued for a more pragmatic use of the 
term, others have advocated greater stringency in the discussion and conceptuali-
sation of the term, without which, it was argued, it would lose its explanatory va-
lue. One of these taking side for a more stringent use of the term is Brubaker 
(2005), who has suggested there to be three "constitutive criteria" for diaspora -  
dispersion, homeland orientation and boundary maintenance.  
He regards dispersion as clearly being one out of three "constitutive" criteria 
for defining diaspora (ibid. p. 5), pointing out that it can be considered recurrent in 
definitions of diaspora generally (see Tölölyan 1991, 1996, 2007; Marienstras 
1989; Cohen 1997; Connor 1986; Safran 1991). Dispersion is the criterion that 
Brubaker considers to be the first and most fundamental one in any attempt to 
define or analyse a diaspora. Dispersion is a trait also included in most scholarly 
definitions of the term. Diaspora necessarily means that the group in question is 
dispersed geographically, across state boundaries. On the basis of various legends, 
biblical texts, literature, historical documents and decrees, dispersion appears to 
have been the hallmark of the Jewish people.  
Tölölyan (2007) points out how the diaspora has often been used inter-
changeably with the term "dispersion". One example of a definition of this sort is 
provided by Connor (1986), which reads as follows: "that segment of a people 
living outside the homeland" (quoted in Tölölyan 2007 p. 649). Indeed, such a 
broad definition makes it possible to use diaspora to describe the most diverse 
groups of migrants, voluntary and involuntary, as well as minorities residing ac-
ross state borders, and all new patterns of mobility across the globe (Björklund 
2011; Brubaker 2005; Chaliand and Rageau 1997; Cohen 1997), such as for ex-
ample "domestic house workers" and "executives of transnational coporations" 
(Tölölyan 2007 pp. 648). Not all of them are necessarily migrants, for example as 
in the cases of "a Queer diaspora" or of transnational adoption in terms of a "dia-
per diaspora" (see, for example, Patton and Sanchez-Appler 2000; Quiroz 2008) 
that have appeared in the literature.  
These widely stretched meanings of the notion and its applications led the 
editor of the journal "Diaspora", Kachig Tölölyan, to write: "Diaspora has become 
an occasion for the celebration of multiplicity and mobility - and a figure of our 
discontent in our being in a world apparently still dominated by the nation states" 
(Tölölyan 1996 p. 28). Many commentators are critical of too broad applications 
of the term. This raising conceptual problems having the consequence of its ending 
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up as a catchword instead of its becoming a useful analytical tool (see, for exam-
ple, Björklund 2011 pp. 115ff. ; Brubaker 2005 p. 1; Tölölyan 2007).25  
It is in the light of such developments that attempts to create a more stringent 
definition of the term are to be understood, in connection with many such attempts 
its being emphasized that homeland is the component that a diaspora evolves 
around. One attempt of this sort was that provided by Safran (1991) in arguing that 
the term diaspora can be applied when "expatriate minority communities share 
several of the following features: 
 
they, or their ancestors, have been dispersed from an original “centre” to two or 
more foreign regions; 
they retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland, in-
cluding its location, history and achievements; 
they believe they are not - and perhaps can never be - fully accepted in their host 
societies and so remain partly separate; 
their ancestral home is idealized and it is thought that, when conditions are favour-
able, either they, or their descendants should return; 
they believe all members of the diaspora should be committed to the maintenance 
or restoration of the original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 
they continue in various ways to relate to that homeland and their ethno-communal 
consciousness and solidarity are in an important way defined by the existence of 
such a relationship (Safran 1991, pp. 83-84). 
 
Indeed most definitions of diaspora refer to the group in question being dispersed 
from a homeland. This implies that a diaspora is dispersed from somewhere and 
thus involves more than simply dispersion (Wahlbeck 1999 p. 33). Homeland ori-
entation is also the second constitutive criteria suggested by Brubaker (2005). He 
notes that the homeland can be "real" or "imagined". At the same time, as many 
scholars have pointed out, an emphasise on "homeland orientation" can be prob-
lematic. Indeed, Safrans' definition has been criticised because of the homeland 
taking such a central position and for it being too rigid as such and for taking dias-
poric discourses as "objective realities" without taking their political dimensions 
into consideration" (Alinia 2004 p. 320). There is a risk, as Khayati (2008) points 
out, that too much attention may be directed at a homeland orientation, whereas as 
a result the conditions under which immigrants lead their "real" lives in countries 
where they reside may become marginalised (p. 15). He argues, in turn that this 
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may be a basis for racism and for the culturalisation of immigrants. This is also a 
problem he argues when a social constructivist approach is employed, since as he 
asserts it aims at "where are you from?" rather than "where are you at?" (Khayati 
2008 p. 15; cf. Hall 2000; Gilroy 1991). This is a risk that should be considered. 
Tölölyan (2007) emphasizes that home must be considered where people live and 
feel at home (ibid. p. 650). Home can also be conceived of as a de-territorialized 
space, Alinia pointing out that the diaspora can be considered to be home (Alinia 
2004 p. 323). Still, I agree with Björklund (2011) that without the perception of a 
homeland there is no basis for speaking about a diaspora. Otherwise there is the 
risk that the idea of diaspora can be, as Tölölyan has put it, "collapsed" (Tölölyan 
2007 p. 647), to its simply meaning dispersion, so that it loses its explanatory va-
lue, or as Tölölyan states: "it is helpful to distinguish it from a dispersion that is 
the consequence of individual and chain migration, motivated by economic rea-
sons" (Tölölyan 2007 p. 649). 
A criticism often raised is that when a homeland orientation is involved in the 
conceputalisation of diaspora, a return movement is generally implied. As Tölöly-
an (2007) emphasizes, however, this can be about a re-turn, without actual 
repatriation: "they turn again and again toward the homeland through travel, remit-
tances, cultural exchange, and political lobbying and by various contingent efforts 
to maintain other links with the homeland” (ibid. p. 649). 
A third constitutive criteria suggested by Brubaker, inspired by Armstrong 
(1976) and Barth (1969), is that of boundary maintenance. Brubaker argues that 
diaspora, "involves the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-á-vis a host society 
(or societies)" (ibid. p. 6), and points out how boundary maintenance can be either 
voluntary or unintended (ibid. p. 5), depending on the circumstances. This is a trait 
of diasporas that also has been noted by Tölölyan, who argues: "Diasporicity ma-
nifests itself in relations of difference" (Tölölyan 2007 p. 650). Important to keep 
in mind is that these differences are imagined and symbolically marked.  
Here Brubaker (2005) points to an "ambivalence in the literature". First, we 
find theories considering "boundary erosion" as representing a constitutive crite-
rion of diaspora. Secondly, we find other scholars emphasizing "boundary mainte-
nance" as a crucial criterion of the phenomenon (ibid. p. 6). 
2.3.3 Consciousness, Cultural Production or Social Formation? 
In the myriad of definitions that have appeared, Vertovec (1999) distinguishes 
three main approaches to diaspora. First there is the one stance considering of 
diasporas as a type of consciousness. This is a stance stemming from post-modern 
and post-colonial theorizing. Such a position is taken by Clifford (1994), who 
emphasizes there being a "diasporic awareness" that develops among what he de-
fines being "diasporan people". Cliffords stance is that diasporas can be minorities 
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that are not necessarily migrants. He argues:"diasporic language appears to be 
replacing, or at least supplementing minority discourse" (Clifford 1994 p. 
311).The mode of thinking behind this stance is the idea that human beings have 
many and diverse origins and many stories to tell. This perspective open things up 
for a very broad application of the diaspora concept, diaspora people being consid-
ered as "being both here and there", weaving together their lives in their original 
and in their new home countries. 
Scholars oriented to post-colonial and/or post-modernist theories have pre-
sented what they describe as "new insights" about diaspora and migration. One 
such insight is that migrants not only are linked to old relationships but also de-
velop new ones, both in their original home country and in the countries in which 
they are residing. In addition migrants establish transnational relationships. All 
these processes going on simultaneously (see, for example, Betrell and Hollifield 
2008 p. 120; Eriksson et al. 1999 Chapter 1; Glick Schiller et al 1994, 1995).  
However, such dual- or multifaceted orientations have long been well known 
to scholars in the migration research area. Both social scientists and historians 
have also since long observed and recognized that migrants tends to adopt a dual 
orientation, their identities being shaped in relation to the sending countries and 
the settlement countries simultaneously (see, for example, Brah 2002; Lundberg 
1989; Povrzanović-Frykman 2001; Wahlbeck 1999; Brubaker 2005; Björklund 
2011). I would rather draw attention to the numerous examples found in the litera-
ture of migrants' developing relationships that in modern terminology are desig-
nated as being "transnational", contacts with their original home countries being 
maintained at the same time.  
Classical works such as The Polish Peasant in Europe and America by Tho-
mas and Znaniecki (1953) and Beyond the Melting Pot by Glazer and Moynihan 
(1963), just to mention two, provide examples of how migrants are simultaneously 
committed to the political, cultural and social life in countries of settlement as well 
as in the countries from which they once emigrated. In Glazer and Moynihan 
(ibid.) it is for example stated that: "And even today, trade with foreign countries 
is still in large measure carried on by nationals of the country involved, who have 
a special knowledge of language and conditions and local customs" (Glazer and 
Moynihan 1963 p. 11). Thus it has long been recognized that migrants play a cer-
tain role in trade and political relations, for example, with their original home 
countries and that contacts with these countries are never entirely broken. What is 
new, I argue, is the unprecedented degree by which communcation, collaboration 
and exchanges are undertaken. 
A diaspora can also be understood in terms of cultural production that can be 
linked to a globalising world (Vertovec 1997; Cohen and Vertovec 1999 p. xix). In 
this vein, diasporas are considered to represent a "world-wild flow of cultural ob-
jects, images and meanings" (p. xix) which points to diasporas being syncretic, 
heterogeneous and incessantly moving. The most prominent representative for this 
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position is Stuart Hall (1999) who asserts that diasporas continuously creates new 
constellations of people, which he refers to as hybridity. In developing his argu-
ments regarding this Hall takes as a point of departure the Afro-Caribean experi-
ence referring to 'the diasporan people', arguing that the "New World", or "Amer-
ica or Terra Incognita", has been the fundamental arena characterized by diaspora 
in which "diversity, hybridity and differences" have developed (Hall 1999 p. 241). 
This can be seen being in interesting contrast to the appoach in which the Jewish 
experience is seen as being perhaps the prime example of diaspora. Like Björklund 
(2011 p. 137), however, I find Hall's argument somewhat contradictory. He refer 
on the one hand to "the Caribbean people" in a way that implies their consituting 
an entity, a group or a community. For instance, he call them "the diasporan peo-
ple". On the other hand, he argues that they represent creolisation, syncretisism 
and argues that the conditions diasporan people live under are constantly in a state 
of flux. According to this view, diaspora is more about boundary transgression or 
boundary erosion than boundary maintenance (Brubaker 2005 pp. 6-7).   
A third approach to this area, propounded by Cohen and Vertovec (Vertovec 
1997; Cohen and Vertovec 1999 p. xvii) is to regard diasporas as a social forma-
tion, or a network or an organisation, that extends across state borders. In this view 
diasporas are to be considered in terms of their being a globally dispersed group or 
network of co-ethnics organised and organizing across state borders. Vertovec 
(1999, 2009) emphasizes this approach to diasporas being useful to illustrating and 
analysing a fundamental problem, that of "how to survive as a group" (Vertovec 
1997 p. 130), or more precisely how to survive as a group in a globalized world.  
If diasporas are to be understood in terms of conciousness or cultural produc-
tion, this assumes a diaspora to be a social formation, its otherwise running the 
risk of being a concept used for "everything in transgression" (Björklund 2011 p. 
138; see also Sökefeld 2006). In line with Björklund I would argue that these two 
positions imply "possible effects" of the diaspora rather than their providing crite-
ria for how a diaspora is to be defined. Sökefeld (2006) suggest that counscious-
ness shall be replaced with "discourse" since: "consciousness nees to be expressed 
in discourse in order to produce social and political effects" (ibid. p. 267). Bru-
baker (2005), referring to what he label "diaspora talk", expresses a skepticism 
toward the idea, often put forward in recent decades, of there being an epochal 
shift in our contemporary world, his asserting that what is considered as "new" 
with a new theory of diasporas in reality not mark a very radical "shift in perspec-
tive" (Brubaker 2005 p. 7). 
This third approach assumes that diasporic people in the areas of "social rela-
tions", "political orientations" and "economic strategies" are oriented towards "a) 
globally dispersed yet self-identified ethnic groups, b) the territorial states and 
contexts where such groups resides, and c) the homeland states and contexts 
whence they or their forbears came" (Sheffer 1986; as quoted by Cohen and Ver-
tovec 1999 p.  xviii). Thus, in this view, the imagining of a homeland that is lost 
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through one's being forced to leave it, one that may be either literal or real (Tölö-
lyan 2007), is a central trait of a diaspora (Björklund 2011 pp. 131-133). Critics 
consider this approach "essentialist" because refering to the Jewish diasporic 
experience and assuming a diaspora to represent a group formation or a network of 
co-ethnics who emphasize their homeland and returning (see, for example, Alinia 
2004; Eriksson et. al 1999 Chapter 1; Hall 1999), however, one should note that, 
most contemporary scholars concerned with subjects such as migration, nationa-
lism, ethnicity and diaspora regard ethnic identities as being situational and as 
being re-constructed continuously there being numerous conflicting identity ac-
counts within any population (Guibernau 1996; Emanuelsson 2005; Lindholm 
Schulz 2003; Björklund 2011; Mandel 2008). Such an approach involves all three 
of the constitutive criteria suggested by Brubaker: dispersion, homeland orienta-
tion and boundary maninteance. 
I would argue however, that there are two additional concerns to be taken ac-
count of. One of the basic issues that Brubaker (2005) brings to the fore is the 
"teleological" approach to a diaspora, one that frequently appears in the scientific 
literature. Brubaker is critical of the idea of a perceived "awakening" of diasporas 
and of diasporas being regarded often as "entities", since not all migrants and 
refugees, in fact commit themselves to either return movements, developments in 
the original homeland or matters of co-ethnic identity. Indeed, there are migrants 
who not perceive of themselves as being in a diaspora at all. Brubaker suggests 
therefore that a diaspora should be considered a stance, rather than an entity, and 
be dealt with as such by reserachers (ibid. p. 13). 
A second concern I would call attention to is that a diaspora has connotations 
for the transnational space as well. The notion of a diaspora alludes to a situation 
of "banishment" and is in that sense reminiscent of the term exile, which in every-
day talk often refers to political refugees as well as people who became refugees 
for reasons other than political ones.26 Diasporic communities also organize, 
communicate and maintain relations across state borders, or as Tölölyan states: 
"Diasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational moment" 
(Tölölyan 1991 p. 4). As Tölölyan also points out, the term transnational is often 
used interchangeably with that of globalization. As such, the diaspora concept is 
useful for gaining an understanding of situations of displacement as well as of de-
territorialized people. In fact globalisation, transnationalism and diaspora are in a 
                                                     
26 One of the lines of argument in Svante Lundberg’s thesis is that “the exile has meaning which is 
part of a collectively maintained definition of the individual precisely a political refugee, and 
which consist in a (declared) intention to return to the home country as the political subject." 
(Lundberg 1989, Chapter 5 and p. 184). 
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way nested with each other (Tölölyan 2007 p. 642). Thus diasporas in which rela-
tions across state borders are maintained are a) globally connected and differenti-
ated and thus b) involve actors who maintain relations to their original homelands, 
to their settlement countries and to transnational spaces. 
2.3.4 Connected and Differentiated  
As noted above, a central feature of diasporas, when considered as social forma-
tions, is that of the aspirations of those involved for sustaining a relationship to co-
ethnic solidarity across state borders (Björklund 2011; Cohen 1997; Vertovec 
1999, 2009; Tölölyan 2007). Diasporas can thus be said to be globally connected, 
at least to an extent, discussions taking place within networks that extend across 
state borders, that protests and actions of solidarity in various places are being 
partly synchronised (Björklund 1993; Marienstras 1989). 
One example of synchronisation is that of protest actions all over Europe tak-
ing place when the Kurdish PKK-leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured by Turkish 
state authorities. The protest actions were violent in some places and were directed 
against official Turkish goals. These protests confronted all members of the dias-
pora community as a whole with questions and dilemmas. Most Kurds, whether 
they sympathized with the PKK or not, were critical to the circumstances under 
which Öcalan had been hijacked and publicly degraded by the Turkish authorities 
(see, for example, Østergaard-Nielsen 2001b). 
Björklund (1993) provides similar examples from the Armenian diaspora. 
One such example was the occurrence of political violence that various Armenian 
diaspora organisations directed against Turkish goals between 1975 and 1985 in 
the cities of Athens, Beirut, Ankara, Paris, Rome, Geneva and Los Angeles. The 
attacks against Turkish embassies, diplomats and the like were all executed in the 
name of the Armenian cause. This confronted the Armenian diaspora with a num-
ber of questions and dilemmas (ibid. pp. 348ff.). 
At the same time diaspora groups are generally highly differentiated and at 
least as heterogeneous as all social communities are. They are internally differen-
tiated because of geographical dispersion, their being located in quite different 
places, and being divided up by class, gender, age and political allegiances, as well 
as by differing experiences in connection with exile and migration. Diaspora 
groups tend to operate at a global and a local level at one and the same time, their 
being both sustaining solidarity with co-ethnic members of them worldwide and 
adjusting to the social and political culture in the countries in which they reside. 
Thus, there is a wide range of different movements and organisations with differ-
ing motives and aims that endeavour to represent the interests of the people and 
peoples belonging to them (Shain 1989; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001b).  
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Thus, diasporas can be mobilised globally and closely connected, and yet be very 
much divided up by social, political and cultural differences within. 
2.3.5 Triadic Relations and Transnationalism 
Various authors with a post-colonial or post-modern perspective assert that what 
they label as "traditional diaspora theories" put too much weight on analysing di-
asporas through the lense of the nation state and criticize the idea that diasporas 
are linked to a certain place or a given history of origin (Eriksson et. al. 1999 pp. 
44ff.). I would agree that diasporas, also when considered as social formations, 
must be seen in relation to transnational spaces. Diasporas are actors on a trans-
national arena. They operate across state boundaries and are involved in complex 
relations with actors who are considered to be external. Diasporas definitively 
contains a political dimension (Castles and Miller 2009 pp. 295ff.). Clearly they 
play a major role on the political arenas, both in intra-state and in international 
conflicts, although they are mostly not the decisive factor in these conflicts (Shain 
1989).  
The dual or even transnational orientation of diasporas is pivotal for their po-
litical commitments. Individual members, as well as political groups and organisa-
tions belonging to a diaspora may influence the economic and political relations 
between the countries involved. Members of the diaspora work not only through 
their own organisations but also through political parties and institutions in the 
countries of settlement. They can provide economic or military support to opposi-
tion movements in their original home countries, and they can either act legally or 
illegally in the diaspora (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001a p. 186).  
Important to consider moreover, is the potential that diasporas can have in 
political and social processes in their original home countries, through economic 
remittances and through social and political knowledge they possess. Until re-
cently this actions of this kind were initiated mainly of the initiatives of the mi-
grants themselves, although a shift can be noted in recent years, where govern-
ments, as well as international organisations, more often than before involve dias-
poras in various political processes and projects aimed at development (see Castles 
and Miller 2009 pp. 70-73; DeHaas 2006).  
This phenomenon is referred to by Gabriel Sheffer (1986) as "triadic" rela-
tions that diasporic groups are involved in - reflecting relations between the coun-
try of settlement, the country of origin and the institutions and actors that belong to 
the different diaspora groups. This can lead to intricate, complicated and some-
times tense relations between all the actors involved (ibid. p. 11). 
One can note first, that the activism of diasporas concerns relations between 
the diaspora and the regime in the country of settlement, whether it is possible at 
all for members of diaspora groups to organise and act politically, in order to pro-
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tect their own interests, depends on the structure of society and the political system 
in the receiving country (Esman 1986 pp. 344, 348). Diasporas may work in dia-
logue with the host society, using that society’s political institutions to endeavour 
to put pressure on the regime in the country of origin, working through their own 
organisations and directing activities of national actors in the country of settlement 
or international organisations, or they might work illegally through underground 
organisations. The political successes and misfortunes of the Jewish diaspora can 
serve as a clear example. In the US the Jewish diaspora is politically well organ-
ised and has had the possibility of acting successfully as a forceful pressure group. 
Conversely Jews residing in Russia and other states of the former USSR, have 
been met with suspicion and been regarded as dissidents and agitators if they act in 
this way (Esman 1986 p. 338). Crucial for the success of a diaspora group is also 
their internal political organisation and political experiences.  
Secondly, one can note that the activism of diasporas is an issue that concerns 
to a considerable degree the regimes in their countries of origin. The interest that 
regimes in the countries of origin take in diasporas can be either positive or nega-
tive for the diaspora group involved. Sometimes the diaspora is seen as an eco-
nomic or political asset by the regime in their countries of origin and one they 
willingly exploit. For example Ministry of Indians Overseas support Diaspora 
Knowledge Network as a way to present high skilled Indians abroad with opportu-
nities and job openings in India (Castles and Miller 2009 p. 71).  
An example of such phenomena often referred to is the economic and mili-
tary support that for a long time was given Israel by the US, as a result of the ac-
tivities of the Jewish diaspora in the US (Esman 1986 p. 346). Moroccan and 
Turkish regimes supported and initiated regime friendly immigrant organisations 
in Western Europe (Castles and Miller 2009 p. 72). In recent years Turkey has 
showed an increasing interest in the Turkish diaspora living in Europe, realising 
the economic and political potential it holds. However, the activities of diasporas 
are often regarded as a threat by the regimes in their countries of origin. There are 
occasions on which members of the diaspora are looked upon suspiciously and 
accused of lacking solidarity with their new home country (Østergaard-Nielsen 
2001a; Lundberg 1989; Shain 1989).  
Third, since diasporas to a large extent act politically in transnational and 
global arenas, their activism may also be an issue that concerns the international 
community. Diaspora organisations and migrant groups increasingly act through 
non-state-based organisations. One example is that of the Turks and Kurds in 
Germany who act throughout Europe with the aim to mobilise public opinion on 
issues such as Turkeys' possible membership of the European Union, human rights 
in Turkey and so forth (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001a). 
It can be assumed that in political conflicts diasporic people are sometimes 
more loyal to the regime in the old home country than that in the country of resi-
dence. On some occasions members of the diaspora are met with suspicion and 
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with growing hostility by the surrounding society (Castles and Miller 2009 pp. 
291ff.; Chaliand and Rageau 1997 passim). History provides many examples of 
how population groups, also that have resided for a long time in a given country, 
feel unsafe and threatened and may be subjected to persecution and xenophobia of 
different forms. Outbursts of anti-Semitism in places where Jewish communities 
have resided for a long time and in which they were well integrated are an exam-
ple. Further examples are the anti-Chinese riots in Denver in the 1880s and the 
massacre of Chinese residents in Indonesia in 1965 and 1970. The genocide of the 
Jews, together with the persecutions of gypsies are horrendous examples from our 
own time (Chaliand and Rageau 1997 pp. 27, 50ff., 106, 134, 136). 
On the other hand, there are examples of diasporic groups being critical of 
the regimes in the countries of origin and supporting resistance movements and 
opposition groups there (Castles and Miller 2009 pp. 278ff.). Under such circum-
stances representatives of diasporic groups may seek for help from the regimes in 
their countries of settlement, bring their cause into international forums or act on 
their own. In fact, relations between diasporas and the countries of origin are in 
many cases extremely sensitive. The regime in the country of origin may attempt 
to put  pressure on members of the diasporic group to act in favour of their inter-
ests.  
Finally, the existence of a diaspora may contribute to complications between 
the original country and the country of settlement. Powerholders in the country of 
origin may feel threatened by activities initiated by diasporic groups inducing the 
governments in the countries of settlement to circumscribe the activities of the 
diaspora (Shain 1989; Esman 1986 pp. 341ff.). 
2.3.5 Summary of the Section 
In this section it has been demonstrated that diaspora is a complex concept with 
many connotations. I argue that a diaspora must be understood as a stance and an 
imagined social formation involving the three constitutive criteria of diaspora as 
identified by Brubaker. First, and perhaps most widespread, is the connotation of 
dispersion that a diaspora has. A diaspora is a group, a community, or a network 
of people dispersed to at least two foreign countries. There are other traits in-
volved, however, which if ignored engender the risk of diaspora being reduced to a 
state of dispersion alone.  
Here we arrive at the second constitutive criteria for a diaspora, namely that 
of homeland orientation. In most conceptualisations of the term it is assumed that 
a diaspora is created by dispersion from a homeland. In addition it is assumed that 
a relationship to this homeland is maintained. The homeland in question may be 
either "real" or "imagined". Important to consider is that diasporic people maintain 
relationships across state boundaries, with sending countries and in networks with 
  
85 
co-ethnics, that extends across state boundaries. Thus, they can also be regarded as 
actors in triadic relations and transnational spaces. The third criterion is that of the 
maintenance of boundaries, imagined, flux and porous. 
2.4 Long-Distance Nationalism 
This section concerns the notion of long-distance nationalism. This is a term of 
relevance for the thesis since the men and women belonging to the generation of 
major concern here feel strongly identified with the Kurdish nation and has been 
involved in pro-Kurdish activism during a particular time period. This generation  
came together in currents of struggling for the Kurdish issue in Turkey and also in 
diasporic settings. The sense of identity of these persons was conditioned by 
events that they experienced in a common historical location. Their imagination of 
a Kurdish community is a central feature of their narratives. 
It shall be emphasised however, that the nationalism emerging among these 
migrants is not identical with the nationalism that develops in their countries of 
emigration. A nationalist movement that develops and/or reorganizes in exile set-
tings is not the same movement as the one that developed in the country of imag-
ined origin. Rather, the nationalism constructed by migrants or exiles and in dias-
poric settings is constructed in, and is strongly affected by, the political, social and 
cultural settings in which the migrants reside and act (see, for example, Anderson 
1992 pp. 4ff.; Olsson 2007 p. 221).  
It is a well known phenomenon that many of the early nationalist movements 
developed outside the imagined home countries. In describing nationalist currents 
that developed in the colonies in the Americas and Latin American countries An-
derson (1992) writes of "non-Spanish Spaniards" and "non-English Englishmen" 
in referring to early nationalist movements of immigrants who were oriented po-
litically, culturally and economically to their countries of emigration for long after 
they had settled down in the colonies. Anderson writes: "It was of great historical 
importance that the exiles did eventually make their place of exile a heimat, and 
that this attachement produced those classical nationalist movements which found 
their final political form in the world's first cluster of true nation-states; and that, 
however turbulent their domestic lives, these states kept their boundaries more or 
less unchanged up till our own era" (Anderson 1992 p. 4). 
2.4.1 The Concept 
Nationalism is both a political doctrine and a theoretical concept. Empirical obser-
vations indicate that nationalism is a shifting phenomenon, appearing in various 
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forms and shapes across the globe. Nationalisms appear in the form of radical 
liberation movements, and in extremely conservative versions, can be imple-
mented from above by state powers, and from below by minority groups strug-
gling for self-determination. They can be produced within the homelands they 
aspire to or through transnational networks. Hence, nationalism is a paradoxical 
phenomenon in many respects. On the one hand, it has been emulated as a model 
of political organisation all over the world and could in a way be considered a 
universal principle. On the other hand, a central feature of every form of national-
ism, in a political ideological sense, is the emphasis on specific and particularistic 
traits of the people included (Hettne et al. 1998 p. 405). 
Thus, contemporary political developments and ideological discourses within 
nationalist movements frequently nurture an understanding of nationalism at more 
theoretical level. As a theoretical concept, nationalism is not very complicated. 
Ernest Gellner’s often quoted definition of the term reads for example: "National-
ism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national 
unit should be congruent." (Gellner 1983 p. 1). 
This definition provided by Gellner has become widely accepted (see, for ex-
ample, Hobsbawm 1990 p. 9). Nationalism is a term alluding to political inde-
pendence, at the same time as it is implied that the national, political and territorial 
can differ from one another. Aspirations for political independence are often 
pointed out as being one of the most crucial facets in the political doctrine of na-
tionalism. In addition nationalism theory involves the idea of a "people" and "cul-
ture".  
It seem plausible to assume, therefore, that nationalism emanates from differ-
ent spheres of society, its thus appearing in a variety of forms and shape, such as 
state building or liberation movements, radical or conservative movements, trans-
national and long-distance movements, irredentism and secessionism. Nationalism 
is clearly related to aspirations of possessing political sovereignty or to joy at hav-
ing it. Hence, nationalism is closely related to concepts such as "state", "nation" 
and "ethnie". These components will be discussed more in detail in the next sec-
tion. 
2.4.2 State, Nation and Ethnie 
As noted in the section above, nationalism connotes to the existence of political 
independence as well as acceptance of the idea of a people. It possesses dimen-
sions of nation as well as of a state, although in everyday speech these two are not 
always separated. Rather, these two concepts are surrounded by confusion, since 
they are often used somewhat thoughtlessly in a reciprocal manner. In everyday 
speech these terms are often used interchangeably. The United Nations is an or-
ganisation for example composed of states. The term nation is often used to refer 
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to a state, but is sometimes also used with the meaning of "cultural community". 
The concept alludes to the independenc of a nation, this being complicated by 
difficulties in defining and delimiting what a nation reprents. 
One of the most influential thinkers regarding modern state formations is 
Max Weber. He distanced himself from the Marxist class-based conceptualisation 
of states, since he “believed that Marxists’ political ambitions took as their prem-
ise a deficient understanding of the modern state, the organising principles of poli-
tics and the complexity of political life” (Held 1992 p. 114). Weber did not deny 
the importance of economic mechanisms and class structure in the state-building 
processes, but he stressed the autonomy of state powers vis-à-vis society.27 Weber 
did never develop a cohesive theory of states, but rather his thinking circled 
around a handful of crucial concepts, those of territory, violence and legitimacy. 
His focus on violence, however have been widely critisised in modern theorising 
(see, for example, Mann 1993 pp. 54-63; Hall and Ikenberry 2003; Jongerden 
2007 pp. 15ff.). 
In modern theorising on state formation, these key concepts of his have been 
further elaborated upon by Mann (1993 Chapter 3) with the aim of obtaining an 
operative and modern definition of what a state is. He suggests the following defi-
nition of it: 
 
1. The State is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel  
2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a 
center, to cover a  
3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises 4. some degree of authorita-
tive, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force.  
(Mann 1993 p. 55). 
 
If Weber was guided by a conviction, in regard to modern societies, that "obedi-
ence in virtue of belief in the justifiability of legality" of " rationally created rules" 
(Held 1992 p. 114; Weber 1972 p. 79), Mann complicates one of the basic princi-
ples in Weber’s thinking on how modern states are constituted, namely Weber’s 
argument that the monopoly of physical violence is pivotal if state power should 
be maintained. Mann comments: "Many historic states did not “monopolise” the 
means of physical force, and also in the modern state the means of physical force 
have been substantially autonomous from the rest of the state" (see Mann 1993 p. 
55). 
                                                     
27 A good review of the major schools of state-formation theories is provided by Mann 1993 Chap-
ter 3. See also Hall and Ikenberry 2003. 
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"Nation" is a far more ambiguous concept than that of "state". In order to under-
stand its complexity adequately it can be illuminating to discuss its semantic 
meaning and its transformation. A glance in Collins English Dictionary provides 
one with the following, rather broad, definition:  
 
1) an aggregation of people or peoples of one or more cultures, races etc. organized 
into a single state : the Australian nation 
2) a community of persons not constituting a state but bound by a common descent, 
language, history etc. the French-Canadian nation. 
3 a) a federation of tribes esp. the American Indians. 
3 b) the territory occupied by such a federation [via Old French from Latin natio 
birth, tribe from nasc~ı to be born].  
(from Collins English Dictionary, Glasgow: 2000 p. 1035). 
 
Thus nation is a concept having broad applications. On the one hand, nations can 
be confused with states, since the concept is used in order to signify a community 
based upon a territorial state. On the other hand, a nation may equally well be a 
community sharing certain traits and values, but not constituting a state. Finally, 
the term "nation" denote a tribe, both as a social and a territorial unit. Today, the 
concept possesses political connotations that it did not have from the beginning. 
As stated in the quotation above, the term nation, is derived from the Latin word 
Nascor (Natio), originally meaning "born" and indicating there to be a common 
descent or origin. The term appeared in ancient Rome, where it held a pejorative 
ring and was used to distinguish people from a certain geographic area that were 
seen as having a status below that of Roman citizens. In addition the term "nation" 
used in the sense of its meaning a group of foreign persons who were born in the 
same place. In the Middle Ages, the term nation was one used at universities for 
categorizing people originating from various geographical areas (Greenfeld 1992 
pp. 3-9, Hobsbawm 1990 p. 14). 
In time the term "nation" became increasingly frequently first equated with 
"people", and it has in recent centuries gradually come to mean "sovereign peo-
ple", indicating an equating of nation, people and state. National identity, in its 
conventional contempory use, should then mean membership or belonging to a 
certain "people" (Hobsbawm 1990 pp. 15-18; Eriksen 1993 p. 97; Greenfeld 1992 
pp. 6-8; Smith 1986, 1991), and in addition a "people" that can be connected with 
a particular territory. The political meaning that the concept of nation has pertains 
not only to a territorial unity, but also to "popular sovereignty" and to "people of a 
common origin". Gradually "nation" as a loaned word, also acquired more or less 
the same meaning as the word "Volk" in the German language (Hobsbawm 1990 
pp. 15ff.).  
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The term "ethnicity" shows many similarities with that of "nation". "Ethnicity" 
originates from the Greek word Ethnikos, which etymologically means "foreign 
people". Nowadays, the term has acquired connotations similar to those of ‘na-
tion’. The term was introduced in the English language in the mid-14th century 
and for a long time was used generally in the sense of meaning "heathen" or "pa-
gan", but in the course of time it acquired racial connotations (O'Dell 2002; Erik-
sen 1993 pp. 3-4; Johansson 2000a). In the US, for example, "ethnic" in the period 
around the Second World War was used for "referring to Jews, Italians, Irish and 
other people considered inferior to the dominant group of largely British descent" 
(Eriksen 1993 p. 4).  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the term came to be used more 
broadly than earlier, in its being used to replace the concept of "race". One of the 
intentions was to change the connotations of the term "people", so it would no 
longer purport "ties of kinship" but would instead refer to cultural belonging. The 
intention was that it should be associated simply with people’s sharing a common 
culture with no connotation of race. It was assumed that the term "ethnicity" pos-
sessed more proper descriptive values. It is argued, however, by Gilroy (2000), for 
example, that allusions to "race" and "kinship" are still manifest in popular de-
bates, as well as in academic discourses on ethnicity, culture and nationalism, its 
thus contributing to providing a picture of people based upon hereditary character-
istics (Johansson 2000a; O’Dell 2002). 
"Ethnicity" was long considered to be a phenomenon that stems from isola-
tion, representing the view that "ethnic groups" are organised on the basis of cohe-
sive cultural "units" or groups. This view has been more or less abandoned in 
modern theorising. Fredrik Barth (1969), who is one of the harshest critics of such 
an approach to "ethnicity", has observed in his fieldwork that "ethnic groups" are 
continuously in contact with one another. Eriksen (1993) points out that one of the 
focal points in his criticism is that: "First, a focus on the cultural uniqueness of 
ethnic groups wrongly presupposes that groups tend to be isolated. On the con-
trary, Barth suggests, shared culture may profitably be seen as an implication or 
result of a long-term social process, rather than as a primordial feature of groups" 
(Eriksen 1993 p. 37). 
In addition, Barth draws attention to the fact that there tends to be a flow of 
people crossing the boundaries between most "ethnic groups", which in turn en-
genders cultural variations within and between groups. Thus, Barth's view that 
"ethnic groups" are essentially to be considered as social organisations (Barth 
1969 p. 11; Eriksen 1993 p. 37). With that Barth rejects definitions of the term 
"ethnic groups" that are based on criteria or elements of "objective culture" (see, 
for example, Eriksen 1993 p. 12). 
The concepts of "nation" and "ethnie", like those of "national identity" and 
"ethnicity" are often used reciprocally. There is no doubt that these concepts have 
many traits in common. Both "nations" and "ethnies" entail the establishment of a 
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dichotomization between "us" and "them". The idea is that belonging to "ethnies" 
and "nations" contributes to create a sense of community between the individuals 
in the group to build a common collective identity. At the same time, it is argued 
that through mechanisms that create shared cultural values and a sense of solidar-
ity, a distinctiveness is created that helps people to separate themselves from other 
"ethnies" or "nations".  
There is one major difference between these concepts, however, one that is 
generally recognised by researchers, namely that the political connotations com-
monly associated with "nation" and with "national identity", contrary to "ethnie" 
and "ethnicity", imply aspirations for independence, self-determination and politi-
cal autonomy (see, for example, Eriksen 1993 pp. 7, 98-100; Johansson 2000a pp. 
97-98). A nation being viewed as a community is not restricted to the political and 
administrative spheres only. Nations, or rather the idea of nations, permeates al-
most all spheres of modern societies, political, economic, cultural and social.28  
2.4.3 Constructed, Imagined, Challenging 
Contemporary scholars studying issues of nationalism largely agrees on an "in-
strumentalist" or "constructivist" approach to the phenomenon. According to this 
approach national identities are modern phenomena and "invented" affinities 
rather than natural ones. Yet very few scholars in the field are proponents of a 
"radical constructivism". 
One of those who most clearly adhere to the position that nations are socially 
constructed entities is Ernest Gellner, who describes nations in terms of their being 
the artefacts of modern societies (Gellner 1983 p. 7). He consider nations in terms 
of contingencies, describing them as a time-bound phenomena attributed to the 
structural transformation of industrial society, which requires homogenous social 
entities. In Gellner's view nations are essentially created through the political pro-
ject of the state, by nationalism and essentially from above: 
 
Nationalism is not the awakening to self-consciousness: it invents nations where 
they do not exist. 
 (Gellner 1964 p. 169). 
 
National identities are thus based on shared cultures, although in the view of Gell-
ner, cultures are created by the "will" of its members. As Gellner states: 
                                                     
28 In the following I will use the terms ethnie and nation interchangeably. 
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Initially there were two especially promising candidates for the construction of a 
theory of nationality: will and culture.  
(Gellner 1983 p. 53, see also p. 7) 
 
Gellner also points to arbitrariness as being a typical feature in national history 
writing. It is not that Gellner rejects the existence of historical-cultural units. His 
objection is directed against the earlier predominant idea that there is a continuity 
with earlier existing ethnic communities or old cultural communities. Rather, he 
considers modern nations to be constructed in order to suit the aims of modern 
nationalists, "historic facts", myths and cultural elements thus being intertwined in 
accounts of nationalism that are invented and arbitrarily composed. Gellner states 
polemically: 
 
The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical 
inventions. Any old shred or patch would have served as well.  
(Gellner 1983 p. 55) 
 
Hence in Gellner's view a nation is invented and fabricated. Benedict Anderson 
(1991) takes a different modernist position inspired by post-modern perspectives 
in defining a nation as "an imagined political community - and imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign" p. 6). A nation is imagined since it is impossible 
that all its members, even in the smallest of nations, are acquainted with or even 
have heard of each other. The nation unites members from the past, the present 
and the future. Hence, the nation must necessarily be something imagined. A na-
tion is limited because it never includes all mankind, or as Anderson put it: "even 
the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has fi-
nite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations" (Anderson 1991 p. 7).  
One crucial aspect of Anderson's definition is that a nation is "imagined as a 
community" because it is a solidarity form capable of binding people together, 
despite inequalities and social divisions (ibid. p. 7). He draws our attention to the 
idea that any society larger than a small primordial one in which all inhabitants 
can meet face-to-face must necssarily be imagined. This is not only an issue of 
space, since the possibility of meeting other nationals also involves a time perspec-
tive. Anderson argues that since shared cultural values, such as the historical 
memories that link the past and the present, cannot be remembered, they must 
necessarily be narrated. Anderson shows how nations can be imagined in numer-
ous ways, from different social positions in the same society, the "official national-
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ism" implemented by the state representatives, and the "popular nationalism" initi-
ated by the bourgeoisie (Anderson 1991 pp. 67ff., 83ff.).29 
Anderson shares Gellner's view in maintaining that nations are modern, so-
cially invented phenomena. However, his modernist lenses are different from Gell-
ner's. Anderson is critical, at least as regards the use of historical memories in 
modern nation building processes. Whereas Gellner views nationalities being fab-
ricated, Anderson consider them as being narrated. In my view, Andersons ap-
proach gives room to recognizing the importance of how people perceive of and 
practice nationality, and emphasizing the importance of how memories, events and 
the like are incorporated into nation building processes, and into shared collective 
meanings in history writing.  
Anderson and Gellner both draw our attention to the circumstance that the 
elements that the nations consists of are socially invented and shifting. However, I 
find Gellner's argumentation to be problematical for three reasons at least. First, 
Gellner's theoretical point of departure is that nation building processes are neces-
sarily implemented from above, which tend to make his analysis narrow-minded 
and state-centred. Secondly, Gellner's theorising is based mainly on an account of 
the European nation-building process. I find his conceptualisation of nation to be 
"static" and one-sided. Gellner provides an analysis of the social consequences of 
an emergent industrial society, but has no ambitions of looking beyond. Third, in 
line with that Gellner confines himself to considering the rational effects of na-
tionalism as being "an offspring of industrialisation" (Jongerden 2007 p. 19), but 
tends to neglect its dark sides or, as Jongerden puts it, "appear to have missed out 
perhaps the most important of all 20th century facts, the Second World War and the 
Holocaust, the direct results of nationalism as expressed through the rise of fas-
cism and its culmination in Nazism" (ibid. p. 19). 
The definition of nations as "imagined communities" that Anderson provides, 
I would argue, can better serve as a useful analytical tool than Gellner's. It is open-
ended and neutral, recognising both the political and cultural aspects of nations, 
without claiming that any particular elements need necessarily be included. Thus, 
Anderson's conceptualisation holds to general claims, with few defining attributes, 
that are easy to apply in analysing nations of the most shifting forms, whether they 
are based on "ethnic" or "civic" principles. Anderson's approach can be helpful for 
scrutinizing how nation-building processes are imagined by individual members of 
a nation, thus taking account both of objective and of subjective definitions, mak-
ing it possible to reveal how the elements of a particular nation are composed. 
However, nations are paradoxical phenomena, their being both "universal" and 
                                                     29	   Compare with the discussion on popular proto-nationalisms and the government perspective on 
nationalism in Hobsbawm 1992 Chapters 2 and 3. 
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"particular" at the same time. In Anderson's approach, the specific historic circum-
stances are not accounted for.  
Anthony D. Smith, who strongly emphasises the historical continuity of na-
tions, argues that nationalism derives its force and its mobilising potential pre-
cisely from its "historical embeddedness" (Smith 1995 p. viii, 153). The theoreti-
cal position that Smith takes is sometimes labeled "perennialist," placing it in be-
tween the "essentialists/primordialist" and the "constructivists/instrumentalists" 
(Smith 1986, 1991, 1995; Guibernau 1996). In this view, the persistence of ethnic-
ity in nation building processes is emphasised. Nations are seen as having their 
origins in 'ethnic cores', these providing a means of establishing a collective loca-
tion, their existing long before the era of modernization. Consequently the old 
ethnic cultures inevitably become politizised in the modern world, a process that 
also implies a territorialisation of cultures (Smith 1986 pp. 155ff.). 
Smith proposes that a nation should be defined by at least some of the follow-
ing elements, "a named human population sharing a historic territory, common 
myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and 
common legal rights and duties for its members" (Smith 1991 p. 14). 
Also, if nations are built on "ethnic cores" or "ethnies" as Smith also refers to 
them, they contain both "ethnic" and "civic" elements.30 Smith points to the salient 
role that specific historical circumstances and particular experiences under which 
the nation-building process took shape play in people's perceptions of their na-
tional belonging. I agree with those who warn that Smith's theoretical approach 
has many shortcomings and contains many fallacies. I am critical of the idea that 
nations are chiefly built upon "ethnic cores" that long existed as "potential na-
tions," since this is an assumption that inevitably leads to an essentialist position 
31. An advantage with Smith's theoretical approach, as compared with Anderson's, 
is that the incorporation of historical circumstances and experiences from the past 
that really took place are accounted for. A further important aspect of Smith's ap-
proach is that account is taken of the persistence of ethnic affinities that mainly 
extend through successive generations.  
Indeed, as both Gellner and Anderson remarked, myths and legends, memo-
ries of events and personalities are retold in a selective way in nationalist dis-
courses. This is a matter not rejected by Smith, however, he points out that what is 
most important is not whether historical accounts and memories are authentic, but 
their integrative purposes that matter. An important matter that cannot be ne-
glected is that people perceive the shared historic memories and cultural values 
                                                     
30 Smith is influenced by Hans Kohn (1944) who originally introduced a model that makes a dis-
tinction between an "Eastern" and "Western" form of nation. This distinction has been criticised 
for example by Anderson (1991) and Guibernau (1996).  
31  This is discussed at length in Anderson (1991). 
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that constitutes their national belonging as being real rather than fabricated or in-
vented. This, I think, is recognized in Smith's theoretical approach. 
2.4.4 Three Central Aspects of Long-Distance Nationalism 
In this section I will outline three main aspects of nationalism that are recurrent in 
the literature and that I find crucial to our understanding of nationalist movements, 
be they long-distance nationalist movements or popular currents that develop as 
resistance movements within states or nationalisms created from above by gov-
ernments. I will first argue that nationalism necessarily is guided by the idea of 
homogenity, secondly, that nationalism is about creating and maintaining bounda-
ries vis-à-vis imagined "others," and thirdly, that nationalism(s) are dynamic phe-
nomena. Within every nationalist movement there is an ongoing discussion about 
who is allowed to represent the nation. Hence national belonging is continously 
contested. 
2.4.4.1 A Vision of a "Homogeneous People" 
A central facet of nationalism is the idea that a nation consists of a homogeneous 
group of people sharing a common origin, their thus making claims to a common 
territory and history. Nationalism thus strives to create "a people" with a common 
origin, sharing a common history and linked to a common territory.  
First, it creates a common history. In accordance with the rhetoric of nation-
alism it becomes important to show that the population has a history in common. 
Claims of historical continuity can be articulated in many ways. As was implied in 
the section above history writing has become one of the most important features of 
every nationalist movement. For these endeavours, nationalists make use of his-
torical records, ancient myths, legends and cultures, although generally in a very 
selective way. Myths are created from legends and also from events that took 
place in the past, that might well be glorious or traumatic, such as periods of 
oppression or of migration. Personalities from the past or from mythology may be 
given the status of being heroes and become glorified. In nationalist accounts, 
events and personalities that are ranked as being prominent are often radically 
transformed to suit the purposes of the nationalist discourses of the day. In the 
course of time they can be replaced, erased or just fade away.  
Another feature that often appears in nationalist accounts is the idea that a na-
tion originates from prosperous societies or epochs in the past, in the Smith's ter-
minology designated as "golden ages," that serve as "focal points of comparison 
with the present" (Smith 1986 p. 200). The memories preserved and reactivated 
from the Golden Age contribute to providing the population hope that the high 
status of the past will be recovered, and finally acquired once again. Memories of 
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the past constitute moral examples for the population (Smith 1986 pp. 22, 67; 
1991 pp. 66, 126).  
Secondly, nationalism creates its own myths which serve the purpose of justi-
fying its legitimacy. These myths serve as instruments used by contemporary na-
tionalists, and moreover also have explanatory values. The myths that accounts for 
the situation of the present, may serve to explain why the nation is suppressed, is 
glorious or is in a tense relation to a neighbouring country.  
Third, nationalism creates common symbols and traditions purportedly de-
rived from local popular cultures. Flags, coins, national hymens and festival days 
are symbols that often allude to ancient heritages, their representing the nation in 
modern times, together with sport events (Eriksen 1993 p. 10), and that have pro-
ved to serve as effective means in the construction of common heritages, values 
and culture that appeal to the whole strata of the population.  
Fourth, nationalism aims at creating a shared culture, shared values and a 
sense of community. Gellner (1983 p. 34) emphasize that in modern industrial 
societies the educational institutions often play a major role in the socialization 
process of its members. Thus these institutions are crucial in the process of creat-
ing homogeneous socities. Anderson (1991 p. 97) and Hobsbawm (1990 p. 12) 
have discussed the significance of the vernaculars. In modern societies education 
needs to be provided in terms of vernacular languages if one is to speak of mass 
education at all. This is a differince from older times when persons belonging to 
the upper strata of society tended to be educated in Latin, Greek or French.  
Finally, as Benedict Anderson (1991 p. 7) writes, "the nation is always con-
ceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship". Thus the aim of nationalism is to create 
a form of solidarity that bind people from all social classes and strata in a given 
community together. In this respect it is different from most other forms of collec-
tive belonging, such as for example "class", which is based on socio-economic 
divisions. Class is moreover appealing to internationalism in accordance with the 
motto, "workers all over the world, unite". Nationalism is ostensibly uniting the 
poorest of proletarians with the richest most landed ones in a given country (An-
derson 1991 p. 7; Eriksen 1993 p. 102).  
As Anderson and Smith point out, however, nationalism has in this respect 
certain affinity with religion. This becomes obvious as regards its capacity to bind 
together people from all society together. In turn this is explaining in part the 
strong mobilising potential that nationalism possesses (see Anderson 1991; Smith 
1991, 1986). Anderson draws attention to that this, in turn being one of the prob-
lems of nationalism: "Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the 
past two centuries for so many of millions of people, not so much to kill, as will-
ingly die for such limited imaginations." (Anderson 1991 p. 7). 
Thus, a central feature in nationalism is that of the aspirations it creates for 
achieving a sense of solidarity and for creating shaping a "we" that is distinct from 
people belonging to other nations. Nationalism strives, through history writing, 
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myths, symbols, traditions and the initiation of common values that are viewed as 
"ours" to create a common past and present, providing its members with prospects 
of a common future. Thus, homogenisation is an important aspect of nationalism. 
2.4.4.2 Maintaining Boundaries 
The idea that nations consist of homogeneous populations implies that only a "par-
ticular" people are to be included in a nation. Thus, nations presuppose the exis-
tence of boundaries. Through history, myths, symbols, culture and shared values, 
typologies are created that help people hold them separate from other groups, cre-
ating a dichotomisation between "us" and "them." 
National identities presuppose there to be other nations as well. Thus, one of 
the central facets of nationalism is to uphold boundaries against "the others", thus 
excluding some people at the same time as others are included. Maintaining 
boundaries becomes crucial in order to separate population groups from one an-
other, whether it be national groups or ethnic.  
One of the first to emphasize the role of boundaries in the articulation and 
maintenance of ethnic belongingness was Fredrik Barth (1969), who asserted that 
the ethnic belongingness persists also in multi-cultural environments and in proc-
esses of interdependence as a result of which interaction between groups, or be-
tween internal and external agents, does not lead to the elimination of any of the 
groups involved.  
A central point in Barth's argumentation is that ethnicity is preserved and ma-
intained by the very social processes that create boundaries against "the other". 
The, boundaries and the processes of maintaining them determine and establish 
who is to be included in the group or excluded from it. These boundaries are nei-
ther given nor static, and are created through interaction between internal and ex-
ternal agents. Barth concludes that ethnic boundaries are always social but do not 
necessarily have territorial counterparts. Thus, Barth advocates that studies of 
ethnicity be directed at the boundaries and not at the cultural contents they sur-
round (Barth 1969 p. 14). 
The idea that the boundaries of ethnies and of nations are socially con-
structed, elastic and flexible, resulting in the contents included shifting in line with 
the political, social and cultural developments over time. Exactly where the 
boundaries run is a matter disputed incessantly. 
Barth's research dealt with ethnic boundaries. As was just indicated, however, 
the difference between nation and ethnie is subtle, the mechanisms appearing to be 
similar, though in a nationalist context the borders are politicised. Maintaining 
boundaries is a central aspect of nationalism, since the process of creating a sense 
of community among those belonging to a nation is also exclusive of others (An-
derson 1991; Billig 1999; Gellner 1983; Greenfeld 1992; Hobsbawm 1990; Smith 
1991).   
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2.4.4.3 Contested Belonging 
Beneath the surface of the forced homogenisation inherent in nationalist ideolo-
gies, nations can be seen as often being highly heterogeneous, many questions 
being highly contested and disputed. Throughout history, most societies have been 
marked by significant social inequalities, thus being far more fragmented and het-
erogeneous in character than what is presumed to be the case in nationalist ac-
counts. In reality, there are always grey zones and hatch-crossings to be consid-
ered in nation building projects, since people have always been crossing national 
borders, having migrated, or married across national borders, resulting in children 
who are the offspring of cross-national marriages, and the like.  
For one thing, historically it has been widely observed that nationalism tends 
to be unevenly spread across various strata of a population, with the consequence 
that it often takes a long time before the entire population shares the conception of 
their belonging to a nation they have in common. Ideas of nationalism are often 
first embraced by intellectuals and within elitist circles, and thereafter come 
gradually to be supported by broader strata of the population, different popular 
movements successively developing (see, for example, Guibernau 1996; Hroch 
1985; Hobsbawm 1990 p. 12; and Yapp 1996). 
In addition, nationalism tends to be articulated and perceived in a myriad of 
different ways by various groups and individuals within the state simultaneously, 
among groups of people each perceiving of themselves as being a nation, or within 
a given nationalist movement. This aspect of nationalism has been commented on 
by Eric J. Hobsbawm who writes that "official ideologies of states and movements 
are not guides to what is in the minds of people" (Hobsbawm 1990 p. 11). 
Hobsbawm adds that national identities intersect with other forms of belong-
ing, such as those of regional, gender, class. Thus, national identities are not a 
priori excluding in character, nor do they supersede other dimensions of people’s 
belonging, such as class, gender, age, or regional or local considerations. 
Nationalism, finally to be said, serve different purposes, those representing 
different groups and interests. It has been widely observed in Western Europe that 
nationalism can be implemented from above by the state authorities (Hobsbawm 
1990). However, nationalism can also originate elsewhere, such as from vernacu-
lar movements and different interests that civil society involves. This has been 
demonstrated by Benedict Anderson who has shown how in Latin America for 
example the "popular nationalism" emanating from vernaculars has been chal-
lenged by "official nationalism" articulated by other social groups in society. Na-
tionalism can be both an expression of a polyethnic ideology stressing shared civil 
rights, and equally well be an ideology stressing shared cultural origins. Eriksen 
points out too that, whereas some people within a given community considers 
themselves a nation and demand political rights, others within the same commu-
nity may strive to limit their demands to cultural rights (Eriksen 1993 pp. 107, 
118ff.; Guibernau 1996).  
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National belonging may also be situational, based on hierarchical structures and 
discrimination within a multi-cultural society. Harald Eidheim (1969) conducted 
field research among the Samis in a mixed Sami-Norwegian community in the 
coastland areas in Norway in the 1960s. He describes the Sami identity in these 
areas as being a stigmatized identity. As an outsider in the small fishing village 
where he stayed it took a long time before people took him into confidence and 
spoke openly with him about their Samic identity. In public spaces all spoke Nor-
wegian with a local accent and could not from appearances easily be distinguished 
from their Norwegian neighbours. The dominant view in the surrounding society 
was that Sami culture was inferior to Norwegian, described as being "primitive, 
backward, stupid and dirty by the dominant Norwegians" (Eidheim 1969 p. 51). In 
the private sphere, in their homes together with their family and with other Samis, 
they habitually spoke Samic. 
Thus, the Samis in the coastal areas "undercommunicated" their Samic identi-
ties in public situations, at the same time as they "overcommunicated" their Nor-
wegian belongingness in presenting themselves as Norwegians to others (ibid. p. 
53).  
A question to be posed in this context is that of when national identities be-
come important. Empirical studies have showen that national identities often be-
comes more important for people, and grow stronger, in situations in which they 
are challenged or threatened. In connection with the conflicts that developed in 
former Yugoslavia, peoples’ identities as Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks and Slovenians 
became stronger after the ethnic cleansing started than they had been before the 
wars (Eriksen 1993; Povrzanovic-Frykman 2001). 
Nations are thus continuously in a state of flux, nation building processes 
necessarily being dynamic and contested fields. This is highlighted by Montserrat 
Guibernau for example who writes: "If the symbols that represents the nation re-
ceive a completely fixed, restricted and confined interpretation, they will probably 
die and become "empty shells" of fragmentary memories" (Guibernau 1996 p. 81). 
2.4.5 Summary of the Section 
Nationalism appears in highly differing forms ranging from radical liberation 
movements to conservative extremist movements, can be guided by ethnic and 
cultural or political overtones, and can originate either from state structures or 
from popular movements. Nationalism can thus be understood as a conception of 
belonging to a socio-cultural community that has political aspirations, one that 
separates it from other nations through the creation of homogenisation.  
I argue in theoretical terms in favour of an anti-essentialist position, one of 
there being no cultural matters or components that constitutes nations, the cultural 
matters and components instead shifting. Thus, nations can be regarded as imag-
  
99 
ined communities. It is important to note however, that for the men and women 
who see themselves as belonging to a nation, national identities are real and not 
simply fabricated. Rather, historical memories of nations are neither fabricated nor 
simply narrated but real. Thus, historical events and conjunctures, and perceptions 
of ethnic identities transgressing generations, should not be neglected. For exam-
ple, a majority of the Kurdish refugees included in the present study had been told 
by their parents and their grandparents of the atrocities that Kurds had been ex-
posed to in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Memories themselves are es-
sentially based on real and lived experiences, but when narrated they can be 
adapted to suit current needs. Narratives do not just come out of the blue, but are 
usually based on real events, yet memories of even the very recent past may be 
partly neglected and new details added. This can affect contemporary Kurdish 
national identities. The next generation of Kurds may tell narratives differently 
and thus affect future Kurdish national identity constructions in line with this. 
Imaginations of the homeland and maintenance of boundaries, enclosing "us" and 
excluding "others", are crucial to the construction of national identity. 
2.5. Closing of the Chapter 
In this chapter I have discussed the concepts of "political generation", "diaspora" 
and "long-distance nationalism".  
First, I have explored the notion of generations in a sociological sense, on ba-
sis above all of the theories of Karl Mannheim, and have pointed out that the for-
mation of sociological generations revolves around the experiencing of historical, 
social and political processes that essentially take place in the formative years of 
the members of a generation. To become an 'actual' generation, in the terminology 
of Mannheim, it is necessary that its members come together following common 
experiences that they have had - these thus sharing a common destiny. From the 
theoretical perspectives on generations provided above I draw the conclusion that, 
to become a political generation in this sociological sense, a generation needs to 
develop a common repertoire of actions and a common consciousness. It was 
noted by Karl Mannheim (1952) that a sociological generation is unifed by senti-
ments, actions, ideas and attitudes (ibid. p. 291). A sociological generation often 
take shape on the basis of a common collective memory, a cultural trauma or 
through a long and complex process following a sequence of events that are criti-
cal to their creation of social identities and a repertoire of actions appropriate. To 
become a political generation a generation needs to actively respond to or resist 
certain social and political conditions of their time (Edmunds and Turner 2002 p. 
16). This is important to consider, I would argue, in studying a political generation 
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of Kurds that became exiled. Equally important to consider is how these genera-
tional experiences contributed to the diaspora. 
Secondly, I have explored the concept of diaspora in terms of its being a use-
ful tool to employ for understanding the ideas concerning the Kurdish diaspora 
manifest in a generation of political refugees. 
I argue in favor of a social constuctivist position. Hence, I understand a dias-
pora as a network or an imagined social formation of people, perceiving them-
selves as being co-ethnics, who maintain relations across state borders. Like Bru-
baker (2005), and Sökefeld (2006), I find it appropriate to consider a diaspora as a 
stance, involving them to whom diasporic identities and strategies are important. 
In the line with Brubaker, I argue that "dispersion", "homeland" and "boundary 
maintenance" are being central traits to consider in conceptualising and analysing 
a diaspora. I use the term in a connotative sense. As such the term is useful for 
analysing and exploring the problems and the lives of refugees, and of de-
territorialized and displaced people generally. 
The view taken here is that diaspora as being a social form not can be sepa-
rated from diaspora as being a consciousness. Rather these must be conflated.  
A diaspora is simultaneously more or less triadic and more or less transna-
tional. In line with Björklund (1993) I consider people beloning to a certain dias-
poric community as being both "connected" and "differentiated". First, they are 
"connected" because they organise for the same purposes across state boundaries. 
Secondly, it must be taken into consideration that diasporas are "differentiated" 
stances, sometimes divided social formations. Diasporic identities are constructed 
in a myriad of various contexts regarding for example class, gender and geo-
graphic location. The members of a diaspora may respond differently to various 
issues and problems of concern for the diaspora. 
The third concept is that of long-distance nationalism. This perhaps merits an 
explanation since use of the term nationalism by no means represents any attempt 
to equate directly the concept of a diaspora with that of a nation. The intention is 
rather, as Abdelhady (2011) notes, to indicate "a process of forging an identity that 
connects the past to the present within complexities of migration and multi-
culturalism" (p. 178).  
Long-distance nationalism created by migrants residing outside the imagined 
homeland are never to be equated with nationalist movements that develop inside 
these countries, not even when re-constucted among exiles (Olson and Wahlbeck 
2007). Long-distance nationalism contains many components that are similar to 
those that constitute nationalism. In the study of a political generation such as the 
one considered here, the fact that long-distance nationalism contains components 
in common with those of nationalism is important to consider. In this chapter I 
have defined and taken up ideas regarding the vision of a homogeneous people, 
boundary maintenance and a sense of belonging as being important components to 
consider. In addition I have argued in favour of a social constructivist approach, in 
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line with Anderson (1991) in considering nations as being imagined. In the chap-
ters that follow I will employ these concepts in defining and describing the politi-
cal generation of interest here and in contextualising the experiences around which 
the generation is organized and having become politizised. Thus, it should be bor-
ne in mind that the generation of concern here was a political one. It was a genera-
tion that responded actively to the conditions of their time. The Swedish scene 
from which the narratives are told is nested in a complex transnational one, conti-
nously changing and highly challenging. 
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Part II 
The Modern Turkish Republic, The 
Kurdish Question and The Emergen-
ce of a Political Generation 
 
We were the sons and daughters of ... so to speak ... analphabet parents, we began 
school and learned, first ABC, but also things that made us discover that we did not 
want to be treated the way they had been. 
(V) 
 
As V describes it in this account, the generation of concern here was different 
from that of its parents and of its grandparents, its being a generation of resistance 
and protest. Those in this generation tended to be better educated than their parents 
had been. They came in contact with one another very much in urban spaces in 
Turkey. They emerged during a specific period and in a specific spatial context, 
their commitment to the Kurdish cause being conditioned by the specific socio-
economic and political developments of their time. They spent what Mannheim 
has termed their "formative years" in Turkey, a state that a few decades before 
they were born was founded on the remnants of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. In 
later parts of the thesis we will see how some of their accounts were informed in 
part by memories transmitted and told by their parents and grandparents, involving 
dramatic events and conjunctures that took place during the final decades of the 
Ottoman Empire and in the early years of the Turkish Republic. This part of the 
thesis is devoted to these historical socio-political developments, and aims at 
providing a comprehensive framework for understanding the conjunctures, settings 
and developments that influenced the political generation in question. It consists of 
three chapters. Chapter 3, which is the most historical one, concerns the political 
developments and the situation of the Kurds in the late Ottoman Empire and dur-
ing the period when the modern state of Turkey was established. During this pe-
riod, the aspirations the Kurds had for an independent Kurdish state were crushed 
for a very long time to come. Chapter 4 deals with the early decades of this mod-
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ern Republic, with particular emphasis being placed on political and ideological 
developments, the Kurdish resistance during this period and the repression that 
followed. The very existence of Kurds in Turkey was to be denied and harsh as-
similation politics carried out. Chapter 5 provides a brief overview of the political 
developments in Turkey during the decades following the emergence of the politi-
cal generation of Kurds in Turkey that were active at some time during the period 
of 1960-1980. This is the Kurdish political generation of our central concerns here. 
The chapter chronicles the political organisations they established as well as the 
political and symbolic resistance they carried out. The account is complemented 
by a discussion of Kurdish politics and the Turkish governments' responses during 
the decades following the coup that took place in 1980. In this sense, the chapter 
provides a framework for the Kurdish activism that developed in diasporic set-
tings, activism that can be considered to in part have been a response to these de-
velopments.  
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Chapter 3  
Becoming Marginalized: From Otto-
man Empire to Turkish State 
3.1 Introduction 
The Ottoman Empire was the homeland of many people. The Kurds resided within 
its borders together with Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Assyrian, Jews, Greek and 
several other religious and ethnic communities. According to most historical re-
cords, the Ottoman authorities was, as compared with the authorities in many other 
states, relatively tolerant toward minority groups. It was not an egalitarian state, 
however.32 Equality before law was not even an ideal, for example, and people 
were treated differently, depending on which ethnic, religious or social group they 
belonged to (see, for example, Zürcher 2004 p. 14). 
In the Ottoman Empire, power was concentrated in Muslim hands, the relig-
ion of Islam being seen as the cement that held the state together and justified a 
collective identity, its forming the basis for people's loyalty to the state. The Em-
pire was governed by the Sultan, who also was given the title of "Caliph33 of all 
Muslims on Earth and the Protector of the Two Holy Cities (Mecca and Medi-
na)".34 The Caliph had the symbolic meaning of being the representative of the 
Prophet on earth. In practice, however, the power acquired by the Sultan was 
derived from the material political reality at hand, the rulers of the Empire gener-
ally having to set the interests of the state above Islamic interests (Hourani 1990 p. 
251; Karpat 2001 p. 241-243).  
                                                     
32 The Ottoman State can be considered as a "traditional" empire, different in structure, from the 
modern state formations described in Chapter 2. I reject, however, the strict and somewhat rigid 
distinction some scholars make between "traditional" and "modern" in studies of the Ottoman 
Empire and other Muslim societies (cf. Gellner 1981); for a different view see Karpat 2001.  
33  The term Caliph is derived from the Arabic halifat rasuli-llah, the successor to the propeht (Kar-
pat 2001 p. 241). 
34 Karpat 2001 p. 65. 
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Christian, Jew and Zoroastrian people were considered to be "the people of the 
book" or dhimmi people. Theoretically speaking, this meant that they were pro-
tected by the state. In practice, they were given a limited degree of autonomy in 
exchange for the payment of a special tax. There was also a more sophisticated 
system of self-administration in the form of the millet35 system, essentially admin-
istrated at the local level (Hourani 1992 pp. 268; 275-276; Poulton 1997 p. 43; 
Zürcher 2004 p. 11).  
The Ottoman Empire has been considered too have been different from the 
contemporary Habsburg and Romanov Empires in its lacking an ethnic or cultural 
core (Karpat 2001 pp. 357ff.). Although the Turks were certainly the dominant 
ethnic group, they were not given a priority to power. For example, a large part of 
the administrators in the military and in the bureaucracy were technically speaking 
slaves stemming from the Balkans. Osmanlı, the language spoken in elite circles 
can be considered to be a mixed language, since it reflected the Persian and the 
Arabic worlds in its vocabulary to a considerable extent. 
3.2. Tightened State Control 
Early in the 19th century the Ottoman authorities began to intervene in the relative 
autonomy enjoyed by the feudal Kurdish chieftains. Gradually, the imperial power 
loosened its grip in Europe, the Empire crumbling at the fringes. External threats 
came rather notably from the Western powers. French, British and Dutch inroads 
were made in the form of increasing numbers of missionaries and merchants, the 
establishment of foreign consulates, not only in Istanbul but also in Van in Eastern 
Turkey, and the introduction of new educational institutions, all of this challenging 
the Ottoman authorities, not only militarily and politically but also in the economic 
and ideological spheres. In addition, Russia was encroaching on the northeastern 
frontiers of the Empire, allegedly establishing bonds with the Christian minorities, 
the Armenians and the Nestorians that inhabited the area thus threatening the Ot-
tomans. Throughout the century, the Kurdish-dominated lands became the scene 
of both the "Ottoman-Russian" (1828-29, 1877-78) and the "Ottoman-Persian"36 
wars, resulting in enormous suffering of the population in the form of destruction, 
pillages and the plagues of all other forms that come with war. 
                                                     
35 Millet is a term that signifies the self-administration or self-rule of a community. Sometimes 
millet has been translated as "people" or "nation". 
36 Referring to several conflicts between 1514-1823.  
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The period between 1839 and 1871 (according to some sources until 1876) is 
known as Tanzimat, meaning literally reorganisation. During this period, a set of 
reforms was implemented aimed at modernising and centralising the Ottoman state 
power. These reforms were essentially carried out in the areas of bureacracy and 
administration, taxation and conscription. In 1876 a new Sultan, Abdül Hamit II, 
assumed office. His policies seemed at first sight to go in a direction opposite of 
his predecessors. Zürcher (2004 p. 78), for example, describes the direction of the 
new sultan's politics as being a "continuation of the Tanzimat" or even a "carica-
ture" of the period, and at a the same time "a break with the past". The sultan car-
ried out a number of measures that proved to be decisive for the social transforma-
tion of Kurdistan. First, he abolished the constitution and also replaced the mod-
ernising reforms undertaken by his predecessors by a "pan-Islamic" policy.  
Secondly, one of the most important measures he took in order to master the 
Kurdish chieftains was the establishment of the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regi-
ments (Hamidiye Sürvarı Ayları), in 1890. These irregular forces, modelled after 
the Russian Cosacks, were purportedly aimed at suppressing nationalist sentiments 
in the Armenian population. Selected Sunni Kurdish tribes that had proved to be 
loyal to the Sultan earlier were to be included into the new cavalry, consisting of 
irregular forces of about 600 men each, that were to be dispersed except when they 
were called for. This resulted in the power of certain Kurdish chieftains increasing 
considerably. According to White (2000 p. 46) it was mostly the Sunni Kurds that 
benefited from the system whereas the Alevis became marginalised.  
From the perspective of the chieftains, the Sultan worked as a protector who 
granted them independent positions (Klein 2007 p. 141). It has been argued that in 
some cases the Hamidiye regiments were provided with a high degree of immu-
nity, so that neither the civil administration nor military authorities had the capac-
ity to control them. A Kurdish tribal chief appointed to head a Hamidiye cavalry 
also was invited to send his sons to tribal schools in Istanbul and Kurdistan. Thus, 
the Kurds included in these irregular forces were expected to become incorporated 
into the Ottoman state structure (Klein 2011, see also McDowall 1996 p. 59). 
Olson (1989) argues that the establishment of the Hamidiye Light Cavalries 
had both positive and negative effects on the emerging Kurdish nationalism. First, 
among the negative effects that Olson points out is that of the Hamidiye contribut-
ing to the exacerbation of intra-tribal hostilities, that in turn strengthened tribalist 
tendencies and undercut the possibilities of a unified Kurdish community. Sec-
ondly, one of the positive effects was that the Hamidiye Light Cavalries brought 
large numbers of Kurds into contact with modern political ideas, and provided 
many Kurds with knowledge of military technology and with military equipment 
and with capabilities of using it. In addition, the presence of the Hamidiye contrib-
uted to a "reduction" in the power of the sheikhs (Olson 1989 pp. 7-14; White 
2000 p. 63).  
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Most observers agree that the formation of the Hamidiye Light Cavalries contrib-
uted to fueling the growing social unrest in the area. Klein (2007) describes, on the 
basis of her research in the Ottoman archives, the creation of these irregular regi-
ments as being "one of the worst kind of abuses committed by the Hamidian re-
gime" (ibid. p. 141). In addition she points out that the Hamidiye chiefs were in-
volved in several criminal activities that the authorities tended to turn a blind eye 
to, such as "murder, raids and land-grabbing" (Klein 2007 p. 141). In particular, 
the Hamidiye Light Cavalries have been blamed for several anti-Armenian atroci-
ties, such as the Sasun massacre in 1894 in which 1,000 Armenian villagers are 
reported to have perished, and the massacres in 1896 in which the Hamidiye Cav-
alries were used against the Armenians.  
3.3 The Kurdish Sheiks 
A decisive phenomenon in the early Kurdish nationalist movement was that of the 
Sheikhs. In Kurdistan, two Sufi orders, the Naqshbendiyya37 and the Qadiriyya. 
were dominant during the decades before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  
Around the year 1800 only two Qadiri dynasties had been dominant in the area 
(van Bruinessen 1992 p. 220). Both these families had a seyyid,38 meaning that 
they regarded themselves as descendants of the Saint who founded the order.39 
These sheikh families were rich and owned considerable land, together with herds 
of animals. Some of its members had obtained status as ulema, which gave them a 
very influential position both religiously and politically (van Bruinessen 1992 p. 
220).  
Traditionally, the mirs had had the power and ability to maintain law and or-
der within the borders of their emirate, and had worked as mediators between con-
flicting tribes or tribal sections. The new Ottoman administrators were able to rule 
in the towns but could never extert control in the countryside without making re-
prisals. Van Bruinessen (1992) writes that power then went through a process of 
"devolution" as many Kurdish fiefdoms disintegrated (p. 195). The Sufi sheikhs 
                                                     
37 The Naqshbendi order has been in evidence in Kurdistan and in Turkey until present times. It 
is probably one of the most widespread and influential Sufi orders presently existing in the 
world. 
38 A saayyid, is a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. 
39 Sayyids from these both families regarded themselves as being descendants of the famous saint 
Shaikh Abdul Qadir al-Gilani (1077-1166) that once had founded the order (see Edmonds 1957 p. 
63; see also McDowall 1996 pp. 50-53). 
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became, by virtue of their positions, the only actors then who were able to mediate 
in inter-tribal disputes and to mobilise people across tribal boundaries (van Bru-
inessen 1984 p. 286). Another matter that van Bruinessen mentions is the Land 
Code of 1858, from which people from the upper strata of Kurdish society, includ-
ing land proprietors, aghas, and sheikhs together with merchants, could benefit 
(van Bruinessen 1992 p. 233). All of these internal developments contributed to 
fueling unrest and conflicts within the area. After the Congress of Berlin in 1878,40 
the Ottoman Empire lost nearly 80 % of its European domains. There were deci-
sive external factors that contributed to the staggering political climate of the time. 
Great Britain occupied the provinces of Bagdad and Basra.41 
The Ottoman authorities allegedly suspected that Russia had heightened na-
tionalist feelings among the Armenians based on demands by Christians.42 This led 
to relations between Christians and Muslims becoming increasingly tense. 
One of the major Kurdish rebellions that broke out in 1880 in the area of Ne-
hru at the Ottoman-Persian border under leadership of Sheikh Ubayd Allah, aimed 
at uniting the Ottoman and the Persian Kurds illustrates this. The sheikh revolted 
on behalf of self administration and Islam. This rebellion has by some scholars 
been labelled as, "the first stage of a greater consciousness of Kurdish national-
ism" (Olson 1989 p. 1; see also Olson 1992; Jwadieh 1960 pp. 215, 225).43 The 
rhetorics and idioms used by the sheikh is full of allusions to nationalism and to 
ideas of a Kurdish distinctiveness. In a often cited message, once sent to the Brit-
ish Consul-General in Persia, William Abbott in Tibriz in Persia, the Sheikh 
writes: 
 
The Kurdish nation … is a people apart. Their religion is different (from that of 
others), and their laws and customs are distinct … the Chiefs and Rulers of Kurdis-
tan, whether Turkish or Persian subjects, and the inhabitants of Kurdistan, one and 
all are united and agreed that matters cannot be carried on in this way with the two 
Governments [Ottoman and Qajar], and that necessarily something must be done, 
                                                     
40 The Berlin Congress 1878 was a meeting between leading statesmen from the Ottoman Empire 
and the leading major European Powers. The meeting resulted in the Empire losing more than 20 
per cent of its territories (see Zürcher 2004 p. 80). 
41 Baghdad and Basra are presently provinces of Iraq.  
42 In Western Europe and the US, concern for the Christian minorities in these areas increased in the 
late 19th and early 20th century. Hence a growing number of missionaries were sent to northwest 
Asia. Relief organisations to support the Armenians and the Nestorians were established in many 
European countries. 
43 Here attention should be directed at the fact that the use and meaning of the term "nationalism" 
has been changing, also in academic circles. 
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so that European Governments having understood the matter, shall inquire into our 
state. We also are a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our own hands. 
(as quoted by McDowall, 1996 p. 53) 
3.4 The Kurds in Istanbul 
Fazlhashemi (1998) draws our attention to the fact that at around 1900 Istanbul 
was a city considered by many in the Muslim world to be, "a window towards 
Europe" (ibid. p. 71). Its being at the same time the political and the commercial 
center of the Ottoman State, Istanbul attracted people from every corner of the 
empire and from the countries surrounding. Early in the 20th century, the urban 
setting of Istanbul gradually became a new arena for public actions by the Kurds. 
It was in Istanbul where many of the intellectuals and learned people in Western 
Asia of those days first encountered ideological and political thoughts and currents 
that were brought in from Europe, such as those of nationalism, liberalism and 
positivism, as well as such inventions as the printing press, journalism and news-
papers just to mention a few. In the decade preceding the First World War, an 
estimated number of 30,000 Kurds were residing in the city (McDowall 1996 p. 
93), among them were members of the deposed prince’s families, sons both of the 
agha’s and of many wealthy sheikhs. A great many Kurds were educated in the 
schools or military academies of the Empire, and many of these heirs of the Kurd-
ish aristocracy of the time obtained prominent positions in the ranks of the state 
administration and of universities and took up such positions as those of lawyers, 
engineers and journalists (Kendal 1979a p. 34; McDowall 1996 pp. 49ff.). 
Early in the 20th Century there was widespread discontent with the Ottoman 
regime. In July 1908 a constitutional revolution by the Young Turk Movement 
was carried out, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) seizing power. The 
Sultan was then forced to reinstate the constitution and the parliament, both of 
which had been suspended for 30 years (Ahmad 1993 p. 55; van Bruinessen 1992 
p. 270; Poulton 1997 pp. 69-70, p. 86; Zürcher 2004 Chapter 8; Pope and Pope 
1997 p. 33), the Sultan's power being circumscribed accordingly. When the consti-
tution was reinstated it was a measure welcomed among the urban intellectual 
Kurds in Istanbul. Concomitant with this the Hamdiye regiments were disbanded, 
althought they were soon to be reorganised. The political climate in the Empire 
had become tense, political opposition being prohibited. Still, several oppositional 
groups were formed in Istanbul and were inspired to open oppositional clubs and 
societies throughout the Empire, as well as among exiles residing in the major 
Western European capitals (van Bruinessen 1992 pp. 270ff.; McDowall 1996 p. 
91, 99; Yapp 1996; Zürcher 2004 pp. 93ff.). 
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3.5 The Political Vacuum 
In the era of relative liberalisation that followed the seizure of power by the Young 
Turk regime in 1908, the first Kurdish nationalist organisations were formed and a 
number of journals were published. Already in 1879 a magazine that can be re-
garded as being "Kurdish" was edited by Mihdad BedrKhan. That journal had first 
been published in Cairo but could in the Young Turk Spring could be printed in 
Istanbul for a short period. The journal was a bilingual one, publishing articles in 
Kurdish and in Turkish on largely cultural and educational issues. Because of po-
litical circumstances, the editors were forced to leave the country, the publishing 
of the journal then having to continue abroad, first in Geneva and then in England 
(Klein 2011 pp. 123-125; McDowall 1996 p. 90). 
However, political mobilisation along ethnic lines seems to have been only 
one of the many possible responses to the transformation process that Ottoman 
society underwent (Klein 2007; see also Natali 2002 pp. 1ff.). A majority of the 
members of the organisations and clubs in Istanbul were aristocrats and notables, 
the Kurdish political scene in Istanbul being dominated by two of the Kurdish 
dynasties. The Kurdish nationalism that emerged in this period may be considered 
a proto-nationalist one (cf. Guibernau 1996; Hobsbawm 1990; Hroch 1986) It was 
mainly people from the aristocracy, together with intellectuals who became organ-
ised, the Kurdish clubs and societies attracting only few people outside these cir-
cles, their never being transformed into a mass movement. The nationalism during 
that period was articulated essentially in terms of cultural markers and made no 
territorial claims. Some sources indicate that people from the lower social strata in 
the Kurdish community in Istanbul were also attracted to the nationalist groups: 
 
For instance, the murids of the Khalidi branch of the Naqshibandiyya, and the por-
ters (hammal) of the Ottoman capital, usually Kurds, were known to be "close to 
Kurdish nationalism" and as such were feared by the inhabitants. 
(Bozarslan 2003b p. 166) 
3.6 Political and Social Challenges 
Ottoman society underwent enormous social transformations in the period between 
1912 and 1923. The country was devastated by the war, large areas lay in ruins, 
and people were uprooted and had suffered very much from atrocities, from the 
winter cold and from epidemics. In addition, the country had been plauged in the 
decades prior to the war, by internal discontent and social tensions (Mango 1999 p. 
347). Greek community there was largely eliminated through emigration of those 
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belonging to it. In 1914, an estimated number of 1.8 million Greeks were residing 
in what today is Turkey. Emigration among the Greeks had started in 1912 and 
continued intermittently in the years that followed. It culminated after the Greek 
occupation of Izmir44 and the destruction of the city in 1922. It is estimated that by 
1923 there were only 400,000 Greeks still remaining in the country (Keyder 1987 
p. 31). At the same time as the Greeks were leaving the country in large numbers, 
there was a considerable inflow of Muslims from, the former Ottoman territories 
in the Balkans, above all (Yapp 1996 p. 150). 
The destiny of the Armenians was far more terrible than that of the Greeks. 
The Armenians were eliminated through extensive deportations and cycles of per-
secution that culminated in the genocide in 1915. Officially, Turkey denies that the 
CUP government was responsible for the atrocities that took place in the Arme-
nian areas.45 Thus even today, the partial annihilation of the Armenian population 
remain a controversial matter in Turkey, the numbers of Armenians killed are also 
being disputed. According to public Turkish figures, about 200,000 - 300,000 Ar-
menians died in the war (see, for example, Mann 2004 p. 140; Pope and Pope 
1997; Zürcher 2004 p. 115).46 Turkish officials also assert that most of them died 
from the winter cold and from hunger, or when participating in combat. Armenian 
historians, on the other hand, allege that as many as 1,5 million were killed. The 
sociologist Michael Mann suggest a plausible estimation to be that 1,2 – 1,5 mil-
lion Armenians were killed during the war (Mann 2004 p. 140). 
The Kemalist regime had also to deal with an unstable and destituted econ-
omy. The Ottoman state had been bankrupt for decades, and extensive loans from 
the European banks were unable to be repayed. Accordingly the Ottoman state was 
placed under the to control of the European powers (Ahmad 1993 pp. 28ff.; Zür-
cher 2004 p. 42, pp. 84-85). 
The country was industrialised only to a very limited extent, a vast majority 
of the population residing in rural areas, its being estimated that only about a quar-
ter of the population were town dwellers (Jafar 1976 p. 44). Before the war, trade 
and various parts of the industrial sector were dominated by the Ottoman minori-
ties,  such as Greeks, Armenians and foreigners from other countries, most of 
these persons later emigrating or being expelled from the Ottoman lands (Yapp 
1996 p. 148). 
When the leaders of the Ottoman Empire realised that their position vis-à-vis the 
Major Powers in Europe was weakening, their policy became one to eliminating 
                                                     
44 At this time the official name of the city Izmir was Smyrna. 
45 Also a well reputed Turkey expert such as Stanford J. Shaw denies the CUP governments' re-
sponsibility in the extermination of the Armenians. 
46  Zürcher (2004) asserts: "Between 600,000 and 800,000 deaths seems most likely" (p. 115).  
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the independence of the peripheral areas and concentrating powers in Istanbul. In 
Kurdistan the mirs, the princes of the emirates, had been granted a relatively high 
degree of independence. In the 19th century their independence was circumscribed. 
The strategy of the regime was to integrate these principalities into the Ottoman 
state structure. The Kurdish fiefs were replaced by governor officials appointed by 
the Ottoman authorities. These governors were nor able to keep law and order, 
neither to take a concilitary role in local conflicts. The consequence was that the 
Kurdish emirates gradually disintegrated and abolished.   
3.7 Kurdish Nationalist Aspirations 
The end of the First World War marked a new era for the Kurds. First, a new geo-
political situation developed, the period from October 1918 to June 1919 present-
ing the Kurds with their best opportunity ever to set up their own national state.47 
Secondly, the political activism of the Kurds in Istanbul can be distinguished from 
that in previous periods, since the first time demands for Kurdish independence 
were formulated (Bozarslan 2003a pp. 21ff.). According to Olson (1992), the crea-
tion of an independent Kurdish state would have been possible until 1921. He 
points out that Great Britian argued in favour of an independent Kurdish body as 
long as it coincided with their political interests.  
In the wake of the war, nationalist sentiments flared up again among the 
Kurds in Istanbul. Efforts were made then by prominent Kurdish personalities to 
reconstitute the old Kurdish organisations, The Society for the Rise of Kurdistan 
(Kürd Teyalii Cemiyeti) being founded. Aristocrats and "intellectuals", such as the 
BedrKhan family and Sheikh Abdulkadr, the son of Sheikh Ubayd Allah, still 
constituted the core of its members. However many observers emphasize that the 
urban middle class and tribal chiefs were much more involved than what they had 
been ten years earlier (McDowall 1996 p. 123; White 2000 p. 67).  
Bozarslan (2003a) describes the organisation as being "distinguished from 
earlier Kurdish organisations in the late Ottoman Empire by the claim to national 
independence and statehood made by some of its members" (ibid. p. 21), and often 
by its being a "passive receiver" and "active user" of "Western ideas", since it was 
infused with the same ideological ideas as the Young Turk Movement (ibid. pp. 
22-26). 
Kurdish nationalism developed in response to Armenian and Turkish nationalism, 
its involving the same components and being inspired by the same ideological 
                                                     
47 This is further discussed in Olson 1991, 1992, 1996. 
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thoughts. However, the Kurdish nationalism of this period remained marginalised, 
limited to a relatively small circle of Kurdish dignitaries, it never developed into a 
mass movement. At the end of this period Kurdish activism declined. Factional-
ism, personal rivalries and antagonism cut through the major Kurdish organisation 
in Istanbul. 
Bozarslan (2003b) cites three main reasons for Kurdish nationalism remain-
ing weak during this period. First, the Kurds in Istanbul did not have a clear politi-
cal programme. Within the ranks of Kurdish society there were some who advo-
cated the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, the BedrKhans, for ex-
ample. Still others, such as Abdulkadir, the president of the organisation, argued in 
favour of a Kurdish autonomy within the frontiers of the Turkish state, and finally 
there were a few who supported a future political integration with the Turks (ibid. 
pp. 168-170). 
Secondly, the Kurds were still regarded as a "legitimate component" of Ot-
toman and Turkish society, "Kurdishness" being a term perceived by the majority 
as an alternative expression of Ottoman or Muslim belongingness. Accordingly, 
the attitude among the Istanbul Kurds toward the possibility of an independent 
Kurdish state could in some respects at least be depicted as "ambivalent". For ex-
ample Kamuran BedrKhan remembered later: "The majority had one foot in the 
Kurdish Camp and the other in the Ottoman-Islamic establishment – they wanted 
to become ministers" (Kutschera 1979 p. 26). Hence, for the vast majority of 
Kurdish dignitaries "statehood did not represent a prirority" (Bozarslan 2003b p. 
170).  
Third, Bozarslan draws attention to the fact that the Kurdish leaders were 
"alarmed at the prospect of the formation of an Armenian state" (Bozarslan 2003b 
p. 171). At this time, the Major Powers in Europe were rather concerned about the 
situtation of the Christian minorities in Anatolia, and in particular of the Armeni-
ans after the extermination of 1915 in particular. Protection of the Armenians was 
given high priority by the Western Powers. Thus supporting the establishment of 
an Armenian state had become a "sine qua non condition for the formation of a 
Kurdish state" (Bozarslan 2003b p. 171).  
Finally the Kurds elected an "exile", General Sherif Pasha, the former Ottoman 
embassador to Stockholm, to head the Kurdish delegation in the peace negotia-
tions in Sèvres.48 In Paris Sherif Pasha prepared a document, Memorandum sur les 
Revendications du people Kurde, together with maps of Kurdistan, that were sent 
to other delegations and governments. However, he did not represent a united 
Kurdish front, the Kurdish position being weak, the final solution presented in the 
                                                     
48 Sherif Pasha was forced to leave his post as embassador in Stockholm in 1908 since it became 
known that he was involved with exile groups oppositional to the Sultan.  
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Treaty of Sèvres being considered "a half measure" by many of the Kurdish activ-
ists. All in all, three different standpoints within the Kurdish camp in Istanbul, 
could be distinguished. The first was "Turkish-Kurdish" and "pan-islamistic" in 
character, influenced by the Turkish nationalists and employed by them to propa-
gate an anti-British atmosphere in Kurdistan.  
The second standpoint was more pro-British, its supporting the idea of auton-
omy, this strategy was supported among others by Abdulkadir. Finally, there was a 
current under the leadership of the emir Emin BedrKhan that propagated for a 
totally independent Kurdistan (Kutschera 1979 p. 27; McDowall 1996 pp. 134). 
Others inside the Kurdish camp supported the politics of "Muslim fraternity" pro-
moted by Mustafa Kemal. At the time of the Peace negotiations, Abdulkadir and 
BedrKhan rejected the map of Kurdistan that Sherif Pasha presented at the Con-
ference (Natali 2005 p. 77). Distrusted by both the Kurdish factions, he finally 
resigned from his post, the Kurds thus being left without a representative when the 
treaty was to be forged (McDowall 1996 p. 134). 
In the course of the nineteenth century relations between the religious com-
munities had deteriorated. A number of developments coincided in producing the-
se tensions (Poulton 1997 pp. 65ff.; Pope and Pope 1997 pp. 32-35; Zürcher 2004 
pp. 82). There was a growing discontent among different Christian groups, mainly 
in the European provinces, that had never been fully integrated into the Ottoman 
society. With this, latent conflicts and local disputes came to the fore. Local upri-
sings were often supported by the various European governments, these resulting 
in a loss of provinces and in the establishment of the new independent states of 
Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia in 1878. Serbia and Romania became inde-
pendent after the Congress of Berlin 1878, whereas Cyprus was leased to Britain 
(Holt et. al 1970  pp. 359ff.; Hourani 1992; Mango 1999 pp. 10ff.).  
In the aftermath of the First World War the Ottoman Empire finally col-
lapsed. The political map of the Middle East was then redrawn, several new state 
formations being created. In 1920 the peace negotiations resulted in the Treaty of 
Sèvres. In accordance with this Treaty, the Ottoman territory was to be partitioned 
between France, Britain, Italy and Greece. Section III of the Treaty included the 
articles 62-64, which stipulated that independent Kurdish and Armenian states 
should be established north of Lake Van in the territories today belonging to Tur-
key (Hurewitz 1956 p. 74). However, the Treaty of Sèvres remained unratified and 
was replaced in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne, which finally recognised the 
establishment of an independent Turkish state in the areas of Rumelia49 and Ana-
tolia. In the new Treaty, all promises of independence for Kurds and Armenians 
had been removed, thus eliminating for long time to come any possibility of creat-
                                                     
49 The European part of Turkey. 
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ing an independent Kurdish state. Four basic reasons for this political shift in the 
strategy of the Major Powers in Europe may be discerned: 
 
1) Until 1921 it was a strategic interest for Great Britiain, to consolidate its 
position in Iraq create a buffer zone between Iraq and Turkey. From 1921 
the British politics towards the Kurds changed. 
2) The advance of the Turkish nationalist movement, which demanded these 
territories (Olson 1989, 1991, 1992).  
3) The position of the Soviet Union, which at the time ardently supported the 
Kemalist regime. 
4) The internal dissension among the Kurds that weakened their position50 
(see Kutschera 1979 p. 27; McDowall 1996 pp. 131; Natali 2005 p. 76-77; 
Olson 1989 p. 24-25 ; Poulton 1997, p. 94; Zürcher 2004 p. 144). 
When the Treaty of Lausanne came into effect, the Kurdish population in the Mid-
dle East became largely distributed between the four states of Iran, Iraq, Syria and 
Turkey. Even today, from a Turkish point of view, the Treaty of Sèvres is regarded 
as a threat to Turkish independence, its stipulating that Anatolia was to be carved 
up into British, French and Italian entities. The Kurds tend generally to look at it 
differently. Nezan Kendal, a Turkish Kurd residing in exile in France since 1971 
and presently director of the Kurdish Instiute in Paris, summarises as follows: 
 
Sèvres had been humiliating for the Turkish people and deeply unjust to the Kurd-
ish people. Lausanne in contrast, was undeniably a victory for the Turks, but for the 
Kurds it marked a new phase of servitude. 
(Kendal 1979a p. 58) 
 
The formation of the modern Turkish state was a reaction to on one the hand the 
external pressures exercised by the expanding Western powers that occupied the 
Ottoman territories, and on the other hand to the extensive internal discontent and 
social unrest that emerged during the last few decades of the Empire. Even today 
Turks feel, with reference to the Treaty of Sèvres, that their national identity is 
                                                     
50 "As long as there are fine people with honour and respect, Turks and Kurds will continue to live 
together as brothers around the institution of the khalifa and an unshakeable iron tower will be 
raised against internal and external enemies." Mustafa Kemal 1919, quoted in MacDowall 1996 
p. 187 
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threatened by external forces aimed at splitting their country up. These develop-
ments are also referred to when unwanted expressions of opinion are crushed. 
The first cycle of open Kurdish resistance to the Kemalist regime took place 
in the early years of the republic, when the political and ideological structures of 
the state were not yet fully established. This early resistance culminated in three 
rebellions: the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, the Ararat Rebellion in 1930 and the 
rebellion in Dersim in 1937. All of them were brutally crushed and were followed 
by severe repression of the Kurds. 
The next cycle of Kurdish resistance took form in post-Kemal Turkey in the 
1960s and 1970s. This time too the Kurdish resistance can be seen as a reaction to 
the repressive policies of the Turkish state. A number of coincident factors gave 
impetus to the emergence of a Kurdish movement: the sweeping economic and 
political changes that took place, the introduction of a multi-party system, the 
country’s close political relations with NATO, initial attempts to integrate Turkey 
in the international capitalist economy and in particular the new constitution of 
1960, which allowed for limited political freedom of the Kurds. How the Kurdish 
movement took shape and interacted with these factors will be analysed in Chap-
ter 5. 
3.8 Closing of the Chapter 
This chapter has described the situation for the Kurds during the last decades of 
the Ottoman Empire. In the first part of the chapter the social and political organi-
sation of Kurdistan in the 19th century were accounted for. The social and political 
unrest in Kurdistan and the Ottoman Empire were described, as well as the social 
transformation of the Kurdish society that took place during this period. In the 19th 
century the Ottoman Empire was threatened by the encroaching European Powers. 
In addition the increasing internal political and social unrest contributed to its we-
akening and crumbling. Nationalist movements emerged among the various ethnic 
groups inhabiting the century, for example, Greece and Bulgaria declared their 
independence. 
In the early 20th century both Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals were influ-
enced by contemporary nationalist ideologies. The Kurdish movements were 
concentrated to Istanbul but local clubs were also founded in the cities of 
Kurdistan. Finally the chapter discuss the peace negotiations following the First 
World War. In the peace negotiations that first took place in Sèvres promises of 
future independent state formations were given to the Kurds and the Armenians. In 
the final peace agreement, signed in Lausanne in 1923, these commitments have 
been anulled. From now on the Kurds became minorities in four different states in 
the Middle East.  
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Table 3a: Chronology ca 1839 - 1923 
1839-1876  The Tanzimat Period - an era of reforms along bureaucratic lines 
 aimed at centralising the administrative and political power struc tures of 
 the Empire.  
 
1908  The Young Turk Revolution - The Committee of Union and Progress 
 seizing power. Their first year in power meant a period of relative 
 liberation. Oppositional groups, many of them pro-Kurdish, organised 
 freely. A year later, however, their power became much limited. 
 
1920  The Treaty of Sèvres.  
 
1923  The Treaty of Lausanne. 
 
Table 3b: The Generation during this period 
This chapter deals with historical developments that took place in the decades before the 
people belonging to the political generation of our major concern here were born. During 
this period, the Ottoman Empire underwent dramatic political, economic and social trans-
formations. The political structures of the Middle East of today were created. In this proc-
ess, the relative autonomy that Kurdish princes and fiefs had enjoyed became circum-
scribed. The Empire collapsed and a number of nation states were created in the Middle 
East. As a consequence, the Kurds became incorporated into Iran and the newly estab-
lished states of Iraq, Syria, Turkey as well as those of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The politi-
cal and social developments that took place during this period affected very much the re-
gionalised Kurdish movements that emerged in the 1960's onwards. 
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Chapter 4 
Repression: The Kurds and the Tur-
kish Nation Building Project 
The aim of this chapter is to describe and analyse the emergence of the modern 
republic of Turkey. The first part of the chapter concentrates on the consolidation 
of the modern Turkish Republic in the 1920s and 1930s. At that time nationalism 
became a founding principle of the modern Turkish state. This section also deals 
with the political leadership of Kemal Atatürk, as well as with the socio-economic 
structure of the country that the Kemalists took over. The political and ideological 
ingredients in the emerging Turkish nationalism that will be scrutinised, in addi-
tion questions of how the Turkish nationalism was carried out in practice in terms 
of political reforms, education, the writing of history and endeavouring to create a 
modern Turkish vernacular being briefly discussed.  
The second part of the chapter is devoted to the responses made to Kemalist 
policies and the repercussions that this resistance had for the Kurds. Questions of 
how the resistance was organised, how the Kurds responded to the Turkish nation 
building project, Kurdish responses to expanding state control, and the political 
organisation of the Kurds from Ottoman times up to the early years of the Turkish 
Republic in the 1930s are discussed.  
4.1 The Turkish Republic 
4.1.1 President Kemal Takes Office 
The modern independent Republic of Turkey was proclaimed on October 29, 
1923. This was a great victory for the Turkish nationalist camp. Still today, the 
Turkish struggle for independence, as well as attempts to create a modern and 
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secular Turkish state, is ascribed in popular narratives to Mustafa Kemal, more 
popularly known as Kemal Atatürk, alone.51 Mustafa Kemal became the first 
president of the Turkish Republic, a position he held until his death in 1938. As 
president he became celebrated and admired by large masses in the Turkish soci-
ety, his being given such epithets as "the immortal leader" and "the saviour" of the 
Turkish nation. The portrait of Kemal as the sole leader has also been promoted by 
Western scholars and by observers of Turkish politics (see for example Lewis 
2002). His political and ideological ideas doubtlessly influenced the creation of the 
modern Turkish Republic, to a marked degree moulding both its institutions and 
Turkish nationalism (Ahmad 1993 p. 56; Zürcher 2004 pp. 156-160). Although the 
role of Kemal in the Turkish nation building project is clearly important, in recent 
decades a more balanced picture has been provided by scholars generally and by 
serious observers of Turkey (Keyder 1997; Mango 1999; Poulton 1997 pp. 95, 
171; Pope and Pope 1997 pp. 54ff; Zürcher 2004 pp. 151-152).  
Recent research has revealed that his position as a leader was actually far 
more disputed and insecure than what rumour tells (Mango 1999 pp. 419, 444-446, 
502-503; Poulton 1997 p. 92; Pope and Pope 1997 pp. 65-66; Zürcher 2004 pp. 
167-168). Zürcher, for instance, shows that the resistance to Kemal that developed 
when he came to power was larely organised by former CUP members and mem-
bers of groups possessing political shades of opinion such as those of the Second 
Group and the Progressive Republican Party52 (Zürcher 1984, 2004). Pope and 
Pope (1997) points to its being unlikely that Kemal could have reached the posi-
tion he did as an executive of the Turkish resistance movement without support 
from some where (ibid. pp. 52ff.).  
Mustafa Kemal was born in Salonica, in present Greece, in a poor middle 
class family. He had a solid military education and came to belong politically to 
the modernising flank of the Ottoman Army. He joined the Young Turk movement 
and became a member of the CUP53 in 1907. During the First World War the Ot-
toman lands became occupied by the Entente powers.54 In 1919 the still relatively 
unknown Mustafa Kemal was appointed inspector of the Third Army and was sent 
                                                     
51 The name Atatürk, literally mean "Father of the Turks". This was a surname that he had 
chosenhimself, that was granted to him by the parliament in 1934 and made forbidden for 
anyone else to wear. Henceforth he will be referred to as Mustafa Kemal. 
52 The Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fıkrası) was the only legitime 
oppositional party in the early years of the Turkish Republic. The party was established in 1924 
and was forced, by the Turkish government, to close down in 1926. 53	   The term Union here alludes to the idea of ethnic unity that was a central idea in the ideology of 
the Young Ottomans and is also to be found in the name of their organisation Ottoman Unity So-
ciety (İttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti), (see, for example, Zürcher 2004 p. 86-87). 54	   These are France, Britain and Russia. The Ottoman Empire participated in the war on the side of 
the Central Powers.	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to Erzurum in Eastern Anatolia, being made responsible for the Ottoman troops in 
the area. The formal organisation of the resistance as established then was given 
the name of The Association for the Defence of National Rights in Anatolia and 
Rumelia55 (Poulton 1997 p. 94; Özdalga 1978 p. 20-22). 
In the fall of 1919, Turkish nationalists took control over the parts of Ana-
tolia that were not occupied by foreign powers (Zürcher 2004 p. 157). Ankara, the 
old provincial town of Angora, was claimed as a new capital, the next step of the 
nationalists then being to establish a parliament in the territories that they con-
trolled. The regime of the Sultan was still recognized by the foreign powers, as the 
legitime rulers, although its influence did not extend far beyond Istanbul (Ahmad 
1993 pp. 49-50; Hourani 1992 p. 359; Mango 1999 pp. 278ff.; Pope and Pope 
1997 pp. 33ff.).  
4.1.2 The Consolidation of the One Party State 
On September 9, 1923 the Republican Party (Halk Fırkası) led by Kemal, declared 
itself a political organization. This was the governing party in Turkey between 
1923-1950. In 1935 the name of the party was changed to the Republican People's 
Party (CHP). Kemal and his regime had a vision of creating a modern and secular 
Turkish State. In line with this they prepared for large changes and carried out a 
"modernising" policy designed to represent a radical break with the past and with 
the Western European nation states, in particular France, as a model (see, for ex-
ample, Mango 1999 p. 396). Since the Tanzimat, the reform era that took place in 
the 19th century, the state apparatus and political discussion in the country had 
essentially been dominated by three ideological currents.  
First, there was a current that in the literature is labeled as Ottomanism. It 
was based on the idea of establishing "a union of the different communities around 
the Ottoman throne" (Zürcher 2004 p. 127), irrespective of language or religious 
affiliations and believed in equality among the millets. Secondly, a current can be 
distinguished generally referred to as (pan)-Islamism. Adherents to this current 
promoted Muslim unity and aimed to "regenerate the empire on the basis of Is-
lamic practices and solidarity within the Islamic Ümmet (community)" (ibid.). 
Third, there was a current heavily influenced by the ideas of nationalism, and in 
the literature is referred to as (pan)-Turkism. Its proponents were aspiring for "a 
union of the Turkic peoples under the Ottoman flag" (ibid.). 
Ottomanism was the official ideology between 1908 and 1913. From 1913 
until it was dissolved, the Ottoman state was governed by the CUP and the Young 
                                                     
55 In Turkish: Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdfaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri. 
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Turks, and Turkish nationalism becoming the dominant ideological current (Zür-
cher 2004 pp. 4,121,127; see also Mango 1999 passim). 
A number of reforms were carried out in the Kemalist era that contributed to 
a radical transformation of the Turkish society and more or less touched the daily 
lives of its citizens. First, there was a set of reforms aimed at taking the influence 
of religion out of the public sphere. Already on November 1, 192256 the Grand 
National Assembly passed a resolution intended to separate the Caliphate from the 
Sultanate, and in 1924 it was definitely abolished. The abolition of the Caliphate 
proved to be a much more controversial matter than it had been to suspend the 
Sultanate. Several of the deputies in the Assembly still regarded the Caliph as the 
legitimate sovereign and head of the state - ”a kind of constitutional monarch” 
(Lewis 2002 p. 256), the Caliphate coming to be used by the oppositon as a sym-
bol and protest actions being organised (Lewis 2002 p. 260; Poulton 1997 p. 92). 
One of the plans of the regime was to implement a uniform public system of 
education. A law passed in 1924 stated that all schools, also the religious ones, 
should be under the control of the Ministry of Education. At the same time, Turk-
ish was made the instruction language both in elementary and in religious schools 
(Stålesen 1996 p. 67; Zürcher 2004 p. 188). Consequently, the religious schools, 
the medreses, where the ulema, the Islamic jurisprudence, had been taught in Ara-
bic, were closed down. A further consequence was that linguistic minorities, for 
example the Kurds, that previously had used their maternal tongue as a language 
of education in the medreses from now on could only be taught in Turkish (Mango 
1999 pp. 403ff.). 
Islamic institutions came under state control and all religious courts were clo-
sed down. In addition, family laws became secularised and were renowned from 
the jurisdiction of the ulema. Religious marriages and polygamy were prohibited. 
Islam was retained as the state religion during the first years of the republic, altho-
ugh there was a clause stipulating that it was to be removed in 1928 (Mango 1999 
p. 463; Raudvere 2002; Zürcher 2004 p. 181). The Kemalist government expanded 
the school system with the aim of increasing the literacy rate in the country. Yet, 
still in 1923, according to estimated figures, more than 90 % of the population was 
illiterate (Stålesen 1997 p. 67). Literacy, was considered to be 17 % for males and 
4.8 % for women. Officially, there were 4,894 elementary schools registered in the 
                                                     
56 For example Mango (1999) describe these events as follows: ”The record shows only that in the 
early hours of 2 November 1922, the assembly passed a resolution (dated 1 November) declaring 
that the sultan’s government had ended on 16 March 1920, when Istanbul was occupied by the 
Allies, that the government of the Grand National Assembly was the only legitimate authority in 
the country, that the caliphate was vested in the Ottoman dynasty, but that the assembly had the 
right to chose the caliph” (ibid. p. 364). 
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schools registered in the country, in Kurdistan the number of schools being esti-
mated in 1925 to be 215 (Weiker 1981 p. 151). 
In addition there was a package of reforms aimed at westernisation. In 1925 
the traditional Turkish headgear, the fez, was banned and was replaced by the 
Western styled cap, or top hat. Traditional courtesy titles such as bey, pasha and 
efendi were taken away. Within a few years, a new civil code and a new criminal 
code were established. In 1934 the Western use of surnames was introduced and in 
1935 a decree was issued that Sunday was to replace Friday as the official day of 
rest (for details on the reforms, see, for example Ahmad 1993 p.54; pp. 80ff., Le-
wis 2002 pp. 266-271, 272, 276-279; Mango 1999 p. 433, pp. 437ff.; Pope and 
Pope 1997 p. 62; Zürcher 2004 pp. 173ff.). 
One of the most radical reforms, however, was the alphabet reform. A similar 
reform had been planned by the Young Turks about a decade earlier. In a decree of 
November 1, 1928 the Arabic script was replaced by a Latin alphabet. A prepara-
tory committee was allowed three months to draft the proposals for the reform. 
The date on which the use of Arabic script was to become illegal was January 1, 
1929. A consequence of this was that even the literate and well educated were cut 
off from the past, all officials also being obliged to learn and use the new script 
(Ahmad 1993 p. 80; Poulton 1997 p. 110). 
A next step in the reform program was that the Turkish language was 
cleansed of all Arabic, Persian and Muslim elements. Osmanlıca or Ottoman lan-
guage, spoken mainly by the upper strata in Ottoman society, was to a large extent 
influenced by Arabic and Persian loanwords. Turkish vernaculars and dialects 
were spoken by those in the lower strata, however. During the Ottoman period, the 
very concepts of ”Turk” and ”Turkish” had a pejorative ring, the language spoken 
by the lower strata of society being referred to as kaba Türkçe or “vulgarised 
Turkish” (Schlyter 1997 p. 115; Poulton 1997 p. 110). 
A number of further campaigns were launched, for example one that was in-
tended to collect Turkish substitutes for what were considered to be loaned words. 
It was believed that a number of genuinely Turkish words were to be found in 
spoken Turkish and dialects, words that were not to be found in dictionaries. 
Forms were sent to areas in which local committees, leaders and teachers could 
collect words and return them to the institute. A similar campaign presented 10-20 
Persian words every day in the newspapers, people being encouraged to suggest 
substitutes for them (Schlyter 1997 p. 124). A significant part of the Arabic and 
Persian words disappeared from the Turkish vocabulary, although in practice peo-
ple continued to use many words originating from these languages, and French 
terms continued to be used, particularly within the areas of bureaucracy and ad-
ministration.  
The reform had far-reaching consequences, one of them being that the lan-
guage people speak in present-day Turkey is quite different from the vernacular of 
Turkish citizens in the early years of the republic. In addition, young Turks today 
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generally find it difficult to understand Mustafa Kemal´s classical speech Nucuk 
from the early 1920s. 
4.1.3 "Kemalism" and "Nationalism"  
The thoughts and ideas that guided the founding principles of the Turkish state are 
generally attributed to Kemal. However, the Turkish nationalism that took shape in 
the 1920s and 1930s was also informed by ideas and developments that evolved in 
the decades previous to the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Karpat 2001; 
Mardin 1962 passim; Poulton 1997 p. 88; Zürcher 1984, 2004 pp. 121, 127).  
The historian Kemal Karpat distinguishes three periods that have been sig-
nificant for the development of Turkish nationalism. First, between 1865 and 
1908, in the Hamidian period and the Tanzimat era, new elite groups emerged on 
the political arena, with aspirations for a modern constitution, attempting to reform 
the Ottoman state. The second period began when the Young Turk government 
took power in 1908 and the Sultan Abdülhamid was desposed. The political ideals 
of a secular republic in which state and religion where to be separated can be 
traced back to the Young Turk era. Also in this era the CUP initiated a campaign 
aimed to "turcify" the population, its being directed against both non-muslims and 
non-turkish speaking muslims (Stålesen 1997 p. 67). 
The third period that Kemal Karpat describes was in the early years of the 
Turkish Republic, during two brief periods between 1923 and 1930 and between 
1930 and 1946. During these periods a nationalism based upon a one-sided ac-
count emphasizing the Turkish ethnic past only was developed, with a sacrificing 
of the Ottoman and Islamic heritages. In turn, social, cultural and ideological con-
flicts came to the fore (Karpat 2001 pp. 402 ff.; Poulton 1997; Zürcher 2004). 
The nationalism of Turkey can at first sight be perceived as being what, in 
the terminology of Anthony D. Smith (1986, 1992), is a "civic" nationalism. In its 
aspirations there was a clear ambition to include all inhabitants of the Turkish 
territories, irrespective of ethnic origin or religious affinities, in the nation-
buildning project. Gradually, however, the nationalism of Turkey became essen-
tially "ethnic" since a Turkish identity, also in terms of language and culture, was 
to be imposed on all of its citizens (Ahmad 1993 pp. 77ff.; Natali 2005 Chapters 4 
and 5; Poulton 1997 pp. 9, 92-100, 114).  
The political reforms mentioned in the previous section were strongly influ-
enced by the founding principles of Kemal, that later were elaborated upon and 
formulated in a doctrine called Kemalism (Kemalizm) or Ataturkism (Atatürkçü-
lük), after the Turkish leader. It aimed at defending the integrity of the Turkish 
Republic and evolved gradually in the course of the 1930s. It never became a 
coherent ideology, but rather took on the form of a set of attitudes, though it was 
never defined in detail (Ahmad 1993 pp. 61ff.; van Bruinessen 1992 p. 274; Öz-
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Özdalga 1978; Poulton 1997 Chapter 4; Zürcher 2004 p. 189). The basic principles 
of Kemalism were laid down in the party programme of 1931. They were those of 
Republicanism, Secularism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism and Revolution-
ism/Reformism.57 These six principles, symbolised in the party emblem as six 
arrows (Altı Ok), were incorporated into the constitution in 1937. Together they 
constituted the state ideology of Kemalism and became used as a vehicle for in-
doctrination and mobilisation in schools and the educational system generally, in 
the media and in the army. However vague some of them were, these tenets cast 
light on the political thinking of Kemal and contemporary Turkish politics. 
First, Republicanism was made a basic principle of the Turkish state, already 
in 1923. It has been described as the most "rigid" of the Kemalist arrows and was 
aimed at prohibition of any political activity that was in favour of the monarchy 
(Weiker 1981 p. 5). Second, the principle of Populism is vague and somewhat 
difficult to grasp. This principle express the belief that the revolution was aimed 
for all people in Turkey, its thus putting the interests of the nation before those of 
different classes or of groups with special interests. Accordingly, class divisions 
were claimed to not exist in the country, this principle also entailing a prohibition 
of political activities based on class. As Martin van Bruinessen has pointed out, it 
became possible to officially deny the existence of a Kurdish population in the 
country (van Bruinessen 1978 pp. 367).  
Third, the principle Revolutionism/Reformism based on the idea that Turkey 
was in the throes of a continuing and fundamental revolution that would result in a 
complete break with its past. The alternative label of reformism implies there be-
ing a continous transformation, although of more moderate means. Yapp explains 
the ambiguous formulation of the principle with a lack of agreement between con-
temporary Turkish leaders regarding the "pace and scope of change" (Yapp 1996 
p. 162). Weiker describes the ambuigity as follows:  
 
The republicans generally took it to mean the summation of the great Atatürk re-
forms but they should be legitimately debated. It was therefore at least nominally 
possible to dissent without putting the legitimacy of the entire Revolution in danger, 
and without tarnishing the image of Atatürk, who had become the very symbol of 
Reformism. 
(Weiker 1981 p. 7).  
 
Fourth, the principle of Secularism that was touched upon in the previous section, 
has been considered to be the most dramatic Kemalist doctrine, its becoming a 
                                                     
57 For a detailed account of the principles see for example Weiker 1981, for a background see 
Özdalga 1978. 
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subject of intense controversy (Weiker 1981 p. 6; Zürcher 2004 pp. 189, 195). 
Fifth, the principle of Étatism, based on the doctrine that the state should play an 
active role in economic development, and added to Kemalism in 1931, implies 
new efforts at economic development being made. A few decades later, in the 
early 1950s, when Turkey entered the international capitalist market economy, this 
principle was deleted from the constitution (Ahmad 1993 Chapter 5, pp. 132ff.; 
Weiker 1981 pp. 6ff.). 
Finally, sixth, but no least, is the principle of Nationalism, an important and 
dominant ingredient in Kemalist ideology. In the 1930s this ideology developed 
into an extreme and chauvinistic form of nationalism, and was also used as the 
prime instrument for building a new Turkish national identity. Since the content 
and formation of Turkish nationalism is of particular interest in the present study it 
will be dealt with below, both separately and at some length. The political devel-
opments in the early years of the republic were essential to the formation of the 
Turkish nationalist doctrine. As Turkish society went through a process of huge 
transformation underlying conflicts in the country came to the light. Protests and 
actions against the regime emanated not only from Islamic groups. Resistance was 
also widespread in Kurdistan. Also, minor groups involving other minorities as 
well as left wing goups came to be in oppositon to the regime, although these 
groups were more marginal. 
The ideology of the Turkish state, the line of arguments employed in efforts 
to impose a Turkish identity upon the minorities in Turkey, was taken from the 
ideas of Ziya Gökalp, a philosopher and poet belonging to the inner circles of the 
CUP, his coming to be a sort of "chief ideologist of a Western oriented Turkish 
nationalism" (Mango 1999 p. 96). In his influential work Principles of Turkism, 
Ziya Gökalp writes: 
 
a nation is not a racial or ethnic or geographic or political or volitional group but 
one composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, morality or 
aesthetics, that is to say, who have received the same education. ... the only solution 
is to recognize as Turk every individual who says 'I am a Turk,' and to punish those, 
if there are any, who betray the Turkish nation. 
(Gökalp 1969 p. 15). 
 
Ziya Gökalp, or Mehmet Ziya, was born in 1876, in Diyarbakir, a Kurdish-
dominated town in the Kurdistan region in Turkey, or Southeastern Anatolia, his 
allegedly being of Kurdish or half-Kurdish origin. He became involved in the Yo-
ung Turk circles and became in time a member of the CUP (Mango 1999 pp. 95ff.; 
Berkes 1959 pp. 13ff.; Poulton 1997 p. 76). His theoretical thinking was 
essentially inspired by French philosophers and attempted to achieve a synthesis of 
the various ideological currents in the Ottoman society - Islam, Ottomanism and 
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Turkism - mixed with ideas of Western modernisation based essentially on the 
sociological ideas of "corporate solidarism" and "collective conscience" developed 
by Émile Durkheim (Karpat 2001; Bozarslan 1996 p. 138; Mango 1999 pp. 5ff.; 
Poulton 1997 p.79). Gökalp took a nationalist point of departure that became evi-
dent in particular in his application of Durkheimian theories, his replacing the 
concept of society with the concept of nation. Central to his thinking was the idea 
that education should be more significant than ethnic origin in the constructing of 
national identities, an idea that still holds sway in pedagogical thought in Turkey 
(Kaplan 2006 p.39). 
It is sometimes hold that "Gökalpism" is a more adequate name for the offi-
cial ideology that laid the foundation for Turkish state nationalism, than Kemalism 
(see, for example, Bozarslan 1996 pp. 136ff.). On the other hand, Gökalp's Kurd-
ish origin is sometimes taken as proof of his ideology not being ethnic in charac-
ter. Other interpretations of his texts hold that he in reality recognizes a distinct 
ethnic identity of the Kurds. The Kurdish historian Hamit Bozarslan draw our 
attention to the following passage in one of the main works of Gökalp: "National-
ist movements among the Arabs and Kurds also began as cultural movements; the 
second stages were political and the third economic" (Gökalp 1969 p. 55).  
The Kemalist ideology was launched in various campaigns aimed at spread-
ing it to the masses. A network of People´s Homes (Halk Evleri) and People´s 
Rooms (Halk Odalari) was established across the country as a whole in the 1930s. 
These institutions were controlled by the local branches of the party, and students 
together with educated party members being sent out into the countryside to in-
form people of Kemalist ideals and principles (Weiker 1981 p. 4; Zürcher 2004 p. 
188). A nationalist historiography became an important element in these cam-
paigns. In the 1930s the construction of a Turkish thesis of history was initiated by 
Kemal. The Turkish History Thesis (Türk Tarih Tesis) written between 1929 and 
1932, reflected the ideals of a unitary Turkish nation. It was created by an aca-
demic committee appointed by Kemal. The Turkish History Thesis thought that 
the Anatolian Turks originally emigrated from Central Asia, that they constituted 
the most ancient civilisation in the world, and came to influence all other existing 
cultures. The results of these efforts of the academic committee was published in 
1931 in the four-volume work History (Tarih), which became a standard reference 
work for schoolbook writers (Stålesen 1997; Poulton 1997 p. 106). 
The thesis was extended, in the view of some commentators its also being 
vulgarised, (see Poulton p. 111; Stålesen 1997 p. 64) in its claiming that Turks 
were the founders of all great civilisations, the Turkish language being described 
as "the most important in the world" and the Turkish race as "a motor of history" 
(Poulton 1997 p. 106; Stålesen 1997 p. 113). This theory was used to prove the 
continuity of the Turkish race, declaring that Turks brought their civilisation to all 
other parts of the world, its being argued in line with this that the Turkish language 
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should be ranked higher, at universities and elsewhere, than it previously had been 
(Behar 1998 pp. 107-109). 
In tandem with the History Thesis, a Sun Language Theory (Güneş Dil Teo-
risi)58 was launched, purporting to demonstrate the supremacy of the Turkish lan-
guage and its very special role throughout history. The thesis marks as depreciat-
ing the Ottoman period, the Ottoman Empire being depicted as a retrograde phase 
of development, referred to as being "alien" and "non-Turkish". The close identifi-
cation with the one party-state, one can note here is shown in especially clear 
terms in volume four, which deals with the history of the Turkish Republic. Poul-
ton (1997) argues that the Turkish History Thesis should be regarded as a reaction 
against the European perceptions of the Turks as being an inferior race, its also 
corresponding to a need for the use of history in the nation-buildning process 
(Poulton 1997 pp. 101, 106; Stålesen 1997) and exemplifying an ultra-nationalist 
strategy in claiming an equal or more prominent place for one´s own national 
group. The volume Tarih was used as a reference work for Turkish history books 
up to the 1950s and continued long afterwards too to influence Turkish history 
writing. 
4.2 Kurdish Resistance 
Kurdish resistance could be considered to be weak in the years of political vacuum 
preceding the creation of the Turkish state but it grew stronger after the Turkish 
Republic was established. In contrast to the previous period, violence now became 
a dominant political means employed in the Kurdish struggle. Between 1925 and 
1938, three major rebellions challenged the regime in Ankara. Bozarslan (2003b 
pp. 175ff.) points out that this can be considered a paradox and argues that the 
radicalisation of the Kurdish resistance can scarcely be explained only simply as a 
response to the repressive Kemalist regime, since Turkish politics not was "ethni-
cised" in the first decade of the republic. During the Turkish struggle for inde-
pendence, Kemal was still inclined to talk about a distinct Kurdish population and 
expressed a tolerant view of it speaking of the existence of different ethnic groups 
in the country. In his speeches he argued in favour of a "Turkish-Kurdish frater-
nity" by making reference to Islamic community and to anti-Christian sentiments: 
 
…there are Kurds and Turks. We do not separate them. But while we are busy to 
defend and protect, of course the nation is not one element. There are various 
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bonded Muslim elements. Every Muslim element which makes this entity are citi-
zens. They respect each other, they have every kind of right, racial, social and geo-
graphical. We repeated this over and over again. We admit this honestly. However 
our interests are together. The unity we are trying to create is not only Turkish or 
Circassian. It is a mixture of one Muslim element. 
(as quoted by McDowall 1996 p. 188). 
 
There are sources that also indicate that when the Grand National Assembly 
opened in Ankara in 1920, Kemal was still thinking of a special position for Kurd-
istan. A proposal for autonomy being granted the Kurds was discussed in the As-
sembly as late as February 22, 1922. Olson points out that the most telling sign of 
the "contemplated nature" of this Kurdish autonomy is probably the Article 16 of 
the proposal declaring: "The primary duty of the Kurdish National Assembly shall 
be to found a university with a law and medical faculty" (Olson 1989 pp. 39-40). 
This proposal was rejected by the Kurdish deputies of the Grand National Assem-
bly (McDowall 1996 p. 188; Olson 1989 p. 140). 
When the Treaty of Lausanne was ratified, all hopes of an independent Kurd-
ish state were finally shattered, Kurdish politics in Turkey gradually turning more 
radical then. Bozarslan (2003b) give three main explanations of why. First, the 
Kurdish leaders realised that Turkish nationalism was going to be institutionalised 
through language and symbols. Secondly, the abolition of the Caliphate eliminated 
the common basis for a Kurdish-Turkish Muslim brotherhood. Third, there was 
growing fear among the Kurdish leaders that the Kurds were going to face "the 
same treatment as that which was meted out to the Armenians" (Bozarslan 2003b 
pp. 182). 
4.2.1 The Sheikh Said Rebellion 
Concerning the personality of the ringleader Sheikh Said it appears to me being of 
interest to mention that he, it is told by the former Head of the Ottoman Banks 
branch office in Bagdad, Mr Reid, who explain himself both to have seen him and 
heard much about him, could be characterised as a fanatic of a type rather like the 
noted/well-known Ghandi. 
(Swedish General-Consul, Constantinople, 10 March 1925 quoted from appendix in 
BedrKhan 1995, this excerpt being translated from Swedish). 
 
In February 1925 a large rebellion broke out in the Kurdistan region in Turkey. 
The leader of the rebellion was a Sufi sheikh, named Said, born in 1865, in the 
town of Palu, north of Diyarbakir. He was a member of a rich and powerful fam-
ily, a leader of one of the most important branches of the Naqshbendi order in 
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Kurdistan, and an influential leader of the tribes in the area (Bozarslan 1992 p. 12). 
In the diplomatic correspondence of the time quoted above he is compared with 
one of the most well-known political freedom fighters and spiritual leaders of the 
time. The few Turkish scholars who have paid attention in any way to this event 
tend to argue that it was instigated by "conservative" and "reactionary" circles 
having the support of Great Britain. In Kurdish circles on the other hand the insur-
rection was sometimes pictured in terms of its being a "popular" uprising. Sureya 
BedrKhan, for example, in a pamphlet addressed to a Western public, label the 
Sheikh Said rebellion as the "Kurdish revolution of 1925". He continues by stat-
ing: "The Kurdish people, now harried and hounded like criminals by the Kemal-
ists, responded gallantly and eagerly to the call to arms" (BedrKhan 1995 p. 46). 
4. 2.1.1 Preparation and uprising 
The rebellion was initially prepared by an organisation referred to as Azadi59 that 
was established in the city of Erzurum and gradually moved its activities to Istan-
bul and Kurdistan. The organisation was mainly dominated by Kurdish intelligent-
sia and officers, although local religious leaders such as Sheikh Said, who became 
radicalised during this period, allegedly belonged to its inner circles (McDowall 
1996 p.192; Olson 1989 p.41, n. 20, appendix). Azadi has been described as a po-
litical organisation, available sources reporting that it had above all the following 
three aims: "to deliver the Kurds from Turkish oppression, to give Kurds freedom 
and an opportunity to develop their country" (Olson 1989 p. 45). Documents show 
that the organisation held a congress in 1924 at which decisions to prepare for a 
general Kurdish rebellion and to seek foreign support for it were made. The or-
ganisation participated in meetings with Turkish representatives and presented a 
proposal for a more far-reaching autonomy than what had been proposed in the 
Grand National Assembly. The date for instigation of the rebellion was decided on 
being sometime in May of 1925 (Olson 1989 pp. 47, 102; van Bruinessen 1992 p. 
292). According to sources consulted by Olson, the congress decided that the re-
bellion should be given a "religious appearance"60 (Kendal 1979a p. 61; Olson 
1989 p. 92; van Bruinessen 1992 p. 292). Througout 1924 preparations for the 
rebellion continued. In September, however, the plans failed. A number of inci-
dents occurred that led to the Turkish authorities realising how serious and threat-
ening the Kurdish demands were. Reprisals followed, the leading figures in Azadi 
being arrested, so that the plans for organising and for the rebellion had to be 
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Ciwata Azadi Kurd meaning Kurdish Freedom Society, a name that later was changed to Ciwata 
Kweseriya Kurd menaning Kurdish Independence Society. 
60 Progressive Republican Party (Terraki-perver Cumhuriyet Firkası) 
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modified (van Bruinessen 1992 p. 283; Olson 1989 p. 91). Finally Sheikh Said, by 
virtue of his influential position, assumed command and began to coordinate the 
preparations for a general uprising, in accordance with the new plan was to take 
place in March 1925 (MacDowall 1997 p. 194; Olson 1989 pp. 91-95).  
On February 8, 192561 broke out prematurely in the village of Piran. On 
February 14 Sheikh Said called for the rebellion through issuing a fetva in which 
he called upon the Kurds to revolt against the government in Ankara. In the fetva 
he stated that he was the "commander of the faithful and fighters for holy war" 
emir al-mujahadin of the rebellion, emphasizing his role as leader of the 
Naqshbendi tarikat and as the sole representative of the Caliph of Islam (Olson 
1989 pp. 93-94, 108). Furthermore he declared that he "assumed the supreme 
leadership over the rebellion" and "wanted everyone to join the holy crusades" and 
to become a "holy fighter" (mujahadin) (Olson 1989 p. 108; see also McDowall 
1996 p. 197; Arfa 1966 p. 38; Bozarslan 1992 p. 13). Darhînî was declared the 
provincial capital of Kurdistan (Kendal 1979a p. 62; van Bruinessen 1992 p. 286). 
At first, the rebellion spread fast and it soon enveloped major Kurdish areas 
in Turkey. A number of weaknesses in the organisation and the coordination of 
things soon became evident. First, the gap between towns and the rural areas be-
came obvious. A number of provincial centres fell in the rebels hands. The strate-
gically most important front, that was under the leadership of Sheikh Said himself, 
aimed at capturing the strategically important city of Diyarbakir. However the 
rebels did not manage to take control of it, due to the well organised resistance that 
the commanding Turkish general and the Turkish troop reinforcements provided 
(Olson 1989 p. 109).  
Secondly, linguistical allegiances and tribal loyalties appear to have been 
stronger than nationalist sentiments. According to the sources available a vast 
majority of the tribes that participated were Zaza-speaking (Olson 1989 p. 95). It  
remains unclear whether the two Kurmanji speaking tribes that joined participated 
fully or not (van Bruinessen 1992 pp. 293ff.; Olson 1989 pp. 94, 96; Kutschera 
1979 p. 82).  
Third, as Olson points out, there was a lack of coordination. In some cases 
Sheikh Said apparently had difficulties in determining who was an ally and who 
was a foe (Olson 1989 pp. 92-97). 
Fourth, far from all the participants appear to have been guided by the goals 
and visions promoted by Azadî. The documents scrutinized by Olson reports about 
the sacking of public buildings, of prisons being opened, and of lootings and the 
like. It is reported that in the city of Elazığ after a number of such incidents the 
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rebellion started on February 11. 
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notables and the town dwellers organised a militia, that attacked the rebels and 
"drove them out of the town" (Olson 1989 p. 111). 
Finally, there was a power assymetry. The Kurdish rebels were facing a 
power, the Turkish Army, that was militarily superior and much better organised. 
The Turkish government had the advantage of better communication and logistics 
and of being able to mobilize larger forces than the Kurds. Thus they could con-
centrate this troops much faster and had superior military resources and modern 
vehicles, such as aeroplanes, at their disposal (Arfa 1966 passim; Olson 1989 pp. 
118ff.). 
 4.2.1.2 Defeat and Aftermath 
The rebellion was short in endurance. However Ankara's reactions to the uprising 
were somewhat delayed. On February 16 the outbreak of an uprising was reported 
in Turkish newspapers. Thereafter it took a few weeks before Ankara intervened to 
crush the rebellion. Olson gives a number of plausible reasons for this, three of 
which were the following: a) the government very likely underestimated the 
strength of the Kurdish resistance, b) problems in obtaining information from the 
area of the rebellion, for example its being that the telegraph lines had been cut, 
and d) that there were not enough Turkish troops in the area to effectively quell the 
rebellion (Olson 1989 pp. 102-106). 
The Turkish government reinforced its troops in Kurdistan before attacking 
the rebels and then it captured them between two fronts. Swedish diplomatic sour-
ces tell of up to 52,000 Turkish troops being mobilised by early April, and of this 
time the Turkish troops easily being able to contain and crush the rebellion. It is 
also reported that France permitted the Turks to use Syrian rail facilities, enabling 
25,000 troops, about 2,000 every day, to be transported across the Syrian border 
into the Kurdish areas in Turkey. About the 14th of April, Sheikh Said was captu-
red, together with some of his closest men, when they attempted to force the 
encirclement line that Turkish forces had set up around Darhini (BedrKhan 1995, 
see also Kutschera 1979 p. 85). By this time the most important battles had already 
been fought. According to Olson it has been stated that this was an ambush and 
that Sheikh Said was betrayed by one of the chiefs of the Cibran tribe (Olson 1989 
p. 116). 
In connection with the rebellion having been suffocated, measures were taken 
to strengthen control over the Kurdistan region. Immediately after the Sheikh Said 
rebellion had been crushed, a harsh and brutal repression started. Already on 
March 4th the Law on the Maintenance of Order62 was passed in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, providing the government extraordinary dictatorial 
                                                     
62 In Turkish: Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu. As referred to by Zürcher 2004 p. 171. 
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powers for a period of two years. That same day, two Independence Tribunals 
were established, one in Ankara and the other one in Diyarbakir (Mango 1999 p. 
422; Zürcher 1984 p. 140). The government declared religious fanatism to be one 
of the causes of the rebellion, and a desire to proclaim an independent Kurdistan to 
be another. They expressed suspicions that the rebel leaders aimed at achieving a 
union with the Kurds in Iraq. 
The Turkish government also hinted the possibility of their being underlying 
British intrigues, since Turkey at the time was involved in a dispute over the elayet 
of Mosul (Arfa 1966 p. 36; Bozarslan 1992). A great number of Turkish troops 
were stationed in Kurdistan in Turkey. Many people were sentenced by the Inde-
pendence Tribunals (İstiklâl Makhemeleri), that were established in Ankara and 
Diyarbakir. Zürcher (1984) writes of the members of these tribunals were theoreti-
cally being appointed by the Grand National Assembly, but in reality Kemal hand-
picking them. The tribunals also failed to adhere to normal juridical procedure. 
Zürcher refers to sources telling that purportedly had 7,446 people been arrested 
and 660 executed in accordance with the Law on the Maintenance of Order during 
the two years they were in effect (ibid. 1984 p. 146).  
Most observers point out that the rebellion came to have far reaching political 
consequences and facilitated the consolidation of the not yet fully institutionalised 
Turkish state. Olson regards the consequences as having been "more important 
than the rebellion itself" (Olson 1989 p. 157). An initial effect was that of a change 
in government. President Kemal realised the threat that the existing opposition 
represented and replaced the Prime Minister Fehti Okyar with the much more 
loyal Ismet Inönü (Zürcher 2004 p. 140). An additional effect which came soon 
afterwards was that the rebellion was employed as an excuse for carrying out 
measures to eliminate the religious opposition. 
In September 1925 Kemal declared: " Gentlemen and those of the nation: all 
of you should know that the Turkish nation cannot become a nation of shaykhs, 
dervishes, religious fanatics, and charlatans. The most correct and truest path of 
the nation is the path of contemporary civilization" (quoted in Natali 2005 p. 81). 
After that repression in Kurdistan became increasingly extensive and ruthless, and 
militarisation of the area intensified. Many commentators agree with McDowall 
(1996 p.198) that controlling Kurdistan then became a "prime function" and "rai-
son d’être" for the Turkish army.63 A number of Kurdish aghas were deported, 
                                                     
63 A more exacting picture is provided by Robert Olson: "It was stated in chapter 5 that seventeen of 
the eighteen military engagements in which Turkish military forces fought from 1924 to 1938 oc-
curred in Kurdistan. Information about post-1938 Turkish military engagements is not available, 
but, if it were, a similar situation would probably be noted. Turkey’s armed forces intervened in 
Hatay in 1938, in Korea in 1950-53, and in Cyprus in 1974. The military engagements against the 
Kurds far exceed the number of external interventions and engagements. By the 1980s, Turkey’s 
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being sent into "internal exile" in the Western parts of Turkey, peasants were mas-
sacred and villages were burnt to the ground. In Diyarbakir, a majority of the Zaza 
Kurds that had been arrested after the siege of the town were executed outside the 
city walls, and many others were hanged in public places. Sheikh Said himself was 
sent to the gallows on June 29, 1925, together with 46 of his closest men at a 
square just outside the city wall that surrounds the old town of Diyarbakir (van 
Bruinessen 1992 p. 291; Olson 1989 p. 127; McDowall 1996 p. 196; White 2000 
p. 76).  
4.2.2 The Ararat Rebellion  
The second major Kurdish rebellion broke out in the area of Ararat in 1930. From 
time to time it has been regarded as being a continuation of the Sheikh Said rebel-
lion. It was initiated by Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists who had escaped 
Kemalist Turkey. In the spring of 1927 Kurdish exiles arranged a congress in the 
town of Bahmbour in Lebanon, in which a new political organisation, the Kurdish 
National Committee, better known as Khoybun,64 was established. The aim of this 
organisation was to continue the Kurdish struggle and defend what were claimed 
to be Kurdish territories: "until the last Turkish soldier had left Kurdish soil" 
(Jwadieh 1960 p. 617). 
Preparations for the new rebellion began and a permanent headquarter was 
established in Syria. The area for a future rebellion, Mount Ararat, was chosen 
strategically. For one thing, there was a geostrategic reason for this choice since 
the fact that the area was situated close to international borders, the slopes of 
Mount Ararat extending into Iranian territory making it impossible for the Turkish 
Army to encircle the rebels. In addition the Kurdish tribes occupying the area were 
already in rebellion against the state. The area was, except from Dersim the only 
one in the Kurdistan region of Turkey at that time not yet fully controlled by An-
kara (McDowall 1996 pp. 207-208; White 2000 p. 77). 
Kurds who participated in this organisation reported that relations were estab-
lished with other political actors in order to gain international support for the Kur-
dish cause. Purportedly, good contacts were established with the French High 
Commission in Syria and with intellectuals in a number of countries. In addition 
Kurdish delegations were sent to meet with representatives of the Western powers 
                                                                                                                                      
 
military actions against the Kurds had assumed external as well as internal proportions" (Olson 
1989 p. 161) 
64 In Kurdish: "to be one’s self" alluding to independence. 
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and of the League of Nations (BedrKhan 1995 p. 53; appendix p. 58). Efforts were 
also made to establish contact with the Soviet Union. An alliance was also forged 
with the Armenian nationalist Dashnak Party (McDowall 1996 p. 203; Jwadieh 
1960 p. 624). From Jwadieh one learns that a protest resolution of the Executive of 
the Second International against the harsh suppression of the Kurds in Turkey was 
passed at their session in Zürich in 1930: 
The executive of the I. O. S draws the attention of the world to the massacre 
by means of which the Turkish Government is seeking not only to reduce the 
Kurds struggling fortheir liberty but also to exterminate the peaceful Kurdish 
population which did not take part in the insurrection, and by which means 
they are seeking to inflict on the Kurdish people the fate of the Armenians 
without the public opinion of the capitalist countries protesting against this 
bloody barbarism. 
(Quoted in Jwadieh 1960 p. 624) 
The Turkish authorities were well aware of the rebels being supported by a Kurd-
ish tribe in Iran, so that they could operate across the border and then withdraw 
into Iranian territories. Available sources point to that some kind of support, tacit 
and possibly even formal, being given by Iran which was "playing the Kurdish 
card" in order to put a pressure on Turkey. The reason for Iran supporting the 
Kurds was that there being unsettled land disputes between the two countries (En-
tessar 1992 p. 85; McDowall 1996 p. 206). At the same time the Turkish forces 
were supported by the Soviet Union, which allowed them to cross the border and 
use Soviet rail facilities in their efforts to stamp out the rebellion.  
By the autumn of 1929, the Kurdish forces dominated a vast area in the re-
gion of Mount Ararat in 1930. Turkish troops began to be concentrated around the 
Ararat Mountain and for a period of time it seemed as though the rebels had been 
defeated. Soon it became however apparent that the rebellion had not been quelled 
and that the Kurds had taken shelter in the inaccessible mountains in the area 
(Frödin 1930 p. 330). In July of 1930 the Turkish government directed a warning 
against Teheran, demanding that the Iranians prevent the rebels from using Iranian 
territory (McDowall 1996 p. 205). A number of treaties were signed between the 
Turkish and the Iranian government in 1932, later to be confirmed by the Treaty of 
Non-Aggression, better known as the Sadaabad Pact signed,  between Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan on July 8, 1937 (Olson 1998 p. 24). Four of its ten cen-
tral articles implicitly adress the need of controlling nationalist sentiments among 
the Kurds.65 
                                                     
65 An abridged English version of this agreement is published in Hurewitz 1956. 
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By the end of August 1930, Turkey had mobilised about 50,000 troops and 
the estimated 3,000 Kurds were surrounded on the mountain of Ararat, and were 
finally defeated (McDowall 1996 p. 205) by brutal means, or as Jwadieh (1960) 
puts it, the quelling was, "accompanied and followed by drastic punitive and dra-
conian measures including deportations, mass arrests, and summary executions" 
(ibid. p. 623; see also Kendal 1979b pp 64ff.; White 2000 p. 79). Sources tell of 
every Kurd found with a weapon in his hand being executed and every man or 
boy, in the Ararat region, from the age of 12 upwards, being sent to Western Tur-
key. These deported boys and young men were not allowed to return to their home 
areas again before 1936 (Kendal 1979b pp. 66ff.).  
The repression continued for many years and was carried out through a num-
ber of special laws that were passed in the Grand National Assembly. On May 5, 
1932 a law was passed in the parliament stipulating that measures of deportation 
and dispersion should be taken against the Kurds. Reportedly they were to be repa-
triated into Turkish villages, in manner such that they would then constitute five 
per cent of the population in accordance with the following declaration: "Four 
separate categories of inhabited zones will be recognised in Turkey as will be 
indicated on a map established by the Minister of the Interior and approved by 
other Ministers. 
No. 1 zones will include all those areas in which it is deemed desirable to 
increase the density of the culturally Turkish population. 
No.2 zones will include those areas in which it is deemed desirable to 
establish populations which must be assimilated into Turkish culture. 
No. 3 zones will be territories in which culturally Turkish immigrants 
will be allowed to establish themselves, freely but without the assistance of 
the authorities. 
No. 4 zones will include all those territories which it has been decided  
should be evacuated and those which may be closed off for public health, 
material, cultural, political, strategic or security reasons.	  	  
(as quoted by Kendal 1979b p. 66) 
 
It is difficult to estimate exactly to what extent these measures were implemented. 
Jongerden (2007 pp. 171, 174, 177) argues that it is a too narrow a perspective to 
consider these repressive measures as being solely instruments aimed at depopu-
lating the Kurdistan region. He argues that the Settlement Act was partly aimed as 
an instrument for creating a homeland for people from parts of the Ottoman areas 
who came to Turkey and having "a larger, positive, objective of creating a Turkish 
homeland" (ibid. p. 174), however adding that there were indeed settlement acts 
aimed at the Kurds. 
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Leaks of information from the by that time highly militarised area speak of 
villages being sacked and destroyed, of killings and of deportations. A report from 
the British consulate in the Turkish town of Mersin describes how "hordes of 
Kurds" from the Ararat region were streaming into the town, driven away from 
their homes without possessions of any kind: 
 
One hundred Kurds, mostly women and children, arrived here [Mersin] by road 
from the interior… They were very scantily clad and many went barefoot. Four 
carts containing their ill and dying, and their few personal belongings, completed 
their procession. They are the remnant of the Ararat Kurds…  
(quoted in McDowall 1996 p. 206) 
 
In the diplomatic report it is also stated that most of these families were settled in 
Western Turkey (McDowall 1996 p. 213 n. 43). The former Iranian embassador to 
Turkey, Arfa describes the situation in his memoirs in terms of "atrocities" and 
"persecution", and accounts of how Kurds fled from Turkey to Iran in search of 
shelter and protection (Arfa 1966 p. 42). The Swedish geographer Frödin obtained 
permission to travel in the area of Van in 1936. During his visit there he observed 
some of the effects of the displacement politics and met with groups of Kurds 
returning home from what he describes as "concentration camps", at the same time 
as he encountered new settlers, mainly Turks from Bulgaria, who had been given 
land plots in the area (Frödin 1948 pp. 182ff.). He told of Kurds residing in some 
of the abandoned Armenian villages and of the local culture of nomadic pastures 
being substantially reduced. Once he came to the village of Shidan, not far from 
the Van lake, the village was in ruins and only one of the houses there was inhab-
ited. Frödin was informed that 3,000 Bulgarian Turks had arrived in the area the 
previous year, and that another 5,000 were excpected to come in 1936 (Frödin 
1948 pp. 70, 90 ). The deportations of Kurds were stopped at the end of 1935 ho-
wever preparations for "pacification" of certain areas of Kurdistan were still in the 
making purportedly for the area of Dersim. 
4.2.3 The Rebellion in Dersim 
The last great Kurdish rebellion in the early Turkish Republic broke out in the area 
of Dersim in 1937. It is estimated that between 60,000 and 70,00066 people resided 
                                                     
66 Van Bruinessen lean on figures referring to the present administrative district of Tunceli. How-
ever he pays the readers attention to the fact that the historical region of Dersim is essentially lar-
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in the area at the time, a vast majority of them speaking Zazakî and Alevis (van 
Bruinessen 1994 pp. 3-8). This area is known for its rugged and nearly inaccessi-
ble mountains. It had always been difficult for the central powers to control and its 
population was known to be "defiant" of state authorities. Historical accounts tell 
of enormous difficulties in collecting taxes in the area, its tribal leaders having 
never joined the Hamidiye Light Cavalries, having refused to participate in the 
Turko-Russian wars and not taking part in the Sheikh Said rebellion (van Bruines-
sen 1994). Also in the 1930s the tribal leaders in Dersim organized pockets of 
resistance against the Turkish regime and governed the area according to their own 
rules. This was regarded as a threat to the government, which prepared plans for 
an administrative reorganisation of the region.  refers to a special report presented 
to the the Grand National Assembly in 1926 it was established that, "Dersim is an 
abscess on the Turkish Republic and it must be removed ,for the sake of the coun-
try's well being" (as quoted by White 2000 p. 79). 
In the 1930s a number of measures were carried out intended to serve as in-
struments to "pacify" the population in the area. Thus, the uprising can be consid-
ered as representing a response to the repressive state policies and the intensified 
militarisation of the region at the time (see, for example, McDowall 1996 pp. 207-
209). In 1935 a special law on Dersim was passed, the name Dersim was replaced 
by the Turkish name Tunceli and a plan for the administrative reorganisation of 
the region was announced. In 1936 a state of siege was declared and a new mili-
tary governor for the district was appointed. In June 1937 military operations be-
gan in the district and many troops were concentrated there. These actions by the 
state power led to fear of massacres and deportations among the people in the re-
gion. The Alevi cleric and tribal leader Sayyid Reza appealed together with other 
tribal leaders in the area, to the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, and to 
the Secretary - General of the League of Nations. Their statement speaks of "these 
tyrannies of the Turkish government against human rights and the Kurdish nation" 
(as quoted by White 2000 p. 81), its pleading for help and resistance. In the letter it 
is pointed out how the Kurds had suffered from the Turkish assimilation policy, 
Kurdish publications being banned, and people persecuted if they spoke their 
Kurdish mother tongue, many being forcibly deported and many having been exe-
cuted. Sayyid Riza demanded freedom and peace for the Kurds in their own coun-
try (Arfa 1966 p. 43; McDowall 1996 p. 208; White 2000 p. 81). 
Under the leadership of Sayyid Riza and local Alevi elites, the population in 
Dersim organised a "guerrilla-like" war in 1937 and resisted the Turkish forces 
                                                                                                                                      
 
ger which can explain why higher population rates are provided by other sources (van Bruinessen 
1994 p. 2 n. 4). 
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until late in October of 1938. The inhabitants of Dersim had been surrounded and 
cut off from outside aid ever since 1936, but their resistance continued long after 
their leader Sayyid Reza had been captured and executed by the Turks (Arfa 1966 
p. 43; Kendal 1979b p. 67; McDowall 1996 p. 208). Finally, they ran out of am-
munition, were forced to surrender and became subjected to widespread execu-
tions and to large-scale deportations. The rebellion in Dersim was stamped out by 
harsh and brutal means (1990; van Bruinessen 1994 pp. 1-2, 8-9; McDowall 1996 
pp. 184-213).  
In his article "Genocide in Kurdistan?" van Bruinessen (1994) refer among 
others to the present British vice-consul at the time in Trabizond on the Black Sea 
coast who compared the incident in Dersim with the, "massacre of the Armenians 
in 1915" (ibid. p. 4). The British diplomat reports: "Thousands of Kurds (...) in-
cluding women and children, were slain; others, mostly children, were thrown into 
Euphrates; while thousand of others in less hostile areas, who had first been de-
prived of their cattle and other belongings, were deported to the vilayets (prov-
inces) of Central Anatolia" (ibid. p. 4). 
Three Turkish Army Corps comprising 50,000 troops altogether were con-
centrated in the area in order to combat the uprising. In addition aerial bombing, 
artillery barrages and purportedly poison gas were all used against the population 
(McDowall 1996 pp. 207-209; Arfa 1966; Olson 1989 p. 105). Thousands of peo-
ple perished. Stories are told about how large groups of women committed suicide 
throwing themselves from cliffs into ravines or into the rivers, about women and 
children who were burnt alive, locked in haysheds or covered with kerosene (van 
Bruinessen 1994 pp. 7-8). 
When the leader of this uprising, Sayyid Reza, decided to surrender he was 
arrested by the Turkish Army and executed. Thereafter, the Kurdish rebels contin-
ued their armed attacks and held out in their struggle about one more year before 
they were out of ammunition. There are no Turkish official figures available re-
garding the number of people who lost their lives or were deported. Jwadieh men-
tions the estimated numbers of 40,000 being killed and 3,000 families being de-
ported after the rebellion had been quelled (Jwadieh 1960 pp. 632-633; se also 
McDowall 1996 p. 209).  
Van Bruinessen (1994) comments that "the only figure on deportations from 
Dersim in the 1930s that I have seen is given by the retired general Esengin, ac-
cording to whom 3,470 persons, belonging to many different tribes, were deported 
to Western Turkey (...) . The actual number may well have been higher" (van Bru-
inessen 1994 p. 11 n. 35). At the time when the Dersim rebellion broke out Turk-
ish nationalism had come to be highly chauvinist and aggressive. After the Dersim 
rebellion had been quelled, Celâl Bayar, the Prime Minister of Turkey at the time, 
declared that "the Kurdish problem no longer existed and that the brigands had 
been forcibly civilized" (Jwadieh 1960 p. 633). This marked the beginning of an 
era of complete denial of the existence of a Kurdish population in Turkey, Kurds 
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coming to be referred to as "Mountain Turks" (McDowall 1996 p. 210; Jafar 1976 
p. 120 n. 121; Jwadieh 1960 p. 633; Natali 2005 p. 93; Poulton 1997 p. 121; White 
2000). It was first in 1946 the Turkish authorities decided to lift the special emer-
gency regime for Dersim (McDowall 1996 p. 209). As recently as in 2011 the 
Turkish Premier Minister Recip Tayıp Erdoğan presented excuses for the massa-
cres in Dersim on the part of the Turkish regime (www.bianet.org 2012-10-15). 
4.4 Closing of the Chapter 
In this chapter the articulation of Kurdish political identities in the period of transi-
tion from the Ottoman empire to the system of nation state based upon fixed terri-
torialized borders and Turkish nationalism has been described. It deals with the 
period when the parents and grand-parents of the political generation of our con-
cerns were politically active. During this period the political structures of the 
Turkish Republic were created. The first part of the chapter chronicles the forma-
tion of this modern state. The chapter took its point of departure in the early 1920s. 
First, an overview of the reforms, aimed at modernisation, that were introduced by 
the Kemalist government in the 1920s was provided. Thereafter the chapter de-
scribes the Kemalist ideology and the Turkish nationalism that developed in the 
1930s. In Turkey, gradually, a highly "ethnicised" political space was created. In 
the course of the 1920s and 1930s, Turkish nationalism went increasingly chauvin-
istic and aggressive, at the same as possibilities of expressing in public ones be-
longing to any other ethnic group than the Turkish was eliminated. 
The last part of the chapter chronicles the Kurdish responses to the Kemalist 
state building project. The Kurdish protests in Turkey became articulated in the 
three major Kurdish rebellions that erupted in the first decades of the Turkish Re-
public: the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, the Ararat rebellion in 1930 and the 
rebellion in Dersim in 1937. In contrast to the Kurdish uprisings that occurred in 
the 19th century the Kurdish rebellions that took place in Turkey in the 1920s and 
1930s were guided by ideas of independence and by nationalist sentiments on the 
part of their organisers. Certainly there was a tribal predominance to be found 
among the participants and there clearly being a number of difficulties in mobilis-
ing large groups of Kurds. Nevertheless, these rebellions were better prepared for 
than earlier uprisings, and they continued even after their leaders had been seized.  
Fourth, the chapter touched upon the responses of the Turkish state to the 
Kurdish uprisings. As has been shown, all the rebellions were crushed with harsh 
and brutal means. The Sheikh Said rebellion became a watershed for future rela-
tions between Kurds and Turks. The rebellion had both included nationalist and 
religious features and was thus seen as a challenge to the Kemalist project. It re-
vealed the strength of a still existing opposition in the country. In the view of the 
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Kemalists, the rebel leaders represented values that impeded the construction of a 
modern and secular Western oriented state. In the aftermath of the rebellion a 
number of laws were implemented that effectively limited the activites of the op-
position. Accordingly, Olson (1989) writes that the Sheikh Said rebellion could be 
seen to "create the atmosphere and mechanisms" necessary to accomplish the ex-
tensive political purges among all groups resistant to the ideas of the Kemalist 
project that followed in its aftermath. He also argues that: "The reason why the 
Sheikh Said rebellion is so important for Turkish history is that the laws and insti-
tutions created for its suppression were agreed to by those who opposed Kemal-
ism" (ibid. p. 159). In connection with that he remarks that "no patriotic Turkish 
official could tolerate a contending nationalism" (ibid. p. 159). Thus the one party 
state was consolidated and a, "greater articulation of the Turkish nationalism on 
which the party and the state were based on" (ibid. p. 158) become possible.  
Finally, Kurdish ethnic identities in Turkey became, in the terminology of 
Eidheim (1969), "undercommunicated" in public arenas. As far as their cultural 
identities was concerned the Kurds were prohibited from speaking their maternal 
tongue openly, and in public spaces they had to say that they were Turks. The 
home was also not always a place where Kurdish could be spoken freely. Politi-
cally, the opposition was prohibited but it continued its activities underground, and 
it was never completely eliminated. After the rebellion in Dersim was so brutally 
crushed in 1938, there was no further open Kurdish resistance in Turkey for dec-
ades to come. In this respect, the "pacification politics" of the Turkish regime had 
been successful, or as van Bruinessen (1994 p. 11) concludes: "After the Dersim 
rebellion had been suppressed, other Kurdish regions being ‘civilised’ from above 
knew better than to resist". 
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Table 4 a: Chronology ca 1919 - 1938  
1919  Greek forces, supported by Great Britain, land in Smyrna (Izmir). 
1920 British forces occupy Istanbul. 
1922  The sultanate is abolished by Mustafa Kemal. 
1923  The Turkish Republic is proclaimed. 
1924 The Caliphate is abolished by the Turkish Parliament. 
 Simultaneously with this, Kurdish associations and newspapers are 
 closed.  
1925  The Kurdish rebellion under the leadership of Sheikh Said Piran. 
 This rebellion is brutally stamped out and Sheikh Said is executed 
 on June 29th. 
1925-1930 A set of refoms is implemented aimed at modernisation and  seculari
 sation. 
1930-31  The Ararat Rebellion occurs. It is quelled by brutal means by the 
 Turkish Army Forces. 
1937-38  The rebellion in Dersim (Tunceli) take place. This rebellion is bru-
 tally stamped out. 
1938 President Mustafa Kemal dies. He is succeeded by İsmet İnönü. 
 
Table 4b: The Generation during this period 
 
This chapter deals with the early decades of the modern Turkish Republic. The oldest 
persons of those included in the study was born during this period. This is the period of the 
previous generation, that became silenced in the repression that followed the Kurdish pro-
tests and uprisings in the early Turkish Republic. It moulded the generation of their par-
ents, who experienced the rebellions, the repressive measures and learning to deny in pub-
lic spaces that they were Kurds. Many of the men and women interviewed for the study 
have told of how they grew up with this silence, fear and heavy repression. 
The implementation of Kemalist principles, above all that of nationalism, came to perme-
ate many fields of social life. The principle of nationalism came to influence, for example, 
what was learned about society and history in school. The repressive laws and the prohibi-
tion of the Kurdish language and all expressions of Kurdishness came to have an impact on 
all Kurds, although people dealt with it differently. Children from Kurdish-speaking fami-
lies could not be educated in their maternal tongue and the children was forbidden to speak 
Kurdish in schoolyards or with friends in their leisure time. 
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Chapter 5 
Resistance: Post-Kemal Turkey and 
the Kurdish Nationalist Movement 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the formation of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey in the 
decades following the Second World War. During this period, the Kurdish strug-
gle, generally speaking had became regionalized and basically limited to the po-
litical arenas within the states of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. In each of these 
states, different political spaces developed. In Turkey the formation of a Kurdish 
political movement was carried out by a new generation of Kurds who had not 
been involved at all in the Kurdish currents that existed in the early part of the 20th 
century. There was no continuity between the earlier Kurdish movements and 
those that appeared then after the Second World War. The movements that devel-
oped into rebellions in the early Turkish Republic took place at a time when relig-
ion had been subordinated to state power.  
The Kurdish resistance that emerged in the early Turkish Republic had been 
influenced by the nationalist movements and ideologies that were dominant at that 
time. The Kurdish movement that emerged in the decades following the Second 
World War, in contrast, was strongly influenced by nationalism, and by Marxism 
and left-wing oriented ideologies that were quite predominant in the universities at 
the time. It was a resistance movement brought about primarily by a) the socio-
economic structures that developed in Turkey with wide economic gaps between 
the south-eastern part of the country, where the Kurdistan region is situated, and 
the western parts of it, b) the political structures at the time, which existed in a 
highly "ethnicized" political space and did not allow at all Kurdish national identi-
ties to be expressed, and c) the repression since earlier of the Kurds that still per-
sisted. 
The members of the political generation of concern here had in common that 
they were born during the time of the modern Turkish Republic's existence and 
were brought up by parents who had the horrific massacres and harsh repression of 
the Kurds by the Kemalist regime fresh in their memory. Thus, among their par-
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ents and their grandparents there was widespread fear of being discovered bringing 
the Kurdish question up in public spaces. They themselves were too young to have 
participated in the Kurdish movements that emerged early in the 20th century, but 
were old enough to have become actively involved in the cycle of Kurdish resis-
tance that took place in the decades before the military intervention in 1980.  
After years of silence following the Dersim rebellion, this new political gen-
eration tested carefully how far the rights recognised by the constitution of 1960 
could be extended. Signs of resistance could be distinguished a few years earlier. It 
is difficult to establish exactly when a generation of this sort takes shape. The con-
stitution of 1960 opened up new opportunities of organising, although political 
opinions that were expressed were still expected to fit into the Kemalist mould. 
Paragraphs 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code from 1926 were still in force. 
According to these political organising and the dissemination of propaganda that 
could "destroy or weaken the nationalist feeling"67 of Turkey were strictly forbid-
den. Thus, organizing resistance and participating in it, either politically or sym-
bolically, in line with Kurdish ethnic interests was still prohibited and continued to 
be dangerous.  
5.2 Multi-Party System 
When Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, he was succeded by his Prime Minister Ismet 
İnönü, one of his most experienced companions. İnönü was to continue with the 
policies introduced by Kemal. At the same time, however, the country began to 
open to the international community and was gradually integrated into the world 
capitalist system, a development that led to the country's being faced with many 
new challenges. Turkey had taken a neutral position during most of the Second 
World War, before finally entering it on the side of the Allies. When peace was 
finally reached in 1945, Turkey became a founding member of the United Nations 
(UN), was admitted as a full member of the NATO in 1952, and participated with 
25,000 troops in the Korean War the same year. The country became a key ele-
ment in the NATO strategy aimed at blocking any Soviet aspirations of reaching 
the Mediterrean countries. Ever since the revolution in Iran in 1979, the country 
has, largely because of its geopolitical situation, been of increasing strategic im-
portance for NATO, its representing the south-eastern flank of the organisation.  
                                                     
67 Quoation from KHRP 1997 p. 7. 
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 At the same time, the Turkish government continued fostering its relations with 
Eastern Europe, above all with the USSR, as well as with other Middle Eastern 
countries and became a member of the European Council in 1949 (Ahmad 1993 
pp. 119, 123-125; Zürcher 2004 pp. 274, 332). 
In addition, extensive economic, political and social changes took place in-
side Turkey, there being a new middle class hoping for liberal reforms. Late in 
1945, president Inönü openly admitted that the one-party system was a shortcom-
ing for Turkish democracy and declared that the general elections in 1947 would 
be free. Parties were allowed to register, although a political organisation on the 
basis of either class or ethnic interests was still forbidden. The Democrat Party 
(DP) was registered on January 7, 1946. This party, chaired by Adnan Menderes, 
soon got widespread support and won a landslide victory in the elections in 1950 
(Zürcher 2004 p. 221). The party remained in power during this decade.  
The political structures had gradually changed. The army had been a domi-
nant factor in Turkish political life, as the rule of a dominant elitist bureaucracy 
originating from the Ottoman state structure had also been. Under the CHP re-
gime, the bureaucracy and the party apparatus had been merged. Zürcher (2004) 
writes:  "one could say that the party was just one of the instruments through 
which the state controlled and steered society" (ibid. p. 221), a power structure that 
was broken, however, when the DP government came to power. 
At the beginning of its period in office the DP regime appeared to fulfil the 
wishes of those voting for them. Several attempts were made to modernise the 
infrastructure of the country. Schools and new roads were built, the electrical 
power network was extended and considerable investments in infrastructures were 
made (Pope and Pope 1997 p. 89). Gradually, however, the party’s popularity 
began staggering. The economic situation deteriorated, which in turn caused a 
growing discontent among the groups that had supported the party. The military 
lost buying power due to the growing interest rates and the incessantly worsening 
economic situation (Ahmad 1993 pp. 117, 125; Zürcher 2004 pp. 225ff., 238ff.; 
see also Özdalga 1978).  
In the final years of the decade the political situation grew increasingly tense. 
Prime Minister Menderes initiated amendments of laws aimed at increasing con-
trol over the universities, i.e. prohibition of political activities on the part of pro-
fessors, and laws that could force judges and professors to retire, together with a 
tightening of the press laws, and the introducing of censorship laws (Pope and 
Pope 1997 p. 92; Zürcher 2004 p. 223). This gave way to widespread discontent, 
first and foremost at the universities and in the bureaucracy. People employed in 
these sectors backed the military overthrow and played an important role in top-
pling the Menderes regime (Pope and Pope 1997 p. 89). 
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Early in the morning on May 27, 1960, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, later leader of 
the ultranationalist National Action Party (MHP),68 announced on the radio that a 
coup had been staged by the military. President Celâl Bayar and Prime Minister 
Adnan Menderes were sent into the prison of Yassıada Island in the Marmara Sea, 
where they were executed by hanging, after accusations of having violated the 
constitution (Ahmad 1993 pp. 136-137; Zürcher 2004 p. 248). 
5.3 The Socio-Economic Landscape 
The people belonging to this political generation had been born and raised in a 
country in which there were marked socio-economic cleavages, and apparently 
unequal regional conditions. Most striking was the difference between the western 
parts of the country, on the one hand, and, the south-eastern parts where the Kurd-
istan region is situated on the other.69 
 Some of the socio-economic conditions, and the changes there, which the 
generation experienced will be chronicled here. 
First, urbanisation was much slower in the Kurdistan region than in the west-
ern parts of Turkey. In the Kurdistan region there were no city of 100,000 inhabi-
tants or more in 1960 and in 1970 there were three cities of this size, "Diyarbakir 
having 139,000, Elazığ, 108,000, and Urfa, 100,000" (Jafar 1976 p. 90). Jafar tells 
of a majority of the urban centres in the region lacking basic facilities. In most city 
centres in the Kurdistan region, amenities such as running water, sewage systems, 
electric power and gas supply, bus services, slaughter houses, and the like, were 
poor or non-existent in many towns. If they existed they were generally in a very 
poor condition and there were no plans for repair or maintenance of these facili-
ties. 
Secondly, there was a wide economic gap between Kurdistan and the western 
parts of the country. As many commentators have pointed out, economic growth 
had been much slower in Kurdistan. Until the 1960s,70 the economy of the region 
was essentially self-sufficient, its being based on animal and stock breeding. 
                                                     
68 MHP is the Turkish acronym for Milliyet Hareket Partisi. 
69 The unequal socio-economic and regional conditions in the country have been described by many 
observers. See for example Jafar 1976 Chapter 3; McDowall 1996 p. 400; Wadieh 1960; van 
Bruinessen 1992, White 2000. 
70 Still in the 1950s a majority of the Turkish citizens lived in the countryside. From the 1960s 
onwards urbanisation increased rapidly and today the urban population double that of the rural 
areas (Jafar 1976 pp. 90-93; White 2000 p. 121). 
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Mechanisation was introduced to agriculture from the 1950s onwards, and the 
numbers of tractors increased, which led to rising unemployment rates among 
farmers, and as a result migration into the city centres of the region and in time 
into western Turkey. Migration could be incited by unemployment or by local 
disputes. Economic instability, together with increasing interest rates, contributed 
in the coming decades to a decrease in profitability for small farmers and share 
croppers. However, in the city centres too a large part of the population of this 
time was involved in farming activities (van Bruinessen 1992 pp. 15ff.; Jafar 1976 
pp. 60ff.; McDowall 1996 pp. 401-402; White 2000). From the 1950s onwards, 
there was a substantial outward migration from the region, although one should 
note that city centres in Kurdistan also grew as a result of migration. White (2000) 
mentions the cities of Diyarbakir, Bitlis and Muş in this respect (ibid. p. 122). 
Social structures in the region were unequal as well. The distribution of land 
holdings was unequal and was concentrated in the hands of a few landowners who 
controlled large estates, in many cases entire villages. For example, the Bucak 
family in the Siverek district is reported to have owned about 60 villages (McDo-
wall 1996 p. 401). Great numbers of the share cropping peasants were forced to 
pay a fixed proportion of their crops to the landowners. Van Bruinessen (1978) 
states that the share in question could vary as much as between 10 and 80 % of the 
crop, while other peasants, "received small fees for working under the landlord 
and his supervisors" (as quoted by White 2000 p. 98; see also Ghassemlou 1967 p. 
117). 
As Geerse rightly remarks, gender is a factor neglected in most literature on 
Kurdish society and the Kurdistan region. Most of the migrants in the 1950s and 
1960s were single men, often coming to the cities to apply for seasonal jobs. In 
time, if the job opportunities increased, it could happen that relatives and families 
followed them there (Geerse 2011 pp. 163ff.). Geerse refers to Karpat (1976), who 
found that 40 % of the female migrants "wanted to migrate themselves" (Geerse 
2011 p. 164), and that the female migrants "had much clearer views on the advan-
tages of urban living conditions than men: they wanted to live in the city to escape 
the difficulties of agricultural and house work in the village, and to create better 
opportunities for their children" (ibid. p. 164). 
White (2000) provides a picture of the socio-economic structures in Kurdis-
tan that is somewhat different from what commentators generally do. He empha-
sizes industrialization, the incorporation into a capitalist economy and the emer-
gence of a proletariat, however small, in the region. This scholar warns: "The 
reader is cautioned against accepting the picture of present-day Kurdistan compris-
ing simply agas, sheikhs, goatherds and smugglers that is proffered in so many 
accounts claiming to describe Kurdish society" (ibid. pp. 113-114), his pointing 
out that the Kurdistan region in Turkey is "part of a modern, industrialized econ-
omy" (ibid. p.122). White asserts, moreover, that there is a Kurdish proletariat that 
"cannot be considered separately from that existing throughout Turkey." (ibid. p. 
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114). The figures White provides establish that: "There were already factors in the 
Kurdistan region in Turkey employing over a thousand workers by the early 
1950s" (ibid. p. 114). Thus, White provides us with the picture of a region incor-
porated into a capitalist economy and caught up in a process of social transforma-
tion. 
Mining and petroleum production are two of the major industries in the re-
gion. Turkey is one of the largest chrome producers in the world, extraction essen-
tially being concentrated in the province of Elazığ. Also, Kurdistan is the sole 
producer of petroleum in Turkey, there being oil deposits in the province of Siirt 
and refineries in the cities of Dörtyol and Batman (Jafar 1976 p. 68).  
State expansion in the form of infrastructure, such as schools and health cen-
tres, were scanty throughout Turkey. Jafar (1976), points to there being a discrep-
ancy between official documents and practises, his noting that the central govern-
ment was "obliged by the constitution of the country to improve health service 
without favourism or discrimination" (ibid. p. 110). However particularly in Kurd-
istan, state investments in social services were practically non-existent in some 
districts (ibid.). On the basis of the literature and of stories by informants it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the state was essentially a distant institution, diffuse or 
known through its repressive means, to many people in Kurdistan at the time when 
people belonging to the political generation of concerns here were being raised. 
A similar observation is made by Geerse (2011), who on the basis of inter-
views with Kurdish migrants in Istanbul notes that in their stories "the state" was 
perceived as distant, mostly present in the person of the gendarmerie officer, the 
teacher at the local school, and the nurse at the local health post - if there were 
schools and health post" (ibid. p. 154). The state interventionism that was carried 
out was apparently aimed at controlling the population by means of violence. In 
these areas the government invested in police stations and gendarmeries, and it 
increased its military presence in the region. Until 1965 it was forbidden for 
foreigners to travel in the area (Pope and Pope 1997 p. 251; Chaliand 1979 p. 68). 
Statistical data provided by Jafar indicates that the magnitude of the inequali-
ties between the Kurdish region and the rest of the country regarding health serv-
ices was greater in 1967 than in 1955. In 1965 there was reportedly one physician 
per 6,667 inhabitants in the Kurdish districts at an average compared with 2,680 in 
the country as a whole. Even worse was the situation regarding dentists, there be-
ing only one per 100,000 inhabitants available in the Kurdish districts as compared 
with one per 6,667 in the country as a whole (Jafar 1976 p. 111). 
Literacy was much lower in the Kurdistan region than in Western Turkey. 
Jafar states that the literacy rate was 31 % among men and 7 % among women in 
the countryside in the Kurdistan region of Turkey in 1965. He notes, however, that 
in the urban areas "the situation was slightly better", with a literacy rate of 66 % 
for men and 28 % for women. An increase in the rate of literacy came about in the 
country as a whole in the 1950s (Jafar 1976 p. 115). 
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The political generation of concerns here was generally better educated than their 
parents. Still, while they were growing up Turkey struggled with socio-economic 
injustices and there were enormous regional cleavages between the eastern and 
western parts of the country. Jafar (1976) reports, for example, that the literacy 
rates in Turkey generally were 34,6 % in 1950, whereas in the Kurdish dominated 
south-eastern region they were only 8,7 %. In 1965 the literacy rates had raised to 
48.8 % in Turkey generally but were 26,8 % in the the southeastern, Kurdish do-
minated areas. Jafar also points out that not only the literacy rates but also the 
numbers of children attending school at all were much lower in the Kurdistan re-
gion. From the statistical sources that he has managed to come by he draws the 
conclusion: "The ratio of pupils attending primary schools, to the primary school 
age population was in 1965 twice as large in the whole country as in the Region" 
(Jafar 1976 p. 116). Since institutions for higher education were essentially con-
centrated in the cities in the western parts of the country Kurdish students had to 
move there to continue their education. Many Kurdish children were also sent to 
boarding schools (Bölge Yatili Okulları), where they became separated from their 
maternal tongue (Hassanpour 1992 p. 133). 
Turkish language training became an important element in educational poli-
cies since it was the language of instruction.71 This, in turn, made it difficult for 
many Kurdish children to become successful students. In the early 1960s it was 
still estimated that "more than three quarter’s of the Kurds in Turkey still did not 
speak Turkish" (Hassanpour 1992 p. 126). Lord Kinross, one of the few foreigners 
who had the possibility of travelling in the area those days describes strikingly the 
dissonance between the language of the community and the language of schools in 
Kurdistan. He writes: “Education has now reached Hakkari72 itself, since the pol-
icy of the Turks, is no longer to suppress, but to civilise these unruly highland 
clansmen. But as few of the teachers spoke Kurdish and few of the pupils spoke 
Turkish, its progress was slow" (as quoted by Jafar 1976 p. 114 n. 115). Even if 
the teacher happened to know Kurdish it was not of much help for the pupils, 
however. As Jafar aptly adds, "even if teachers could speak Kurdish they were not 
allowed [...] to instruct in that language" (Jafar 1976 p. 114 n. 115).  
                                                     
71 Indeed there were schools in Turkey in which education was provided in other languages, for 
example in English, French and German. Kurdish, on the other hand, was strictly forbidden and 
was many times not even referred to as a language. For example it was claimed to be: "a language 
with no grammatical rules and with a mixed vocabulary of 8,428 words", few of which were con-
sidered to be Kurdish words (Hassanpour 1992 p. 133). 
72 Hakkari is a district in the Kurdistan region, situated in the very southeastern corner of Turkey 
where the borders of Turkey, Iraq and Iran meet. 
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5.4 1960 - 1980 Political Openings and Turmoil 
The interim government initiated preparations for a future return to civil rule. A 
new and significantly different constitution was ratified by referendum July 9, 
1961. Its aim was to support the future stability of the country. Several articles 
were included in it that opened the way for a more liberal political climate. For 
example, the new constitution allowed a broader spectrum of unions and political 
parties, than earlier, to be established (Ahmad 1977; Ahmad 1993).   
On January 13, 1961, political parties were again allowed to be registered and 
elections were held in October the same year. Eleven new parties were registered, 
two of them to be dominant in parliament during the coming decade. First, the old 
CHP went into political life with a new manifesto, which emphasized issues of 
social justice and social security. With ambitions to attract voters from lower strata 
and the inhabitants of the gecekondus,73 the party was oriented towards Social 
Democracy. Before the elections in 1965, party leader Bülent Ecevit, positioned 
the CHP "to the left of the centre", which become a slogan of the party in the 
1970s (Ahmad 1977). In addition, the Justice Party (AP),74 a conservative party, 
chaired by Süleiyman Demirel, was considered as a successor of the old DP.  
A more tolerant political climate for parties outside the Kemalist mould thus 
appeared. Traditionally, ever since Ottoman times, there had been a rift between 
religion and secularism and also divisions between conservatives and modernisers 
in Turkish politics. In the 1960s a radicalisation and polarisation of Turkish poli-
tics began.  
Now the left could enter the legal political scene. In February 1961 the first 
legal left-wing party in the modern Turkish Republic was established, namely the 
Turkish Workers Party (TİP),75 that was modelled after the British Labour Party. 
In the elections in 1965 the party gained 3% of the votes cast and took seat in par-
liament. The party was a controversial voice in Turkish politics, for example by 
paying attention to the Kurdish question. In 1968 the party split due to conflicts 
over the position taken towards the Soviet Union. 
A second tendency was that ulranationalist or right-wing extremist groups 
appeared on the political scene. Their leader, Alparslan Türkeş, developed an ul-
                                                     
73 Gecekondu literally means "built over night". The term refer to illegal settlements without land 
titles. See, for example, Zürcher 2004 pp. 269-270. 
74 In Turkish: Adalet Partisi. 
75 In Turkish: Türkiye İsçi Partisi. The oldest left-wing party was the hardline pro-Moscow Com-
munist Party. This party had been banned in the 1920s, yet still had a small and devoted follow-
ing inside the country. 
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tra-nationalist programme for the party, one that reminded a lot of the aggressive 
Kemalism of the 1930s, but with a more violent nationalist tune. For example, the 
ideology of the party, named CKMP (Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi), included 
a vision of pan-Turkism and the reunification of all Turks in Asia. In 1965 the 
party changed its name to the MHP.76 The partys’ youth organisation, popularly 
known as the Grey Wolves, in Turkish Bozkürtler, was founded in the same year. 
The name of this group alludes to a figure in old Turkish mythology. The group 
received para-military training and in the late 1960s went to the streets with the 
explicit aim of intimidating left-wing sympathisers and people with liberal views 
(Poulton 1997 pp. 139ff.; Zürcher 2004 p. 257).  
A third tendency, which appeared, at the end of the decade, was that a relig-
ious party, the National Order Party (MNP),77 was founded in 1970. The party 
was led by Necmettin Erbakan, at the time an independent parliamentarian from 
the religious stronghold of Konya in central Turkey (Ahmad 1993 p. 144; Zürcher 
2004 p. 259). 
In the last years of the 1960s and in the early 1970s the situation in Turkey 
turned increasingly more violent. There were political clashes in the streets; 
robberies, kidnappings and pitched battles between left-wing and right-wing 
groups. According to Zürcher, there is not much doubt that the left-wing groups 
started the military violence in the streets, from the fall of 1968 onwards, however, 
the violent actions of the militant right surpassed the violent actions of the left 
(Zürcher 2004 p. 258). 
On March 12, 1971, a group of officers demanded that President Süleiman 
Demirel step down. A new civil government, composed of technocrats and repre-
sentatives of various political parties, was installed. Martial law was imposed on 
several provinces and a new reform package was introduced. Several parts of the 
constitution were curtailed, which led among other things to repression of the trade 
unions and the introduction of laws aimed at tightening control over the university 
campuses. In addition, the military began a witch hunt against progressive people 
and several persons were arrested. Some decades later the existence of a counter-
gerilla organisation that had been built up with the help of American support in 
1959 in order to prevent a communist takeover was revealed (Zürcher 2004 p. 
259).  
The 1970s became a decade of violent political instability. Elections were 
held again in October 1973. However, since no party gained an absolute majority 
of the votes, the establishment of a coalition government was inevitable. The situa-
tion of minority- and unstable coalition governments continued throughout the 
                                                     
76 In Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi. 
77 In Turkish: Millim Nizam Partisi. 
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decade. No less than ten different cabinets were formed in Turkey between 1971 
and the military coup in 1980, not a single one of them having a majority of seats 
in the parliament (Ahmad 1993 pp. 162ff.; Gunter 1990 p. 24; Zürcher 2004 pp. 
261ff.; Özdalga 1987 pp. 119-124).  
As the political power was incessantly being weakening, the militant violence 
grow worse. Two notorious incidents, in 1977 and 1978, respectively, contributed 
to pouring petrol on the fire. In 1977 a Mayday demonstration that had gathered an 
estimated 200,000 participants at Taksim square in central Istanbul turned into a 
bloody massacre after unknown gunmen, apparently positioned on one of the sur-
rounding rooftops, opened fire and 39 people were killed (Gunther 1990 p. 30; 
Pope and Pope 1997 p. 134). In Kahramanmaraş, in southeastern Turkey, the same 
year, the death toll rose to more than a hundred in a massacre after pogroms, orga-
nized by the right-wing extremist Grey Wolves, had been carried out against Ale-
vis. On December 25, 1978, following the incident in Kahramanmaraş, Martial 
Law was declared first in 13, later extended to 20, of the Turkish provinces, most 
of them in southeastern Turkey. The political violence gradually escalated. Com-
peting groups, left-wing and right-wing, fought against each other in the streets, 
controlling whole neighbourhoods and parts of the university campuses that were 
declared by them to be "liberated zones". In April 1980 the death tolls reached a 
level of twenty to thirty people a day (Gunter 1990 p. 29). Pope and Pope (1997) 
describe the increasingly fragmented political structure of Turkey in the 1970s in 
this way: 
 
For the remainder of the decade the country lurched from clash to clash, gradually 
dividing not only left from right, but Turk from Kurd, Sunni Muslim from Alevi 
Muslim. 
(Pope and Pope 1997 p. 134). 
 
Gunter (1990) describes the situation as a "political deadlock". Political murders 
and kidnappings became commonplace. Pope and Pope (1997) note how political 
and ideological divisions were to be found in most public spheres: 
 
University campuses were the most obvious ideological battleground. But govern-
ment buildings, teachers' unions, police forces and, towards the end even army boot 
camps became radically divided. Supporters of each tendency would eat in different 
canteens or sit on opposite sides of offices. 
 (ibid. pp. 130-131). 
 
The political violence gradually slid into a situation difficult to manage, often re-
ferred to as "anarchy" and "extremism" (Gunter 1990 p. 24; Özdalga 1987; Pope 
and Pope 1997 Chapter 9; Zürcher 2004 pp. 263-264). Political organisations, left- 
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and right-wing, were struggling with each other, were splintered, divided and re-
organized to form new ramifications of them. Along with the left-right dimension 
that appeared in Turkish politics in the decade, religious and ethnic political lines 
could also be distinguished, although these groups were not allowed to organize 
openly. Several observers state that the combats involved were not on equal terms 
(Poulton 1997 pp. 161ff.; Zürcher 2004 p. 263). Zürcher asserts that right-wing 
groups affiliated with the ultra-nationalist MHP were protected, their also infil-
trated the police and armed forces (ibid. p. 263).  
Pope and Pope (1997) refer to a quotation of the later junta leader General 
Kenan Evren admitting that the generals supported the right. The situation was not 
unambigious, however, since there were some polices who sided with the leftists 
as well (ibid. p. 133). The political atmosphere in the Kurdistan region, and all 
over Turkey, in the late 1970s, can best be described as "chaotic" and "anarchic". 
Political groups controlled "liberated zones" in the towns, and various areas in the 
countryside as well. Throughout the decade, the governments in power were weak 
and brief in endurance, unable to manage to fully control the situation in the Kurd-
ish areas. This, in turn, provided the Kurdish activists with a space in which to act, 
small underground groups mushrooming in theatre groups, political organisations 
and cultural clubs. 
It was during this period of economic, social and political transformations, 
which gradually turned into a political chaos, that the political generation of inter-
est here became politically active, Kurdish nationalist sentiments emerging and 
developing into a nationalist protest movement.   
5.5 Kurdish Resistance 
After the rebellion in Dersim was finally stamped out in 1938, it seemed as though 
all Kurdish resistance in Turkey was crushed, with the exception of a few minor 
protests that were carried out. The period following this is sometimes referred to 
by Kurds as being "the quiet years". In the late 1950s there were certain signs of 
Kurdish nationalist sentiments coming to the surface. A new generation took 
shape, also in sociological terms. In this section the emergence of the Kurdish 
resistance movement during the 1960s and the 1970s will be chronicled. First, the 
early signs of Kurdish resistance, conducted by people that could be labelled as 
being spearheads, and the repression against it will be described. In the following 
sections, an overview of the Kurdish nationalist movement will be provided, and 
some of the main parties and organisations that appeared during this period will be 
accounted for. As will be demonstrated below, the Kurdish movement that devel-
oped within the state of Turkey was immense and is thus difficult to map. Gürbey 
(1996 p. 23) provides a picture of how the movement was patterned, she's distin-
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guishing three dominant currents of it. First, there was a current with roots in 
Kurdish nationalist circles, essentially the KDP-Iraq, that became manifest with 
the creation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Turkey (KDPT) in 1965. Sec-
ondly, Gürbey identifies a current with roots in the legal Turkish left of the 1960s, 
essentially in the TİP and circles of people who left the party and established the 
Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (DDKO)78 in 1969. Third, there was a 
current with roots in the radical Turkish left manifested in the establishment of the 
PKK. Below, a brief background of why Kurds in Turkey began to organize dur-
ing this period will be provided. Thereafter these currents will be chronicled at 
some length. 
5.5.1 "The 49" - the Spearheads 
On April 1, 1961, the conducting of a remarkable trial was announced in the Turk-
ish newspapers. After a year of incarceration in the military prison in Sivas in 
Eastern Turkey, 49 Kurdish men were facing charges of being "Kurdists".79 The 
indictment included counts of among other things "disseminating rasistic propa-
ganda", "separatism", "collaboration with foreign powers" and "instigation of rac-
istic hatred". In Kurdish circles, this group of prosecuted Kurdish men is known as 
"the 49",80 their symbolic actions in favour of, "equal rights for the people in the 
East", as they expressed it, marking the beginning of a new era of Kurdish resis-
tance in Turkey.  
What these men had purportedly done were seen as serious crimes in Turkey. 
Despite the mitigating political climate in the 1950s, it was still prohibited to ad-
dress the Kurdish question overtly. Hence, all expressions of Kurdish identities 
were, in the terminology of Eidheim "undercommunicated" in public spaces. Why 
did the first signs of an emerging Kurdish movement appear then? Why did these 
men attempt to bring the Kurdish question into the public arena? How did it come 
about that they took the risk of challenging the political hegemony in Turkey? 
First, at a personal level, these young people had all been confronted with the 
picture of themselves as what could best be described as "subordinated others". 
One of them, Musa Anter, was a prominent Kurdish journalist and author who was 
arrested for having published a poem in Kurdish. His commitment to the Kurdish 
question seems to have developed in connection with his education. Born in 1918 
and described as a bright young school boy, he was "handpicked" by the local 
                                                     
78 In Turkish:Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları. 
79 In Turkish kürtçü, see Kendal (1979 p. 74). 
80 See Kendal (1979). 
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authorities in the city of Mardin and sent to a boarding school in Adana.81 Thereaf-
ter, he was admitted to the Law Department at Istanbul University. In the student 
dormitories of Istanbul he came in contact with other young male Kurdish students 
who had been sent to Western Turkey for university studies. Still others were also 
sent abroad. An old Kurdish activist, Q, with whom I had an informal discussion 
in Turkey told me that when young Kurds came to Istanbul, or abroad, they be-
came increasingly aware of the existing injusticies and social cleavages in Turkey. 
Furthermore that it was in these settings their resistance and critisism against the 
existing conditions took shape. 
Secondly, at a structural level a number of internal and external develop-
ments contributed to paving the way for an emerging oppositional current. Faced 
with the socio-economic standards of Istanbul, Western Turkey and from abroad 
the Kurdish students became increasingly aware of the vast economic inequalities 
and the enormous social differences between Western Turkey and Kurdistan. 
Musa Anter and his Kurdish comrades began very carefully to bring the question 
of inequalities between Western Turkey and Kurdistan into the public arenas. Be-
ing a group of articulate persons, they worked as spearheads of further Kurdish 
protests in Turkey.   
In the 1950s the political developments in neighbouring Iraq contributed to 
the rise of emerging nationalist sentiments among the Kurds in Turkey. After the 
coup d’etat by General Qasim and the Free Officers in Iraq on July 14, 1958, the 
Iraqi Kurdish rebel leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, who had been driven out of Iraq 
in 1945, was allowed to return from his exile in the Soviet Union. President Qasim 
announced the implementation of a new constitution stating that "Arabs and Kurds 
are partners in the Iraqi homeland and their national rights are recognised within 
the Iraqi state" (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987 p. 79). The Kurds in Iraq were 
then granted a number of rights in the constitution and were allowed, from 1959 
on, to publish a weekly journal, Xêbat,82 in Kurdish. In addition, news of the de-
velopments in Iraq and the advances made by its Kurdish population reached the 
Kurdistan region in Turkey through radio broadcasts in Kurdish from Iraq and 
from Jerevan in the Armenian Soviet Republic. Purportedly, the broadcasts 
reached large numbers of people in the Kurdish population in Turkey. In the com-
ing decades, it was above all young people from urban settings in Kurdistan who 
were caught up in the political struggle. 
One of them, the well-known Kurdish politician Mehdi Zana, was at the time 
a young tailor apprentice in the town of Silvan. Zana describes how important it 
                                                     
81 Adana is situated on the Eastern Mediterrean coast in Turkey. 
82 Xêbat is Kurdish for struggle. 
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was to have the opportunity to listen to programmes in Kurdish. He recalls how he 
used to listen to the radio programme "The voice of the Kurds’ together with his 
friends, despite its being "barely audible", his stating that "for us it was extraordi-
nary" (Zana 1997 p. 5). 
An episode in the city of Kirkuk in Iraqi Kurdistan July 14, 1959 came to 
have violent political repercussions in Turkey and contributed to heigthening the 
anti-Kurdish sentiments.83 Fighting between rival groups, on the one hand Kurds 
adhering to the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), and on the other politically conser-
vative Turkmens, resulted in what were killings of mostly Turkmen people.84 In 
Turkey, Deputy Arsim Erin called for revenge, declaring that "Kurds killed our 
brothers, come let us kill as many Kurds as they killed Turkomans. Are you not 
going to repay with interest?" (as quoted by McDowall 1996 p. 403). In a protest 
rally shortly thereafter, 80 Kurdish students in Turkey manifestated openly against 
Erin’s statement, which in turn led to the arrestation of "the 49" (Natali 2005 p.  
96). 
The arrest of "the 49" gave rise to new waves of protests among the Kurds, 
these in turn followed by new arrests in the early 1960s (Kendal 1979b p. 74; 
McDowall 1996 p. 403). Kurdish-Turkish relations became strained still more 
following the military coup of 1960 and deteriorated further as relations between 
President Qassim and the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani in Iraq became rapidly 
more tense. The prospect of a future war in Northern Iraq led to warnings by Ce-
mal Gürsel, president of the military interime government, who announced to the 
Kurds that: "The army will not hesitate to bombard towns and villages: there will 
be such a bloodbath that they [any rebels] will be swallowed up in their country"  
(McDowall 1996 p. 404; see also p. 416 n. 17).  
 
                                                     
83 Kirkuk is a city situated in one of the most oil rich regions of Northern Iraq. The city is essen-
tially inhabited by Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens all making claims to the city. In 1970 an Au-
tonomy Agreement was reached between the Iraqi Baath regime and the Kurds, aimed to guaran-
tee political and national rights to the Kurds. The Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzanî laid claim to 
the city, which since then has been a disputed territory. After the US invasion in 2003 the Kurd-
ish government in Northern Iraq seek to integrate Kirkuk into the semi-autonomous Kurdistan 
Region. A referendum was due to 2007, was planned to decide whether the city was to be in-
corporated into Iraqi Kurdistan Region or not. Still while these lines are written, in the early 
spring of 2013, the question of Kirkuk remains an inflamed and disputed one. 
84 Details about the number of people killed in this massacre varies between 39 to 79 (see, for ex-
ample, Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1987 p. 71).  
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5.5.2 Eastism 
In time a loosely organised informal current generally known as the Doguculuk, 
meaning "Eastism", developed. Their activities can be described as being a cam-
paign devoted to highlighting the socio-economic conditions of the Kurdistan re-
gion in Turkey. Still, it was dangerous to speak openly about the Kurdish question 
or to publish on the topic. The Kurdish students in Istanbul and Ankara had to be 
very careful, to avoid discussions being overheard. One interviewee, X, told, for 
example, that someone found in a police raid having a piece of paper with Kurdish 
words written on it was in serious trouble, since it was still considered a crime that 
one could be charged for. Words such as "Kurd" and "Kurdistan" were not men-
tioned in speeches or written documents, which instead they publicly adressed the 
"Eastern question", thus attempting very cautiously to bring into open discussion 
the economic and social situation in "the Southeast" that Kurdistan in Turkey was 
now publicly labelled (More 1984; White 2000 pp. 131ff.). 
One example of such difficulties was that of further restrictions directed then 
at use of the Kurdish language. The important role of languages, symbollically and 
practically, in binding people together and creating a common national identity, 
was apparently taken account of by the Turkish authorities. In the early 1960s 
Musa Anter returned to Kurdistan and lived in Diyarbakir where he published the 
journal Illeri Yurt85 dealing mainly with the neglected socio-economic situation in 
the southeast (Kutschera 1979 pp. 339ff.). Most of these publications were confis-
cated after a few issues only, and closed down by the Turkish authorities. Several 
Kurdish journalists, editors and authors were prosecuted and had to pay fines or 
serve long prison sentences. Further restrictions were declared on the use of the 
Kurdish language. In January 1967, for example, the following decree was issued 
by the Turkish government: "it is illegal and forbidden to introduce to, or distrib-
ute in, the country, materials in the Kurdish language of foreign origins in any 
form, published, recorded, taped or material in similar form" (quoted from 
McDowall 1996 p. 408). Repressive measures were directed at anyone who dared 
to be defiant of this decree. One of the most conspicous cases is the one of the 
author Mehmet Emin Bozarslan. In 1969 he was arrested because of publishing an 
elementary ABC-book in Kurdish and in addition for having translated and pub-
lished the Kurdish epic Mem and Zin into Turkish. His books were cancelled and 
were burned by the Turkish authorities, and he had to spend several years in prison 
because of his books (McDowall 1996 p. 408). 
The Kurds, in turn, mobilized. Protest actions, known as "the East Mass Mee-
tings" were organised all over Kurdistan, political pamphlets in defence of the 
                                                     
85 Illeri Yurt is Turkish for "Forward Fatherland". 
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people in the east being circulated and manifestations being organised by people 
belonging to subgroups and to circles of the TIP and DDKO. On August 3, 1967, 
mass meetings were arranged in several towns and cities in the Kurdistan region in 
Turkey assembling large numbers of people. Reportedly as many as 10,000 people 
participated in the town of Silvan and an estimated crowd of 25,000 in Diyarbakir. 
Among the demonstrants there were people from many social strata; students, 
tribal leaders, artisans and labours (Zana Gündoğan 2011; Kutschera 1979 p. 340; 
Kendal 1979b p. 66). In 1969 the mass meetings continued on a still larger scale.  
5.5.3 An Emerging Kurdish Nationalism 
In the coming two decades, the Kurds began increasingly to organise along ethnic 
lines. Since Kurdish parties by definition were prohibited, it was a movement in-
volving small undergound parties, associations and loosely affiliated persons. In 
its structure, the Kurdish movement reflected the culturally, socially and politi-
cally fragmented Kurdish society in Turkey. In public they acted through various 
legal student, youth and cultural organisations. In its structure the Kurdish move-
ment reflected the cultural, social and political fragmented Kurdish society in Tur-
key. It was interconnected, in a complex way, with the Turkish society in which it 
appeared. Bozarslan (1992), for example, describes how "confusing" the impres-
sion of Kurdish manifestations in the 1960s and 1970s could be: "photographs of 
Atatürk (identified as a symbol of the anti-imperialist struggle), Lenin (showing 
the road of salvation) and Sheikh Said (symbol of the Kurdish resistance) were 
ranged side by side" (Bozarslan 1992 pp. 97-98).  
The first of the three currents distinguished by Gürbey (1996) that I men-
tioned above was essentially influenced by Kurdish nationalism, in particular 
KDP-Iraq, which resulted in the founding of the KDPT in 1965. It is said to have 
appealed to conservative parts of Kurdish society. The party was founded by Faik 
Bucak and Sait Elçi, who both had been active in conservative Turkish parties. 
Bucak, who became the party leader, was a lawyer holding a seat in the Turkish 
Parliament (More 1984 p. 193). He came from an influential agha family in Siv-
erek, in the Urfa district. Sait Elçi, was an accountant who had earlier been active 
in the DP party in his hometown Bingöl. Allegedly, the party attracted sympathis-
ers among the traditional upper strata of Kurdish society (McDowall 1996 p. 406). 
In public, the party acted through a small "Turkish" right wing party, the New 
Turkey Party,86 (Natali 2005 p. 96). Its first party programme declared that the 
Kurdish nation is "ancient" and that the aim of the party was to struggle by peace-
                                                     
86 In Turkish: Yeni Türkiye Partisi. 
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ful means and that it was to accept the National Pact,87 which meant that they did 
not intend to challenge the territorial integrity of the Turkish state (Gündoğan 
2002 p. 22). 
It was also demanded in the programme that the Kurds be recognized in the 
Turkish constitution, that Kurdish should be the official language in Kurdistan and 
that publishing in that language should be allowed. The party had its stronghold in 
the area of Bingöl-Diyarbakir and the districts along the Turkish-Syrian and Turk-
ish-Iraqi border (see ibid. pp. 32, 45). 
As a small clandestine party operating in a turbulent political environment, it 
was vulnerable both to external and internal challenges. Faik Bucak was murdered 
in a Kurdish protest rally in 1966, allegedly knocked down by agents from the 
Turkish police. Thereafter, the KDPT weakened quickly. Bucak was succeeded by 
Sait Elçi, who became party secretary. Elçi in turn was arrested when he partici-
pated in the previously mentioned East Mass Meetings in Diyarbakir in 1967 and 
was sent to serve one year in prison in Western Turkey. The following year the 
entire group of the central committee and its members in Diyarbakir were arrested 
and tried in Antalya88 (Gündoğan 2002 pp. 22ff.). The activities of the party then 
ceased until 1969. However that year the party splintered due to internal conflicts.  
The new faction was led by Sait Kirmizitoprak, better known as dr Şivan. In 
1971 the two rivalries were both murdered in Iraq under obscure circumstances. 
Purportedly Elçi was first killed by doktor Şivan, who in turn a few months later 
was executed by Barzani. Another version circulating accounts that MIT, the 
Turkish Political Police, was involved in both murders (van Bruinessen 1988a, 
Kutschera 1979; see also Gündoğan 2002).  
Gürbey (1996) distinguishes a current having roots in the legal Turkish left, 
essentially the TİP. Radical Kurds in the early 1960s saw the TİP as an alliance 
between progressive Kurdish and Turkish forces, a party they could be represented 
in. In fact many important positions in the party were held by Kurds. For example, 
the General Secretary between 1968-1969 was Tarek Ekinci from Diyarbakir, and 
Mehmet Ali Aslan was the chairman of the party from 1969 on. At the fourth party 
congress a resolution was passed that openly recognised the existence of a Kurdish 
population in Turkey (Kutschera 1979 p. 342; More 1984 p. 69), although in time 
many Kurds began to question TİP's standpoints regarding the Kurdish question. 
The critics argued that there was "a core of influential members", all of them eth-
nic Turks, in leading positions in the party who were indifferent to the situation of 
the Kurds. In reality, they claimed, TİP's policies supported the feudal structures 
                                                     
87 Misak-I Mîllî.  
88 Allegedly except for one whose real name was not revealed. 
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of Kurdistan, exactly as the already established Kurdish organisations (Imset 1992 
p. 387; Kutschera 1979 p. 341). From 1969 onwards the party splintered, due to 
internal schisms, with the result that the Turkish left became increasingly frag-
mented and appeared more and more in the form of militant groups, ramifications 
and factions that were fighting each other (Kendal 1979b pp. 79ff.). 
   From then on socialist oriented Kurds also began to organise along ethnic 
lines. In Ankara and in Istanbul in 1969 the organisation the DDKO was formed. 
In public, the organisation appeared as a society for "revolutionary youths", and 
the group being described as "the first legal Kurdish organisation" (Entessar 1992 
p. 90). Soon the organisation had branches in most Kurdish cities in Turkey (van 
Bruinessen 1984 p. 8; Kendal 1979b p. 80). From the spring of 1969 until June 
1970, due to the relatively open political climate, the DDKO could operate overtly 
and organized Kurds at the universities and in urban settings. People that belonged 
to the organisation represented a wide range of political standpoints, although a 
majority of its members sympathised with TİP, and in many cases membership in 
the two organisations overlapping (van Bruinessen 1984).  
In connection with the growing political instability in the late 1960s, the or-
ganisation increasingly attracted the interest of the political police. In October 
1970 its front figures were arrested and in the time of the military coup of 1971 the 
organisation was closed and several of its leading members were imprisoned 
(More 1984 p. 69). Some of the Kurdish activists escaped the country. Others had 
to spend the coming years in prison and were not to be released before the time of 
the election campaigns in 1974. That year amnesties were promulgated that made 
it possible for many of them who had left the country to return. The time was well 
chosen. Following the extensive arrests of people, the situation had become tense, 
especially in the Kurdish districts. During his tours in the election campaign, Bü-
lent Ecevit gave promises to the Kurds of his taking up the Kurdish issues if he 
should win the elections.  
In addition, international developments contributed to putting pressure on the 
Turkish government. One factor was the oil crisis in 1973-74 that created  consid-
erable problems for the Turkish economy. Another one was that of the conse-
quences the Cyprus crisis in 1974 had. Turkey’s military intervention resulted in 
the island becoming partitioned. President Bülent Ecevit became a great hero in 
the eyes of a majority of Turkish citizens. Internationally, however, the position of 
the country was strained. The United Nations called on several occasions for the 
withdrawal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus and the US declared an arms em-
bargo against the country (Pope and Pope 1997 pp. 125, 128). Or as E, one of the 
interviewees included in the present study said: "it was not possible for the gov-
ernment to deal with such an internal tension"(E).    
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5.5.4 "Radicalised" and "Ethnicized" 
After that Ecevit had decreed a general amnesty in 1974 and many people had 
been released, the Kurds began to reorganize and a more radical Kurdish move-
ment began to develop. Prisons have often served to nurture the political activism 
and ideological formation of activists. Thus, Gündoğan has a point in emphasizing 
the role that having to spend time in prison following the military intervention of 
12 March played for many of the Kurdish activists in their ideological schooling 
and radicalization: "Kurdish political prisoners began to study the Kurdish history, 
the language etc. more deeply. They discussed intensively the social and political 
situation of their country (Kurdistan) and re-evaluated their relationship with the 
Turkish left" (Gündoğan 2002 p. 33). The radicalisation of young Turkish citizens 
that began in the late 1960s was to continue and intensify during the coming dec-
ade. A clear leftward shift could then be distinguished in the Kurdish movement. 
There are several factors that may explain the increasing radicalisation of 
Kurdish activists and politicians during this period. Turkey modernized and the 
market economy penetrated the country increasingly, resulting in growing socio-
economic inequalities. This, together with the increasing unemployment rates, 
forced increasingly larger numbers of Kurds to migrate to urban centres in Kurdis-
tan and Western Turkey (McDowall 1996 pp. 412ff.; Natali 2005 pp. 95ff.; van 
Bruinessen 1984, 1988a; White 2000 pp. 133-134). In Western Turkey the Kurd-
ish migrants gathered in the shanty towns, the gecekondus, that mushroomed 
around the cities. 
Simultaneously, there was social unrest among young people. Turkeys' 
investements in higher education did not meet the needs of the increasing numbers 
of young students aspiring for an academic degree. Far from all of them who 
wanted to could get to study at a university. McDowall (1996) points out that in 
1977 there were 360,000 applicants but only 60,000 places, at the same time as the 
unemployment rates were increasing in the 1970s (McDowall 1996 p. 411). 
One can see here a process of radicalisation and ramifications of it within the 
nationalist camp emanating from the KDPT. Splinterings of this party continued in 
the 1970s. As many observers (see, for example, Entessar 1992; Gunter 1990 pp. 
16, 65; Kendal 1979b; Kutschera 1979 p. 340; More 1984; White 2000 pp. 131ff.) 
point out, the conservative oriented leadership of the old party failed to respond to 
the ongoing radicalisation among young and intellectual Kurds in Turkey. As a 
result they became manouvered out by factions increasingly influenced by Marx-
ist-Leninist ideologies. According to Gunter (1990) the KDTP had continued to 
exist "as little more than an appendage of Mullah Mustafa Barzanî's KDP" (ibid. p. 
66) after the former leader Elçi had been killed in Iraq. In this context it is of rele-
vance to note that the Iraqi Kurdish movement was weakened during this period. 
The Kurds in Iraq had been promised autonomy in 1970 (Vanly 1979 pp. 
168ff.). When the agreement between the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi Kurdish mo-
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movement collapsed then their leader Barzanî instigated a rebellion that was to 
continue until 1975 (ibid. pp. 182ff.). During this uprising, the Iraqi Kurds were 
supported by the Shah of Iran. When a peace agreement was reached between the 
Shah and the Iraqi Baath regime in 1975, which entailed the Shah immediately 
withdrawing his support of Barzanî, why the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion collapsed as 
did the prospects of a Kurdish autonomy in Kurdistan Iraq (Vanly 1979 pp. 168ff.; 
McDowall 1996 pp. 335-337; Natali 2005 pp. 60-61).  
In 1978 the Marxist wing of the KDPT formally established a new group 
which was called the Kurdistan National Liberators (KUK). This group emerged 
in the aftermath of the defeat of the Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzanî in 1975. The 
group operated across state borders and managed to gain strong support in the 
districts of Mardin in the Kurdistan region in Turkey. This group allegedly contin-
ued to support the Iraqi KDP. It claimed to be the legitime representatives of Bar-
zanî's old party in Turkey (Imset 1992 p.397, van Bruinessen 1992). Like many 
other Kurdish political groups of the time it was weakened by internal splinterings 
and, reportedly, was finally divided in 1978. 
The group once led by Dr. Sivan (Shwan) continued its activities, first named 
PPKK, the Kurdish Vanguard Workers Party (PPKK) founded thereafter in the 
1970s, after the dividing up of the KDPT. Within the Kurdish movement it was 
known as Pesheng, the Kurdish word for Vanguard (More 1984 pp. 194f.; Imset 
1992 p. 389). 
This process of radicalisation also took place in the movement having roots 
in TIP and DDKO. Immediately after the amnesty in 1974 an attempt was made to 
unify all progressive Kurds into a single organisation. A group of members of the 
banned DDKO founded then the Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Associations 
(DDKD).89 At that same time too, preparations were made for establishing a radi-
cal Kurdish party that was to be connected with the organisation but was to oper-
ate clandestinely. The twists and turns surrounding the establishment of this un-
derground party may appear confusing. The plan was that the party should be 
named Kurdistan's Workers Party and be given the acronym PKK. However, be-
fore they launched the name in a broader circle of Kurds, the radical group around 
Abdullah Öcalan announced the establishment of a party with the same name. The 
party connected with the DDKD was then given the same name in Turkish: Kürd-
istan İşçi Partısı (KİP). The emerging Kurdish left came to meet the same fate as 
the Turkish one did. Soon this organisation splintered into a myriad of different 
groups and branches, many of which in time splintered up in turn (van Bruinessen 
1984 p. 10; Kutschera 1979 p. 79). A few of them will be described briefly below 
                                                     
89 In Turkish: Devrimci Doğu Kültür Derneği. 
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in order to provide a picture of the character of the movement, with all its differ-
ences and overlappings. 
One group with roots in the DDKD, named Rizgarî90 was founded in 1976 
around a group of intellectuals who published a magazine of the same name. Their 
magazine was prohibited after the first issue, but they continued to publish it ille-
gally. The group aspired to establish a Kurdish socialism independent of the two 
communist blocs of the Soviet Union and China. Rizgari was weakened, however, 
because of internal adversaries and splinterings (Entessar 1992 p. 93; Imset 1992 
p. 395; More 1984 p. 199). In 1979 a splinter group named Ala Rizgarî was for-
med.91 The adherents of this group defined themselves as "non-communists" and 
advocated that "democratic organisations" should play a prominent role within the 
Kurdish liberation movement. In their view the Kurdish proletariat could not be in 
the forefront of a socialist revolution in Kurdistan, since, as they argued, no strong 
proletariat had developed in the area because of the feudal socio-economic structu-
res that still predominated. Because of the criticism the group directed against the 
Soviet Union, some commentators believed them to be Trotskists (Gunter 1990 p. 
66ff.; Imset 1992 p. 396; More 1984 p. 200). 
Kawa was a small group that emanated from the DDKD organisation, the 
name of it alluding to a legendary blacksmith who plays a heroic role in Kurdish 
mythology.92 This group allegedly broke away from the DDKD after internal de-
bates about relations with the Soviet Union. The members of Kawa took a strong 
anti-Soviet position and allegedly developed a Maoist ideology (Imset 1992 p. 
392). However, most of the activities of the party took place in urban settings in 
Istanbul and Kurdish towns. From 1977 on the group was divided into a handful of 
minor groups, purportedly because of internal struggles and debates about China’s 
Third World Theory (Imset 1992 p. 393; More 1984 p. 200; Gunter 1990 p. 67). 
In addition there is one left wing group that especially merits presentation. A 
number of former TİP sympathisers came together in a political group outside the 
DDKO structure that still exists today and gain some influence among Kurds liv-
ing abroad. A number of progressive individuals gathered in the Socialist Party of 
Kurdistan of Turkey (SPKT)93 that was established in 1974 and still exists.94 The 
                                                     
90 Rizgarî is Kurdish for liberation. 
91 Ala Rizgarî is Kurdish for "The flag of liberty". 
92 The legend of the blacksmith Kawa (in Kurdish) or Kaveh (in Persian) who led an uprising 
against Zahhak - an evil tyrant ruler with serpents growing from his shoulders- exists in Kurdish 
and Iranian mythology.  
93 In Kurdish: Partiya Sosyalist a Kurdistana Tirkiyê. 
94 In the literature varying information is provided concerning the year in which the party was es-
tablished. Sometimes it is said that the party was formally established in 1979, although the long 
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name was later changed to the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK). For 29 years it 
was to be led by General Secretary Kemal Burkay, a Zaza speaking lawyer from 
the area of Dersim, who once belonged to "the 49" and is a distinguished Kurdish 
poet and writer. In the 1970s the party published two journals, one in Kurdish, 
Roja Welat, and one in Turkish, Özgürlük Yolu.95 
The PSK mainly attracted members from urban settings, working class peo-
ple and people organised in the radical trade unions. The ideology of the party can 
be described as being a moderate variant of socialism mixed with pragmatic cla-
ims to independence. In its program it is stated that it is a party of "working class 
people" and "poor farmers in Kurdistan", a future revolution in two stages also 
being predicted. Gunter (1990 p. 64) quotes from the party program: "Because 
Kurdistan has not got its national independence yet and done away with feudalism, 
the character of the revolutionary stage facing the Kurdish population is the na-
tional democratic revolution. This revolution is going to take the colonial fetters 
off the people, wipe out the foreign domination and liberate the Kurds" ... "Our 
Party knows very well that only socialism can put an end to exploitation and 
backwardness" (ibid.; see also Enessar 1992 p. 92). Hence, Kurdish self-
determination was a central theme in the programme of this party. The party took a 
pragmatic position concerning a future independence for the Kurds, however, 
pointing out that there are two possible solutions to the Kurdish question: "there 
will be set up either a federation in Turkey or the Kurdish people will establish 
their own independent state. … Time and the historical development will tell" 
(Gunter 1990 p. 64).   
Also the PSK advocated that the struggle for liberation to be conducted by 
peaceful political means (see Burkay 2004 pp. 78ff.) and criticised other Kurdish 
and Turkish groups that chose to struggle by armed means. In the view of the 
General Secretary Kemal Burkay, the armed struggle in Turkey had been 
inconsiderate and contraproductive, "However before the military coup of 12 
March 1971 the Turkish left wing movement, out of impatience, chose 
undergound activites and misdirected armed actions. And the Kurdish nationalist 
movement before 12th September 1980, without weighing pros and cons, also 
decided to wage an armed struggle" (Burkay 2004 p. 84). 
                                                                                                                                      
 
term general secretary Burkay states that it was in 1974 (Burkay 2004).The name of the party has 
later been changed into Partîya Sosyalîsta Kurdistan (PSK). Since the party still exist it will 
henceforth be referred to with that name. 
95 Roja Welat is Kurdish for "Sun of Homeland" and Özgürlük Yolu is Turkish for "The Path of 
Freedom". 
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Hence, as the argument goes, organisations that opted for an armed struggle were 
"trapped" by the Turkish government, since the armed struggle contributed to 
heightening fascist and racist overtunes and were taken as an excuse for the Turk-
ish authorities continuing to pursue its repressive policies against the Kurds. Bur-
kay directed sharp criticisms at the PKK, the policies of which purportedly had 
had the effect that, "instead of fighting the bourgeois system, directs an aggressive 
policy against the revolutionary movements of Turkey and of Kurdistan" (White 
2000 p. 157; see also More 1984 p. 185). In recent years, however, Burkay have 
criticised the double standards of the European politics concerning the PKK. In a 
statement he comments that the PKK has been listed as a terrorist organisation by 
the EU in the following way: 
 
It makes one wonder why such a resolution was not passed when the PKK were re-
sorting to acts of violence in the 1980s and up to the mid 1990s, particularly within 
Europe. Instead the resolution is passed at a time when the PKK have ended their 
armed activities. It is also clear that the resolution has been passed in an atmosphere 
following September 11th and is a result of persistent demands from Turkey. 
 (Burkay 2004 p. 152). 
 
His conclusion is that the EU policies in reality serve to support the Turkish gov-
ernment's "uncompromising and aggressive stance" concerning the Kurdish issue 
(ibid. p. 153). 
Over the years the SPK has actively been calling for the establishment of a 
Kurdish national front in Turkey and been involved in the formation of a number 
of alliances with the Kurdish parties in the neighbouring states (see Burkay 2004 
pp. 66-68). A meeting between Kemal Burkay and the PKK leader Abdullah Öca-
lan took place in Damascus in 1993, after the later had offered a unilateral cease 
fire in the guerilla war that it waged against Turkey (White 2000 p. 69; see also 
Marcus 2007 p. 217; Gürbey 2000 p. 82). Like most Kurdish parties at the time, 
the SPK operated in public through a legal youth front, the Revolutionary Peoples 
Cultural Association (DHKD).  
The politician and taylor from Silvan mentioned above, Mehdi Zana, affili-
ated with the SPK, became the elected mayor of the city of Diyarbakir in 1977. He 
ran as an independent candidate in the municipal elections. Pictures from those 
times show his supporters celebrating his victory in huge processions in the streets 
of the city. By the political and military authorities his success at the polls was met 
with open disapproval, however:  
 
 
I was elected from fourteen candidates, with about 54 percent of the vote - two 
times more than the candidate from the incumbent party of Bülent Ecevit. The Tur-
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Turkish authorities, the prefect and the military commander were appalled by my 
election but I was elected democratically  
(Zana 1997 p. 7) 
 
Mehdi Zana held his position as mayor of Diyarbakir until the military interven-
tion that occurred in 1980. He was then arrested and imprisoned for many years 
because of his activism in the SPK. 
5.5.5 The PKK 
Finally, Gürbey (1996) distinguishes a third current in the Kurdish movement that 
appeared in this period. Since Kurdish organisations were prohibited many Kurds 
were involved in the Turkish revolutionary left-wing movements (Bozarslan 2000; 
Gunter 1990; White 2000). In the mid 1970s, a Kurdish group with roots in the 
Turkish radical left entered the arena, namely the PKK.  
At first the group became known as Apocus or Apocuslar, a name based on 
the word Apo, which is Kurdish for "uncle", and was the nickname of the party 
leader. Abdullah Öcalan was born around 1950 in a village in the Urfa province in 
Kurdistan. He was given a scholarship to the Political Science Department at An-
kara University. It is reported that he was seen initially as a kind of a steady model 
student. Soon, however, he became caught up in radical political movements and 
finally dropped out of the university. Abdullah Öcalan was first a member of a 
small leftist group known as Ankara Higher Education Union (AYÖD)96 (White 
2000 pp. 135ff.). At that time Öcalan lived in a student collective in an apartment 
in the surburb of Tuzluçayır. It is told how young radicals and militants were com-
ing and going in the apartment, some of them staying there for longer and others 
for shorter periods of time. Radical students used to gather in the apartment often 
for night-long discussions. Allegedly, Öcalan and the circle of people surrounding 
him were at the start tolerant and quite open to differing opinions, but gradually 
became more and more dogmatic.97 In 1974 he decided, to form, together with a 
group of his ideological closest friends, an informal pro-Kurdish group, Kurdistan 
Revolutionaries (Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden 2011a p. 128). In the inaugural 
                                                     
96 This is the Turkish acronym for: Ankara Yüksek Öğrenim Derneği, that according to White was 
based on an earlier "Guevaraist" organisation, the Turkish Popular Liberation Party-Front 
(THKP-C) (see White 2000 p. 135; see also Gunter 1990). 
97 Informant's account. 
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meeting, problems of Kurdistan and the situation of the Turkish left-wing move-
ment were discussed. 
According to available sources the Kurdish issue was not given a very 
prominent rank in this meeting. According to Gunter (1990 pp. 58ff.),  it was de-
cided that the group, from that day on, should be distinguished from the Turkish 
left. This first period has been characterised as being their years of "ideological 
group formation" (Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden 2011a p. 135). Gradually, the 
group moved its activities to the towns and cities in the Kurdistan region in Tur-
key, where they soon came in conflict with other Kurdish groups and parties (see, 
for example, Imset 1992 p. 13). 
The period of 1977 to 1979 can be seen as having been "the stage of party 
construction" (Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden 2011a p. 135). On November 27, 
1978 the Apocular group organised to form a political party, the PKK. At the same 
time, a party programme, containing its founding ideological principles, was pro-
claimed. It was established in the party programme that Kurdistan was to be con-
sidered a "classical colonial country" that was held down by four colonial powers, 
namely Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria (Gunter 1990 p. 59). As Gunter points out, it 
is interesting to note that the Soviet Union was not mentioned in this context. The 
party programme also established Kurdistan being "semi-feudal" and "underdevel-
oped", criticising members of the bourgeoise and the land-owning class who coop-
erated with the colonial powers for betraying their national identities. Examples 
mentioned in the party programme were such acts as to participating in the Turkish 
parliament and tolerating the establishment of the Turkish school system in Kurd-
istan. In the view of the PKK, these activities were to be considered as interactions 
with the colonial powers, their serving to destroy the national identities of the 
Kurds (van Bruinessen 1988a pp. 40-46; Gunter 1990 pp. 71ff.). 
The party initiated its armed struggle for independence in 1979. During this 
period, their actions were essentially directed against the feudal system in the Kur-
distan region in Turkey. A powerful and influential landowner, Mehmed Celâl 
Bucak, a parliamentarian for the conservative party, was selected as a target for 
their first armed attack. The attempt to murder Bucak failed, however. As a result, 
a bloody feud commenced between, the Bucak family, on the one hand, purport-
edly supported by "elements of state authority" (Gunter 1990), and the PKK on the 
other, assisted by two minor tribes loyal to them. As the political climate turned 
more violent, the armed attacks spread and soon involved several landowners and 
left wing-groups in the clashes that took place.   
Gunter also points out that another result was that large numbers of youths 
joined the armed PKK geurilla groups. The PKK attempted on their part to exploit 
local conflicts for their own purposes. It is reported, for instance, that in the 
Mardin province the party was involved in armed conflicts with the KUK, which 
had been active in the area for a long time and had strong support among the peo-
ple residing there (van Bruinessen 1988a p. 42). 
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When the military coup took place in Turkey on September 12, 1980, the leader-
ship of the party had already managed to escape to Syria. Öcalan settled down in 
Damascus and could, with the help of the Syrian government, establish training 
camps in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon (Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden 2011a pp. 
130ff.; Gunter 1990 pp. 71ff., 99). As has also been observed, the persecution and 
repression of those PKK members who were still left in Turkey in the wake of the 
military intervention was particularly severe (Amnesty International 1984).  
The politicans had lost control over the situation. The Army, seeing them-
selves as guardians of the republic, were planning to step in. This time, the coup 
took a long time to mature, the plans made being more detailed than before, since 
the military saw it as important to not repeat the mistakes they made in their earlier 
interventions in 1960 and 1971. Early in the morning of September 12, 1980, Gen-
eral Kenan Evren declared that the military had taken charge of political power. In 
a communiqué sent out by the military, it was announced that the aim of the mili-
tary was to "restore the authority of the state and remove the obstacles in the way 
of the democratic order" (quoted from Pope and Pope 1997 p. 142). The commu-
niqué continues: 
 
The state has become unworkable and constitutional organs have fallen into dissen-
sion and silence. The sterile and uncompromising position of political parties mean 
they have not been able to create the necessary unity. Destructive and separatist for-
ces…have put the life and property of citizens i danger…promoting reactionary and 
other perverted ideologies…that have brought us to the brink of division and civil 
war.  
(quoted from Pope and Pope 1997 pp. 142-143). 
 
This time the military junta had prepared for fundamental changes. Immediately 
after the coup, the parliament was dissolved, and all political parties and two of the 
most radical unions being suspended. All political leaders, with exception of the 
ultranationalist Alparslan Türkes, were arrested. Equally interesting to note is the 
role played by Türgut Özal, a liberal economist with a background in the World 
Bank and responsible for a reform programme under President Demirel's cabinet. 
Özal was appointed Prime Minister under the junta between 1980-82 (Zürcher 
2004 p. 306). A new constitution was elaborated and was subjected to referendum 
on November 7, 1982. Voting were made mandatory. The result arrived at was 
that the constitution was approved by 91,4 % of the votes casted. Zürcher (2004) 
points out that a high percentage of "no" votes was only to be found in the Kurdish 
provinces (ibid. p. 281). 
The new constitution strengthened the power of the president, a temporary article 
sanctioning the presidency of General Kenan Evren for seven years, after the con-
stitution was adopted. Many of the liberties that had been granted in the constitu-
tion of 1960 were then restricted or suspended (Zürcher 2004 p. 281). Several 
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Articles were clearly aimed at protecting the integrity of the country. The aspira-
tions for a unitary Turkish identity were expressed particularly in those parts of the 
constitution concerned with ethnicity and nationality. For example, one Article 
stipulated that: "Everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizen-
ship is a Turk" and Article 3 established that "The State's language is Turkish". A 
passage in Article 26 read: "No language prohibited by law shall be used in the 
expression and determination of thougth", its purportedly being aimed at the Kurd-
ish language. 
On November 6, 1983, elections were held. A few months earlier the 
establishment for new parties was permitted. Out of 15 parties that were 
registered, only 3 were approved by the National Security Council (Ahmad 1993 
p. 188). In the elections, the Motherland Party (ANAP)98 gained a majority of the 
votes. Its leader Turgut Özal formed a cabinet and was a few years later, more 
precisely in 1989, elected as the first civilian president after the coup, a post he 
held until his sudden death in 1993 (Zürcher 2004 pp. 282, 291-295; McDowall 
1996 p. 437). 
5.6 Defeat and After 
5.6.1 Eliminated 
Following the coup, efforts were made to stamp out the Kurdish current and a 
more stringent control of the public arena was established. In this period the Kurd-
ish movement became further "ethnicized" (Natali 2005 Chapter 5). A significant 
example of this was the new language law, no. 2932, introduced on October 19, 
1983, the underlying implication that the Kurdish language was totally forbidden 
(McDowall 1996 p. 424; Natali 2005 p. 109). Initially, in the first article of the 
law, the language question is presented in terms of being a security matter, "in 
order to protect the indivisible unity of the state, with its land and nation; the na-
tional sovereignty, the national security and public order". Its second article indi-
cates what languages could not be used in Turkey: "No language may be used for 
the explanation, the dissemination, and the publication of ideas other than the first 
language of each country which recognises the Republic of Turkey". In Article 3 
finally the native language of Turkish citizens is specified: 
 
The mother tongue of the Turkish citizen is Turkish. It is forbidden a) to develop 
any form of activity in which a language other than Turkish is used an disseminated 
                                                     
98 In Turkish: Anavatan Partisi. 
  
172 
as the mother tongue; b) at gatherings or demonstrations, to carry posters, bannes, 
signs or other such objects written in another language … or to broadcast records, 
tapes or video-cassettes or other objects of the media in another language without 
the consent of the highest official in the region. 
(as quoted by McDowall 1996 p. 443 n. 12).  
 
As an effect of this law the private use of Kurdish became a criminal offence. Im-
mediately following the military coup d´êtat, the numbers of arrested, detentioned 
and tortured increased dramatically throughout Turkey. The country was now un-
der the direct rule of the military (Ahmad 1993 p. 181; Zürcher 2004 p. 278). For 
years to come, people suspected of "terrorism" were seized and mass trials contin-
ued on into the early 1990s. Large numbers of university teachers and people em-
ployed in the public sector were arrested or suspended from their work. It is diffi-
cult to obtain exact figures on the number of people arrested in the aftermath of the 
coup. Gunter states: "In the year following the September 12 intervention, a total 
of 43,140 persons, including 21,864 leftists, 5,953 rightists and 2,043 separatists 
(Kurds) and 13,289 people whose political orientation had not been established 
were arrested" (Gunter 1990 p. 31). Zürcher (2004) found that in 1982 the number 
of arrests had risen to 122,600, and still in 1983 as many as 80,000 remained in 
prison, 30,000 of them still waiting for trial (ibid. p. 279). According to Amnesty 
International (1984 p. 2), in referring to the Turkish Milliyet, 178,56599 people 
were arrested, were taken into custody and were interrogated by the security 
forces. Most of the cases of torture took place in police stations while the arrested 
were still being held in detention incommunicado.100 In huge and very protracted 
mass trials, people were sentenced to serve long terms of imprisonment. Some 
                                                     
99  McDowall (1996 pp. 413-414) comments on the varying figures of arrested Kurds in the purges 
following the military take over: "But this was achieved at an enormous cost. During their period 
of office, according to their own statistics over 60,000 people were arrested. Of these 54 % were 
leftists, 14 % were rightists and only 7 per cent Kurdish separatists. While such figures bore out 
the incontestable fact that like all Turkish administrations, the generals were much more harsh on 
the Left than on the Right, it was difficult to believe the statistics on the Kurds. It was important 
for Ankara on the one hand to warn for the danger of Kurdish separatism but on the other to deny 
the actual extent of it. So the number of officially arrested were limited to less than 4,500. The 
International League of Human Rights provided a very different story. It claimed that no fewer 
than 81,000 Kurds had been detained between September 1980 and September 1982. This sug-
gested the problem of Kurdish dissidence was much more widespread than the generals cared to 
admit. The fact that two thirds of the Turkish army was deployed to Kurdistan in order to guaran-
tee its tranquillity was not advertised.”  
100  In Turkey the period of time after arrest a detainee could be deprived of communication with, as 
for example relatives and lawyers, i.e. be held in detention incommunicado, was 30 days. During 
the period after the military intervention of 1980 this period was extended to 90 days. The period 
being reduced thereafter to 45 days in those areas still under martial law. 
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were realeased waiting for the pending trials, many of these persons seizing the 
opportunity then to leave the country (Amnesty International 1984; Gunter 1990; 
Natali 2005). 
Inside the prisons the conditions were reported to have been bad, if not to say 
horrific. Torture was widespread. Various reports and testimonies indicated pris-
oners to protest incessantly through hunger strikes and to in some cases sign pro-
test petitions against "inhuman treatment". F.H Koers, a Dutch lawyer who, on 
mission for three different organisations, attended mass hearings in Turkey in 
1982, also reports of defendants complaining at the trials of their confessions hav-
ing been obtained under torture: "At the opening of the session of a trial known as 
the ‘Fatsa trial’ on 12 January, one of the defendants refused to cooperate in estab-
lishing his identity until the court first heard his complaints concerning treatment 
in detention and during interrogations. The spokesperson for the court said that 
complaints should be filed at 'the appropriate place' and that they were not in order 
at the time. The defendant replied that up to that time the many complaints made 
by the detainees had yielded no results" (Amnesty International 1984 p. 7). 
A personal picture of the conditions prevailing inside the prisons of Turkey is 
given in Mehdi Zanas' published memories of his 11 years in the notorious prison 
No. 5 in Diyarbakir.101 Mehdi Zana, who as pointed out previously, was the mayor 
of Diyarbakir at the time of the coup. In his capacity of being a leftist and a well 
known Kurdish activist, he was one of the first to be arrested. On September 24, 
1980, he was detentioned and sent to the then newly constructed military prison 
Diyarbakir. His case opened in May 1981 and closed in the fall of 1983. The ver-
dict was that he was sentenced to 24 years of imprisonment for "offending Turkish 
nationalist sentiments" (Zana 1997 p. 6).  
Zanas' and others stories (see, for example, Amnesty International 1984) bear 
witness to the conditions in the prison being extremely harsh. It was overcrowded, 
housing far more inmates than what the buildings were planned for.  
The prisoners were subjected both to physical and to psychological torture. 
Zana and others were repeatedly tortured during their time in prison. However, his 
account of the years he spent behind the bars is essentially a "counter narrative". 
Zana describes how he was determined to resist, at least mentally, the grim treat-
ments in order to provide a role model for the other prisoners, most of them much 
younger than he. However, in particular resistance among the PKK-adherents is 
reported to have been well-organized and to have contributed to that the group 
gaining respect. The prison is known in addition to have been a training ground for 
that party (Eccarius-Kelly 2010 p. 110; Marcus 2007 p. 67). Not all of them could 
                                                     
101  Mehdi Zana has been imprisoned and sentenced on three occasions and has spent 16 years in 
Turkish prisons altogether because of his political commitments.  
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stand the inhuman treatment they were subjected to in the prison. Some of them 
went insane, others were beaten to death or chose to commit suicide (Zana 1997). 
According to McDowall (1996), official records acknowledge that 32 people died 
in custody in Diyarbakir between 1981 and 1984. However, the author adds that 
unofficial sources claim that it was at least twice as many (ibid. p. 425). In his 
account, Zana recalls several former political colleagues and friends who ended 
their lives in the prison:   
On the night of January 20 and 21 1984 Rezi Aytur a member of the Kurdish 
movement Ali Rizgari hung himself in his cell. 'I love life but not to suffer 
this torture. This is how I protest. I wish bravery to all my prisonmates'. In 
the meantime a group of agitators were driven to the steam room for special 
treatment. One of them, a remarkable man that I had known for years, 
Necmettin Büyükkaya, had his skull fractured. He died on January 24, 1984. 
(Zana 1997 p. 31). 
Violence, threats and reprisals became part of everyday life in most of the Kurdis-
tan region for years to come. Repression not only took place in the prisons, but 
most of the Kurdish districts had been under emergency laws since 1977, and after 
the coup they were ruled under martial law for several years. In 1987, martial law 
was lifted to be immediately replaced by the Emergency Rule Law (OHAL) in 13 
provinces. According to OHAL, extraordinary powers were given to the regional 
governor stipulating that: "The governor could empower security authorities to 
search homes and party offices without warrant, order evacuation of entire vil-
lages, and restrict public meetings" (Watts 2010a p. 89). Four of the provinces 
remained under OHAL until 2002 (Jongerden 2007 p. 84 n. 38). The number of 
army troops increased to 200,000 in the early 1990s (McDowall 1996 p. 425). 
When Mehdi Zana was arrested in 1980, the Kurdish issue was still a marginal one 
in the political discourse in Turkey.102 When he was released in 1991, it had turned 
into the most burning domestic issue of all. In the aftermath of the coup, the Kurd-
ish movement became more or less eliminated. In the 1980s the PKK was to be the 
dominant Kurdish party in Turkey.  
 
 
 
                                                     
102  Geerse for example, refers to interviews with Kurdish left-oriented migrants in Istanbul in the 
1970s, stating that people of the left generally did not separate between Kurds, Turks and Alevis 
then (Geerse 2011 p. 169). 
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5.6.2 Armed Struggle 
It was rather widely believed that after the extensive political purges that took 
place, and the increasing military presence in Kurdistan following the military 
intervention, the armed resistance in the region was finally suffocated. From Syr-
ian soil, however, the PKK then began to prepare for its revival. The period be-
tween 1979 an 1980 was a time "when the guerilla warfare was prepared and or-
ganised" (Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden 2011a p. 135). At the party congress in 
1982, the PKK adopted a strategy in three phases, "defence, balance and offence" 
(Gunter 1990 p. 72; Jongerden 2007 pp. 60-61). The process with a guerrilla war 
was to start and hopefully develop into a "conventional battle" against the Turkish 
military forces. Portrayed as different ideologically from other Kurdish groups in 
Turkey, the PKK openly supported the idea of an independent Kurdish state across 
the present borders of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. 
An incident on the night August 14-15, 1984, in the small towns of Eruh and 
Şemdinli at the Syrian border marks the beginning of the bloody protracted armed 
uprising against the Turkish state that was to last for years to come (Pope and Pope 
1997 p. 258). The attack was carried out by the Kurdistan Freedom Brigades 
(HRK),103 the first front organisation within the PKK structure to be declared. Af-
ter the attack, the rebels withdraw to training camps in Iraq. The geopolitical situa-
tion in the early 1980s was propitious for the PKK, the ongoing war between Iraq 
and Iran resulting in free reins being given to the Kurdish parties in northern Iraq 
because of the government troops of that country being needed at the frontiers. An 
agreement with the Iraqi KDP made it possible for the PKK commandos to locate 
their forces there (Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden 2011a p. 131; Marcus 2007 pp. 
69ff.; White 2000 p. 136). A group of "recognisers" was purportedly sent secretly 
into Turkey in 1982 with the mission of examining the political situation there, 
gathering information concerning the strength of the Turkish military in the Kurd-
ish areas, place hideouts in the mountains and, if possible, establish contacts with 
local people (Gunter 1990 p. 71; Imset 1992 p. 31).  
HRK was soon reorganised into the Peoples Liberation Army of Kurdistan 
(ARGK),104 later completemented by an organisation mainly concerned with politi-
cal activities, the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK).105 Within 9 
years the PKK were growing from a group of some houndred rebels to a well or-
                                                     
103  In Kurdish: Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan. 
104  In Kurdish: Artesa Rizgariya Gêlê Kurdistan. 
105 In Kurdish: Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan. 
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ganised group consisting of male and female fighters.106 Between 1984 and 1987 
the main goals of the struggle were military plants, patrols and village guards. A 
further goal of the activities was to recruit new guerrilla troops among "the revolu-
tionary people", that is the poor peasants and unemployed who should be educated 
in guerrilla warfare (Marcus 2007 p. 37; Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden 2011a pp. 
128-131). 
The PKK fought a hardcore guerilla war during the 1980s. Rugman and 
Hutchinson were among the foreign journalists who had an opportunity to visit the 
PKK training camps in the Bekaa Valley. They reported on the hard drill and dis-
cipline found among the guerilla troops in the training camps:  
Physical training for recruits began at six in the morning, followed by 
several hours of indoctrination in class rooms decorated with pictures of 
Marx, Lenin and Che Guevara. The guerrillas were told the ‘errors’ of other 
tribal or non-tribal violent groups, and taught how to incite civilians to 
revolt. The PKK leader presented himself as a concoction of ideologies, 
telling his disciples that he was not only a Marxist-Leninist, breaking the 
mould of traditional Kurdish society, but also a Kurdish patriot and a good 
Muslim. Visitors reported that Öcalan’s fervent followers varied in age from 
9 to 50, and that they slept in tents and unheated rooms to prepare for life in 
the mountains of southeast Turkey.  
(Rugman and Hutchinson 1996 p. 32). 
However, some of the methods employed were criticized. The PKK had become 
known for its brutal methods and its attacks on civilians. Many commentators 
provided examples of internal critics and dissidents having been subjected to grim 
reprisals. Several testimonies given by dropouts tells about party members being 
obliged to engage in self-criticism (White 2000 pp. 144ff.; Imset 1992 p. 83; Mar-
cus 2007 pp. 96, 138ff., 259). Entessar (1992) points out that the reading of texts 
other than those produced by the party was strictly forbidden (Entessar 1992 p. 
96). 
In 1990 the party decided to stop its attacks and massacres against the civil-
ians, and that guerilla troops committing actions of these types should be pun-
ished. In the early 1990s the party's popularity among the Kurdish population in-
creased. Marcus (2007) points out, for example, how the good reputation of the 
PKK came for the population of the Mount Cudi. The soldiers became known for 
"their honesty and respect of their people" (p. 119). According to Marcus the 
                                                     
106 In the early years of the PKK, the overwhelming majority of its guerilla troops were men, the 
number of women beginning to increase in the early 1990s. According to Marcus (2007 p. 173), 
about a third of the PKK troops in 1993 were women. 
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moral of such stories was that "the rebels were exacting but fair, and those who did 
not cross the PKK would not face problems " (ibid. p. 119).  
In 1993 and 1995 a unilateral ceasefire was declared by the PKK. However 
since the party was understood by the government in Ankara as being a "terrorist 
organisation" their unilateral peace offer was not responded to (McDowall 1996 p. 
436). The armed struggle of the PKK continued during the 1990s, although the 
rhetoric and the political claims had changed. On March 17, 1993, the party leader 
Öcalan proclaimed a unilateral cease fire from March 20 to April 15, and at-
tempted to initiate a dialogue with other Kurdish party leaders (Kutschera 1994 p. 
15). The Turkish authorities did not accept Öcalan's offer. Öcalan decided in turn 
to extend the cease fire. About the same time, an agreement between the PKK and 
other Turkish-Kurdish parties was arrived at. In May the cease fire was broken 
after a group of PKK soldiers, allegedly without order from Öcalan, attacked a bus 
filled with Turkish soldiers.  
In the early 1990s the Turkish president Turgut Özal took a pragmatic posi-
tion and initiated a number of openings regarding the Kurds, supporting discus-
sions for a solution of the Kurdish issue (Kirisci 2010 p. 59; McDowall 1996 pp. 
429, 431; Natali 2005 p. 109). Meetings between the Turkish government and the 
PKK started during his time in office. President Özal died of a heart failure in 
April 1993, and for many years rumours circulated that he had been murdered, his 
relatives claiming that he had been poisened. In 2012 an autopsy was finally made, 
the results showed that his body contained poison, however, the actual cause of his 
death could not be established (Reuters 2012-12-12). After Özals' death, the idea 
of a possible dialouge with the PKK was abandoned, although, according to an 
article published in MERIP-reports the meetings continued sporadically in the 
1990s and further meetings carried out between 2009 and 2011 (Hess 2012).  
5.6.3 The "Social Earthquake" 
On September 20, 1992, a 74 year old man was suddenly gunned down at the out-
skirts of the city of Diyarbakir. It was the author and poet Musa Anter, who had 
been a front figure in Eastism (see section 5.4.2). Together with a friend he was 
visiting a Cultural Festival in the city of Diyarbakir. He was probably murdered by 
a death squad with connections to the security forces and in 2006 Turkey was 
found guilty for this murder by the European Court of Human Rights (see, for 
example, Todays Zaman August 27, 2008). The news of his death was a shock to 
Kurdish as well as Turkish intellectuals, since Anter was seen as a man of dialogue 
advocating peaceful means as a mode of operation.  
Turkey is a country that long has been accused of human right abuses. In the years 
following the military coup in 1980 however, the number of reported cases of 
assault increased dramatically. In the early 1990s, the numbers of extra-juridical 
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imprisonements and disappearances escalated dramatically (Amnesty International 
1990). Human Rights reports indicate how particularly vulnerable the situation of 
people was who took a position critical of the state ideology. The numbers of civil-
ian - journalists, intellectuals and others - who became victims of the violence, 
Musa Anter being only one of them, amounted to thousands of persons.  
In the 1980s and 1990s, the war between the PKK and the Turkish army re-
sulted in civilian casualties and affected most people in the Kurdistan region in 
Turkey very negatively. The Turkish government basically responded to the activi-
ties of the PKK in two ways. The one was by intensification of military activities 
in the region. The other was by the establishment of a Kurdish militia. The village 
guards were employed by the state and were armed by the military for self-
protection  purposes. These guards generally were recruited from tribes classified 
as being loyal to the government having right or far right political sympathies or 
were considered "criminal" or "delinquent" by the government (see, for example, 
McDowall 1996 p. 422). Far from all of the village guards had enrolled voluntar-
ily, however.  
In many cases, manpower was offered to the militia by tribal leaders. There 
were economic incentives for many people in being guards, in view of the high 
unemployment rates, the impoverishment and the low average incomes (Jongerden 
2007 pp. 55, 260ff., see also; McDowall 1996 pp. 421ff.; Geerse 2011 pp . 171ff.). 
McDowall reports, for example, that in 1992 the monthly salary for a village guard 
was slightly more than $ 400, whereas the average annual income per capita was 
about $230 (see McDowall 1996 p. 422). This author also points out how Kurdish 
landowners exploited the system to their own gain, since individual villages were 
often forced to pay a share of their salaries to the local agha107 with the result that 
the number of village guards increased considerably when such a system was es-
tablished. McDowall (ibid. p.422) reports, for example, that there were some 
25,000 village guards in 1990 and that the number had increased to 35,000 in 
1993.  
The implementation of the village guards contributed to the situation for the 
Kurdish civilians deteriorating, in particular in the countryside, where they be-
come trapped between the guerrilla forces of the PKK on the one hand and  the 
military forces of the Turkish state on the other (Besikçi 1990 p. 63; Imset 1992 
Chapter 7; McDowall 1996 p. 46; Geerse 2011 pp. 171ff.). The conflict between 
the PKK and the Turkish army forces developed into a regular war.   
From the beginning, huge military resources were invested in combatting the 
PKK. Military actions were essentially directed at the Kurdish civilian population, 
and in the course of the 1980s the violence escalated enormously. During these 
                                                     
107 Agha is a chieftain of a tribe or of a section of a tribe. The title can also be given to landlords. 
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campaigns that were carried out, people were driven from their houses and forced 
to line up in front of the military forces who beat, humiliated, tortured or even 
sexually abused the villagers in front of their neighbours (Jaber 1988; Geerse 2011 
pp. 112ff.).  
The year 1988 proved to be a particularly violent year in the Kurdistan region 
in Turkey. Yet it was also a year in which public attention was drawn to the Kurd-
ish question through two situations or series of events in particular. The one, 
which was attended to by the international community with a great deal of interest, 
was when 60,000 Iraqi Kurds (McDowall 1996 p. 360) were forced to flee across 
the Turkish border to escape the gas bombings carried out by President Saddam 
Hussein. A second was that of the Turkish press from that year on beginning to 
write about the Kurdish question. An attack by military commando units on the 
village of Yeşilyurt near Cizre in 1989 attracted public interest and detest after a 
Turkish newspaper had published about the incident. The villagers were first bea-
ten by the military, forced to lie down in snow for hours and then given human 
excrements to eat. Due to the public attention given the case, it was taken to the 
European Commission on Human Rights (Rugman 1995 p. 35).  
The left-wing journal İkibine Doğru108 wrote about mass graves containing 
the remains of many Kurds who had disappeared. The Kurdish discontent led to an 
uprising against the Turkish army forces in the town of Silopi, where Turkish 
journalists watching the incidents were beaten by the police. In the early 1990s the 
occurrence of military raids against the villages increased. The military employed 
a scorch-and-burn policy, driving people from large parts of the countryside. More 
than 3,000 villages and hamlets in the region were raized and completely demol-
ished by the Turkish army forces during this period (Information and Liasion Bul-
letin nr 126-127:1995; Jongerden 2007 pp. 80ff.). In addition, there were incidents 
in which Kurdish towns were destroyed either completely or partly. For example, 
Sirnak with its 25,000 inhabitants was reduced to ruins.   
However, the major cities in Kurdistan also became swollen by refugees. For 
instance, it is reported that the city of Hakkari had 80,000 inhabitants in 1996 
compared with 35,000 two years earlier. Diyarbakir had 400,000 inhabitants in 
1990 but had grown to 1,5 million in 1996. The heavy inflow of migrants pro-
duced enormous pressure on the cities, where there was generally a lack of hous-
ing facilities and where unemployment rates were already high (Information and 
Liaison Bulletin no. 105 p. 5; Middle East International 96-12-04). 
Critical voices pointed out that the effects of the state policies against the 
PKK were essentially "counterproductive" and contributed to radicalising large 
groups of the Kurdish population (see, for example, Gunter 1990 pp. 25ff.; 
                                                     
108 In Turkish: Towards 2000. 
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McDowall 1996). People began increasingly to sympathise with the PKK and 
become more tolerant toward them. This can be exemplified by a quotation of a 
man from Bismil, a township near Diyarbakir, who witnessed the following: 
 
Last week the Turks had an operation here. They herded up 2,000 people, and took 
away 25 for questioning. The PKK is a symbol of our freedom here. Yes, they burn 
schools, but the schools are teaching our children Turkish nationalist ideas. We 
don’t want our children growing up to become our enemies. 
 (as quoted by Rugman and Hutchinson 1996 p. 86).  
 
At the same time, the PKK guerrillas were reported to have attacked villages in 
which people had joined the village guard milita. Individual village guards were 
often punished in a grim fashion. In some cases, children and women reportedly 
were burned to death in their houses following PKK campaigns(Entessar 1992 p. 
103). In addition, there are reports of people who were considered to have "col-
laborated" with the state and who belonged to the village guards who in many 
cases were subjected to reprisals by the PKK. The British journalist Jonathan 
Rugman (1999), who travelled to the town of Cizre, near the Syrian border at the 
time of Newroz109 in 1990, reported of individual village guards being severely 
punished:  
 
I arrived in Cizre at the eve of Newroz to find that the PKK had already begun ce-
lebrating in its own grim fashion. Thirty people had been killed in violence last 
week. The latest PKK victims were three village guards, found hanging from town 
lamp-posts. When the bodies were cut down it was discovered that their mouths 
were stuffed full with bank notes. There was the equivalent of £ 120 in each mouth 
– a village guards salary. 
(Rugman 1996 p. 45)  
 
A Kurdish insurrection that began on March 12, 1990, reportedly stemmed from 
combat between the PKK and Turkish military troops in the area of Mardin. It was 
asserted that during the combat the Turkish military bombed Kurdish villages and 
the fields surrounding them. The funeral of one of the guerrilla fighters developed 
into a mass demonstration in which about 5,000 participants took part. The atmos-
phere grew increasingly tense when civilian participants were attacked by army 
troops. Arrests of some 700 persons took place and many persons were injured. 
                                                     
109 Newroz refers to the traditional Iranian new year holiday. It is celebrated in the time of the north-
ward equinox (18-23 March) throughout the Middle East and Central Asia, for example in Kurd-
istan, Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. 
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The following day a protest manifestation was organized in the town Nusaybin, 
where shops were closed and students boycotted their classes. The insurrection 
spread to other towns and cities, where manifestations of solidarity were organ-
ised. In the town of Cizre, a manifestation led to a gathering of 15,000 persons.   
For years to come protest actions took place at the celebrations of the Kurdish 
New year on 21 March (McDowall 1996 p. 427; The Middle East International 
1990-04-13, 1990-04-27, 1990-06-22).  
In a report, the mayor of Nusaybin later pointed out that people protested sin-
ce the situation had "exploded from within". It was told that the protests were "due 
to humiliation and terror" that the military had carried out against the civilian 
population. The mayor was dismissed from his post and the government an-
nounced the possibility of further displacement actions. In 1992, 103 people were 
reportedly killed during demonstrations in Kurdish towns. Investigations showed 
that the military had been shooting civilians unprovocated and it was found out 
that the military had been shooting at a civilian building for more than 20 hours 
(Jaber 1992; Imset 1992 p. 327; The Middle East International 1990-04-13, 1990-
04-27, 1990-06-22). 
All in all, the incessant escalation of violence in the Kurdish areas, which tar-
geted civilians and militants alike, as well as such respected personalities as Musa 
Anter, together with the increasing numbers of unsolved murders as well as state 
officials committing serious crimes against human rights with impunity, under-
mined people's reliance on state authorities and contributed to resistance and to 
criticism of the regime. 
5.6.4 Openings and Deadlocks 
While Mehdi Zana was in prison his wife became politically active. Leyla Zana 
was 14 years old when she was married to her cousin, who was 22 years older than 
her. She was 19 when her husband was being imprisoned in 1980, pregnant with 
their second child. Having had only a few years of education, she did not master 
the Turkish language. As one of the wives of political prisoners, she became in-
volved in organising protest manifestations outside the prisons. In the process she 
became involved in political activities as a reporter and a human rights activist. 
She allegedly learned Turkish from her son’s school books. She was arrested in 
1988 and was severly tortured and sexually humiliated by the police (Marcus 2007 
p. 173). In 1991 she was elected to the Turkish parliament as a representative of 
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the Kurdish dominated Peoples Labour Party (HEP).110 The ethnic based HEP 
party was then a novelty on the public political arena in Turkey. 
A number of political changes that were carried out in the late 1980s and ear-
ly 1990s made it possible for a Kurdish ethnic-based party to obtain seats in parli-
ament. The influx of Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq who were fleeing the 
gas bombings of Saddam Hussein contributed to drawing international attention to 
the situation of the Kurds in the Middle East. In 1991 President Turgut Özal saw it 
necessary to recognise "the Kurdish reality". However, at the same time, there 
were new and further restrictions that made obvious how difficult it was to carry 
out a democratic transformation of the Turkish judicial and political system. The 
Grand National Assembly removed the law that had restricted the use of Kurdish 
language (Kurdistanbulletinen No. 3 1989). In addition, the notorious paragraphs 
141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code, stipulating that people could be punished 
for ‘insulting’ Turkish nationalist feelings were abolished, but were replaced by a 
new Anti-Terror Law. According to paragraph 8 of this Anti-Terror Law people 
could be arrested and punished for separatist activities, even if they did not use or 
advocate the use of violent means. In several cases, people became charged, with 
the authority of this paragraph, for separatist propaganda when speaking or singing 
in Kurdish in public spaces (Amnesty International 1990, 1992, 1994; Gürbey 
2000 pp. 62ff.; Muller 1996 pp. 179, 181ff.). 
In 1989 a group of Kurdish parlamentarians were thrown out of the Social 
Democrat People's Party (SHP)111 after attending a congress on the Kurdish issue 
in Paris (Watts 2010 p. 62). Their exclusion led to strong reactions on the part of 
Kurdish politicians, many of whom chose to leave the party in protest. They reor-
ganized and established a new party, in June 1990 the HEP being founded (Middle 
East International no. 361 1989; Turkish Daily News 1995-01-24). Demands on 
their agenda were that the village guard system be abolished, the emergency laws 
lifted and the special military teams that operated in Kurdistan be moved out of the 
region. They also demanded cultural rights for the Kurds, such as TV-
broadcastings and education in Kurdish.112 In Turkey there is a 10 % barrier pre-
venting small and regionally based parties from obtaining seats in parliament. HEP 
                                                     
110 In Turkish: Halk Ekmek Partisi. HEP is perhaps not to be considered a "Kurdish" party, but rather 
a pro-Kurdish one. As Marcus (2007) points out, "In keeping with the professed desire to be a 
party for all of Turkey, HEP's chairman was supposed to be Turk and the general secretary a 
Kurd" (p. 128). 
111 In Turkish: Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Partisi. 
112 The party’s political agenda is compiled in a letter by the parliamentarians addressed to the 
spokesman of the European Parliament 1992-06-02. It is published in an internal briefing by the 
Swedish Committee for the Human Rights of the Kurds, see Svenska Kommittén för kurdernas 
mänskliga rättigheter:Meblemsbrev juni 1992. 
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succeeded in forming an alliance with SHP, their agreeing to cooperate with the 
pro-Kurdish candidates, basically for pragmatic reasons. HEP obtained 22 votes in 
parliament in the 1991 elections (Middle East International no. 418, 1992-07-05).  
At the inauguration ceremony in the parliament, the HEP deputies wore ties, 
scarfs and headbands in green, red and yellow. These are the three colours of the 
Kurdish flag. Wearing them together was seen as a provocation by a majority of 
the members of the Grand National Assembly.113 Leyla Zana and one of her party 
colleagues also provoked strong negative reactions in taking their parliamentarian 
oath partly in Kurdish. There are many versions circulating of exactly what Leyla 
Zana was saying. Marcus quotes from the prison writings of Zana: "I will fight for 
the fraternal coexistence of the Kurdish and Turkish people within the context of 
democracy" (as quoted by Marcus 2007 p. 165). It also proved to be difficult to 
carry through a pro-Kurdish policy in parliament.  
The HEP politicians soon became branded as subversive elements, the alli-
ance with the SHP being dissolved. In addition, a preliminary investigation of the 
party was undertaken at the constitutional court in Ankara, and on July 15, 1993 
the party was prohibited. Together with 12 other HEP deputies, Leyla Zana was 
stripped of her parliamentary immunity on March 2, 1994. Seven of them being 
prosecuted in the State Security Court in Ankara, charged for high treason and 
separatist activities (Information and Liaison Bulletin no. 104-105 p. 71). The 
prosecutor first demanded a death penalty. Leyla Zana was sentenced, in accor-
dance with paragraph 125 of the Turkish Penal Code, to serve a 15 year prison 
term, but was freed by amnesty in 2004. The same year, her husband Mehdi Zana 
returned to Turkey after being in exile in Sweden for 10 years. The other indicted 
deputies were to spend between 3 1/2 and 15 years in prison (see, for example, 
ibid.; Gürbey 1996 p. 27).  
Over the years, HEP has been succeeded by a series of different pro-Kurdish 
political parties. Each of them has been prosecuted and the party forbidden, and  
thereafter Kurdish activists having reorganised, doing so again and again, each 
time with the use of a new party name. 
Turkey has been striving for membership in the European Union since it be-
came an associated member in 1963. Now, there are several amendments of its 
legislative bodies and its political structures that are required of Turkey in order 
for it to meet the Copenhagen criteria114 that Turkey needs to fulfill before nego-
tiations with the European Union can commence. 
                                                     
113 The combination of red, green and yellow has been considered as being subversive and provoca-
tive. In fact in the city of Batman in 1992 the mayor considered changing the colours of the traf-
fic lights in order to avoid the combination of these three colours.  
114 The Copenhagen criteria are the political measures that must be fullfilled for membership in the 
European Union. The criteria were established at the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. 
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Since the early 2000s the reported numbers of physical torture has diminished 
Keyman (2005). However, torture is still frequent and few perpetrators punished. 
In addition, more sophisticated methods of abuse and ill-treatment have become 
common instead. For example, the number of investigations and prosecutions of 
people considered as being political liabilities have increased. One such example 
is that of the young mayor of Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir, member of the pro-
Kurdish DEHAP party and both a lawyer and human rights activist. In July of 
2006 he purportedly had no less than 126 court cases going on against him be-
cause of his political activities. In post-1980 Turkey no Kurdish movement has 
emerged the way such movements did in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Instead the new generation of pro-Kurdish politicians, such as Leyla Zana 
and Osman Baydemir, operate mainly within the established political system. 
They organise openly within parties that make no use of the word Kurd in their 
party names, yet strive for Kurdish rights and the recognition of Kurds (Watts 
2010a; Watts 2010b). The following observation made by Watts115 at the Newroz 
festival in Diyarbakir in 2004 serves to illustrate the elements of ambuigity that 
can be distinguished in political manifestations in pro-Kurdish circles in Turkey: 
 
On the one hand, festival organizers billed the event as a multicultural 
"rainbow" celebration, a tactic pro-Kurdish activists have increasingly used 
as a way to duck charges of separatism and to recast notions of Turkish 
nationhood. On the other hand, there was no doubting that organizers and 
participants saw Newroz as a Kurdish national (though not necessarily 
nationalistic) event. Songs were mostly in Kurdish, and Kurdish national 
colours of red, yellow and green were everywhere on clothes and banners 
(Watts 2004b p. 2) 
Turkey is a country that has been modernising rapidly in recent decades. Still, 
there are huge socio-economic cleavages between the Kurdish districts and the 
western parts of the country although in the 1990s extensive resources were in-
vested in schools, roads, hospitals and the like in the Kurdistan region. The infra-
structure, however, is still poor and the unemployment rates high. The political 
scene in the country is still fragmented and is full of nuances. Natali (2005) points 
                                                                                                                                      
 
Turkey became a candidate country 1999. In 2001 Turkey signed a protocol with the EU in which 
the steps the country needed to take to meet the Copenhagen Criteria were declared.  
115 The text entitled "Turkeys Tentative Opening to Kurdishness" is available at 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero061404. 
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out how the complex structure of the political arena in Turkey influences the 
Kurdish political scene as well.  
The political treatment of the Kurdish issue in Turkey may be considered as 
"paradox". This can not least be illustrated by the efforts of the pro-Kurdish activ-
ists and nationalists to extend the limits of the Turkish democracy. Generally it is 
recognised among scholars and other observers that "the Deep State", that is the 
military, still govern the country (see, for example, Zürcher 2004). On one hand 
commentators on Turkey often claim that the country has went through a positive 
process of modernisation which in turn has brought with it the establishment of 
several democratic institutions (see Mango 1999; Lewis 2002). On the other hand 
more critical observers, scholars and others, points out that the democratic institu-
tions in reality are weak and ineffective. Natali (2005) for example labels the 
country in terms of being a "quasi democracy". In his analysis of the modern his-
tory of Turkey Keyman (2007) emphasise the distinction between "democratic 
institutions" and "democratic consolidation". Hence Turkey has been successful 
carrying the former out, but failed to establish the latter, and so far a plural and 
liberal democracy has not yet developed in Turkey.  
On the positive side is the fact that the Kurdish question was thus recognized, 
at least formally, although still with limits and restrictions. The Kurdish language 
had become legalized for private use but could still not be used in political or other 
contexts without the risk for repressive measures. In 1999 Turkey was accepted as 
a candidate country for membership in the European Union. This entailed the need 
that a process of amendming the constitution in the areas of politics, bureaucracy 
and jurisdiction and other areas of societal relevance began. 
Such developments could be conceived as being contradictory, however. The 
AKP government that came to office in 2003 had approved several reform pack-
ages. During their time in power a number of initiatives had been taken to achieve 
a resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey. During the last decade, neverthe-
less, a more tolerant climate has come about for the discussion of Kurdish issues in 
public forums. One example of this is the documentary film that has been pro-
duced concerning on the horrific conditions that were present in the Diyarbakir 
prison No.5, in which several Kurds were imprisoned in the aftermath of the coup 
of 1980. This film was awarded the title of being the best documentary in the film 
festivals in Ankara and Antalaya. Also in 2011 the Kurdish politician, author and 
poet Kemal Burkay, leader of the SPK, was able to return to Turkey after 30 years 
of exile in Sweden. In November the same year Premier Minister Abdullah Gül 
apologized for the massacres that took place in Dersim in 1937-38 
(www.bianet.org 2011-11-24). 
On the other hand, however, there are tendencies pointing to continued re-
pression and difficulties in implementing policies that change the situation. Many 
of the initiatives for reforms and other improvements in the situation of the Kurds 
that have been carried out by the government can be regarded as shallow and thus 
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have failed (Eccarius Kelly 2010 pp. 192-193, 198). In 2006 a new terror law was 
introduced, allegedly based on a very broad meaning of terror. In very recent ye-
ars, numerous human rights activists, Kurdish authors and politicians have been 
arrested, according to most observers without proper evidence or on shallow 
grounds. When these lines are now written, in the fall of 2012, Turkey is still the 
country in the world in which the largest numbers of reporters is imprisoned. In 
March of this year, several academics and authors writing on the Kurdish issue 
were imprisoned, allegedly for their ties to the Kurdistan Communities Union 
(KCK),116 which is an umbrella organisation for PKK and other organisations. The 
KCK-trials are still going on, and there are reports coming of clashes between the 
PKK and the army, and of the arrests of many people (www.bianet.org 2012-09-
28, 2012-09-13, 2011-12-13, 2011-03-09). 
5.7 Closing of the Chapter 
This chapter has described Turkey and its Kurdish issues during the period follow-
ing the Second World War. It was during this period that the political generation at 
the centre of our concern here emerged. Particular emphasis in the chapter is 
placed on the development of the Kurdish nationalist movement in which they 
participated.  
The early sections of the chapter concern the political framework in which 
the Kurdish movement in Turkey developed, a brief overview of the politial and 
socio-economic developments in Turkey up to 1980 being presented. It was shown 
that in Turkey a certain degree of political liberalisation took place during this 
period, that provided the possibility of new actors appearing on the political arena 
in the country. Right-wing, left-wing and islamist political dimensions was gradu-
ally to be distinguished during these decades. However, due to the laws in force 
and various judicial restrictions that existed it was impossible for any ethnically 
based or pro-Kurdish organisation to appear overtly. The Kurds of the political 
generation organised in clandestine groups and parties that appeared in public in 
the name of cultural organisations or publishing houses. In the 1960s and the 
1970s, social and political conflicts came to a fore, a political radicalisation gradu-
ally taking place in the country, of both a left- and a right-wing character, with 
subsequent social and political unrest and turmoil, all of this culminating in the 
military interventions in 1971 and 1980. 
                                                     
116 In Kurdish: Koma Civakên Kurdistan. 
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The sections thereafter chronicled the Kurdish movement that emerged in Turkey 
during the decades preceding the coup of 1980, in which the political generation of 
central interest here participated. Various events critical to the emergence of the 
movement were pointed out, such as the socio-economic inequalities between the 
Kurdistan region and Western Turkey, the emergence of a Kurdish movement in 
Iraq and the highly ethnicized public political space in Turkey. The Kurdish pro-
test organisations began their efforts here with the expression for cultural identi-
ties, attempts to draw attention to "the eastern question", and efforts to attain influ-
ence and sympathy for the Kurdish issue within the Turkish left. Gradually, the 
movement became more radicalised, and at the same time more fragmented. In the 
1970s it was drawn into political turmoil that culminated in the military coup in 
1980. In the wake of the coup, the Kurdish movement was suffocated, many of its 
key figures escaping from Turkey, various of those who remained inside Turkey 
being prosecuted in long protracted mass trials that often led to their being sen-
tenced to long periods of imprisonement. One party, the PKK, initiated a guerilla 
war in Turkey.  
The final sections of the chapter were devoted to developments concerning 
the Kurdish issue in Turkey during the decades following the 1980 coup. The 
1980s and the 1990s could be characterised as decades of repression, involving 
much civilian suffering and many clashes between the Army and the PKK. There 
were openings as well, however. In 1991 "the Kurdish reality" was recognized by 
president Turgut Özal and certain restrictions against the Kurdish language were 
lifted. In the early 1990s a new generation of politicians entered the scene, essen-
tially operating within the legal pro-Kurdish parties that existed then.  
Repressive measures continued to be carried out under the emergency laws in 
the Kurdistan region, against pro-Kurdish activists, journalists and human rights 
activists, however. In the Kurdistan region thousands of people were forcibly dis-
placed from their homes as villages in the area were evacuated, allegedly in search 
of PKK-guerillas or "terrorists" as it often was declared. 
The year 1999 was a turning point in repression. The PKK-leader Abdullah 
Öcalan was hijacked in Kenya and was brought back to Turkey where he was de-
tained. The same year Turkey was recognized as a candidate country for member-
ship in the European Union. During the decade that just passed, there have been 
both openings and deadlocks. On the one hand, the political climate has opened up 
and been mitigated to some extent. Martial laws have been lifted from the Kurdis-
tan region, the Kurdish issue has been recognized in public debate as the very exis-
tence of a Kurdish population. In 2011, for example, the Kurdish politician Kemal 
Burkay decided to return from his exile in Sweden, where he had resided for 30 
years, and Kurdish has become an elective subject in Turkish state schools.  
On the other hand, people are still arrested, accused of "being members of an 
illegal organisation", young Kurdish guerilla soldiers are still dying in the moun-
tains, and there are obvious discrepancies beween what is stated in public docu-
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ments and how things are actually carried out in practice. Keyman (2007), a politi-
cal scientist following developments in the country, has emphasised the distinction 
between "democratic institutions" and "democratic consolidation". Turkey has 
been succesful in carrying the former out, but has failed to establish the latter, and 
thus far the Kurdish issue has not yet been solved in Turkey.  
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Table 5a: Chronology ca 1960 - present 
 
1946 Multi-party system implemented. 
1950 Open Elections are carried out for the first time. Democrat Party (DP) 
 wins. 
1952 Turkey becomes a member of NATO. 
1960 A military coup removes the Democrat Party led government from 
 power. 
1961 Ex-President Adnan Menderes is executed. 
 A new constitution is implemented. 
1971  A military coup removes President Süleyman Demirel from power.  
1965-1980 The emergence of a number of pro-Kurdish political parties that  operate 
 clandestinely and appear in public through legal cultural organisations. 
 Many of these groups are splintered into numerous branches and new 
 parties. Radicalisation and ethnification of the emergent Kurdish move
 ment.  
1978 The establishment of the PKK. 
1980  A military coup led by general Kenan Evren. 
1981  The military abolishes all political parties. 
1982 A new and more restrictive constitution is implemented. 
1983 The military returns power to civil hands. 
1984 The PKK initiates its armed struggle against the Turkish state. 
1984-1999 3,000 villages in the Kurdistan region are evacuated and demolished by 
 the Turkish Security Forces. A majority of the evacuations take place 1993 
 and 1995. These actions are carried out by brutal means, such as beatings 
 and extrajudicial executions, destruction of property, burning of houses 
 and livestock. Hundreds of thousands of people were forcibly displaced. 
1987 Pre-1980 politicians are allowed to return to politics. 
1991 "The Kurdish reality" is recognized in public by President Turgut 
 Özal. 
 500,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees attempt to cross the Turkish borders. 
 The refugee camps for Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Turkey draw attention to 
 the Kurdish question. 
1991- Ongoing: On several occasions Turkey sends troops across the Iraqi border 
 to suppress the Kurdish guerilla (PKK, PJAK). At several occasions Tur
 kish bomb raids are carried out in Northern Iraq to eliminate the  Kurdish 
 guerillas. 
1991- Ongoing: A number of legal pro-Kurdish parties are formed, expe
 rience repressive measures and harassments and are finally forced 
 to close down, only to be succeeded by new  
 pro-Kurdish parties. The first legal pro-Kurdish party HEP (People's Labor 
 Party) is formed in 1991.  
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1992 Kurdish New Year clashes. Some 92 people die. 
1993 President Turgut Özal dies. 
1997 A "Covert" military coup. 
1999 February: The PKK-leader Abdullah Öcalan is captured in Kenya 
 and is imprisoned in Turkey. 
 November: Turkey is granted candidate status to the European Union.  
2003 The Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) wins the general 
 elections. 
2004 The European Union agree to initiate accession discussions with  Turkey. 
2011 The Kurdish politician, author and poet Kemal Burkay, returns to 
 Turkey after more than 30 years of exile in Sweden. 
 November: President Abdullah Gül apologizes for the massacres in 
 Dersim in 1937-38. 
2012 March: The imprisonement of several academics and authors for  writing 
 about the Kurdish question. 
 Clashes with the PKK continues. 
 Dozens of people arrested and detained in operations against the  KCK 
 Kurdistan Communities Union (an umbrella organisation to the PKK). 
 
 
Table 5b: The generation during this period 
 
1950-1960  The political and social structures that developed in the Turkish Republic 
 influence the Kurdish youth during their schoolyears as they are facing various 
 expressions of Turkish nationalism in school and in other public spaces. 
 
1960-1980 The people belonging to the political generation became politically 
 active and their actions became increasingly radicalised. Many po-
 litically active Kurds are forced to leave the country. A certain po-
 litical liberalisation facilitates political organizing, but pro-Kurdish or
 ganisations could not operate overtly. 
 
1980- Several politically active Kurds leave Turkey in the decade before 
 the coup. Kurdish refugees settle down in many parts of the world, 
 some becoming political refugees in Sweden. The generation emerges as a 
 diaspora political actor. 
 In diasporic settings, the Kurds reorganised and become involved in 
 trans-national networks together with co-ethnic compatriots from 
 Iran, Iraq and Syria. The dramatic developments that take place in 
 Turkey and the Kurdistan region of it contribute to fuelling the 
 activism in the diasporic setting. 
 In the years of the military coups, the exiled generation is prevented 
 from returning to Turkey. This does not mean that their contacts 
 with their former home country are definitely broken. Rather, they 
 followed these dramatic events from a distance, their narratives 
 about being Kurdish being affected by the dramatic events taking 
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Part III 
Diaspora and Resistance: The Story 
of a Kurdish Political Generation in 
Diaspora 
Introduction 
Those short and colourful nights haunt me now all the time. Inevitably, most of tho-
se words, which gleamed like pearls in the dark, could not escape the fierce waves 
of time hence - - they vanished. However, one memorable expression survived as 
part of my destiny: welatê xerîbiyê. My grandmother, who would be transformed 
into a fairy inhabiting her epics, tales and stories, would constantly repeat these 
mysterious words: wêlate xerîbiyê … welatê xerîbiyê … welatê xerîbyê.  
(Uzun 1995 p. 197)117 
 
In his short story Separation is Such a Grief the Kurdish author Mehmed Uzun 
recalls the many tales he heard from his grandmother during his childhood. To him 
her words were magic, the intrigues she told of enchanting and fascinating. Still, 
most of it faded away in the course of time. Yet there was one expression that 
became written into his mind - Wêlate Xêribîye.118 These words, implying an un-
known destiny in a foreign country, were recurrently repeated in his grand-
                                                     
117 This is from the English version of the short story Separation is Such a Grief, published in Kurd-
istan Times No.4 1995 pp. 191-205. The Swedish version of it is to be found in the anthology 
Granatäppelblomning from 1998. 
118 Khaled Khayati (2008 p. 2) mentions other concepts used by Kurds alluding to the exile as a 
trauma, and to dispersion and uprooting such as hāndāran, tarawagā, awarābun, darbadarî and 
mānfa in Kurdish. Appellations that are frequently used in lyllabues, in popular culture and in the 
popular narrative of the home country are azar (trauma), sitam (oppression) and qurbani (victim).  
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mother’s tales, symbolising the destiny of many Kurds who throughout history had 
been forced away from their Kurdish homelands to lead their lifes in distant pla-
ces. So it was told to him.  
When he became older, Uzun heard the same theme repeated in the ballads 
and epics told by the Kurdish Dêngbêjs, the minstrels and story tellers who passed 
the oral cultural traditions on to new generations. In the late 1970s his life story 
took a new direction, his being forced to leave his home country. Uzun writes that 
he then "joined the two-hundred-year-long caravan of exiles" (Uzun 1995 p. 199), 
his following a path many Kurds before him had been forced to take. As Uzun’s 
account implies, the experiences of displacement and deportation have been com-
mon ingredients in the tales and stories that shape the collective memory of the 
Kurds. 
The imagination of a "foreign country" presupposes there to be an idea of a 
home country and there being features that bind the Kurds together into a commu-
nity, a nation. In popular narratives the Kurdish nation is often considered an "op-
pressed nation" moulded by centuries of repression and occupation by foreign 
powers (Alinia 2004 pp. 320ff.). Many Kurdish men and women belonging to the 
political generation of particular interest here were, like Mehmed Uzun, following 
the "caravan of exile". In this part of the thesis, the accounts told by the 23 inter-
viewees will be analysed together with some written sources produced by people 
of their generation.  
Kurdish political refugees from Turkey began to arrive in Sweden already in 
the mid-1960s. Some of the interviewees were here then for shorter periods of 
time as refugees or as exchange students. Among those who arrived in the after-
math of the coup in 1980, many had first spent a period of time in neighbouring 
Middle Eastern countries before coming to Sweden. However, it was not before 
the period of increasing political turmoil in connection with the coup that large 
numbers of Kurds left Turkey to settle down in Sweden and other countries. The 
first major concentrations of Kurds in Sweden were in Stockholm, Göteborg and 
Uppsala and other large cities (Alakom 2007 pp. 69-75; Kuutman 1983; Yetkin 
1984 p. 129). It was in these cities that the interviews were conducted in 2001 and 
2002. 
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, those belonging to the political generation 
arrived at a time when the Swedish welfare state was still expanding and an earlier 
"assimilationist" immigrant policy had shifted shortly before into a new strategy, 
one that can be characterised as "multi-culturalist". The intention was to give im-
migrants the same basic political and social rights as the native-born Swedes (Jo-
hansson 2008; Khayati 2008 pp. 182-190; Svanberg and Tydén 1991 Chapter 26). 
These policies contributed to the development of an institutional framework 
from which the political generation could benefit. The Kurdish immigrants ob-
tained support from the Swedish authorities, and were provided with new re-
sources and with opportunities that made it possible for them to reorganize and to 
  
193 
develop new strategies for their lives. Indeed, Sweden has from time to time been 
depicted as "a haven" for the Kurds since the Kurdish community in Sweden is 
well organized. Sweden more or less become a centre for Kurdish politics of iden-
tity.  
Alakom (2007) writes that "Stockholm is not only the capital of Sweden, it is 
the cultural and literary capital of the Kurds as well" (ibid. p. 73). Indeed Stock-
holm played a prominent role in Kurdish diasporic activism, and it is, most proba-
bly there that Kurdish manifestations in Sweden once began to develop. It has 
been documented for example how Kurdish delegations participated in demonstra-
tions of the Social democrats and left-wing groups in the mid-1960s (Alakom 
2007 pp. 150, 153). Many Kurdish parties and organisations that are active in 
Sweden have their head offices in Stockholm, which in addition is the city in 
which the majority of Kurdish publishing houses in Sweden are located. At the 
time when they began to  arrive the Kurds was still a group largely unknown to the 
Swedish public, their encounters with Swedish society not being without chal-
lenges. 
Seen from a historical perspective, the refugee-, immigration- and immigrant 
policies at that time were relatively generous (Appelqvist 1997 p. 2, 1999; Abiri 
2000). According to Appelqvist (1999), a vast majority of the asylum seekers 
coming to Sweden in the early 1990s were given residence permits in that country, 
under the Geneva Convention, or these could be obtained by people recognized as 
de facto refugees or war resisters (ibid. p. 2).119 Comparatively speaking, citizen-
ship was relatively easy to obtain after living a certain period of time in the coun-
try. The entitlement to citizenship in Sweden is based on the principle of Ius san-
guinis,120 which mean that "inclusion is based on "law of the blood" and geneal-
ogy, with citizenship justified through ancestry" (Mandel 2008 p. 210). In accor-
dance with the Swedish Citizen Act from 2001 double citizenship is allowed. 
In popular terms Sweden has for long time been considered essentially an 
ethnically "homogeneous" country. In reality however, the picture is much more 
diverse and complex (see, for example, Svanberg and Tydén 1991; Hagerman 
                                                     
119According to the Aliens Act 3:1 p. 3 to be considered a de facto refugee is he "who is unwilling to 
return to his country of origin because of political circumstances and therefore is willing to ad-
duce weighty reasons to suppport his consideration" (quoted in Appelqvist 1999 p. 8). The term 
de facto refugees was later replaced with "humanitarian needs" which has been criticised as being 
an unprecise criterion (Appelqvist and Zettervall 2008 pp. 232ff.). 
120This is in contrast with Ius soli, which states that children are to automatically be given citizenship 
in the country in which they are born, even if their parents are not natives of that country. This 
principle is applied, for example, in Australia, Great Britain and the US. A third principle is Ius 
domicili, according to which citizenship is given on the basis of long-term residence in the coun-
try. 
  
194 
2006; Johansson 2000b). First, there have always been ethnic minorities residing 
in Sweden,121 although these were recognized as such as late as 2000 
(www.sprakradet.se/minoritetsspråk; Prop. 98/99). Secondly, there has always 
been immigrants coming to Sweden. In the 1930s their numbers for the first time 
exceeded the number of emigrants (Corman 2008 p. 176).  
With a growing economy the Swedish Welfare state and its public sector be-
gan in the 1940s to expand. Now there was an increasing demand for labour, the 
authorities actively recruited people from abroad and immigration was "seen as 
necessary for development of the whole Swedish welfare society" (Appelqvist 
1999 p. 8). This continued until 1972, when the recruitment of non-Nordic labour 
definitely came to a halt. This marks the beginning of a new phase of immigration, 
dominated by refugees and family re-union. From then on, the only way for non-
Nordic immigrants to obtain a residence permit in Sweden, unless they were being 
united with family members or close relatives who were Swedish residents, was to 
apply for asylum (Appelqvist and Zettervall 2008 p. 200, Johansson 2008 ).  
As all countries Sweden has its own dark legacies as well. For example, the 
country was influenced by nationalist and other contemporary ideological currents 
that flourished in Europe and other parts of the world in politics and science 
throughout the 20th century. One such example is the National Institute for Race 
Biology, which was established in 1922, and was the first one in the world of its 
kind (Johansson 2000b p. 329; Broberg and Tydén 2005; Svanberg and Tydén 
1998 pp. 258-267; Khayati 2008 p. 196). The aims of the institute were to study 
eugenics and genetics, and to establish in what areas the "Nordic race" was most 
applicable.  
Other dark legacies of Swedish history are the sterilisation policies conducted 
in the 1930s and 1940s and policies that were directed against the native Sami 
people and other minorities (Svanberg and Tydén 1991 p. 360ff.). Immigrants 
arriving in Sweden in the late 19th century, many of them Jews from the Baltic 
states, Poland and Russia where the subject of contemporary racist immigration 
debates (Svanberg and Tydén 1991 p. 264). In a study of the murders of alleged 
Bolshevik agents conducted by Russian exiles in Stockholm in the early 20th Cen-
tury Lundberg (2004) describes how suspicions against immigrants were raised. 
"The Russian Danger" was a term used at the time to express concerns about 
which challenges and threats to "Swedish" society immigration might possibly 
entail. That author argues that, at the time, the imaginations, and suspicions, of 
danger and "orientalism" could be directed at immigrants from Eastern Europe and 
that similar ideas of "dangerous immigrants" are still to be seen today, yet directed 
                                                     
121 Those recognized as national minorities in Sweden are Finns, the Sami people, Roma, Jews and 
Torne Valley Descendants. 
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now at new immigrant groups. Lundberg points out for example that Muslims are 
now perceived as dangerous and are portrayed in media often with connotations of 
terrorism, violence and the like (ibid. pp. 241-244). 
The interviews and the collection of empirical material for the thesis took 
place at about the same time as Lundberg's book was published. By now the multi-
culturalist immigrant policy had been replaced with a new policy, this time with an 
emphasis on integration.  
Attention was drawn to the fact that, despite the good intentions of the social 
and cultural policies targeting immigrants, they tended nevertheless to be excluded 
or marginalised in many fields such as in housing, the labour market and politics 
(Dahlstedt 2008; Franzén 2000; Lange 1999; Urban 2005, 2007; Berruti et al. 
2008). For example, it was found that unemployment rates were higher among 
immigrants and that many had difficulties in finding a job commensurate with 
their qualifications (Berruti et. al 2002; Franzén 2000; Höglund 2008). As men-
tioned in Chapter 1, the possibilty for non-citizen immigrants to vote in municipal-
ity and regional elections was introduced in 1975.  
According to Castles and Miller (2009), the participation of non-Swedish ci-
tizens in these elections has "declined over time" (ibid. p. 285). Participation in the 
elections was particularly low in certain housing areas with high concentration of 
immigrants, such as in Rinkeby were only 35 % of the residents in that area voted 
in municipalitey elections in 1998 (Dahlstedt 2008 p. 264). Sweden had also 
experienced the emergence of anti-immigrant movements and the occurrence of 
racist attacks of refugee camps. A referendum against the reception of immigrants 
was also held in Sjöbo in southern Sweden in 1988.  
Another thing that had changed was that Kurds were no longer an "unknown" 
immigrant group in Swedish society. Many Kurds had succesfully participated in 
social life in Sweden. Books by such authors as Mahmut Baksi, Mehmed Uzun 
and Mehmet Emin Bozarslan were published in Swedish, a Kurdish library opened 
in Stockholm and a Kurdish woman, Nalin Pekgûl, had been a parliamentarian for 
the Social Democratic Party ever since 1994.122 Kurds had obtained very much 
sympathy when hundreds of thousands were forced to escape in the aftermath of 
the Gulf War in 1991. Swedish artists and NGOs arranged concerts, fund-raisings 
and solidarity actions to support the Kurds. However, the Kurds in Sweden has 
also been connected to a number of incidents that attracted negative attention. For 
example, in connection with the murder of Olof Palme, the murders of dissidents 
of the PKK in the 1980s, and two cases of honour killings drew the attention of the 
Swedish media: Pela Atroshi in 1999 and Fadime Şahindal in 2002. 
                                                     
122 Between 2003 and 2011 Nalin Pekgül (then Baksi) was the chairman of the National Federation 
of Social Demoratic Women in Sweden. 
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The following Chapters 6 and 7, deal with the narratives of the political generation 
of interest here and their participation in the manifestation of a Kurdish diaspora.  
Chapter 6 analyses stories that can be described as back-ward looking, con-
taining a flavor of nostalgia, are analysed. Suffering and fortitude are the guiding 
themes of this chapter. The stories echoe experiences that the interviewees have 
made when they were living in their original homeland, as well as experiences of 
displacement. Some of the stories deals with memories inherited from their parents 
or grand-parents. Generally these stories fit into the dominant discourse of dias-
poric people being victimised and idealising their original homelands. These are 
the stories of a defeated generation. However the stories also displays the senses of 
defiance and resistance among the interviewees.  
Chapter 7 deals with stories that can be considered as forward-looking. The 
chapter focuses on stories on experiences from the country of settlement and the 
diasporic situation. The interviewees came to Sweden when they still were rela-
tively young activists. In Turkey they had committed themselves to the Kurdish 
question. Many of them had been members of radical left wing organisations. In 
the diasporic setting new political strategies emerged. Gradually the interviewees 
got involved in transnational networks. In the chapter questions of how members 
of this generation view their possibilities and difficulties in developing practices 
and strategies in a diasporic setting are discussed. The chapter revolves around the 
themes of re-consideration, challenges and of becoming challengers. The stories 
included in this chapter essentially challenge the dominant victimisation discourse. 
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Chapter 6 
With A Sense of Nostalgia 
6.1 Introduction 
The introduction of this part of the thesis began with a quotation from a novel by 
the author Mehmed Uzun. From the stories told by his grandmother the word Wê-
latê Xêrîbîye, foreign country, remained in his memory. In the novel he depicts 
himself as one among all the Kurds that have been forced to escape across state 
borders and to become diaspora Kurds. This is an experience that he shared with 
several others of his generation. As was pointed out in the introduction the idea of 
escaping to a "foreign country" intimiates the existence of belonging to a "home 
country". Uzun belonged to a generation that had been politically defeated, es-
caped their home country and ended up as political refugees. They continued to 
closely follow the contemporary developments in their home country and in the 
exile committed themselves to the Kurdish cause in various ways. Hence many of 
them were as activists politically oriented to the developments in the original 
home country. These experiences certainly informed the narratives about what it 
mean to be Kurdish.  
In this chapter accounts of what it mean to be Kurdish to the members of the 
political generation are presented and discussed. Two basic threads that run 
through the narratives can be distinguished.  
First, there are a number of stories to be distinguished that have to do with 
suffering. These stories fits well with the traditional view of diasporas as their 
members feeling "victimised" suggested by Cohen (1997), alluding to the connota-
tions the term may have regarding conditions of a catastrophe and of displacement 
(ibid. pp. 3ff., 25ff.). The suffering reported concerns "loss" and "deprivation" and 
alludes to difficulties that the Kurds have gone through in the present and also 
have been through in the past. The production of a collective identity draws on 
selected memories from the past as well as on events and occurences experienced 
much more recently. In Chapter 2 it was pointed out that diaspora have connota-
tions of victimisation and displacement alluding to the Kurd and the people around 
them having been forced to escape from catastrophic situations in their home 
countries. These matters are reflected in many of the stories told by the interview-
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ees. As will be taken up below, the people telling these stories had been forced to 
escape from their original home country, often after being persecuted for long 
periods of time or when their situation had become unbearable.  
In the accounts of their being Kurdish, obtained in the interviews, a second 
stance can be distinguished, one that implies a perspective of national romanti-
cism. These accounts tell of their being a strong people. In these accounts the im-
plicit point is made that the Kurds have survived as a people throughout centuries 
of repression and atrocities that they have been exposed to, their also being a peo-
ple with rich resources in land, culture and history. The term national romanticism 
alludes to a movement that developed during the 19th and 20th centuries involving 
the idea of political legitimacy based on organic links to a given territory and pro-
moting the idea that their language, culture, people. National romanticism also 
imply that elements such as language, race, culture, history, customs and religion 
are indigeneous and evolve within every given culture or nation. The national ro-
manticist view is thus built on essentialist assumptions. One such assumption is 
for example the idea that boundaries of a nation and its imagined cultural or ethnic 
essence merges. 
The accounts presented reflect the experiences of the interviewees, or in the 
words of Mannheim (1952 p. 297), their "stratification of experiences" referring to 
constellations of factors, events and opportunities during a specific period of time, 
as well as responses to these from a common "vantage point" (Edmunds and 
Turner 2002 p. 8) and location in history.  
6.2 The Suffering People 
Desecrated Homeland 
The meaning of being Kurdish was a theme recurrently discussed in the inter-
views.  Mention was made in the interview situation, from the diasporic viewpoint 
taken, of a homeland they had been dispersed from, as was the idea of a common 
history and ancestry of a people stemming from the specific territory of Kurdistan. 
In many of the accounts the idea of a common territory of origin was mentioned as 
a central feature characterising Kurds. In these narratives particular landscapes as 
well as nature were often commemorated and given a prominent place. In most 
narratives concerning nationalism and national belonging, the land concerned is 
referred to in terms of "what grows and what the land gives" (Lindholm-Schulz 
2003 p. 103). Guibernau (2007) points out that the territory referred to in national-
ist discourses and narratives "embodies ideas, aspirations, sentiments, some of 
wich evoke a strong sense of national meaning" but she also underscores the 
meaning and importance that the territory often has as, "people’s primary source 
of nourishment" (ibid. p. 23). This territory has a basic geopolitical and geostrate-
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gic meaning to them just as it is commemorated and evokes a sense of distinction. 
In addition, the status of the imagined homeland is intimately linked to the status 
of the people. In writings, lyrics and statements Kurdistan is many times presented 
of as its being a "suffering" country and emotional relationships to the homeland 
are often expressed as Kurdistan is depicted. In the account of B allusions to na-
ture, nourishment and the status of the country and its people are all expressed: 
It is an old, old, very old geographical region. Kurds have lived there for 
thousands of years. It is an area with many cultures, people and minorities, 
such as Assyrians, Syrians, Armenians, a beautiful country with high 
mountains and rich waters, divided, a country waiting for justice. People 
living there should have peace, should live in peace and have calm, with 
peace and rest, like all other people. The country should not be bombarded. 
The trees should not be burned down. Even animals should not be forced to 
escape because of an ongoing war there. 
(B) 
In B's statement above one can see how the idealized picture of the homeland con-
trasts with sentimental reflections of the occurrence of a catastrophy. He conveys 
the picture of a land that is rich and beautiful, abundant in natural resources and 
hosting myriads of people and cultures. This picture is darkened, however, by the 
circumstances prevailing in the time when the narrative was told. It is about a 
country that has not been left in peace, that which is living and is growing in the 
country being devastated and ravaged. These reflections are similar to what can  
be found in research on other refugee communities as well. In a study of the Pales-
tinian diaspora, Lindholm-Schulz (2003) describes how the present status of Pales-
tine is sometimes referred to in terms of being "a feeling of immense injustice" 
(ibid. p. 93).  
The same allusions are to be found in B's account as he describes Kurdistan 
as being a country which is "divided", under attack yet "waiting for justice". The 
country is seen as being bled white as its natural resources are being devastated, 
people being driven from their lands, and not even the animals are saved, this im-
plying that the country is being deprived of its capacity to nourish its people. The 
present is referred to at the same time, however, in terms of that the country is still 
awaiting the pending justice, where waiting becomes a condition which is present 
(ibid. pp. 94-95). The country is described in terms of passivity and its being vic-
timized, although the account points to the future, the hope being nurtured of that 
justice being administered at some point.  
Such presentations of the land are abundant in written presentations of Kurd-
istan directed at the public. A similar description of Kurdistan is to be found in an 
essay written by the then exiled Kurdish politician Kemal Burkay (2004) who 
attempts to explain the main factors behind Kurdistan's present status. Burkay 
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asserts that "tribal social structure, divisions between religious movements and 
confession, and the institutions of land ownership and the sheikhdom have always 
been obstacles to the unification of national forces" (ibid. p. 35), his thus problem-
atising the internal social structures of Kurdistan in terms of being "tribalist" and 
the like. But he also writes: "The true reasons that have prevented the Kurdish 
nationalist movement from succeeding are external ones" (ibid. p. 35), his continu-
ing:  
Kurdistan’s extraordinary wealth and its strategic location are the most 
important reasons why our country is still divided and our people still 
subjected to so much suffering. For the abovementioned reasons Kurdistan 
drew the attention of the Western Colonizing states in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The English, the French, and the Russians struggled for 
control over our country. Then, after World War I, they once again divided it 
up according to their own interests 
(Burkay 2004 p. 33). 
In the text Burkay portray Kurdistan as "one of the wealthiest countries in the 
world" (ibid. p. 31), and paint the picture of a land abundant in resources such as 
those of fertile soil, as well as minerals and extensive deposits of oil. At the same 
time the underlying message seems to be that the existence of natural resources 
makes the country rich, the occurrence of them becomes a curse and a major factor 
behind the exploitation and suppression of Kurdistan. He continues the text then 
describing the Kurdish struggle first against the Ottoman and Persian Empires and 
thereafter against the dominant powers of the 20th century (ibid. pp. 35-36). 
It is interesting to note that Burkay, in the final sections of his article, predicts 
that the present state borders in the Middle East will be renegotiated sometime in 
the future: "The borders will lose their significance. Artificial borders, which to-
day divide Kurdistan with barbed wire and land mines, will then disappear." (Bur-
kay 2004 p. 39). Thus, one can see that Burkay perceive the division of Kurdistan 
as a condition that is temporaly and "un-natural" rather than its being permanent.  
Colonised 
In diasporic circles it is often asserted that interest in trade policy and in the ex-
traction of natural resources, above all through the oil wells, have been critical 
factors in impeding the development of an independent Kurdish state body. Kurd-
istan and its status are central features in many of the written presentations of the 
land that were made and proliferated by the political generation in question in their 
countries of settlement (see, for example, Burkay 2004 p. 24; Baksi 1974 pp. 10-
12; Uzun 1996). In the sources collected for the thesis the condition that the Kurds 
never have been united under one single leadership is frequently ascribed to exter-
nal forces and circumstances (Burkay 2004 p. 35; Baksi 1974 pp. 17-28).  
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In an essay entitled "Kurdistan in Turkey" written by Kendal Nezan, a prominent 
Kurdish intellectual in Europe, the developments leading to the contemporary 
situation of Kurdistan, a country extending across several state borders, is de-
scribed as "the Colonial Carve-Up of Kurdistan" (Kendal 1979a p. 58). Gunter 
(1990) describes how in the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movements that advanced in 
various parts of Kurdistan in the 1960s and 1970s, Kurdistan was often referred to 
in terms its being a "colony" and an "occupied" country (Beşiçki 1991; Gunter 
1990 Chapter 5; Jafar 1976 p. 144). 
The Turkish sociologist Ismael Beşiçki has described the status of Kurdistan 
as an "international colony" referring to the land being "exploited" by four states. 
This has also been how Kurdistan has been referred to in presentations of the 
country directed at a Swedish audience. This is also how the author and journalist 
Mahmut Baksi describes the status of Kurdistan in a book he wrote while he still 
was living in Turkey:  
It should be emphasised that Kurdistan, despite its rich natural resources, 
today constitutes one of the poorest and least developed areas in the Middle 
East. The reason for this is the semi-colonial policy conducted by the ruling 
bourgeoisie in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria and the merciless policies of 
exploitation carried out in collaboration with the imperial monopolies 
(Baksi 1974 p.12, this excerpt of it translated from Swedish) 
In the passage quoted Baksi describes Kurdistan as a poor country, subjected to 
the "semi-colonial" policies carried out by the four states. In the quotation pre-
sented above, however, the policies carried out by these governments are placed 
into a broader perspective, that of imperialism and of capitalism. The conditions 
present there were further complicated by the fact that the state powers governing 
Kurdistan are allied with the "the imperialist powers", its being asserted that the 
exploitation of Kurdistan was sanctioned by "influential" external powers. The 
quotation thus illustrates the radical left-wing oriented positions that many of them 
beloninging to this political generation took. 
In other texts Kurdistan's situation is referred to in terms of "colonisation", 
something which had persisted for a long period of time. One example is to be 
found in the 5th party programme of the PKK, in which the periods when Kurdis-
tan was conquested by the Persian Empire, and about a century later on was being 
islamicized are referred, its being stated that, "our people began a phase of perma-
nent occupation or subjection to tyranny" (PKK Party Program Chapter 2 p. 1). On 
the basis of this it is concluded that: 
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The Islamic ideology took over from national development, and in this way 
our people were alienated from their own values and were thereby hindered 
in their national development. This was an important factor which lead to 
our people remaining under the control of the foreign feudal powers. 
(PKK Party Program, Chapter 2, p. 1)123  
It seem to be assumed in this passage, that the national development of Kurdistan 
has been impeded and obstructed by external forces. Here the islamisation of Kur-
distan is mentioned as an example. In the text it is described how the Kurds throg-
hout history have been subjected to several "enslaving empires" such as the Persi-
an, Greek, Roman and Ottoman. It is furthermore suggested that the Kurdish 
people have been "alienated from their own values". In connection to what is writ-
ten in this excerpt it is interesting to note that White (2000) points out that a cen-
tral feature of the ideology of the PKK is that of their creation, or "re-discovery", 
of a "natural Kurdish personality" which, according to the rhetoric of Abdullah 
Öcalan, implies that the Kurdish people had been "dispossessed of" this "true 
Kurdish personality" by "their colonisers" (ibid. p. 137). 
The Kurds are frequently, in various sources, presented as being "one of the 
largest ethnic groups without a state of their own" (see, for example, Kurdistan 
Times 1995 p. xi) or, in a more exacting way, as "one of the largest ethnic groups 
inwithout a state of their own" (ibid. p. xi; www.landguiden.se). An underlying 
message here is that of the Kurds not only being a stateless people, but their also 
representing a "nation" that has the right to have a state of their own, their having 
been deprived of "the right" to govern themselves. It is thus implied that the gov-
ernments in the Middle Eastern states that are hosting large Kurdish populations 
are not "legitimate". 
The picture of Kurdistan as a colonised and occupied country has been mani-
fest among the diasporic Kurds. Ever since I was first introduced to Kurdish dias-
pora settings in the mid-1980s, I have heard again and again Kurdistan being re-
ferred to as a "colony" and "occupied country". The apprehension of Kurdistan as 
an occupied country is been expressed by diasporic Kurds in many ways and set-
tings. For instance, at Newroz parties, the celebrations of the Kurdish New Year, a 
common feature of the programme in the 1980s and 1990s was a performance in 
which a man recited a poem about Kurdistan, simultanenously with this the flags 
of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria were brought onto the stage one after the other, 
thrown to the floor and trampled on (own observations). In this way, it was dem-
onstrated that the powers governing Kurdistan not were considered as being the 
legitimate government of the Kurds there. 
                                                     
123 The party program is available at http://www.hatford-hwp.com/archives/51/169.htlm. 
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In recent decades the apprehension of Kurdistan as a colonised country has partly 
been challenged. Iraqi Kurdistan has become an autonomous region. This self-
administrative entity was based on the UN resolution 688, which allowed for the 
establishment of a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel in Iraq. Since the imple-
mentation of a new constitution in Iraq,124 this area constitute a self-administered 
region within the federal structure of the Iraqi republic (Natali 2005 p. 163). In 
some circles, the autonomy has been referred to as a de facto state and hopes been 
nurtured that it would be the emerging embryo of an independent Kurdish state 
(Olson 2005). Recurrently, the autonom region is referred to as "the Free Kurdis-
tan" (see, for example, Jîn Kurdisk Kvinnobulletin no 1, 1994 p. 6). For example T 
said that he "visited Kurdistan in 1994" in recounting a trip to Iraqi Kurdistan, and 
in the same vein the director of the Kurdish Library told of aiming to contribute to 
the founding of modern libraries in "Kurdistan". Thus, hopes were nurtured that 
the KRG-administered area would develop into an independent political entity. 
The Silenced People 
The narrative of the political generation is to some degree the story of "a people" 
who have been silenced, marginalised and concealed. Shared collective memories 
are of central importance generally in narratives or national identities. These can 
be about events from the past that are celebrated or traumas that are commemo-
rated and mythified (Hettne et al. 1998 pp. 255ff.). Other events are dealt with 
quietly or are concealed from collective memory. There may be tacit consents to 
not talk about certain events, although this does not necessarily mean that these are 
obliterated from collective memory. Eastmond (2007) points out: "In the produc-
tion of social memory and a common narrative as a community personal narratives 
may merge with those of others and draw on other previous historical accounts of 
repression and displacement, some of them learnt in childhood" (ibid. p. 256). In 
the narratives of the members of the Kurdish political generation studied here we 
finds examples of memories that have been transmitted from earlier generations. 
The men and women who came to belong to the political generation that was 
involved in the Kurdish movements of the 1960s and 1970s were children and 
grandchildren to persons who personally experienced, and had sometimes suffered 
very heavily from, the extensive repression carried out in the Kurdistan region in 
Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s. Many of them, for example E and Z, had parents 
and grandparents who were actively involved in the Kurdish uprisings that took 
place during these decades. Suffering, fear and sacrificies that older relatives had 
been through were also mentioned in the stories of M and S. There were many 
who recalled, in their interviews, how the memories of these events were dealt 
                                                     
124 This is the Constitution of 2005. 
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with in their families while they were growing up. Like S many recalled how they 
were kept quiet if they tried to ask more about what had happened than what they 
had already been told:    
and in 1938 the state carried out a massacre in my home town. My mother 
and father were newly-born at the time. Many were murdered, many were 
expatriated, in one month between 70,000 and 150,000 … no one knows 
exactly. But I know that I have lost many, many relatives, aunts of mine that 
disappeared, uncles that were ... grandfather that was murdered before the 
eyes of my grandmother, who was pregnant. We grew up with stories of 
such kind. There were no pictures taken, nothing written down, nothing like 
that, at the time. But we listened, about the people being murdered. My 
maternal grandfather and grandmother and all others in their generation were 
in a way marked. All told of their being sad, and that they were marked, 
because they had been hiding in the mountains, for weeks, several months, 
without food. All this made one start to wonder. "How was it that it became 
like this?" If one asked about something, the adults did not want to tell 
anything and they did not want us to ask again. They were terrified. 
(S) 
The repression of the Kurds is placed in a historical framework in this account, 
although a framework involving only the relatively recent past, on the basis of 
stories told by older relatives. Here the scene and the agency were placed in the 
recent past and S as the narrator was not directly involved in the course of events. 
The fear expressed is not one the narrator herself has experienced. Rather it is a 
fear that she has observed in others or heard about. Similar memories concerning 
older relatives reluctant to tell of what had happened, were told by many of the 
interviewees.  
Mentions was made of how many people were shocked and traumatised by 
the harsh repressive measures carried out. In many families it was a topic that was 
avoided and seldom touched upon. P told how it could happen occasionally that 
those belonging to the grown up generation touched upon these events, their talk-
ing for example about older relatives who were killed or had disappeared. E told 
for example of the circumstances under which his grandfather was killed in the 
aftermath of one of the uprisings, having been kept secret from him until he was 
nearly an adult. 
In the parents' generation the massacres and the repression that followed the 
Kurdish uprisings in the early years of the Turkish Republic were followed by an 
"initial silence" that could be observed in communities that had experienced exten-
sive massacres of this type, being labeled as a "survivors syndrome" (Cohen 1997 
p. 49). In the narratives told by these who became involved in politics in the dec-
ades following the Second World War, these rebellions were increasingly more 
commemorated, the suffering that the older generation went through having be-
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come a major ingredient in their accounts. Bringing up these events could be in-
terpreted as a way of legitimatizing the Kurdish struggle in the present and legiti-
matizing a position "oppositional" to the Turkish identity. 
Assimilation 1 
The assimilation policies directed at the Kurds in Turkey have been discussed in 
earlier chapters. Many of the accounts can be understood as being in opposition to 
the public discourse in Turkey in which the Kurdish issue, in the words of Yeğen 
(2011) was to the effect that "The Turkish state denied the ethnic component of the 
Kurdish question" (ibid. p. 71), thus its being adressed as primarily "a social issue" 
(ibid. p. 72). In the accounts included here, there are many examples of repression 
and attempts to assimilate the Kurdish population that the interviewees have expe-
rienced themselves.  
As when stories of this kind are told, reference is frequently made to experi-
ences in everydaylife contexts, often experienced already in their childhood. As 
was described in previous chapters the public sphere in Turkey is known to be 
highly "ethnicized" (Natali 2005 pp. 93, 103; see also Houston 2001 prologue p. 
ix, passim). One example of this is the banderols on which there were statements 
declaring "How happy is he who can say 'I am a Turk' "125 decorating strategic 
places in squares and public buildings in every city and town. The state ideology 
created a "hegemonic" structure, one mirrored in public places and practices. One 
such memory was revealed in B's account, telling of how he dealt with Kurdish 
identity while growing up in Turkey where Kurdishness was strictly forbidden in 
all zones that could be considered public or, in Goffmans'  terminology, "front-
stage": 
My name is ... actually I have two names, and most Kurds have two names. 
My name is Brûsq, the name that I was given by my father and.. my parents 
... father and mother. That was Brûsq. Lightning. But during registration ... 
my parents were obliged to change my name and they wrote Birol, so in all 
public documents my name is Birol. This is not my real name. My name is 
Brûsq. And none of my parents, or of my friends or any of my acquaintances 
know me as Birol. They know me as Brûsq. 
 (B) 
The story is located in the Turkey of his childhood and illustrates how in public 
spaces he, like all Kurds, was denied the use of his Kurdish name, the name his 
parents had given him, in public spaces and how citizenship rules penetrated into 
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the everyday lives of people. Although he was a member of the Kurdish commu-
nity and as such was identified as Kurdish, in crossing the frontier to the public 
sphere he becomes Birol, a citizen of Turkey and from that moment on he could 
not, according to his story, openly express his Kurdish identity. Brûsq is his "real" 
name and symbolised, in his words, the person "who he in reality is".  
Given names have a strong symbolic meaning, since they signify social be-
longing, such as that of ethnicity, class and gender. Giving a Kurdish name to a 
child under the condition that non-Turkish names were forbidden could be inter-
preted as a symbolic act of resistance (Guibernau 1996), as a lived struggle against 
assimilation. The description B providing fits into what Eidhem reported on 
(1969) in a study of how Norwegian Samis in Norway managed their position in 
public spaces since outside their homes they rejected to speak Samic, they "under-
communicated" their national identity in public spaces, and in most forms of social 
interaction with the majority population, many of them having at the same time 
cautiously articulated their ethnic belongingness through symbolic actions. As is 
intimated in B's account having two names was an experience that he shared with 
many other Kurds from Turkey. In his memoirs, for example, the author Mehmed 
Uzun write of how he was first given the name Hême by his parents, but since this 
name was not approved by the local authorities he was to be called Mehmet (Uzun 
2008 pp. 41-43). 
 Another example of how the Kurds were prohibited by the Turkish authori-
ties from giving Kurdish names to their children was provided by the author Dilşa 
Demirbag-Steen, who told in the Swedish radio programme "Summer" in June 
1999 that the authorities approved her given name only after that her father had 
changed the spelling of it so that it could be written exclusively with letters from 
the Turkish alphabet. In Kurdish circles it is widely believed that prohibitions 
against use of non-Turkish names are in reality aimed specificially at Kurdish 
names. One of the women interviewed for the thesis for example remarked: "My 
own name for example, my name is R, and that is not a Turkish name. It is an 
Arabic name, but it is not forbidden" (R). Her continuing that the issue of name 
permisson has been actualised further in recent years, through parents having or-
ganised protest actions against state employees having rejected the registration of 
Kurdish names, with reference to that these names are non-Turkish.  
The story told by B, as well as other examples of stories that have been told, 
shows that from their experience it became a necessity to adapt, partly at least, 
through organising daily lives in accordance with the demand of assimilating 
Kurds in the Turkish nation-building project. They can also be understood as ex-
amples of a symbolic resistance (Guibernau 1996), since it tells of how parents 
continued to give Kurdish names to their children, despite its being prohibited, and 
also of how people found ways of continuing to use these names within certain 
circles and in certain contexts. 
  
207 
Assimilation 2 
The theme of assimilation was brought up in almost every interview. In many of 
these accounts the meeting with authorities and representatives of the Turkish state 
is in focus. There are generally only a few Turks residing in the Kurdish domi-
nated towns and villages in the Kurdistan region in Turkey. Most of them either 
military personnel and their families, or state employees such as doctors, teachers, 
governmental administrative personnel and policemen. Hence, in Kurdistan, the 
only Turks that many ordinary Kurdish citizens encountered were state representa-
tives (Baksi 2006 p. 67; cf. Geerse 2011 p. 154). Many of the interviewees, for 
example D, E and C, told that these persons followed various strategies aimed at 
assimilation. The school years had a prominent place in the memory of many of 
them belonging to the political generation of interest here. Many of those inter-
viewed describe themselves having been punished, or how they had witnessed 
classmates who had been punished, ignored or belittled by their teachers because 
of their not knowing Turkish when they started school. One of these interviewees, 
E, tell that he "hated" the teachers because of this.  
At the same time a somewhat different picture was provided by a man with 
whom I had an informal discussion at the outset of the work with the thesis who 
told me that there were teachers that "just shook their heads and laughed at how 
impossible the situation was" (Ü). Thus, in the interviewees and in various texts 
we can note varying experiences of the school system on the part of those belong-
ing to the political generation, if all of them were faced with the prohibition of 
speaking Kurdish in school. There are several accounts of their experiences in 
school, in which they emphasise the attempts that were made to assimilate them 
into a Turkish nationality by means of the school system. In his memoirs the 
author Mahmut Baksi describes how the children in the boarding school he was 
sent to were encouraged to dissociate themselves from their Kurdish backgrounds: 
Every week we went to see Turkish films in school. In these films there was 
much joking about peasants and the way they talk and how they are dressed. 
People who reminded us of our parents and brothers and sisters were 
depicted as underdeveloped, yes dangerous. We, on the contrary, looked 
more or less like the actors on the movie screen. We began to identify with 
these Western-style dressed smart people. Not only the films, but also our 
teachers influenced us in that direction. Many of the pupils made efforts to 
forget their Kurdish language. They believed that by doing so they would 
become perfect in Turkish. They did not want anyone to become aware that 
they were Kurds, since Kurds according to our teachers, were worthless 
people, which we also could read in our schoolbooks. In time, many of the 
boys lost contact with their parents. More and more pupils refused to go to 
their home villages to see their parents in the summers. They did not want to 
be children of poor Kurdish rural workers or to be peasants any more. 
(Baksi 2006 pp. 86-87; this part from it being translated from Swedish). 
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The scene presented in this quotation took place in one of the boarding schools 
that many Kurdish children were sent to in order to receive an education. As Baksi 
recalls, during his years spent in this school there was a sense of inferiority im-
planted into the children because of their Kurdish background. In the school that 
Baksi described, the pupils encountered not only a completely different language 
than their mother tongue, but were also confronted with a lifestyle and manners 
that were different from theirs and presented as being better and more civlisized 
than what they were used to from the rural areas that they came from (Baksi 2000 
pp. 85-99). His description of the educational politics in Turkey reminds one of the 
ideas launched by Gellner (1983), who emphasised the importance of the school 
system in the nation-building processes.  
Schools are often considered to be a suitable arena, or instrument, for spread-
ing a sense of people's belonging to a nation, with all the classical ingredients this 
has of a common history, origin and the like. The school system in several coun-
tries has been an instrument for attempts of integrating minority children, in Swe-
den for instance where boarding schools were first established with the purpose of 
bringing up, educating and also to ‘"civilise" Sámi children (Lantto and Mörk, 
2008 p. 142). For the Turkish regime, as for many other governments across the 
globe, the school became an instrument for socialising the children to conformity 
with an ideological or standardised system, and here for teaching the children the 
Turkish language. The text above suggest that many children indeed became as-
similated to a considerable extent, yet it is plausible to assume that the boarding 
school system tended to alienate many Kurdish children and a number of sources 
suggest that in the long run the boarding schools created many of the staunchest 
Kurdish nationalists (see, for example, Kendal 1979b p. 74). 
Adjustments 
Many of the stories presented above fed into the widespread idea that a diasporic 
narrative is one of victimisation (Cohen 1997). In both the previous stories for 
example, the implementation of assimilation policies in Turkey and the negative 
consequences for the Kurds in that country that these had, were referred to. The 
picture is however much more complex and, as we will see, the dominant narrative 
full of contrasts. Among the interviews collected we find several accounts that 
point out effects of these policies how people had to adjust to sometimes paradoxal 
situations and different environments. These stories imply that the assimilation 
policies had failed, yet still had consequences for people of Kurdish origin in their 
everyday lives. V, for example, mentions that there was a discrepancy between the 
Turkish society he read about in his schoolbooks and the Turkish society he ob-
served. He emphasise that the society he learned about in school was far more 
democratic and equal than the one he encountered in his every day life. U tells that 
the stories about Kurdish history he learned at home was completely different 
from them taugth in school. 
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Many stories tell about how many belongings became natural and socio-cultural 
boundaries managed and easy to get on with. In everyday life encounters between 
people were often friendly and not at all dramatic. In some local areas of Turkey, 
children were immersed, from early years in an atmosphere of diverse cultural 
settings and languages. The Hançepek quarter, also known as Gavûr Mahallesi,126 
situated in the old town of Diyarbakir, in which the Jewish, Assyrian and Arme-
nian population of the city resided, is vividly described in Mehmet Uzuns essay 
Pomegranate Flowers. He lived for various periods of time there during his child-
hood and acquried many Armenian acquaintances. Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian 
could all be spoken at the same dinner table (Uzun 1998 pp. 13ff.). Thus, to many 
people managed in their daily lifes the co-existence of several languages and cul-
tures.   
At the same time, an example of how relations between different population 
groups could become tense is given in the memoirs of Mahmut Baksi. Several 
Bulgarian-Turkish families had immigrated to Turkey and where assigned  land-
plots and houses in Kurdistan by the authorities. Baksi writes about how Bulgarian 
-Turkish families came to his home town. New houses were built for them, and 
they were given land. At the beginning the atmosphere was tense, the Bulgarian 
children and their families being harassed by the Kurdish children, but in time they 
were becoming friends and the Bulgarian learning to speak Kurdish. Baksi writes, 
however: "Then again we did not learn Turkish" (Baksi 2007 p. 31). 
Finally, in the 1960s and 1970s an increasing urbanisation took place in Tur-
key. Thus, there were many Kurdish families that moved to the cities in Western 
Turkey. Many of them, especially the women, girls and young children, came 
there without having command of Turkish. M, who grew up in a rural setting whe-
re only Kurdish was spoken, moved to Istanbul with his family at the age of five. 
He describes how frustrating and incomprehensible the first meetings with Turkish 
speaking people were to him:  
And before we came to Istanbul I learned [the] Turkish alphabet without 
knowing a word of Turkish. It was an interesting experience and it was my 
uncle who taught me the alphabet. I simply recognized these words and 
signs, not their meaning. And I knew by heart the words and signs that were 
written there, for example a and ı, but I did not know what they meant. In 
this way I learned the alphabet and a little bit of Turkish but without 
knowing what they meant. So when I as a child for the first time met a 
person who spoke Turkish, ... I was shocked. In Istanbul, when we came 
there Istanbul, ... I did not understand anything. As far as I knew, all people 
spoke Kurdish. So when we came to Istanbul and went out in the streets, and 
                                                     
126 The Christian neighbourhood. Gavûr mean infidel in Turkish. 
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I tried to talk with a boy ... he did not answer me, and he reacted in a strange 
way, I remember that I said to my mother: “Mom, no one can speak my 
language, what shall I do?  
(M) 
The only person in the family who knew Turkish at the time they moved to Istan-
bul was his father. After being there for a while however, the family, like many 
other Kurdish migrant families, gradually shifted language from Kurdish to Turk-
ish. Two years later they returned to their home village. By then, M recall, he had 
become a bit of an "outsider" in his old home village because he had forgotten his 
Kurdish. Now he was not able to communicate with his class mates in the school 
yard since they were speaking Kurdish there. In the school in the township chil-
dren were taught Turkish, but they communicated in Kurdish in their everyday 
lives outside schools. In the little village where M lived with his family, there were 
only a few people who could speak Turkish. Thus, it became necessary for M to 
learn his maternal tongue partly anew. It took him a summer in the village before 
he was able to communicate adequately in Kurdish again. Finally, he concludes, 
laughing, "my Kurdish ... it came and went".  
As M moved from Kurdistan to Istanbul, he had to deal with some of the so-
cio-cultural boundaries and language barriers that existed within Turkey. Since 
these boundaries and barriers had been perceived by him, in accordance with the 
state ideology in Turkey however, they had been neglected as being Kurds (Hous-
ton 2001). In Istanbul he became an outsider at first, unable to communicate effec-
tively with other children. As he expressed it he was "shocked" the first time he 
met someone who spoke Turkish. Suddenly, his maternal tongue had become use-
less when he went to play with other children in the streets. When his family re-
turned back to Kurdistan, he became an "outsider" again. In Istanbul a monolin-
gual use of Turkish had been encouraged. In the home village he found himself 
once again in a situation in which he was excluded because of his language, this 
time by his classmates at the schoolyard in Kurdistan. Neither could he communi-
cate with relatives of his in the village at the time of returning there. However he 
easily adjusted to the new settings as his family moved away from the home vil-
lage and back again. 
Taking side 
In many of the stories it is emphasised that being Kurdish is an active choice. In 
none of the states of Iraq, Iran and Turkey one could say that the Kurds: "consis-
tently differentiated themselves from Arabs, Turks and Persians" (Natali 2005 p. 
ii). Many of those interviewed more or less explicitly, suggested that actively tak-
ing sides in the matter is necessary to become a Kurd. Still in Turkey, it was told, 
at least it would have been a possible option for them to adjust to the assimilation 
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policies there and become a "Turk". Simply sharing a given location in history is 
not sufficient for any group to constitute a generation in a sociological sense sinse 
it does not necessarily create a common "generational consciousness" (Manneim 
1953 pp. 306ff.). Accordingly, as was discussed in Chapter 2, Mannheim sug-
gested the occurence of "differentiated antagonisic generation units" (ibid.) shar-
ing the same location in history. This fits in to what G says when he discuss how 
to define a Kurd. G stated clearly, for example, that being a Kurd has nothing to do 
with a person's language skills, or how acquainted he or she is with Kurdish his-
tory, music, customs, traditions and the like, there being many persons in Turkey, 
who denied the existence of the Kurds, even if they, as G explain: 
speak Kurdish much better than I do, are dancing Kurdish dances much 
better than I do. But all the same they are saying that there ... are no Kurds.  
(G)  
Thus, there are persons in Turkey who could be considered as being Kurds when 
attributes considered as "objective" criteria in defining ethnic belonging are used. 
Yet, these persons do not, in using subjective critera, perceive themselves to be 
Kurdish. Or they have chosen, voluntarily or involuntarily, not to appear as Kurds 
in public spaces. And it happens that some of these people even deny the very 
existence of a Kurdish people. G chose a well known personality to illustrate what 
he mean: 
 
(…) a very competent foreign minister, like Hikmet Çetin.127 He is from my 
home town. Together with one of his relatives I was a refugee while he has 
been one of Turkey’s most successful foreign ministers. And he could speak 
Kurdish much better than me ... in the 1980s when he was a minister of 
foreign affairs in Turkey he spoke Kurdish with his mother. But he was a 
Turk in public. Thus his identity was that he was a Turk, he was a citizen of 
Turkey and he was the foreign minister of Turkey. There are many many 
examples.  
(G) 	  
                                                     
127 Hikmet Çetin, born in Lice, the Diyarbakir province, was Turkey's minister of foreign affairs 
between 1991-1994.  
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In Turkey there are many examples to be found, in all sectors of society, of per-
sons of Kurdish origin who have achieved prominent positions in society, as poli-
ticians, business people, academics and so forth. In the capacity of being Turkish 
citizens, and with a good command of Turkish, anyone has the basic possibility of 
having a good position in society in Turkey, even if he or she in reality can be 
classified as being a Kurd, providing he or she makes no mention of it. Thus, be-
ing Kurdish in a Turkish context, it is implied by G, takes an effort and some sac-
rifice. Struggling for the right to express ones national identity openly is an active 
choice. 
Defeated 
Taking refuge from the original homeland or being banished from it are remem-
bered as "lived experiences" and real memories for the first generation of refugee 
immigrants that the men and women the present thesis focuses on actually consti-
tute. It seem thus plausible to assume that the metaphor of suffering symbolizes 
what they express in terms of imaginations of belonging to a homeland out of 
reach. Cohen (1997 pp. 27, 31) coined the term "victim diasporas" to refer to dias-
poric groups that have been formed as consequence of forced migration and trau-
matic events in their original homeland. In his work Cohen argues that narratives 
of diasporas often emphasise their "catastrophic origins" and regard the diasporic 
condition as a trauma. Examples of victimisations also abound in accounts and 
narratives of the Kurdish diaspora, Kurds often being portrayed in terms of their 
suffering and being to a large extent subjected to repression. 
The "de-territorializing" perspective that Cohen provides has been critized, 
however, for limiting the diasporic condition to its being applied to refugee com-
munities only. In the narratives about Kurds we also find accounts of that Kurds 
have been banished and been forced to leave the Kurdish homeland for long peri-
ods of time, either recently or in a historical perspective. Looking at the Kurdish 
issue at large shows it to be difficult to find some single and well-defined process 
that caused the immense migration flows of people migrating from Kurdistan al-
though from the 1980s onwards emigration from all the states hosting large num-
bers of Kurdish residents has increased. Kurds were leaving Kurdistan and Turkey 
in small numbers in the 1960s and 1970s and thereafter the emigration increased. 
For the generation of major concern here the military coup of 1980 was a critical 
juncture. For Y it was recalled as being a really serious political situation: 
And then, 1980 the military coup took place. (...) This seizure of power was 
very bloody. Many people died in prison, they became abused and tortured. 
[The junta] did everything to eliminate the Kurdish resistance against the 
regime. They [the Kurds] were not well organized, and in addition they were 
left-wing. But everything was done then to eliminate such movements, it led 
to many people escaping Turkey, others being imprisoned. They were 
maltreated. During this period, between 1980 and 1984, ... for four or five 
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years, the military maintained the power in Turkey. It was much, much 
worse than what happened in Yugoslavia for example or what is happening 
in Rwanda. 
(Y) 
Developments in Turkey during the period immediately following the coup pre-
vented the men and women who had been active in the pro-Kurdish movement to 
continue the careers of political resistance they had commenced with. Inside Tur-
key extensive political purges took place. Many Kurdish activists were impris-
oned, others were either sent out of the country by their political organisations or 
were forced to escape.  
In Chapter 5 it was chronicled how the Kurdish movement was completely 
shattered following the military intervention. From this time and for many years 
on it was virtually impossible for them to continue their activities in Turkey, and it 
became increasingly difficult following the implementation of the new constitution 
in 1983. Harsher restrictions were then imposed on the Kurds. Accordingly 1980 
changed the situation for all of them completely since the military intervention had 
effects so far reaching that they also affected those who had managed to escape 
Turkey before the coup took place. 
Dispersed and Scattered 
As was pointed out earlier a diasporic condition involve by necessity a sense of 
belonging to a "people" or a community which is dispersed from the imagined 
homeland and as such distributed across borders (Brubaker 2005 p. 5; Björklund 
2011 pp. 136-137). The condition of belonging to "a people" that are dispersed 
virtually all over the world is shared by all diaspora groups and constitutes one of 
the central elements characterising a diaspora (see, for example, Brubaker 2005; 
Clifford 1997; Cohen 1996; Marienstras 1989). Today, Kurdish settlements are to 
be found basically all over the world and there are still Kurdish migration flows 
from the Middle East. In connection with the European Year Against Racism de-
clared by the EU in 1997, for example, representatives of the Kurdish party SPK, 
active in the exile settings wrote the following:  
 
About 25 million of the roughly 35,128 million Kurds still live today in their 
original homeland of Kurdistan. As a result of expulsion, war, and 
migration, most of the remaining 10 million Kurds live in other areas of 
these four states, in neighbouring countries, and in the diaspora, which 
                                                     
128  For a discussion on the number of Kurds see Chapter 1 in the thesis. 
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includes scattered groups of Kurds in Europe. Today an estimated one 
million Kurds live as labour migrants and refugees in Europe alone. 
(from On the Situation of the Kurdish People in the European Year Against 
Racism by the Socialist Party of Kurdistan, Stockholm 1997 p. 3, see also 
Burkay 2003 p. 41). 
In the text it is argued that the vast majority of Kurds "still" live in their "original" 
homeland, which in turn indicate implicitly an extensive displacement from the 
homeland. The readers attention is drawn to the condition of very large numbers of 
Kurds nowadays residing outside Kurdistan proper. The text reports of Kurds 
moving away from their homeland in large numbers because of such factors as 
"expulsion", "war" and "migration", the last one being probably in part for socio-
economic reasons such as those of employment and education.  
Being dispersed from the Kurdish homeland meant that one was living out-
side the imagined territory of Kurdistan, implying that Kurds in Istanbul, Baghdad 
and Teheran are dispersed and separated from their original homeland. As a result 
a Kurd born in Kurdistan in Turkey is perceived as being dispersed from his or her 
original homeland even if the new place of settlement is situated within the territo-
rial borders of that state. In addition, it is of significance that the occurrence of 
forced migration from Kurdistan was a burning issue at the time when the text was 
published. For decades there had been a considerable emigration from Turkish 
Kurdistan, one that accelerated in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s there were still a 
war raging between the Kurdish PKK-guerilla and the Turkish Army. Large num-
bers of Kurds were escaping the warring area, many of them forced away from 
home and belongings by the military (Geerse 2010 p. 20; Jongerden 2007 p. 72). 
In addition large numbers of people were escaping from other parts of Kurd-
istan. The situation in neighbouring Iraq was still uncertain and destabilised, even 
if Kurds administered the area of Iraqi Kurdistan since 1992 which engendered 
large numbers of refugees being located there (Cook 1995; Natali 2005 p. 66; 
McDowall 1996 pp. 378ff.). 
Homeless and Uprooted 
Rootlessness and homelessness, referring here to the losses and suffering of mi-
grants, are common metaphors used to signify a diasporic condition and have been 
observed in the narratives of various diasporic groups (see, for example, Lind-
holm-Schulz 2003 p. 86). These metaphors have been criticised because their allu-
sions to "re-territorialising" claims (Alinia 2007 pp. 275ff.; Sökefeld 2006 p. 280), 
since it can surely be asked whether people really have "roots" and not are capable 
of finding themselves new homes. To many people, however, the condition of 
being an exiled person means something more than just being detached from a 
particular territory and all the social and material resources linked with it. 
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The diasporic condition has been described as: " a condition of 'alienation' " 
(Lindholm Schulz 2003 p. 21). In numerous scholarly studies it has been exempli-
fied and underscored how a period of "uncertainty’ and "homesickness" often is to 
take place following the leaving of one's original home country. (Lindqvist 1989; 
Lundberg 1989 pp. 102ff.). Edward Said (2000) discusses exile partly in terms of 
its being a cognitive exercise, in his calling attention to emphasize the phenomena 
of "solitude" and "spirituality" pointing out a number of existential dilemmas that 
are evoked when a person is in a state perceived as being one of liminality (ibid. p. 
181). H describes his first period of time in Sweden as one in which life seems not 
to have a direction and in which freedom and other facilities acquired seem mean-
ingless: 
But it was difficult. [We were] apathetic, powerless, idle ... . Yes freedom, 
but like in a luxurous prison. You did not have the capacity to do anything 
that had any kind of meaning of any sort. Everything was like ... as if it were 
made of plastic, as if life, ... as if there was nothing that could make an 
impression.  
(H) 
 A liminal phase is a floating condition, to some persons its being very temporal, 
and to others something more permanent. H's account imply a condition of home-
lessness in a symbolic sense, or an existential condition since he describes a situa-
tion in which "home and life" are "shattered" and a sense of "estrangement" devel-
ops (Said 2000).  
On the one hand, he perceived himself to be recently arrived refugee who is 
separated from, and thus no longer completely a part of, the original home coun-
try, detached as he was, from the territory of the homeland, and accordingly from 
friends, relatives and well-known places that have become out of reach, and de-
velopments there in the homeland have become difficult or impossible to follow 
closely. A possible interpretation of this account is that a person in such a situation 
does not perceive himself as having a proper place in the receiving country, where 
the settings and customs still may be unfamiliar, and where old skills and the ma-
ternal tongue, serving as a means of communication, maybe is useless with excep-
tion for within a close circle of family and friends.  
One experience shared by refugees is that of not only being stripped of the 
territories of the original home country but also being thrown into a new socio-
cultural context, in which earlier manners and knowledge maybe are of no use. Or 
as Lindqvist (1989) put it: "The self-evidence of the social world is lost and in-
grained agency patterns prove inadequate in the new context" (p. 109). 
In the material collected for the dissertation, there are many examples to be 
found of how the first period in Sweden was perceived as what could be described 
as an "artificial childhood" (ibid. p. 109). When the author Mehmet Uzun de-
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scribes his first period in Sweden, he portrays a situation of vulnerability and help-
lessness:  
My mother tongue suddenly became useless, meaningless and a burden. It 
stopped protecting me, it stopped giving me a sense of security and strength. 
I could not express myself. Deprived of my mother tongue I lost my identity 
and personality. 
(Uzun 1996 p. 202) 
Having a language in common is crucial to being able to communicate and create 
a sense of commonality, its also being linked with a sense of identity and of the 
personality one has. When Mehment Uzun describes his first period in Sweden he 
emphasise how he was confronted with a completely new society and culture in 
which he did not entirely grasp the social codes and scripts of how to behave. As 
the text moves on, he then give various examples of how skills and talents he had 
learned and managed were not "applicable" in the society where he had just settled 
down. Uzun points out its having been difficult to interact with people since the 
"values" that used to be "obvious" and "unquestionable" became of no use (Uzun 
1996 p. 202).  
Temporality 
A reccurrent theme in the accounts is that the escape to another country often was 
not intended as being permanent. This is a phenomenon that has been observed by 
various commentators, that of refugees at first considering the refuge and exile 
involved as temporary conditions, often with a short time perspective (Lundberg 
1989; Lindqvist 1989; Lindholm-Schulz 2004). Thus, many of them have arrived 
in the countries in which they were given asylum without any intention of building 
up a new life there (cf. Wahlbeck 1999 pp. 106-109). Rather it seems, from the 
stories told, to have been common to arrive in Sweden with the expectation that it 
would soon be possible to return to the original homeland. The escape from the 
original home country is generally considered by refugees to be a temporal solu-
tion. Thus, the life in exile could be viewed as follows:  
When we came ... I never thought of buying an apartment, or saving money. 
No, 'in a few months we are going to return'. But it did not happen. After one 
year, two years, three, four, five years. Time just went on. (...) And I was 
never thinking of having an apartment, a kitchen table like this ... I was 
never thinking of that. Because you have the idea that you should return and 
struggle. After some time when I married and got children ... I realised ... 
'but this is not realistic'. 
(D) 
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D changes his voice when he recall how he was thinking during his first years in 
Sweden, in doing so marking the fact that he nowadays find this belief a bit naive, 
or that he now has a better overview of the situation. His now being an observer of 
things from a distance, he can see the unreasonableness in the situation. Over time 
his perspective had shifted although it took him a long time to obtain insight that 
the defeat of the generation, as well of his settling down in Sweden, was to be of a 
more permanent character. When D tells of his thinking at the time of his arrival in 
Sweden he mentions that he was thinking of a return within "a few months, one 
year or so", and expected it to be a limited period of waiting until the situation in 
Turkey had calmed down. His journey to Sweden had involved longer periods of 
waiting in other Middle Eastern countries while on his way. During the first years 
in Sweden, the political struggle was what was essentially occupying his mind and 
his time. Aspirations of creating a new home then came with marriage and having 
a family. 
In accounts and written documents, the interviewees frequently refer to 
shared knowledge about the past. A further matter brought up in the interviews 
was that different times and places may either contrast with one another or con-
flate as people transgress the borders between them. It has often been observed 
that immigrants, in particular refugees, perceive of themselves as "in-betweeners" 
situated in a state of alienation from both the past and the present resulting in 
"temporal confusion" for some period (see, for example, Lindholm Schulz 2002 
pp. 108-111). 
Also regarding the prospects of the Kurdish struggle a shift in time perspec-
tive can be noticed. For example, U recalled his reactions when he had asked a 
Kurdish friend how long a time that person had been in Sweden: 
 
So I definitely came to make politics. I thought that I would go back as soon 
as possible. When I came here ... I remember once, I asked X ... I asked him, 
... 'For how long have you been here?', He said 'five years'.  I said nothing to 
him but said to myself ... 'How stupid he is. How can he stay here five years.' 
Yes. I thought that I would be here only for a few months, or that after a year 
I would return. Yes, but now I’m [still] here, after more than twenty years. 
And still it feels like a very short time [laughs]. 
(U) 
To U this was, at the moment, a very long period. At the time for the interview, 
however, he perceived 5 years to be a rather short period of a person's life. As the 
interview moved on U told of his having believed: "Within 5 years Kurdistan 
should be free". To him, and many others, it took some years to realize that the 
time for a possible return to Kurdistan or Turkey would have to be postponed for a 
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long time to come and that life in a diasporic setting was to become a more per-
manent condition.  
It seems difficult to establish exact when and for what reasons the exile will 
end. The opinions regarding this expressed in the interviews ranged from presenta-
tions of the exile as a more or less permanent condition to statements in which the 
exile condition was basically denied or rejected. To D it was the initial period in 
Sweden that became a state of limbo, while to A the limbo seemed to be more 
permanent. The director of the Kurdish Library, for example, labelled a lecture he 
gave at at Uppsala University as, "Kurdish literature in permanent exile",129 allud-
ing to his experiencing of a complete escape whereas F says he has no idea of 
what a life in exile is like and advises me to talk with someone else about that 
subject. 
 At the time of the interviews, return was not a concrete matter for most of 
those interviewed, when life in the diasporic setting was discussed. It was rather 
the impossibility or difficulty of return that was touched upon. Indeed, at the time 
when the interviews were conducted several of those interviewed had not been 
able to return to Turkey all since coming to Sweden. Although there were persons 
who had been allowed to make short visits to the country, or had been adviced by 
friends and or by networks that it would be possible to go to Western Turkey only 
for a short trip. Spending a week or so there were by many considered to be with-
out risk.  
Alienation 
Becoming a political refugee in Sweden has for many of those interviewed proved 
to be far from a painless experience. In some of the accounts their feeling them-
selves to be at some distance from what they consider to be meaningful and impor-
tant in life is described. There are accounts in which a sense of alienation vis-à-vis 
contemporary conditions and life in Sweden is expressed. A describes his situation 
as a Kurdish political refugee in Sweden as follows: 
 
Yes, it is a tremendous distress, a tremendous persecution. It means that ... 
you have to struggle incessantly for your identity. What [does] this mean? 
Yes, many things. Yes, that I am from a noble family, I have never missed 
anything in my life. But now in Sweden where I lead a slightly better life, I 
miss a lot. I miss a job, I miss my friends, I miss social relations, I miss … 
yes … . In my country there were hordes of people that expected me to come 
                                                     
129 Lecture given at Centre for Multiethnic Research, Uppsala University March 4, 2000. 
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and see them. Just go and see them. Here there is no one that just comes to 
see me.  
(A) 
The story A tells here illustrates how detachment from his home country brought 
with it more substantial losses of both material and social resources. His  present 
situation is depicted as one of gloom and passivity, as such very much in contrast 
to his far more active and prosperous past that is now out of reach. For A, who is 
unemployed at the time of the interview, and who regards himself as "a defeated 
Kurdish personality", it is his lack of a position and his difficulties in establishing 
social contacts in the new home country that disturb him most. His story reminds 
one of what Lundberg writes about Latin American exiles in Western Europe, 
namely that "defeat and exile have a double meaning" (Lundberg 1989 p. 37). His 
exemplifying this by a quotation of Igonet-Fastinger (1984) who writes that exile 
means "the collective failure or defeat for a socio-historic project as well as the 
individual failure or defeat of a life project" (Igonet-Fastinger 1984, p. 234). When 
A was politically active in Turkey, and later in Iraq, he worked clandestinely, left 
his work and lived on money he could get from his relatives. To him the political 
movement he participated in was defeated, the social position that he acquried 
through his political career also being gone. His story is thus not embedded in a 
safe social context. The social and economic security achieved in the new home 
country cannot compensate for his losses in social contacts, the feelings of empti-
ness and the existential difficulties that this brings with it (Lindqvist 1989; Lund-
berg 1989 p. 39). 
6.3 National Romanticism 
The legitimate nation 
Anthony D. Smith has pointed out that one of the main reasons for national identi-
ties having become such a common "fundamental shared" identity in our contem-
porary modern world is that they are "ubiquitous" phenomena (1991 p. 143). Na-
tions are found all over the globe, and wherever national and ethnic conflict 
emerges claims of national sovereignity can be raised. The contemporary world is 
a world of nation-states, and nationality gives political resistance and ethnically 
based liberation movements legitimacy. Thus, becoming a nation could give the 
Kurds a status of legitimacy as a people. This is a tendency reflected in the an-
swers given when the interviews evolved around what being Kurdish mean to the 
informants: 
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Yes, you see, we know that what constitutes a basis for national identities (..) 
is above all language, a common history and traditions. All of this you can 
find in a Kurd. We have a common language, which is Kurdish. And we 
have a common history, which is very dramatic, and it unites us all 
emotionally in our fight for independence and in our struggle for human 
rights. 
(R) 
Several times when the question of Kurdishness was brought up in the conversa-
tions the interviewees at first, like R above, began to discuss, in very general 
terms, what principles are needed to bring a nation into being. R expresses both a 
rational and an emotional relation to her nation, emphasizing that the Kurds pos-
sess several of the attributes required to be recognized as a nation. This could be 
interpreted as implicitly meaning that the Kurds fulfill the principles established 
for national self-determination. Most of those interviewed maintained that the 
Kurds constitute a "nation" on an equal footing with all other "nations" around the 
world. In the interviews it was emphasized generally, more or less explicitly, that 
the Kurds should have "the same rights" as other nations in our contemporary 
world. U, for example, said he felt that the Kurds "have the same right to political 
independence, to cultural independence as any other people”.  
It was pointed out by the interviewees generally how the very existence of 
the Kurds as a people had been denied in the recent Turkish history and that the 
Kurdish nation building process had become decayed for several reasons. The 
picture that emerged from the answers and statements of the interviewees indi-
cated them to consider the Kurds constituting a people, one that normatively spea-
king was eligible to be a nation, and that is still waiting for its legitimate status as 
a nation. However, exactly what a recognition of the Kurds was to bring about was 
more unprecise and was disputed. One finds cautiousness and the taking of 
different positions. As the interview with R moved on she said that "suppression 
give way to resistance", and that there would not have been as much Kurdish resis-
tance if the linguistic and cultural rights of the Kurds had been recognized. Among 
the persons interviewed we find those who, like T, says:  
I am in favour of a Kurdish nation state, but I do not say that we should 
establish a state through the use of violence ..., first we must have the 
[necessary] qualifications ..., people must be elected, through referendum or 
through similar arrangements, and if the people decide that they want to 
belong to Turkey, okay, then they can belong to Turkey, for example, or to 
Iraq or Iran, ... must accept the solution arrived at and continue with a 
democratic approach to the problems ... . 
(T) 
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Most interviewees express that a longing for justice and independence for Kurdis-
tan. While some of them, like T, are talking of an independent Kurdistan, others 
advocate a recognition of the Kurds in Turkey in the form of language rights or 
autonomy, or kindly decline to talk about it or even to talk about any political as-
pects of the Kurdish issue. There surely are quite different opinions and positions 
regarding such matters among those interviewed, and it is possible that some of 
them have changed their viewpoints and opinions over time. They might well also 
change the answers they would give to the questions depending on who the inter-
viewer is. 
Idealising the Past 
National romanticism often alludes to the past. In several of the accounts the past 
is idealised. Also in many written documents and books produced by people be-
longing to the political generation of our concerns there is a flavour of nostalgia to 
be found. In his essay Separation is Such a Grief  Mehmet Uzun suggests that this 
is a general phenomenon since:…"Both Ovid and Mevlana lived in the shadow of 
their memories." (Uzun 1996 p. 200). To further emphasize for the reader how 
important the past and memories from of the original home country becomes to 
refugees he provides an example from when he once acted as the moderator of a 
conference panel on exile literature. He asked all of the participants whether they 
had ever dreamt about their new home country during their first years as exiles. 
Their unanimous answer was "no". In the first period of exile, all their dreams had 
concerned the country perceived as their "original" home country, and had gener-
ally been in their maternal tongue. Regarding this Uzun writes as follows: 
As I was waiting to apply for asylum at the Immigration Office of 
Stockholm Airport, my mind and heart flew, like two white pigeons, back to 
my own country: to the loved ones I had left behind, to my grandfather’s 
grave which I would never visit again; and to my old friend Apê Xelîl, a 
witness to the recent Kurdish history whom I had met in prison in the 
1970s…In my new country, I jealously claimed the colourful memories and 
painful experiences of my former life, the faces that shaped my 
personality…everything from my past that had drifted away from me. Aware 
that I was living my new life in the shadows of my memories, I tried to make 
the shadows visible. 
(Uzun 1995 p. 200)  
Physically, his body was in Stockholm, Sweden. His "mind and heart" however 
returned immediately to the place he considered to be home. This could be inter-
preted as if he mentally was in his original home country, though his body was too 
far away for him to be able to follow his loved ones and he had no possibility of 
closely following what was going on at the places that he missed. Thus, it became 
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an important mission for him to "make the shadows visible". His orientation to his 
homeland thus was more than room and space. 
To some of the interviewees the involuntary refuge from the home country 
was expressed as a turning point, sometimes even as a juncture at which life 
ended. One of the best-known examples of this is perhaps something the Polish 
writer Witold Gombrowicz expressed, commemorating his exile in Latin America 
by comparing this period in his life with a "grave" (Uzun 1998 p. 85). A similar 
position can be detected in some of the stories told by members of the political 
generation. To A for example life in Sweden seem to be a condition of waiting, 
remembering and suffering, a marginalized position it would seem. While we were 
talking he returned recurrently to the past, to the movement he participated in dur-
ing the 1970s. This he explained as follows: 
Yes, the 1970s was my best period of time, my youth. And I will never 
become tired of talking about the 1970s, because I live in Sweden as a 
defeated political person. The only thing I have left is to look back and (...) 
yes think about the 1970s.  
(A) 
As anyone thouroughly conversant with national identity constructions should 
know, narratives on this theme told about the past more often than not have more 
to do with the present than with history (Anderson 1991 pp. 102ff.; Hettne et al. 
1998 Chapter 6). The account told by A takes the shape of being a tragedy with a 
flavour of nostalgia in it. A tragedy because it is implied that most of what was 
important in life is gone. The past is glorified and described as a period when life 
had a real meaning. The present seem difficult to deal with, at least at the time of 
the interview and the memories of the past seem to be more important than the 
present. 
A Quest for the "True Kurdishness" 
As was pointed out earlier, a central element in national identity constructions is 
the imagining of there to be a common past alluding to there being a "natural" and 
"continuous" link they have with the orginal homeland. Several examples are to be 
found in the material providing the basis of the present thesis, Kurdish national 
identities being presented there as if they were "natural" or "essential", alluding to 
what an ancient origin the Kurds have and to their continuous historical links with 
the land of Kurdistan. At the same time, as has been pointed out by a number of 
commentators, essentialist positions taken within a nationality discourse need not 
necessarily be dismissed as signs of "racism" or "chauvinism", but can also be 
seen as attempts to give voice to a people’s perceiving themselves as being subor-
dinate (see, for example, Brah 1996, who presents a critical discussion of essen-
tialism), making reference to connections with ancient times in narratives con-
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cerned with national identities readily serving the purpose instead of providing the 
group in question, and the nationalism that evolves, legitimacy (Deniz 1999; Gell-
ner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Smith 1991). Hamit Bozarslan (2003a p. 14) asserts 
that "historiography", the writing of history in the present, is "the instrument par 
excellence" for the creation of nationality narratives. In historiographical narra-
tives selected episodes and fragments from history are told, and used in a way that 
makes such narratives suitable for explaining the groups’ current situation. In A’s 
account for example, references to the existence of Kurds in ancient times serves 
as a springboard to giving legitimacy to the modern Kurdish nation building proc-
ess:  
The Kurds are an ancient nation originating in Mesopotamia. They have not 
moved anywhere. They have been living there all the time. At present, the 
historical documents that exist are not available for us Kurds. Yet so far we 
have heard, or have read here and there, we are a much older people than the 
Jews, or the Bible. (...) . Then, to return to your question, we have a great 
deal to be proud of as human beings ... . We have never been Arabic or 
Persian or Turkish nations. 
(A) 
In the passage quoted A establishes that the Kurds have a strong and continuous 
link to their lands, his also indicating that the Kurds are a strong people, since they 
have not been assimilated into any of the nations that since the mid-20th century 
have been politically dominant in the area. In line with this he emphasize the 
strength of the Kurds, who have been able to withstand "the occupation" of their 
lands and have managed to survive over the centuries as "a people". He draw at-
tention immediately thereafter, however, to the precarious situation the Kurds are 
presently in, and says that the historical documents that could prove the existence 
of the historical circumstances he has told of are not accesible to the Kurds. Thus, 
the story he told can be interpreted as an attempt to justify the Kurds’ nation build-
ing project, at the same time as he places himself in opposition to contemporary 
political conditions and the current status of the Kurds.  
Since historiography represents an important ingredient in the construction of 
national identities it is important to organise and to control historical documents 
that prove the claims of the Kurds of their having very deep historical roots. In 
various studies of nationalism attention has been drawn to the occurrence of na-
tional institutions such as archives, museums, libraries and the like, their role in 
creating a national consciousness being pointed to in the nationalisms constructed 
by states (see, for example, Anderson 1991 p. 178 ; Gellner 1983 ; Hettne et al. pp. 
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303-307; Hobsbawm 1990). In Turkey and Iraq archival records covering periods 
that are considered to be grisly or involve acts having been committed  that are are 
labelled as politically sensitive have been difficult to get access to.130 
As the interview with A continues, it becomes increasingly evident that in his 
view the Kurds have become marginalised since they fail to have control over such 
institutions as museums and archives in the states in which they reside. A contrasts 
the present situation of the Kurds in Turkey with how it used to be in Ottoman 
times. The establishment of the Turkish Republic serves as his "focal point" in 
comparing the present situation with that in the past. He says that the Kurds were a 
"dominant group within the Ottoman Empire" and continues asserting that 
"Mustafa Kemal took it away from us". Thus, at the same time that he is legitimiz-
ing the Kurdish project which he himself is part of, he is deligitimizing the present 
political order.  
In A’s view it was when the multi-faceted social fabric that existed earlier, 
involving several different semi-independent groups of subject people, was trans-
formed into a modern state, guided by ambitions of creating a homogenous nation 
that the status of the Kurds changed, their losing the influence then that they had 
had earlier. In the Ottoman society Kurds had held influential positions, whereas 
in modern Turkey their status deteriorated. As an example, he mentioned the 
Kurds living in the cities in Western Turkey having been forced to "forget their 
identity", their becoming in this way a marginalized people in the modern Middle 
East.  
The Symbolic Value of Language 
In discussions in the interviews regarding what it meant to be Kurdish the Kurdish 
language was frequently mentioned as contributing very much to create a sense of 
togetherness and shared collective identity among the Kurds. Their language was 
also seen as the element that most clearly distinguish the Kurds from their "oth-
ers". Languages doubtlessly have a strong practical role in binding people together 
and creating a sense of communality in local settings, both socially and culturally. 
Yet language boundaries are not necessarily fully congruent either with political, 
social or cultural boundaries. Historically speaking the standardisation of national 
                                                     
130 For example, although the Ottoman archives in Istanbul were opened in 1985, it has continued to 
be difficult to get access to some of the archives, researchers having been banned from the ar-
chives if their works is not considered to be in line with Turkish public discourses and principles 
or corncerns dark episodes in Turkish history. A well known example is the German expert on 
Armenian genocide, the historian Hilmar Kaijser, who was banned from the archives from 1995 
to 2005. The archives concerning the Kurdish rebellions, for example, or the Courts of Independ-
ence in the early years of the Turkish Republic, have not yet been opened. However, steps have 
been taken in the direction of providing a more liberal climate.  
  
225 
languages is a novelty, one that according to Anderson (1991) commenced with 
the development and spread of printing technology (pp. 37ff.). For obvious rea-
sons, languages can also serve as one of the most evident excluding mechanisms. 
In the struggle for national rights among the Kurds, the language issue has played 
a prominent role, especially so in the case of Turkey (Ahmadzadeh 2003 p. 153; 
Hassanpour 1992 pp. 132ff.; Uçarlar 2009 Chapter 7).  
The language issue, I would argue, is also, and has been, a central question 
for this political generation, due to the long-term prohibition of speaking or using 
Kurdish in Turkey. This has contributed all the same to making use of Kurdish an 
important marker for identitifying persons as being Kurds. Among those who be-
long to the political generation the thesis deal with there are native speakers of 
Kurmancî as well as of Zazakî. All of them know Turkish, however, since that was 
the sole language of education in Turkey when they grew up. Some of the inter-
viewees grew up in settings in which use of the Turkish language dominated 
particularly, in the western parts of the country. Not all of those interviewed were 
fluent in Kurdish, and a number of them said that they first learned to read and 
write in this language when they came to Sweden. In some cases, certain infor-
mants knowledge of Kurdish was questioned by various other informants. This is a 
problem of a type pointed out by Tayfun (1998 pp. 45ff.) for example in criticizing 
how readers for assessing different books are selected before purchases of books 
for Swedish libraries are decided upon. 
The Kurdish language issue in Turkey is also gendered. In Kurdistan the 
Kurdish language has continued to be the major language, in fact employed in part 
because many women never having gone to school and never having learned Turk-
ish.  
Since the very existence both of Kurds and of the Kurdish language was de-
nied until 1991, many Kurds who moved to Western Turkey shifted language to 
Turkish. Accordingly there are people who do not speak Kurdish yet define them-
selves as Kurds, as well as people who can manage in speaking Kurdish yet con-
sider themselves to be Turks. 
Discussions of language and of belonging become easily perplex in a Kurd-
ish-Turkish context, since there are so many there positions people can take and 
strategies they can follow considering the language use. Many of those inter-
viewed provided examples of how their were going back and through between use 
of Turkish and of Kurdish during their childhood. One of them is R, who grew up 
in a large city in Western Turkey, where her family resided in a neighbourhood in 
which Turkish inhabitants predominated. Turkish was the language spoken in pub-
lic spheres and in school and she managed the language very well. At home use 
were made of both languages. R told of how, when her parents were speaking to 
each other in Kurdish, she spoke Turkish to them, since although she could under-
stand Kurdish, as she says, she did not manage to speak it. At the same time her 
mother, like a great many Kurdish women residing in western Turkey, never be-
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came fluent in Turkish. They found ways of communicating within the family 
satisfactorily in two different languages: 
Yes, they were speaking Kurdish among themselves. My mother, she told us 
long, long fairy tales, and she only told them in Kurdish because her Turkish 
was very weak. But I read Turkish books to her, novels and stuff like that. 
She listened with pleasure while I was reading. So we were both satisfied. 
She told me Kurdish fairy tales and I read Turkish novels to her [laughing]. 
(R) 
R says that, despite her not learning to speak Kurdish very well while she was 
growing up, her closeness to the language and the skills in it she acquired facili-
tated her learning Kurdish properly as an adult while then in a diasporic setting. 
Socialised into a setting in which the Turkish language dominated, her Kurdish 
was "implicitly" (cf. Mandel 2008 p. 276) there all the time, or as she put it, she 
had "passive Kurdish inside her head". 
When V spoke about the significance of language he was referring to litera-
ture, asserting it to be impossible to label an author writing in a language other 
than Kurdish a Kurdish author. For example he mentions its being discussed 
whether or not Yasar Kemal can be considered to be a Kurdish author since, 
though of Kurdish origin, he wrote in Turkish. Rhethorically N asked: "What 
about a Swede travelling to Kurdistan and writing about that? Would that be a 
Kurdish author?" D took a similar though somewhat more ambivalent position:  
 
Charlotta: How would you define a Kurd? 
D: A Kurd? 
Charlotta: Yes. Who is a Kurd? 
D: If you feel like being a Kurd, then one is a Kurd. Thereafter comes the language. 
First you need to feel that you are a Kurd. If I feel that I am a Kurd then I am a 
Kurd. I can’t force someone, like: “you are from this town, soyou must be Kurd-
ish”. But, after saying you feel  you are Kurdish comes the language. If you don’t 
have the  language, you cannot feel you are a Kurd. That is a bit difficult.  
(D) 
 
In D’s view "having a sense of being Kurdish" is of critical importance, although 
he remarked, that it would not really be possible to have such a sense without 
knowing the language. However, that would not be really possible without know-
ing the language. D felt he should not impose a Kurdish identity on anyone else. 
Changing his tune and making a quotation while declaring that he doesn’t want to 
impose a Kurdish identity on anyone, he distances himself from those who write 
their categorisation on others. Thereafter he made his own position clear. He could 
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not understand how anyone could have a sense of being Kurdish without having a 
command of the language, one’s otherwise having no sense of belonging. He re-
marked that a Kurdish song, if he had been unable to understand its content: "wo-
uld have been like a song in Arabic or Hindi", and would have been without 
meaning to him. His concluding that if the existence of the Kurdish language were 
threatened, so that it was about to vanish, Kurdish identity would in turn become 
challenged.  
D dwelled upon the language issue at some length. He pointed out the impor-
tance of a language, not only for creating a bond of togetherness between people, 
but also to serve as a distinguishing marker, this, according to him, being particu-
larly important in a Middle Eastern context to separate between different groups of 
people. According to D there is:  
 
... there is no difference between me and a Turk, and an Arab, and a Persian, and a 
Greek. Because we all remind of one another. No big difference, the same nose, 
same eyes and hair. But when he starts to speak: 'Yes, he is a Greek, and he is a 
Turk, and he is an Arab' and then you know the difference. 
(D) 
 
D considered ethnic boundaries to have become more blurred in the contemporary 
world and other differentiating markers, such as clothes and food, customs and 
tradition to have become increasingly similar across cultural and ethnic boundar-
ies, languages remaining however important. This explained, he felt, why lan-
guage has become such an important distinguishing marker among Kurds from 
Turkey. Due to the Kurdish language being forbidden and people being punished 
for speaking it in public places, he considered there to be a risk that it could van-
ish, which in turn could contribute to the erasing of the Kurdish identity. 
Places 
In narratives on national identities, certain places often take on central promi-
nence, their being given a strong symbolic importance. A place recurrently re-
ferred to in the material collected for this thesis is Diyarbakir, the largest city in 
the Kurdistan region of Turkey. The city is often labelled as being the unofficial 
Kurdish capital in Turkey, as its a centre for Kurdish culture and politics. In Kurd-
ish circles the city is also known as Amed (van Bruinessen and Boeschoten 1988 
p. 127). In the 1960s and 1970s the city received many immigrants from the sur-
rounding townships and villages. The first university college was established there 
in the 1960s, and in 1974 the first university in the Kurdistan region in Turkey was 
established there as well. Diyarbakir was also a city that came to symbolize very 
much the suffering of the Kurdish people. In Chapter 2 the role that traumas can 
have in the creation of generations was discussed. A trauma, as I pointed out, does 
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not necessarily refer to just one such event, but can well consist of series of events 
the generation has been through or can be referring to (Abrams 1982 p. 259).  
The Diyarbakir Military Prison No. 5 has a very negative meaning for all the 
Kurds who were imprisoned and tortured there in the wave of arrests that took 
place immediately after the military coup in 1980 (Zana 1997). In an Amnesty 
International Report on this from 1984, the horrendous conditions in this prison 
and the mass trials of pro-Kurdish activists are described. Many Kurdish politi-
cians and Kurdish personalities well-known in other respects had to serve time 
there. Diyarbakir is a city that many of the men and women in the political genera-
tion studied here have a relation to. Several of the persons included in the thesis 
spent part of their youth in the city, acquired their education and became involved 
in political life or in various forms of resistance there. Many, though far from all, 
of those who have celebrated Diyarbakir in their songs, texts and speeches were 
born in the city. In the poem I love you the author and writer Nedim Dağdeviren 
express his longing for the city: 
Words of love engraved on the city wall in Diyarbakir live on 
visible if you scrape a little 
For mothers with no other words than these 
of comfort for their sons 
who died of consumption, malaria or speeding bullets 
they grew out of the unconditional abundance of their mothers flesh:“Ez 
kurbana te me lawo, Ez kurbana te me."131 
(from I Love You by Nedim Dağdeviren quoted in Grive and Uzun (1995) 
Världen i Sverige Stockholm:Ordfront, pp. 78-79. Translated from Swedish 
by Robert Goldsmith.).  
In the poem above, the city, Diyarbakir is the beloved one. Dağdeviren was born 
and raised in Bismil, a small town situated a few miles to the east of Diyarbakir. 
As a student he moved to Diyarbakir where he later worked as a teacher of Turkish 
and Turkish literature, his residing in the city a number of years before he was 
forced to leave Turkey. It was in Diyarbakir that he became involved in politics 
and in cultural life. And it was in Diyarbakir he was arrested and tortured in the 
aftermath of the military coup of 1980. 
Another example of how the city of Diyarbakir is honoured in poems and lyr-
ics is to be found in the works of Mehmed Uzun, who spent part of his childhood 
and youth in Diyarbakir, and who chose to live there a last time then when he re-
                                                     
131 These lines are Kurdish for: "Let me suffer in your place my son, let me suffer in your place." 
  
229 
turned from his exile in Sweden in 2005.132 The city is often mentioned in his 
works, at the same time as he found it difficult to describe it in a manner that lived 
up to its true magnificence: 
 
How can I describe the city with the long wall of chiseled stones 
famous for its high towers, this enchanting city once the centre  
for so many cultures, the Hurrite, the Assyrian, Urartu, the Medes, the Persians, 
Rome, Bysans, Islam and the Osmans? 
(Uzun 1995 p. 12) 
 
The city is known as being very old and is famous for its long solid black basalt 
walls that encircle the old town, their often being referred to as the second largest 
in the world, after the Great Wall in China. Uzun's universe, Diyarbakir has a 
strong symbolic value as a centre, not only because of it central place in Kurdish 
cultural and political life, but also for its role in the emergence of numerous cul-
tures that have been influential in the area. Uzun describes Diyarbakir in terms of 
being an impregnable city.  
Inspired by a passage in Italo Calvinos work Invisible Cities, he writes that 
Diyarbakir was a city that could respond to, "the desires of its inhabitants" (Uzun 
1998 p. 12). A bit later on in the text he states that the town has been "the cradle of 
so many cultures" (ibid. p. 13), however, it is simultaneously expressed that the 
city has become ’dishonoured’ since it had a military prison with a terrible reputa-
tion. 
Practices 
Places are associated however not only with buildings, parks, historical sites and 
the magic flavour these can have. When asked about Kurdishness, some of the 
interviewees emphasised that the local settings in which they were born and had 
spent their childhood had done very much to create a sense of belonging for them. 
U, for example, mentioned the atmosphere in his home village where all the other 
inhabitants were native Kurdish speakers, and that it was the customs and the daily 
life there that he relate to most when thinking of his being Kurdish. V explains 
what make him longing for his home district: 
When we travelled to Istanbul and Ankara, so ... we longed very much to get 
to Diyarbakir. What is it that makes me long so much for my home district? 
                                                     
132 Mehmed Uzun died in Diyarbakir October 10, 2007. 
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It is the fact that it is my home district. It, it is what was there, when we were 
playing, for example. These were Kurdish games. When we did this or that it 
was Kurdish. These were Kurdish things. It was something that we did. It 
was not what someone else did in Çorum, or in Manisa, but it was what we 
did in Diyarbakir, in Van, in Bitlis. That, in my opinion, in a way has always 
been [there] as a basis for everything. 
(V) 
It was thus the social relations and the togetherness that were created in the places 
in question that caused the longing. When asked about his Kurdish identity W said 
that he didn't think it was so easy to "grasp theoretically" what made him Kurdish. 
He considered himself as being the "result" of the customs, practices and traditions 
that were developed and maintained in his home district:  
Take the flavour of a dish. One prepared by my mother, but that has also 
been prepared earlier by my grandmother, as well as by yours and yours 
[pointing at a number of imagined listeners while he is talking]. It may be 
about dolma. ... Greeks make it, Turks make it, Persians make it, Arabs 
make it. But we make it in a different way. Another flavour. ... I don’t know 
if you've eaten dolma in Diyarbakir, it is not prepared with minced meat but 
[with] small small pieces of [chopped] meat. And this is what created me. It 
is something common that we eat. How is it that when you see a carpet you 
say, 'this one is Kurdish'. This makes me feel confident. This is my 
description of it all. 
(V) 
In his account, V explains the meaning of being Kurdish by binding a place, local 
practices and the past together. He expresses the sense of togetherness created in 
his encounters and interaction with people and in the different practices and the 
like that take place on an everyday basis. The picture he paints, however, is frozen, 
its describing a place in which customs and the traditions have been the same for 
long periods of time. In so doing he give voice to his thoughts of a continuity with 
the past (Billig 2009). 
The Chauvinism of "Other People" 
In an earlier chapter it was pointed out that, in the contemporary world, nations 
constitute the most legitimate political bodies and actors. To organise on the basis 
of nationality has become the apparently most justified and effective instrument 
for claiming political and cultural rights. However, not all of those who organise 
within political parties or movements based on ethnicity fully agree with the ide-
ologies of nationalism. Here, one should recall that nationality is only one facet of 
a person’s social identity and a facet that can become "active" and/or "politicised" 
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under certain circumstances (see, for example, Bradley 1996 pp. 24ff.). As the 
relevance of an individual’s belonging to an ethnie or a nation can be perceived 
and activated during certain periods of time and may fade away during other peri-
ods of one’s life. Having been involved in a movement organised on an ethnic 
basis does not necessarily mean that nationality and ethnic belonging remain, or 
that it ever was perceived as being the most important facet of a person’s social 
identity. Homogenity is generally proclaimed by nationalist movements and in 
nationalist discourses. However, the idea of homogenity is not necessarily shared 
by all of those who perceive of themselves as belonging to a particular nation. 
The men and women belonging to the generation of primary concern in the 
thesis, its members had been experienced the Turkish state nationalism that did not 
recognize the existence of the Kurds. Among the interviewees the Turkish nation-
alism was perceived by as being "chauvinist". When discussing nationalism some 
of the interviewees were conscious of the fact that their aspirations for national 
rights could be perceived likewise. During our conversations on nationality there 
were various reflections made regarding the complexity of national belonging. 
Many of the interviewees were explicitly critical to "essentialist" or "chauvinist" 
positions. The view that nationalities are blurred and multi-faceted phenomena 
was strongly emphasised by certain of those interviewed. For example, U reflected 
a great deal on the complexity of nationality and social identities: 
You decide yourself whether you’re Kurdish or not, or how much of a Kurd 
you are. There is not simply one single form of collective national identity. 
Yeh, maybe there is in some periods. But this is not the case when it comes 
to boundaries and to content. And then too … you’re a human being, not 
simply a nationality. 
(U) 
U refers to a world in which a myriad of jostling Kurdish identities exist side by 
side. His understanding of Kurdish identities is of their being contextual and shift-
ing, both over time and in space. Most important he sees Kurdishness as being 
only one of the many components of a person’s identity. U’s statements can be 
interpreted as if he is allowing an openness, an inclusiveness and an individual 
interpretation of Kurdish nationality. In several of the accounts, there is a defence 
against the clichés that often appear in the presentations of Kurds that tend to flou-
rish. Finally U emphasises that social identities are indeed are very complex.  
When M is asked about who a Kurd is, he points out that the picture of Kurds 
painted in circles of Kurdish nationalists is stereotyped, and is cut and dried. The 
stereotypes presented giving the impression of Kurds being traditional. One exam-
ple that M brings up is that of Kurds being pictured as wearing such traditional 
clothing as Shalvars and the like. For example, that Kurds wear traditional clothes 
in everyday life: 
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... an imagined picture of the Kurds that reflects a nationalistic discourse. For 
example if you take a look in a book with a chapter on Khani. In their 
everyday lives, they don’t wear this kind of clothes. They are like modern 
political people. But when it comes to the imagination [of who a Kurd is] 
they say that “this is a Kurd, a Kurd wears a pushi133, a traditional buggy 
trousers and so on. 
(M) 
M places the story within the clichés and stereotypes of how Kurds are that, as he 
points out, exist more or less everywhere. He distances himself from expressions 
of chauvinism and racism that are often dominant in national identity narratives.  
E, in turn, takes a similar position, his attempting to provide a picture of Kurdish 
nationalism as being inclusive and tolerant: 
Regarding Kurdish identity, I think you can say like this, that on the one 
hand there is an ethnic Kurdish identity and on the other hand a cultural 
Kurdish identity. By ethnic identity I mean if you have a pure Kurdish 
blood, in racist terms, such as you’re being born of Kurdish parents, having a 
Kurdish paternal grandfather and a maternal Kurdish grandfather and 
Kurdish ancestors. This is racist you know. I have nothing to do with this, 
since I’m of the opinion that Kurdish identity is more cultural than ... ethnic. 
First, in Kurdish we used to say that there are [several groups that have 
crossed our lands], and that we thus don’t have pure Kurdish blood in our 
veins. There may be all different kinds of blood. This is not what we think. 
But culturally, I see people with a common language, a common culture, a 
common tradition; yes a common history and a sense of belonging to a 
certain cultural group.  
(E) 
E thus distance’s himself from positions that he perceives as being essentialist and 
racist, based on the idea of Kurds having the same blood in common. Thus, in this 
view and that of many of the others who were interviewed, the national sentiments 
they commit themselves to are of a different kind and are quite distinct from those 
of a Turkish nationalism that were a guiding principle in the Turkish state in which 
they grew up. Those interviewed emphasized the importance to legitimate the idea 
of the nation and the national unity of Kurds, who they see as having the legiti-
mate right to national rights that they have on the basis of their language and of 
their ethnic roots. At the same time, they distance themselves from nationalism of 
                                                     
133 Pushi is a Kurdish scarf. 
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violent or chauvinist forms, and criticise national sentiments that are excluding, 
racist or oppressive. 
6.4 Closing of the Chapter  
This chapter has attempted to distinguish how the members of the political genera-
tion of interest here perceive of themselves as Kurds, and to complement the pic-
ture generally presented of the Kurdish diaspora narrative as a narrow minded 
"victimization narrative". Here a more dynamic picture, rich in the contrasts, be-
comes salient. A narrative of continuous resistance and reflection.  
Many of the narratives described are homeland-oriented and contain multiple 
references to a sense of belonging. First, the narrators refer to Kurds as "ordinary 
people" with "the same rights as other people", the Kurds being perceived as "a 
nation" in the sense of its being "a nation among nations", one that should thus be 
given the same rights as other people recognized as nations are. In so doing they 
place themselves within a broader narrative of people's freedom and dignity. It 
may thus be interpreted in terms of the Kurdish issue that is referred to being an 
issue of humanity and equality. Secondly, there are narratives referring to experi-
ences that they perceive as being specific to the Kurds and that are common to all 
Kurds regardless of in what state they were born or of their citizenship, for exam-
ple that the "common history" of the Kurds is "very dramatic" and that the lands of 
the Kurds are divided.  
Third, the narrators make references to experiences specific to their genera-
tion, exemplifying how place and time are entwinded in the nationality construc-
tions the generation forms. For example, the experiences of being obliged to un-
dercommunicate Kurdish belongingness in public spaces, the emphasis on their 
language, their encounter with the school system and the idea that it is an active 
standpoint being a Kurd. Salient becomes a narrative which is dynamic and rich in 
contrasts with a number of underlying themes that may be distinguished. There is 
a tension in the narratives between essentialist/historicist and universalist posi-
tions. On the one hand there are accounts that imply an essentialist and national 
romanticist view, for example when anxiety regarding the Kurdish lands is men-
tioned, and when there is a sense of nostalgia, such as for example regarding me-
mories from childhood and youth.  
On the other hand there are accounts in which a more dynamic understanding 
of Kurdishness is demonstrated and where the narrators problematize the idea of a 
homogeneous and "static Kurdishness", defending themselves against stereotype 
pictures of Kurdishness. In several of the accounts, the narrators present them-
selves as "an ordinary people" alluding to the idea of their having the same stan-
dards as other people around the world. Suffering can be experienced and narrated 
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in a myriad of different ways, referring to one's country, one's people and one's 
memories from everyday lives. In the narratives presented in the chapter, one can 
see Kurds described in terms of their being an incessantly persecuted people, de-
prived of control of their land and its resources and of historical sources that could 
contribute with further insights in their dramatic history.  
In many of the accounts the scenes are placed in the context of historical 
events or reflect contexts belonging to a recent past involving memories transmit-
ted from the generation of their parents as well as family histories that often are 
surrounded by silence of a sort. In contrast, those interviewed did not simply imag-
ine themselves as being passive victims since examples of the Kurds presented as 
a strong and struggling people were provided in the narratives. For example, it is 
intimated that the Kurds have always put up resistance and been struggling. Hen-
ce, the overall narrative oscillate between the extremes of suffering and strength. It 
was intimated in the accounts that the Kurds are "impregnable", in a sense a peop-
le who have never really been "conqurered" but rather have shown the capacity to 
withstand all of the atrocities they have been exposed to. 
A salient feature that emerges then when a comprehensive picture of the nar-
ratives is put together is rather that the generation perceives of themselves not as a 
passive generation of victims but rather as "reluctant victims", alluding to the more 
archaic meaning of reluctance derived from the Latin term reluctare, meaning to 
offer resistance or opposition which in turn is derived from luctari meaning "to 
struggle" (Collins English Dictionary 2000 p. 1302). 
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Chapter 7 
Looking to the Future: Ambiguities 
and Challenges 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with accounts of challenges and ambiguities that the people 
belonging to the political generation in question were confronted with in the dias-
poric setting in Sweden. Their views and actions representing a "generational re-
sponse" (Edmunds and Turner 2002; Eyerman and Turner 1999) to the conditions 
under which Kurds had been living in Turkey. As a political generation they did 
not accept their struggle having ended up in a final defeat in any sense when they 
came to Sweden as exiles. Protests and resistance continued in the settlement 
country. In the diasporic context a complex and multi-faceted political landscape 
took shape, moulded by socio-political structures in the settlement country as well 
as being open to trans-national arenas. The narratives revolve around the themes of 
re-consideration, taking the scene, expanding symbolic resources, challenges and 
the implications of diasporic activism. Their commitments to the Kurdish cause 
took on new ways, and their overall narrative does as well. Two new strands of 
their thinking can be distinguished, one that of their referring to their project as 
one of emancipation and the other that of their being challengers.  
7.2 A Myriad of Organisations 
The political situation of Kurds in Turkey had long been highly complex and con-
flictual, and it became no less so for those Kurds who had left Turkey and were 
living in a diasporic setting, though many of them became reorganised, splintered 
and had new ramifications added (Gunter 1990 p. 103; Grojean 2011).  
Two of the political parties in question managed to continue having a political 
influence and still dominated the political landscape of the Kurds from Turkey 
who were in exile. The best-known of the two is the PKK which today consists of 
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a complex network of different parties and organisations (Hamdi Akkaya and Jon-
gerden 2011b pp. 159f.).134 One of these affiliated groups is The Kurdish Parlia-
ment in Exile, established in The Hague in 1995 and led by Yaşar Kaya from 
DEP.135  
Allegedly this platform was basically constituted by members of the PKK 
and organisations affiliated with it. The parliament was abolished in 1998 when it 
joined the PKK affiliated Kurdistan Democratic Confederation (KDC), that meets 
in The Hague. In 1999 the National Congress of Kurdistan (KNK)136 was founded 
as an umbrella network, organising Kurds in the diaspora as well as representa-
tives of various parties, religious and cultural institutes and independent organisa-
tions and intellectuals (Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden 2011b p. 159 n. 10). During 
1981 and 1982 several members of the PKK central committee came to Europe 
(Grojean 2011 p. 187). 
The second major party that has managed to survive is the SPK,137 which has 
affiliations with the organisation Komkar and has ramifications all over Europe. 
This party was the largest and most influential Kurdish-Turkish party in Europe up 
to 1984, when the PKK initiated its armed struggle. In 1988 the party succeeded, 
so as to initiate and build the political front, TEVGER, which included several 
parties, though not the PKK. This platform has reportedly been limited to Kurdish 
communities in Europe (Gürbey 2000 pp. 84-85; Zürcher 2004 p. 317).  
In the diasporic setting, numerous Kurdish organisations, associations, soli-
darity groups and institutes were founded, some of which organised Kurds from 
different parts of Kurdistan, whereas other organisations recruited members exclu-
sively from Turkey. In the various diasporic settings involved, organisations out-
side the party structures have mushroomed. It is difficult to obtain a comprehen-
sive overview of the Kurdish diasporic organisations that exist and their activities. 
There are a myriad of organisations, over the years many of them having estab-
lished local branches as well as special groups directed at young people and at 
women. In addition, various organisations changed their names or closed down. 
                                                     
134 The complexity of the PKK and its ability to transform itself makes it difficult to obtain an over-
view of the organisation. Or as Hamdi Akkaya and Jongerden (2011) puts it: "It is difficult to 
present the organisation with a traditional organisational flowchart. As the members and sym-
pathizers of the PKK refer to Abdullah Öcalan, as a sun (güneş) we may develop this analogy and 
compare the organisation of the party-complex as a planetary system: The planets (PKK, 
KONGRA-GEL, KKK/KCK, KNK and guerilla forces) are in orbit around the sun (Abdullah 
Öcalan) and various moons (institutions, committees) are in orbit around these." (Hamdi Akkaya 
and Jongerden 2011b p. 147). 
135 The Democracy Party - a pro-Kurdish party existing between 1993 and 1994. 
136 In Kurdish: Kongra Netawiya Kurdistan. 
137 Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (see p. 165-166 in the thesis). 
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As was pointed out earlier some of the organisations were extensions of the Kurd-
ish political parties (Alakom 2007). From the 1970s and on up to the early 2000s, 
many Kurdish organisations were established in Sweden.  
In Sweden it has become possible for immigrant organisations to receive 
state subsidies to organize and form association, although a condition for receiving 
subsidies is that an associations must be "purely" cultural and not political or relig-
ious (Hellgren 2008; Berrutti et al. 2002 p. 172). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Kurdish students began to organize in Europe al-
ready in the 1950s. The KSSE138 was founded in Wiesbaden in then Western Ger-
many in 1956. Later ramifications of such organisations were founded throughout 
Europe, the Swedish branch of it apparently being founded in 1966. The KSSE 
reportedly held its Fourth Congress in Stockholm August 2, 1970. The congress 
gathered Kurdish students from 14 different countries, among them 17 participants 
from Sweden (Alakom 2007; see also Emanuelsson 2005 p. 85). A few years later, 
the organisation splintered, and the ramification AKSA being established.  
In Sweden the Kurdish Worker Organisation that recruited its members large-
ly from the Kulu province in Turkey and from different parts of Kurdistan was 
established in 1976. According to Alakom (2007), this was the first Kurdish wor-
kers organisation established in Sweden. Yetkin (1984) reports, many Kurds from 
Turkey had experienced there being a "gap" between Kurds from Kurdistan in 
Turkey and from central Anatolia. The aim of the organisation was to gather 
Kurds from different parts of both Kurdistan and from Anatolia (ibid. p. 151).  
There were many organisations that aimed at uniting the Kurds, independent 
of their country or political affiliations, with the aim of uniting different Kurdish 
political strategies and drive both solidarity and cultural issues. What is perhaps 
the best-known and most influential organisation operating at a national level in 
Sweden, the Federation of Kurdish Associations in Sweden (KR),139 was estab-
lished in 1981. 
Inspecting various documents and reports from the time when the organisa-
tion was founded shows there to have been an ambition then of creating a unified 
organisation for all Kurds in Sweden. Yetkin reports of a meeting in the ABF-
house in Stockholm in 1980 in which the possibilities of organising were first dis-
cussed: "almost all Kurds were there, it was like the Kurdish national day Newroz. 
Everyone left their disputes behind, greeted each other heartily and hoped for a 
unification of Kurds in Sweden" (Yetkin 1984 p. 154). In a report from The Na-
tional Board of Health and Welfare, Yetkin (1984 pp. 154ff.) refers to excerpts 
from a leaflet produced by the KR to inform the public of the organisation. From 
                                                     
138 In Kurdish: Komeley Xwendekaranî Kurd Le Ewrûpa. 
139 In Swedish: Kurdiska riksförbundet. 
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these excerpts one learns that KR was aimed at being a "mouthpiece" for Kurds 
living in Sweden, "consciously working for the democratic and social rights of the 
Kurdish immigrants" and "informing about and creating opinion for the Kurdish 
people's democratic and national rights". In the excerpt presented by Yetkin, the 
situation of children and of women were emphasized in particular. It is, for exam-
ple, told of Kurdish women having difficulties in adapting to the situation in Swe-
den, because of their being "illiterate", "isolated" and having "language difficul-
ties". 
The children were said to have "identity problems", as well as "psychological 
problems", the leaflet quoted being formulated as a quest for active contacts with 
Swedish authorities and interest organisations in order to provide with them an 
understanding of the Kurdish issue (ibid. p. 138).  
On their web page it is stated that the organisation is "unique in the world" 
because of its organising Kurds from all parts of Kurdistan (http://www.fkks.se/). 
The Kurdish Women’s Association, affiliated with KR, was established in 1985; in 
Stockholm the organisation had about 600 members in 2002.  
However Svensk-Kurdiska kulturföreningen i Sverige, which sympathizes 
with the PKK, has been left outside of KR. Two years later it established, together 
with a number of other organisations, "Kurdistans Demokratiska Riksförbund i 
Sverige" (Yetkin p. 154). 
In addition several Kurdish institutes, Kurdish interest groups, minor organi-
sations have been established in Sweden such as the Kurdiska läkarförbundet, 
Kurdiska författarförbundet and Kurdiska lärarförbundet.140 Many cultural or-
ganisations or groups, such as theatres and dance groups, have likewise been 
formed, together with other minor groups working for special interests, participa-
tion there being basically on an idealistic, non-profit basis, these groups not re-
ceiving state subsidies for their activities. One of the theatre groups was Teyater 
Medya, founded by a group of Kurdish women in Stockholm in 1990. According 
to one of its former members the group has consisted of housewifes, workers and 
students. A short article on the group appeard in a womens' journal, Jîn: Kurdisk 
kvinnobulletin, in 1994, the group's ambition as being presented there to, "describe 
contemporary and historic Kurdistan from a cultural and sociological perspective, 
to show the reality of Kurdish women under the veils of colonialism and patriar-
chy, and to challenge prejudices and taboos of all kinds in society, especially the 
prejudices directed against women in Kurdish society" (Jîn 1994 p. 15).  
The political landscape of Kurdish activism in diasporic settings has developed 
into a pluralistic one, comprised of a myriad of associations comprised of groups 
                                                     
140 Association of Kurdish Physicians, Association of Kurdish Authors and Association of Kurdish 
Teachers. 
  
239 
working in a formal political sphere, as well as individual actors, informal groups 
and networks. Many of the institutes and organisations established in diasporic 
settings have manifested themselves both in the countries of settlement and in 
transnational political space, often with extensions to groups and networks in other 
countries and other parts of the world, local and global activism being linked to-
gether in this way (Wahlbeck 1999; Emanuelsson 2005; Khayati 2008; Eccarius-
Kelly 2011).  
A large part of the activities carried out by people belonging to the political 
generation considered here could be designated as "transnational", since many of 
these people cooperate with political parties and organisations, Kurdish groups and 
individual actors in other countries, there in addition being examples of activities 
of this sort that have been carried out in Turkey with support from Swedish NGOs 
and the Swedish governmental agency Swedish International Development coop-
eration Agency (SIDA). For example, people belonging to the generation focused 
on here have been involved in projects in Turkey concerned with distribution of 
journals and with language training. 
7.3 Reconsiderations 
Still there is, a rather small group in Germany, and in Switzerland, I don’t 
know, perhaps in France there was, since it is a rather small group, it is 
difficult to find out who has dropped out, who is left… 
(M) 
In the quotation above M attempts to describe what happened with the political 
organisation that he once had been a member of in Turkey. As far as he knew it 
had been closed down and the members searched through by the police. People 
with a prominent position in the organisation had been captured and arrested. 
Many former members had reorganized then in various subgroups ramifications. 
Other Kurds from Turkey, who were forced into exile had had somewhat similar 
experiences. The defeat of the Kurdish movement and the dispersion of its activ-
ists across many different countries was certainly a traumatic juncture for many of 
its former members, the political parties involved suffering from splinterings and 
divisions, the movement being more or less eliminated after the coup of 1980. The 
quotation above conveys a sense of distance and of reorientation, for one thing 
because it implies that the situation got out of hand, and also because the narrator, 
who was still a Kurdish activist, had only a vague idea of how the group he once 
was a member of now was organised and whether it is still was active or not. M 
told of how the group had several times, in the years following the coup, made 
fruitless attempts to reorganize. 
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And this last attempt came to nothing. So one could say that these activities 
and the organisation ceased to exist at that time. So at that time I declared 
that I was not a member of the organisation. Because at that time there were 
no such organisation. Okay, there were people ... in European countries and 
they, like an exile group, continued their activities. And they considered 
themselves an organisation and they issued publications and such things. But 
it was an exiled group and in my opinion an exile group cannot bring about a 
Kurdish revolution. So I could not see any future under such conditions. So I 
said that I am a ’maveric’, an independent person, I am not a member of any 
organisation. 
(M) 
It had finally become obvious that the group could not operate inside Turkey and 
so M declared himself being an independent activist instead. The group was bleed-
ing white as it members were imprisoned or escaped the country. The police also 
relocated the group repeatedly, and found out about any attempts being made to 
reorganise. Since it became obvious to M that the exiled group did not have the 
capacity to achieve the radical transformation of society that he had been striving 
for, he decided finally to leave the organisation. For him, commitment to the 
Kurdish cause had taken new directions in Sweden, where he at the time of the 
interview was occupied with his academic studies and spent much of his spare 
time editing a magazine for a Kurdish-speaking audience. 
Many of the pro-Kurdish activists that concern us here continued to be in-
volved in the political parties, at least during the first few years in exile, their still 
feeling themselves committed to the struggle going on in their original homeland. 
When the political situation in Turkey deteriorated in the aftermath of the military 
coup there in 1980, several Kurdish organisations in Turkey advised their mem-
bers to flee the country. For example G told of the parties in many cases making 
strategic decisions concerning the countries to which their members would best be 
moved. Various activists in central positions in the Kurdish movement in Turkey 
were sent out from the country by their parties, many of them continuing the 
struggle for many years after the coup then as members of radical Kurdish parties 
located abroad. 
A central thought in Karl Mannheim’s theorizing on generations from a so-
ciological perspective is that of their being united by a common counsciousness. 
The political generation studied in the present case was informed of the Kurdish 
cause from childhood on and was radicalized in the 1970s. In the interviews there 
were examples of how different aspects of the movement had gradually been chal-
lenged by various of its members after some two decades in exile. Some of the 
accounts reflected how the narrators in question had distanced themselves, any-
where from partly to completely, from the ideological and political views that had 
guided them when they participated earlier in Kurdish movements in Turkey. D, 
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for example, was still sympathetic toward the aims and ideals of the group of 
which he had once been a member, yet there is one thing he found compromising 
two decades later: 
There is only one thing, one thing that I regret, and that is that we believed in 
the Soviet Union. That was a big mistake. Because of the ideology we said 
to [the Kurds in] Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurds who were fighting then against 
Iraq, that it was not right for them to do so, because Iraq and Syria were both 
a bit left wing. At that point we were against our people there. But otherwise 
I think we were doing good work…but we were all escaping then … 
(D) 
The account above reflects how the narrator dissociates himself from the pro-
Soviet view that led to their taking a position against certain other Kurds, and from 
the understanding of political standpoints he had when he was young. In the inter-
view with D it became palpable that this political radicalization had been influ-
enced by Marxist ideology and left-wing ideals. He regretted having taken sides 
against other Kurds, who were in Iraq, because of their fighting against a pro-
Soviet country.  
For others, looking back on the commitments they had made to the move-
ments in the 1960s and 1970s seemed to call forth self-criticism of a deeper sort. 
In reflecting on the situation in the aftermath of the coup that took place in 1980, 
two decades later, H had dissociated himself from clandestine organisations of all 
kind: 
I continued to be active in the same organisation up to the military coup of 
1980. But then, at the time of the coup in 1980, I realised in a way that 
something had went wrong. Because it appeared that all organisations, 
Kurdish or Turkish did not matter, were tremendously infiltrated by the 
Turkish intelligence service. ... I then thought, "I´ll never work in an illegal 
organisation again!". Because as soon as you enter an illegal organisation it 
is in a way to invite the intelligence service to infiltrate. That is much worse 
than ... . Because the police becomes irritated if you work legally. That 
confuses them and they don't know what to do. But if you work in an illegal 
organisation ... then the police are happy about this. That was what I realised 
in 1980 and after that I never again worked politically. Because there was no 
legal-democratic popular movement. There were only small, highly 
infiltrated illegal ones, and I didn´t want to be in such an organisation.   
(H) 
H´s story reflects a sense of pessimism and self-criticism. He is putting forward a 
criticism of a deeper sort, pointing to ideological and structural problems. 
Throughout the interview he distanced himself from contemporary Kurdish co-
  
242 
activists in Sweden. For H the developments following the coup of 1980 led him 
to conclude that belonging to underground organisations was not a sensible way to 
go. In a similar vein, he was critical of movements and groups that re-organised 
after the coup. Since these were not, as he expressed it, "legal-democratic popular" 
organisations. He felt that they were not in line with developments over the course 
of time. In a study of Latin American exiles by Lundberg (1989) pointed out that 
positions of that sort taken by H, involving criticism of what appeared to be out-
dated political approaches and "illusions regarding their own importance" are 
common among refugees (ibid. pp. 44-47). Lundberg emphasizes such criticism 
often being directed at structural problems in resistance movements and organisa-
tions generally rather than at specific individuals.    
The escape and arrival in Sweden did not mean that people belonging to the 
generation thought that the struggle was over. As was taken up in Chapter 6, many 
of them had plans to return soon and much of their activism was oriented directly 
to developments in their former homeland. A problem many perceived was that it 
was difficult to follow their situation in the former homeland closely, the geo-
graphical distance being a great hindrance or as R put it: "the people who were in 
exile could not do much". In the course of time the commitments shifted and ex-
panded in the direction of an increasing interest in the conditions under which 
Kurdish immigrants and refugees were living in Sweden:  
I came to Sweden at the end of 1986. And I was thinking the whole time 
until 1992 that I would return. I had no problem in accepting Swedish 
society. But I could not return and I could not accept that. But also I couldn’t 
do anything about matters in Turkey and Kurdistan. I could not. But what 
can you do here? So I began in the 1990s to contact the Kurdish Association 
and I worked there. And I was member of a committee working for political 
refugees.  
(K) 
K arrived on her own in Sweden in the 1980s. Her story reflects a sense of defeat, 
since she gradually realised that she was cut off from the political struggle in 
which she had been active and was unable to do anything about the situation in 
Turkey. In addition, the fact that she could not return to Turkey had the conse-
quence that she had became separated from friends and relatives in the old home 
country. At the same time, her story is in many respects in line with the criticism 
that Malkki (1995a, 1995b p. 510), for example, has directed at the view that refu-
gees are passive victims who are alien to the societies in which they settle down. 
In many cases the original homeland has not necessarily has been an ideal place to 
live in either (Geerse 2011 p. 36). Indeed K had escaped a difficult and precarious 
situation, for her however the issue was not that of becoming socially embedded in 
a new society but rather of not being able to contribute to the Kurdish struggle. 
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Over the course of time she had committed herself more and more to the situation 
of Kurdish refugees in Swedish society. 
In some stories the arrival to Sweden is depicted in exclusively positive 
terms, with an emphasis on the new opportunities and resources available in the 
new home country. When the author Mahmut Baksi, who escaped Turkey just 
before the coup of 1971, came to Sweden, there were only a few Kurds residing in 
the country (Baksi 2007 p. 27). That author describes how it at that time, in the 
early 1970s, was relatively easy to become established as a foreign writer. He de-
scribes how, as a political refugee, he was generously received and was introduced 
into circles of other journalists and authors: 
Now a fantastic period began. I was the luckiest newly becoming Swede of 
all and hoped that it would continue this way. I was 27 years old. And 
Sweden was like Paradise. Also 'The Swedish Writers Union' received me, I 
felt like a king. My friend Memo followed me to their secretariat and I was 
introduced to the chairman of the union, Jan Gehlin, lawyer Anders Fischer 
and Jane Hallberg. They were also generous and gave me 2,000 Swedish 
crowns from a recently established fund for foreign authors. For a period of 
a few weeks I was permitted to borrow a three-room apartment near 
Mosebacke with a view over the nearby lake and the boats in it. From there I 
moved to Alvik. 
(Baksi 2007 p. 131, this excerpt of it translated from Swedish) 
This excerpt is from a book in which the author narrates his memories of life as an 
exile in Sweden. It reflects a sense of success, happiness and generosity in describ-
ing his arrival to Sweden and first meeting with the Swedish Writers Union. From 
the account he provides, we learn that it was relatively easy for a newly arrived 
political refugee and writer to become introduced to a circle of Swedish col-
leagues. Baksi came to Sweden by ferry May 25 1971, after having spent a short 
period of time in Germany with, as he put it: "a small bag with some of my books 
" (Baksi 2007 p. 128). He applied for asylum, which was approved and he took a 
train then to Stockholm. Friends had helped him in advance with various arrange-
ments, so that he had a place to stay, and they took care of him, making it easy  for 
him to adapt himself to the new situation and the new country (ibid. p. 128).  
From the quotation above we can draw the conclusion that the atmosphere in 
the Swedish Writers Union was a welcoming and generous one. A similar picture 
of the reception of political refugees that were writers and arrived to Sweden dur-
ing this period is provide in Mehmed Uzun's memoires. Uzun had been acceted as 
a prisoner of conscience by Amnesty International and was soon integrated into 
networks and circles of professionals (Uzun 2008 p. 295).  
To many it became more relevant to commit themselves to social issues in the 
society of settlement and establish contact with the government, with authorities 
and with Swedish associations and solidarity groups in order to make the Kurdish 
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issue known among Swedes, than to be fixated simply on what was going on in 
their country of orgin. A few of the interviewees were also or had been active in 
Swedish political parties. Others found it difficult to become a "Swedish politi-
cian", as G for example, who was highly committed to his work directed against 
racism and other social injustices and who participated actively in Swedish social 
life, but who reasoned as follows:  
But there is one thing that I never did, and that I will never do. I will never 
commit myself to, or become a member of, a Swedish political organisation. 
That would mean double loyalties. You will always be a hindrance for the 
one or the other. I have considered myself as a Kurdish politician ... insofar 
as I could be seen as a politician at all. 
(G) 
In G´s account above it is implied that he is a activist who takes part in many areas 
of Swedish societal life, for whom, nevertheless being member of a Swedish po-
litical party is out of the question since it would mean "double loyalties". In doing 
as he does, of he marks off a boundary, to use Tölölyan´s (2007) term, a limit to 
how much he wants to participate. His statement can be interpreted as his reserv-
ing himself against being assimilated, which is completely different from being 
integrated (Bettrell and Hollifield 2008; Tölölyan 2007). Being assimilated would 
perhaps be a clear abandonment of his Kurdish identity, and the position he takes 
reflecting an unwillingness to give up his identity as a "Kurdish" politician.  
7.4 Bringing the Kurdish Question In 
7.4.1 Taking the Scene 
Many of those who were interviewed participated in organisations, solidarity 
groups and protest actions of various kinds. Many of them were committed to 
opposing the extensive human rights abuses that were going on in Turkey. 
Alakom (2007) describes how protest manifestations were arranged to inform the 
public about the conditions of the Kurds in Turkey and in Kurdistan (Alakom 
2007, newspapers). Kurds were also active in sister organisations in their new 
home countries and Alakom (ibid.) tells of Kurdish delegations that participated in 
May Day parades in Stockholm in the 1960s and 1970s. In the first years of exile, 
most of the activities of the Kurdish refugees were essentially what can be charac-
terised as "homeland oriented", in the sense that they were activities concerned 
with the situation in Turkey and in Kurdistan.  
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Many of the Kurds who arrived in Sweden and in other countries in the 1970s and 
1980s perceived, rightly enough, that there was a lack of knowledge of the Kurds 
and their situation on the part of the authorities and of the public in the societies in 
which they settled down. Since many of the Kurdish organisations from Turkey 
were left-wing oriented, many of the activities that were intended to draw attention 
to the situation in Kurdistan and Turkey remained in or was directed at left wing 
circles. One example of this was the youth organisation DDKD, which organised 
protest actions to draw attention to the arrests and imprisonments of their members 
in Turkey and the situation for the Kurds generally: 
 
We must inform the progressive world opinion about the unfair trials, about 
the oppression and the attacks systematically carried out against the people 
of Kurdistan. We must protest against the military fascist junta in Turkey 
and these trials. We must reveal the truth about these trials. 
(Armanc (1981) Solidarity with DDKD p. 19, this excerpt of it translated 
from Swedish) 
This excerpt is from a leaflet produced by the organisation DDKD that was dis-
tributed in the early 1980s, at least by Kurds in Sweden and Germany. The leaflet 
is an appeal for "solidarity" and it reflects the radicalisation of the Kurdish move-
ment. It is explicitly directed at a "progressive audience" and aims to draw atten-
tion to the contemporary situation in Turkey and the ongoing mass trials against its 
members. During this period most of the Kurdish diasporic activism was carried 
out in limited spaces, or in what Goffman would have termed "back stage zones". 
Not much of the Kurdish activism, nor its aims and purposes, were known to the 
public in the settlement countries. 
In time protest actions aimed at a wider audience were also arranged. The 
author Mahmut Baksi, for example, as a political refugee, found it important to 
attract attention to the Kurdish issue, making it his business to keep informing 
people about the situation his people were in and what was happening with them 
in his original home country of Turkey. Many accounts dealt with the failure of 
people generally to know much about the Kurdish issue. In Sweden there were no 
difficulties in arranging manifestations expressing solidarity with immigrant 
groups, independence movements or ethnic minorities. The problem was rather to 
attract attention from the public audience. Mahmut Baksi describes the following 
situation: 
Since we were political refugees we believed that [people in] Sweden should 
be informed about why we were coming. The military junta had captured 68 
student leaders and demanded death penalty for them. From the very 
beginning we protested by pasting up leaflets in the Stockholm underground. 
Despite our sometimes risking our lives regarding such matters the 
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newspapers didn’t take us seriously, writing little or nothing about the 
military junta. Because of this we decided to conduct a hunger strike at 
Sergels torg in the middle of the winter. … our hunger strike at 17 degree 
below zero attracted considerable attention during the six days the strike 
lasted. One night, a group of about 150 sympathizing with the fascist 
Turkish Grey Wolves attacked us. Yet we had our defenders and friends. 
The Grey Wolves were condemned and the Swedish press and the media 
were filled with articles about the cruel military junta in Turkey. Thanks to 
the hunger strike we also got many Swedish sympathisers.  
(Baksi 2007 p. 133, this excerpt of it translated from Swedish) 
The conditions under which immigrant groups can organise, act and give voice to 
their opinions are moulded by the political and social structures in the countries of 
settlement. In Sweden there were no formal hindrances to organizing either for the 
Kurds, or for the Turkish nationalist groups. Activities considered as "extremist" 
were not tolerated, whereas Baksi and his friends gained sympathetic support in 
terms of Swedish public opinion. In research on the political activism of immi-
grants and refugees it has been shown how informal factors regulate the kinds of 
activities that are accepted and kinds of groups that can appear and be accepted in 
the country of settlement. The excerpt from Baksi's text imply that it from the be-
ginning was difficult to attract attention from the Swedish public to the situation 
for the Kurds. A similar situation is illuminated in Lundberg's (1989) work on left-
wing Latin American activists in exile in Western Europe. The Latin American 
refugees perceived their being kept at a distance by left-wing activists in their new 
home countries, despite the fact of their belonging to quite similar ideological 
movements (Lundberg 1989 p. 7). 
Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) point out that there often are "thresholds" that 
"shape the agency of the homeland political actors" here (ibid. p. 105). In addition, 
she points out (2003 Chapter 6) that there are informal "thresholds of tolerance" 
that serve to regulate immigrant activism. For example, there is a higher degree of 
tolerance for activities that are peaceful and are exercised by groups, parties and 
organisations that are perceived as being democratic and "non-extremist". In the 
case described by Baksi, of Kurds being attacked, the Kurdish movement benefit-
ted from a reverse threshold of tolerance effect, due to the group that attacked 
them definitely exceeding the "threshold of tolerance", as it was perceived by the 
Swedish media and by the public generally, this resulting in positive attention and 
sympathy being directed at those that were attacked. 
In the course of time, the scene broadened and activities were more con-
sciously directed to a wider audience. One example of this is the establishment of 
The Kurdish Library in Stockholm in 1996 by a man who for a long period of time 
had used a room in his private home for collecting books that could be included in 
such a library. The library became a reality when the project received financial 
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support from The Culture of the Future Foundation, together with positive interest 
and moral support provided by the Swedish authorities at both the national gov-
ernmental and the municipal level.141 Space for housing the library was provided 
at Skeppsholmen in the very centre of Stockholm. Dağdeviren was employed as 
the director of the library. His goal was to make it into a "national institution" ac-
cessible to Kurds all over the world. The following can be said to represent the 
gist, more or less, of his remarks at the time: 
We define ourselves as a nation. Yet a nation without institutions does not 
exist. Having a library of their own has for a long time been a major need of 
the Kurdish people. There are a large number of institutions throughout the 
world in which books about the Kurds are available yet without someone 
taking responsibility for systematically collecting, preparing and making 
Kurdish literature available to the public. The present library should be seen 
against this background and need. That there may be one particular person 
running it ... is not relevant here ... the need of such a library having long 
existed ... . We have been given the opportunity in Sweden ... of having such 
a library ... as a national institution collecting literature in this area without 
reservation: printed material, postcards, maps and so on. 
In the interview, the director emphasized both his role of being a "representative" 
of the Kurds and the "need" of an institution of this kind. In addition, Dağdeviren 
emphasizes that the Kurdish library in Stockholm is different from other cultural 
institutions around the world, some of which at the time had much larger collec-
tions of book relating to the Kurds. When the library opened there had been a 
critical discussion in the press concerning the claims that the library should be 
labelled a "national library" (see also Lindberg pp. 4-5). The library is an example 
of a project that contributed to making the Kurds in Sweden visible to a wider 
audience. Its activities, including lectures, exhibitions and book presentations were 
directed from the start both at a Kurdish and a Swedish public. For example, lan-
guage courses in Kurmancî and numerous presentations, in Swedish were arranged 
at the library. 
The narrative told by Dağdeviren contextualises the establishment of the li-
brary and the activities it carried on within a complex transnational space, one that 
can nevertheless be considered as being located within a Swedish context. As the 
interview moves on he expresses the "logic" he sees in a project such as that of the 
Kurdish library established in Sweden, expressing some of the cultural politics of 
the country and its support of immigrant organisations. In a way it was an outcome 
of opportunities provided at both a local and a national level. At the same time, the 
                                                     
141 The library was, for example, inaugurated by Marita Ulvskog, then Swedish cultural minister. 
  
248 
library can be placed within the broader context of transnational activism. For 
example, one of the intentions of the library was to develop a digital library cata-
log that would be accessible all over the world. Also the library had established 
contacts with libraries in Iraqi Kurdistan and cooperated in joint projects in the 
areas of education, digitalisation and cataloguing.  
7.4.2 Expanding Symbolic Resources 
Becoming Writers and Publishers 
From time to time it is stated that Sweden is the country in the world in which the 
greatest amount of literature in Kurdish is produced and published (Ahmadzadeh 
2003; Hassanpour 1992 p. 454; Tayfun 1998). Certainly, Stockholm is a centre for 
Kurdish literature, although as Gröndahl (2002) points out this is true primarily 
regarding literature in Kurmancî. In Southern Kurdistan, or Northern Iraq, there is 
extensive publishing of literature in Soranî, only a small part of the literature writ-
ten and published in this dialect being produced in Sweden (ibid. p. 333). The role 
of Sweden as supposed "haven" of Kurdish literature needs to be seen in proper 
perspective. The publishing of literature in Kurmancî, for example, was permitted 
in the former Soviet Union and a number of Kurmancî speaking authors and poets 
have been active there142 (Gröndahl 2002; on book publishing in the USSR see 
Ahmadzadeh 2003 pp. 167-168; Hassanpour 2002 pp. 212ff.). The Kurdish Insti-
tute in Paris was founded already in 1983. It has been prominent in the role of 
developing the Kurmancî and of publishing in this dialect (van Bruinessen 1998 p. 
46). 
During the time that the interviews were conducted, it was estimated that 
about 80 % of all active authors writing in Kurdish were residing in Sweden 
(Gröndahl 2002). A solid inventory of Kurdish publishing in Sweden was con-
ducted by Tayfun (1998). A few Kurdish journals were also published in Sweden 
during the 1970s, and, according to Tayfun, during the period between 1980 and 
2000 more than 130 Kurdish journals was published in Sweden. Between 1971 
and 1997, 402 books in Kurmancî and in Zazakî were published in Sweden, as 
compared with 109 books in these dialects in Turkey during the same period. It is 
noteworthy that from 1971 and up to 1990 there were only 11 books in these dia-
                                                     
142 Also Joyce Blau, professor in Kurdish at the University of Sorbonne in Paris, draws attention to 
the occurrence of literature in Kurmanî produced in the former Soviet Union at a symposium on 
Kurdistan that took place in Lund, autumn 2007. However the literature produced in the former 
Soviet Union is written in cyrillic alphabet and not accessible to Kurmancî spekars in other parts 
of the world unless they are similar with that alphabet. 
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lects published in Turkey (Tayfun 1998 p. 42). There is also a Kurdish bookstore, 
Sara, located in the centre of Stockholm.  
Tayfun points out that many of the books that were published in Turkey ei-
ther were written or were first issued in Sweden. Between 1980 and 1997 15 jour-
nals in the dialects of Kurmancî and Zazakî received state subsidies from the 
Swedish Arts Council (Tayfun 1998 p. 34), as did 19 publishers that issued works 
in these languages (ibid. p. 30). 
As a result, the publishing of books and other printed material in Kurdish has 
been of particular importance for the Kurdish dialects that have played a dominate 
roll in Turkey. It is interesting to note in this context that Stockholm has been por-
trayed as being "a Kurdish capital" (see, for example, Alakom 2007), both in Kur-
dish circles in Sweden and among Kurds from Turkey generally. It has also been 
pointed out that the cultural political atmosphere in Sweden has contributed to "a 
renaissance for the Kurmancî literature", since novels have been written on the 
basis of plots found in the old epics, of old lexica and journals in Kurmancî having 
been compiled and published in Sweden, from which it has become accessible to a 
Kurmancî speaking audience. 
In accounts of how Kurdish literature and the Kurdish language have ex-
panded in Sweden, it has been emphasized that a "renewal" of the Kurdish litera-
ture has taken place (see, for example, Dağdeviren in Friesel 1999 p. 79), and that 
there has been an expansion of literary genres in the language as well as an expan-
sion of the language: 
 
Then the first children’s journal was published in Stockholm, the first satiric, 
or as I said humoristic paper, was published in Sweden, the first women’s 
journal, and the first journal in a dialect that we call Dîmlî or Zazakî. (...) 
The first journal in that dialect being published in Sweden, the first real 
Kurdish printing house and publishing house is here in Sweden, as well as 
the first kindergarten, and the first Kurdish library. All of these had an 
influence on the other ... and then on film, theatre and music. 
(D) 
In his account, D convey the message of publishing in Kurdish having flourished, 
mushroomed and gradually spread to all different literary genres and fields in 
Sweden. D explains how the generous and open political climate and the interest 
in language issues among the Kurds conspired to result in an expansion and a re-
newal of Kurdish literature and publishing. The publishing of literature in Kurdish 
Kurmancî and Zazakî also includes books translated into these dialects from other 
languages. A number of classical works and world literary works have been trans-
lated into Kurdish. W, D and E, for example, have all been involved in translating 
literature and other texts into Kurdish.  
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In the context of diasporic and ethno-nationalist mobilization, it is interesting to 
note that children`s literature has become a major genre in publishing activities in 
Kurmancî in Sweden. Tayfun (1998) found that childrens´s books represented 
about a quarter of all the literature published in Kurmancî. Many of these were 
translations of Swedish children's books such, as Ludde and Pippi Longstocking, 
and of Alfons Åberg into Kurmancî as well as the other two main Kurdish dialects. 
Providing literature for children in their maternal tongue is certainly a way of rein-
forcing and protecting the language, and of transferring it on to succeeding genera-
tions.  The meaning that books like Ludde and Pippi might have for children in 
Kurdistan has also been discussed. Gröndahl (2002) for example suggests that the 
extensive publishing of children’s literature in Kurdish is an attempt to integrate 
and transfer social norms of Swedish society to the children involved. 
The lack of literature in Kurdish was probably one reason for writing and 
publishing in Kurdish having been carried out. A further aspect of it is the matter 
of the norms and values in Turkish text- and schoolbooks provided, which was 
underscored by C who first in Sweden worked as a home language teacher in Tur-
kish: 
I started with these publication activities because of my work as a teacher, 
this putting me in touch with Kurdish children as well. And there was also 
not much material of this sort available. There was a lack [of material] in 
Kurdish generally. And when I taught Turkish it was with material that 
contained state propaganda. 
(C) 
C draws attention here first to the fact that there was not much literature for chil-
dren produced in Kurdish that could have been used in education in that language. 
Secondly, he puts forward the matter of norms and of democratic values. As the 
interview moved on, C pointed out that the content of the Turkish schoolbooks 
was "very ideological" and "nationalist", and "that they are not accommodated to 
what is established in the Swedish curriculum for education" saying that people 
should not be racist, since "these books are racist". C also added that "these books 
are not accommodated to the children". He said finally that there were "conflicts" 
in which other teachers, as well as parents, were involved concerning the matter of 
Turkish parents "wanting the classroom to be like those in Turkey". 
U told of his having a sense of its being almost "a duty" of his, as a politically 
active and committed Kurd, to immerse himself in the Kurdish language, history 
and culture, and to provide a broader Kurdish audience with the sources and the 
knowledge he had acquired through supplying them with articles and books in 
Kurdish: 
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And I wrote a number of articles, which were not very scholarly, but as to 
my identity I was politician, you see. I was not sufficiently grown up and 
mature to become a politician, but felt all the time that as a politician it is 
very important to have knowledge about Kurds, about their politics, history 
and language.  
(U) 
He adds that: 
It helps in the struggle, you know. In the Kurdish struggle (...) if a history 
book or grammar, or other literary book. It is a tool you see (...) in the 
Kurdish struggle, it is not only about knowledge, it fills a propagandistic role 
as well.  
(U) 
In the story of U producing literature as part of a struggle, literature in Kurdish 
becomes a "tool" in the political struggle generally, his implying that the very ex-
istence of Kurdish literature is important. In reading his account, the idea launched 
by Benedict Anderson (1991) of how printed literature has played a central role in 
the creation of national communities comes to mind: "the convergence of capital-
ism and printing technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the 
possibility of there being a new form of imagined community, the basic morphol-
ogy of which set the stage for the modern nation" (ibid. p. 46). This could be in-
terpreted as the story told ny U implying that the publishing here has a broader 
purpose, that of every book, journal and other type of script published in Kurdish 
seeing to it that the Kurds have a body of literature and a language in which they 
can express themselves. 
One can note that book publication and authorship can be considered as high-
ly "gendered" activities. According to Tayfun (1998 p. 16) there was only one 
female Kurdish author from the Kurdistan region in Turkey who had published in 
Sweden during the period he investigated. His report, based on statistics from the 
Swedish Council of Arts, shows that publishing houses were run by men and only 
few women were on the editorial boards of journals, there also being few women 
who had obtained state subsidies for publishing. It should be added, however, that 
there were politically active women writing and producing texts for various pur-
poses. During a short period of time a small group of women affiliated with the 
Kurdiska kvinnoförbundet also published the journal Jîn: Kurdisk kvinnobulletin 
mentioned in a previous section. 
To Conquer a Language 
As was described in Chapter 6 the Kurdish language has a central role for many 
Kurds from Turkey since it has been prohibited for such a long period of time. 
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Kurdish refugees from Turkey, in several European countries, began the work of 
publishing and writing in their maternal tongue. Indeed, many Kurds were writing 
and presenting their intellectual thoughts in Turkish, while the use of Kurdish of-
ten was limited to the sphere of everyday life. Van Bruinessen (1998) emphasize 
the role of the diaspora in producing a working Kurdish language. Claims of lin-
guistic rights are prevalent in the accounts here. In the accounts it is sometimes 
emphasised how Swedish immigrant policies supported the maintenance and ex-
pansion of maternal languages among immigrants. Some of those interviewed 
declared that Turkish was their maternal tongue, others that their Kurdish was 
"very weak" since they had not spoken Kurdish with their parents. X declared that 
he had first learned Kurdish properly in Sweden at the age of 25. 
As has been mentioned in earlier chapters, Swedish municipalities have been 
obliged to offer home language training to immigrant children ever since 1976. 
For various reasons it took some time before Swedish authorities observed that 
there was a need of home language training for the Kurds. One reason was that in 
public population statistics the Kurds were registered as being either Turkish, Ira-
nian, Iraqi or Syrian. The first Kurds arriving in Sweden were the guest workers 
from the Kulu province in Turkish Anatolia who spoke Turkish but had never 
attended school. The occurrence of Kurdish speaking immigrants became known 
to Swedish authorities first when families with wives and children who were only 
Kurdish speaking came to Sweden (Yetkin 1984 pp. 135-137).  
Interest in education in Kurdish became increasingly articulated with the ar-
rival of political refugees to whom linguistic rights were important. The author 
Mehmet Emin Bozarslan was one of those who actively struggled for the estab-
lishment of language training in Kurdish. He wrote of the lack of knowledge he 
perceived authorities to have concerning Kurdish immigrants: 
What they know is that a large group of immigrants comes from what on the 
map is called Turkey and then they set up a programme of education 
involving home language teachers in Turkish.  
(Bozarslan 1981 p. 8, this excerpt of it translated from Swedish) 
In Sweden people from different parts of Kurdistan came together, many among 
them having been given the opportunity to learn Kurdish and being offered educa-
tion in it with the support from Kurdish organisations. The organisation KR was 
active in the establishment of a program for the education of teachers in the mater-
nal Kurdish tongue. The first Kurdish classes were provided by Kurdish authors 
with a good command of spoken and written Kurdish, initiated by Kurdish and 
Kurdish-Turkish organisations in Scandinavia. Kurdish classes were also provided 
for adults, although this was an activity that was not uncontroversial:  
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Because the Turkish regime has decided to eradicate the Kurdish language 
and culture, it attempts to carry out the same oppression also outside the 
borders of Turkey, i.e. in Europe, where the Kurds can use their language 
freely. The following situation developed in the final stages of a language 
course that was given in Copenhagen: The 25th of July the advisor of Turkish 
at the embassy called the general secretary of the 'The Association of 
Kurdish Workers from Turkey', Mahmut Erdem, to try to persuade him to 
stop the Kurdish language course. The motivation for this given was that 
Kurdish is prohibited in Turkey, and that Kurdish children are not to be 
given education in Kurdish. When the advisor of the embassy was asked 
whether he was aware of this being the case in Denmark and that it was here 
the course was being given, he answered: "Turkish children are not to learn 
Kurdish".  
(Bozarslan 1981 p. 3) 
The excerpt above is in line with observations made by Sheffer (1986 p. 391) of 
homeland regimes often being "ambiguous" regarding such matters and sometimes 
intervening or attempting to stop or limit the activism of diasporaic populations 
from their countries. The Turkish government´s interest in the activities of "their 
emigrés" was not limited to such statements as those by the Turkish ambassadors. 
The language restrictions on Kurdish were made more stringent in the aftermath of 
the coup in 1980, led to the concerns of Turkish authorities regarding language 
training in Kurdish in Scandinavia. In the accounts of such matters provided here 
there are several examples of its being perceived that Turkish authorities control 
and supervise the activities of Kurdish refugees in Sweden. One such example is 
provided by D, who recalls when the Turkish authorities called on the Swedish 
embassy in Ankara as well as the Swedish foreign ministry to express their attitude 
toward the opening of a Kurdish kindergarten in Stockholm. In an article in the 
daily Svenska Dagbladet, the ambassador Haluk Özgül explain his concerns as 
follows: "Turkey has according to the constitution one language-turkish" and con-
tinues: "The parents ands their children in the kindergarden are Turkish citizens 
and because of that they ought to speak Turkish and no other language there." 
(Svenska Dagladet 1985.01.11 quoted in Tayfun 1998 p. 44). 
Individual Kurdish authors have been prosecuted in Turkey because of their 
work. For example, Mehmet Uzun authored a novel, written in Sweden but dis-
tributed in Turkey, that allegedly argued for "separatism". In 1996 Mehmet Emin 
Bozarslan and his Turkish publisher were prosecuted after the publication of a 
translation of the Kurdish classical epic Mem and Zîn into Turkish. Kurdish home 
language training was provided to school children in Sweden from 1981. When 
education in Kurdish was provided, an inventory of the need for textbooks and 
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teaching aids was carried out by responsible instances (SIL 1984 pp. 2, 18, 21).143 
It is interesting to note that Swedish authorities felt called on to underscore the 
importance of informing parents selecting mother-tongue language classes in Kur-
dish for their children about the consequences it might have since Kurdish not is a 
public language and no education in Kurdish is provided in their home countries. 
In Sweden the schools in some cases became an arena for conflicts between 
parents belonging to different ethnic and political groups. The Kurdish attempts to 
use their language and claims to linguistic rights diverged from the Turkish public 
narrative that for years had denied the very existence of the Kurds. There are ex-
amples of Turkish-speaking parents sympathising with the ultra-nationalist Turk-
ish parties attempting to prevent Kurdish-speaking parents from sending their 
children to home language training in Kurdish, or attempting to convince them to 
not do so. 
Another theme that can be distinguished in the accounts is of how the Kurd-
ish language had expanded in the Swedish diasporic setting. It has often been em-
phasized that Kurdish is widely used among Kurds in Sweden. In Sweden, Kurd-
ish has effectively been employed in public Kurdish arenas, such as in meetings 
and manifestations. In the interviews this was described as differing from the 
situation in other countries hosting large Kurdish communities. D compared it 
with the situation of Kurds residing in Germany. He spoke of meetings there in 
which Kurds usually spoke Turkish at Kurdish meetings and conferences. At first, 
when Kurds were meeting, they spoke Turkish, though Kurds from Sweden were 
making their speeches in Kurdish. In the course of time, Kurds from Germany 
began speaking Kurdish when attending meetings and manifestations in Sweden:  
 
D: But when they come to Sweden, they at once start to speak Kurdish. 
Because you have to follow this norm ... but automatically it turns out like 
that. Because then, they say all over the world that in Sweden Kurds are very 
active and do many positive things.  
Charlotta: But how did it become like this. There are so many Kurds in 
Germany? 
D: Yes, half a million live in Germany.  
Charlotta: But they do not speak Kurdish? 
D: No, they do not speak Kurdish. They speak German or Turkish.  
                                                     
143 SIL is the acronym for Statens Institut för Läromedelsinformation, in English The Government's 
Teaching Material Authority. 
  
255 
Charlotta:What if they meet Kurds from Iraq or Iran? 
D: Then they speak German. 
(D)	  
In Germany the authorities did not support the Kurdish claims to linguistic rights, 
since this was seen as being a "step towards recognising the establishment of a 
Kurdish state" (Emanuelsson 2005 p. 113). Thus, Kurdish gradually became a 
"lingua franca" for the exiled Kurds. D’s account illustrates how a diasporic com-
munity is, in the words of Björklund (1993), simultaneously "differentiated" and 
"connected", differentiated since it shows how highly diverse practices developed 
at local and national levels in diverse diasporic settings, and connected not only 
because of their organizing across state boundaries and arranging common meet-
ings, but also in the sense of influences being transmitted, as was the case for 
Kurds from Germany speaking Kurdish at meetings in Sweden.  
One theme that can be distinguished in the accounts is that it has become 
possible in Sweden to develop and modernise the Kurdish language. One of these 
interviewed mentioned for example that the Kurdish language in Sweden could be 
described as much more advanced than that in Kurdistan or elsewhere: 
But if you travel, for example, to Van or to Diyarbakir, and ask about the 
Kurdish language, they will definitely tell you: 'okay, we don't speak a pure 
Kurdish [language], but if you go to Stockholm you will hear a clear and 
rather modern and advanced Kurdish language'. Thus for them, Stockholm 
and Sweden are symbols of linguistic advancement, cultural advancement 
and so on. 
(M) 
Another matter brought up in the conversations was that the language had "devel-
oped" and become "modernized" in the diasporic setting. It was emphasized that 
this would never have been possible if all Kurds from Turkey were still residing 
there. N, for example, described the language as having become "focused" in the 
struggle, noting that the Kurdish language was something "we have returned to" 
and "conquered" and that people in Sweden nowadays have the Kurdish language 
as "their first language", which can be interpreted as being quite a difference com-
pared with how it used to be. It was thus felt that the diasporic arena had made it 
possible not only to perceive and make use of the symbolic resources available, 
but also to strengthen and expand them.  
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7.5 Becoming Swedish-Kurds  
Becoming "Immigrant Others" 
One theme brought up frequently in the interviews was the experience that certain 
attributes are ascribed on the basis of their being immigrants, in particular Kurdish 
immigrants. This is a well-known phenomenon. In Sweden, just as in other West-
ern countries, there is a debate about the "stereotypes" often attributed to immi-
grants in the media and in public discussions (Brune 2008; Pripp 2002). A number 
of incidents that have occurred have been the source of a negative conception of 
the Kurds in the media. For example, in the 1970s and 1980s Kurds were generally 
placed in the media side by side with the PKK, following the murder of two of its 
defectors. In this connection there was an emphasis in the media on incidents in 
which violent methods were employed. 
When the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was murdered in 1986 consid-
erable attention in the media was directed at the Kurds again, due to its being at-
tributed to the PKK path initiated by the Swedish police chief Hans Holmér. Also, 
two young Kurdish women, Pela Atroshi and Fadime Şahindal, were murdered, 
the one in 1999 and the other in 2002, by their relatives. These murders attracted 
an enormous interest in Swedish media and otherwise in the public debate. "Honor 
killings" were debated by journalists, politicians, scholars and many others. The 
debate soon took a "culturalist" turn. "Kurdish culture" and "Islam" were terms 
frequently used to explain the murders. These murders also caused widespread and 
strong reactions among Kurds in Sweden and in many other countries. Several 
scholars have seen indications of that the debate on "honor killings" affected many 
Kurds negatively (Alinia 2004; Khayati 2008; Eliassi 2010). When these "honor 
killings are brought up in the interviews it becomes evident that they had a 
stigmatising effect both on men and on women. 
G is one of these persons who tends apparently to bring up such issues when 
the situation of Kurds in Swedish society is discussed. He maintains that politi-
cally active persons in Sweden are generally well aware of the Kurdish issue and 
sympathize with the Kurds, but that, among persons who are not politically active, 
prejudices regarding Kurds and a negative picture of them tends to flourish. I ma-
kes use his own private experiences in describing how he perceives of Kurds as 
being portrayed in public and in the Swedish media: 
Not exactly terrorists [laughing], but something like that, I think is what’s 
inside people's heads, the idea of Kurds’ never being reasonable, being 
disorderly and noisy, or in the best case simply noisy. I think that these 
murders have now led, at least in Sweden, to there not being a single 
Kurdish girl who hasn’t been asked about her parents, who’s in school hasn’t 
been asked about her father, yes, her father in particular. My daughters have 
been asked anyway, and they were very upset. About. Eh. Their classmates 
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were asking them: "What is your father like?" with implicit negative 
expectation regarding him. Not about profession, or his appearance. No, 
nothing like that. But: ... "Does your father want to kill you?" Despite that ... 
they’ve been going to school [together] ... . The oldest starts her last year in 
college this year, and the younger one is sixteen. ... They’ve been asked 
about such things by classmates of theirs who’ve been in our home.  
(G) 
This account involves the sense of being an "other" and of being "categorized". An 
"other" because it imply that his daughter was asked whether her father was a pos-
sible murderer, just because he was a Kurdish father. "Categorized" because in 
being seen as someone capable of killing his daughters certain norms and values 
were ascribed to him. What concerns G is the fact that Kurds as a group are looked 
upon as "outsiders", and that "bad characteristics" is being attributed to them. The 
"othering" process he describes is also not one conducted by people he meets oc-
casionally, but are to be found in what may be his closest circles of acquaintances. 
What G says fits in with observations made by Brune (2007), who argues that 
reporting on immigrants often involves stereotyping them. She points out that 
when events, such as the murder of Fadime Sahindal, is reported in the media, 
dichotomous pictures are often conveyed where Kurds or other immigrants are 
attributed to putative "traditional values" whereas Sweden is attributed with values 
such as "equality" and "modernity" (ibid. p. 351). 
If Kurdish men perceived themselves as being attributed with the character of 
"noisy", completely opposite attributes were given to the Kurdish women. Rather, 
there was a tendency that women were characterised as "powerless". One such 
example was provided by R, who told an anecdote about a woman friend of hers 
who was a physician. This woman had been asked by one of her colleagues how it 
was possible for her, as a Kurdish woman, to be allowed to obtain a qualified edu-
cation:  
She was asked how it could be that she, who was Kurdish, could have been 
allowed to qualify herself to become a medical doctor? 'She who was a Kurd' 
and 'Kurds that are so conservative.' Did they all believe that Kurds come 
out of medieval caves and have a medieval mentality? That they have 
women who are slaves and are not allowed to qualify themselves or to move 
freely? In my opinion it’s just a very small group who carry out such 
oppression against their wifes and their daughters. [It] exists of course, [it is] 
more or less a patriarchal system. But I can’t say that it’s more intense 
among Kurds than in any Latin American or Arabic family. [They] can’t see 
the different shades of white and grey. They believe that [we] all belong to 
the same category.  
(R) 
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R clearly dissociates herself from prejudices and from a stereotyped picture of 
Kurdish women that she thinks prevails in the media. Her message is that preju-
dices regarding Kurdish women are bred among people who are otherwise ex-
pected to be "well educated" and "enlightened". Thus, in her view, such a stereo-
type is surprising and irrational. R perceives of Kurdish women as generally being 
portrayed as "weak" and "oppressed", and as not being given access to resources 
that could have given them the possibility of obtaining an education and a profes-
sion or of taking their place in public and political spaces.  
She points then out the place and the situations in which prejudices are dis-
cussed, that they are discussed in public spaces, Kurds thus being confronted with 
them in their everyday lives whether they want to be or not. R points out that peo-
ple not only air their prejudices regarding Kurdish women in private rooms but 
also in interactions between people in everyday situations. 
What she and also I tell of reminds one of what Pripp (2002) has found in his 
research concerning people who are presented in a stereotyped way in the media, 
his pointing out that a consequence of this is that such people are not able to avoid 
the pictures of them that are provided and the effects these have on how people 
perceive of them (ibid. p. 68). Both I and R describe stereotypes they are con-
fronted with in Swedish society, and it is implicitly understood that they conceive 
of other Kurds in Sweden being confronted with these as well. Something clearly 
common to the accounts of I and of R is how they distance themselves from the 
stereotypes they report being confronted with, leading to their being characterised 
as ethnified outsiders. Explicitly they express that they find it difficult to defend 
themselves from these stereotypes.  
 Representativity 1 
An often disputable issue concerns who should be given the right and the legiti-
macy to speak for the group and whose interests should be attended to and be 
given priority. Although little research has been conducted thus far on the role of 
Kurdish women’s organizing, one exception to this is Mojab (2007) who points 
out that this is a subject often neglected in the literature and by Kurdish political 
organisations. Referring to the opening of a Kurdish Womens’ radio station in 
Stockholm, Mojab remarks: "The absence of high-profile Kurdish political party 
representatives (all male) was notable" (ibid. p. 69). Wahlbeck (1999) has ob-
served that the emancipation of women and the equality of the sexes are subjects 
that are not ranked high on the agendas of Kurdish organizaitons (ibid. p. 120). 
When I was conducting the interviews, for example, it proved to be difficult 
to get access to women, and in speaking about this with male acquaintances and 
those who were interviewed many of them said: "I don't know of any women who 
are active in the Kurdish movement. Most Kurdish women are housewives". Al-
though this statement no longer reflects adequately the situation today, it is in line 
with what has been written in reports on the Kurdish immigrant group issued by 
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the Kurdish Project in the 1980s. According to these reports a majority of the 
Kurdish women coming from Turkey were housewives, many of them illiterate, 
and some of them without knowledge of Turkish. They had followed their hus-
bands to Sweden or in some cases been given residence permits as in the case of 
family reunions (see, for example, Turan 1984).  
However, there were a number of women belonging to the political genera-
tion in question who were politically active. When I was finally able to get in 
touch with various women in this regard, it turned out that some of them belonged 
to networks including also male interviewees who had told me that they did not 
knew any women who had been politically active in Turkey. It would thus be rea-
sonable to conclude that much of women’s diasporic activism at the time went 
unattended. 
One matter involved concerns what questions were included in the political 
agenda. An issue that was brought up in some of the conversations was that of 
women's issues always having been subordinated to the "bigger" and much more 
"important" question of the emancipation of Kurdistan: 
 
During this long period of time I was always involved with men, and with 
the Kurdish issue. They reminded me continually of their feeling that 'We 
must not bring up women's issues. [That will be] after the Kurdish issue'. 
And that’s how we did it. We were waiting until some kind of freedom was 
given us so that we then could start with women's issues.  
(J) 
J noted that being a woman in a male-dominated organisation was not a problem 
in itself, what was at issue being rather when to pursue the question of women’s 
emancipation. R remarked, in a similar vein, that when she worked in a Kurdish 
political party she could write about the women’s situation as long as it not was 
referred to as feminism. J came to Sweden in the 1980s but returned after a few 
years to work politically in various Middle Eastern countries. In the organisation 
in Sweden she had been active in there were only a few women in leading posi-
tions. At the time of the interviews she chose to give priority to questions concern-
ing women's emancipation and in addition committed herself to the situation of 
Kurdish children and teenagers in Sweden. 
Many women were active in the political generation in Turkey, although they 
did not constitute a majority there, and there were very few of them who obtained 
an influential position within the organisations in which they were active. R said 
that "we just went along", since women's issues were allegedly never on the agen-
da. According to K, women had no influence in the organisations in which she was 
active and questions of equality between men and women were not on the agenda. 
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agenda. J returned to Kurdistan after a short period in Sweden and did obtain a 
leading position in her party there. 
This brings us to a further theme that was brought up in the discussions on 
gender equality. J, R and S all pointed out that it was difficult to mobilize women 
politically. J described this as follows: 
They [the women] always get the heaviest [load of work] at home. The men 
always leave. So they [the woman] give up very easily. But that is ... when 
I’m with them, with these guys, and they say 'You are one of us', I 
sometimes say that they don’t see us as women because of our being with 
them and struggling together with them and discussing with them all the 
time … . They [the women] are always given many things to do at home and 
also have to work. You know in Sweden they are studying or they are 
working, and in addition [many of them] have several children and [that] 
takes up much time. So women don’t get much free time … it’s difficult to 
take one’s place elsewhere. 
(J) 
J described these conditions from the standpoint of being a politically active 
woman. She contrasts herself in a way with women who don't participate in the 
activities of the political parties or whose main responsibilities for the household 
work prevent them from that. In many respects her reflections are in line with what 
was reported in the Tensta Project in the 1980s (see Turan 1984).  
R and S, however, said that relations between Kurdish men and women in 
Sweden had changed. R gave examples from her own relationship saying that it 
was easier for her to be away from home in the evenings than what it was in her 
first years in Sweden. S pointed out that women had gotten the opportunity to stu-
dy and to work outside the home, despite women often having to take the main 
responsibility for the household and the children. In her view however, women 
should take responsibility for their situation: 
That’s very difficult. But if you want to have equality, I think you have to 
enter politics. You have to participate. We’ve left ... yes the laws ... and 
everything we’ve left to the men. We’ve have left everything in their hands. 
We can’t just expect then that they’ll do everything for us. Maybe they don’t 
have an idea of what we want. I think, then we have to take part and decide 
and build up [something].  
(S) 
On the one hand, the women were critical to how they found the position of wo-
men and young girls among the Kurds. K who for a period of time had been the 
editor of a women’s journal in Stockholm telling, for example, about how daugh-
ters of Kurdish politicians and activists came to the women’s group and told of 
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restrictions that were placed on them at home. On the other hand, the women who 
were interviewed told of Kurdish women at the time being depicted in a stereotyp-
ing fashion and being described negatively in the public media, their mostly being 
presented there as being subordinate and oppressed. R gave an example of women 
being made "invisible" in public discussions in Sweden. In the following example 
she reported on what she was told by one of her friends who was active in a Kurd-
ish organisation when journalists were looking for information about the situation 
of Kurdish women immediately after that the young Kurdish woman refereed to in 
the previous section, Fadime Şahindal, had been murdered by her father:  
Also if the question as a matter of fact is directly about women, you can say 
that people tend to turn to men instead of to women. … For example, 
someone told me about a journalist from one of our biggest newspapers 
coming twice to conduct an interview with the [male] chairman of our 
organisation. When the journalist was about to come for a third time, my 
female friend went outside the door and just grabbed him and said: "You 
must talk to me. You have something to do with us and not just with him". 
So she dragged him in there, into a room they have. 
(R) 
The anecdote that R told can be interpreted as there being a clear gendered hierar-
chy or as women being neglected within the organisation and in Swedish society, 
at least as far as Kurdish woman are concerened. What she tells reminds one of 
Mojab’s remark about Kurdish women, namely that "women are confronted with 
the relations of their non-state status, the politics of state-seeking projects, and the 
immigration and settlement policies of the host-land. Each of these relations re-
produces patriarchy in specific ways." (Mojab 2007 p. 77). 
R described how her friend was made "invisible" and given a subordinate po-
sition by her Kurdish colleague and by the Swedish journalist. The chairman of the 
Kurdish organisation, who was a man, did not direct the Swedish journalist to the 
representative of the organisation for Kurdish women when he was going to inter-
view people about the situation of Kurdish women. This implied that the women's 
branch and the main organisation it was in were at least to a large extent separate 
spheres, which can be interpreted as there being a strong hierarchy within the or-
ganisation. In addition the anecdote can be seen as reflecting the view of Kurdish 
women in the majority society since the Swedish journalist passed her office every 
day without taking any notice of the fact that he was passing a Kurdish women's 
organisation and that he easily could have talked directly with the women there 
about how they perceived of their situation themselves. R interpreted this event as 
women being neglected. Alinia (2004) points to similar experiences he had had 
regarding the position of Kurdish women in Sweden. 
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Representativity 2 
In the overall narrative of the generation there are several contrasting and to some 
extent conflictual stories. As was accounted for in Chapter 1, Kurdistan is ethni-
cally and linguistically heterogeneous. In recent decades, sub-groups and overlap-
ping identities that hitherto had not been very visible in public spaces, such as 
political ones had begun to organize in Turkey and in various diasporic contexts 
(Uçarlar 2009 pp. 219f.). Matters connected with the question of whether or not 
their aspirations for rights and for recognition are politicised illustrate how fuzzy, 
complex and overlapping the constructions and negotiations concerning national 
belonging could become.  
Among those interviewed one finds persons who considered Zazakî to be 
their maternal tongue, in the diasporic setting some of them having begun to mani-
fest a "Zaza" identity. Many of the most prominent leaders and figures in Kurdish 
rebellions and in recent movements have been Zaza speaking. Of those included in 
this thesis who stated that they were Zaza-speaking most of them said they were 
"Zaza-speaking’ Kurds". Hence, Zaza and Kurdish may be competing identity 
markers, as expressed in the account H told: 
Now I say that I’m a European, a Zaza who live in Sweden and we are part 
of the EU ... . In 20 years you don’t know. Maybe there are no borders left 
… . But in my other circles, the Turkish, the Kurdish ... I say that I’m a Zaza 
who lives in Kurdistan, or who comes from Turkish Kurdistan, or the 
Kurdish part of Turkey. But that is disapproved of, also by Kurds, because 
they want to imitate Turkish chauvinism and assert that Zaza is a branch of 
Kurdish, which is completely unfounded. Internally, for the sake of 
democracy, we have to say that Zaza is a Kurdish language, since otherwise, 
the majority will want to assimilate us.  
(H) 
H describes a conflicting scenario, a position of being subordinate to Kurds. Most 
of them that I have talked with seemed that they considered themselves Zaza-
kurds in a "complementary" way, implying that social identities can be complex 
and have many sources. For example is W and O who, it seemed to me, did not 
struggle for a distinct Zaza identity, his rather seing the Zaza as one component of 
his Kurdish identity. P, who came from a religious family, employed a similar 
strategy, his describing there being three components of his identity that were im-
portant to him, the Kurdish, the Zaza and the religious. He said that as he grew 
older he realised that each of these components was equally important. 
Next Generation 
The complexity of the processes by which national identities are constructed was 
highlighted in the discussions concerning the next generation. Several of those 
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interviewed alluded to how their Kurdish identities would be challenged by the 
next generation, on the one hand examples being given of how their children as-
pired to "preserve their Kurdish identity", and on the other hand R, in speaking 
about Kurdishness in Sweden, saying that "Kurdish identities are getting stronger, 
you want to preserve them, and ... yet, when it comes to one’s children, this is 
unfortunately not so easy, "her going on to tell about how her son is "dreaming in 
Swedish" and how he wants "an explanation in Swedish from me" when discus-
sions in Kurdish or in Turkish become too complicated or abstract. It is not pri-
marily the Kurdishness of her own son that she sees as "threatened", even if she 
fears that his sense of being Kurdish will gradually "weaken" over time, but rather 
her doubts as to whether future generations will continue to really be Kurdish: 
And if he marries a Swedish girl I think there will not be much left of his 
Kurdish identity. [Not] for his children anyway. It can only be for himself. 
Because he does feel like.. Because when I ask him he says that he definitely 
is Kurdish, not Swedish. I say to him that 'You are a Swedish citizen and you 
were born here. You can also be seen as Swedish' since he know Swedish 
better than our other two languages. He says 'No I am a Kurd'. Yes! He 
wants to preserve his [national] identity. But I think it will fade away in 
time. If he marries a Swedish girl, for which there is about a 50 percent 
[chance] things will go that way I think. And if they get children, I think, 
then there will be nothing left of a Kurdish identity. And it is natural for 
things to turn out that way. It is a process that you can’t prevent.  
(R) 
R show herself to be aware of Kurdish identities continuously being challenged 
and reconstructed, the younger generation responding to the social and historical 
settings they grow up in. I was often told that the children not were going to ‘be 
Kurds’ in the same way as their parents. This often did not seem to be of much 
concern. Many were happy that their children were doing well and became well 
integrated in Sweden. U told, for example, of his daughter being both Kurdish and 
Swedish and of how he could not decide to what extent she was of each. Many 
told of difficulties and problems when their children went to Turkey to see their 
relatives there. U told of his children always complaining about their not being 
able to do things in the same way as in Sweden, Z telling about his son calling 
home and complaining about the weather and the food, and W was concerned 
about how he as a political refugee not was able to follow his son to Turkey to 
help him socialise with other Kurdish men. R, in the account of hers reported on 
above, expressed a grief when she opened her story. Many considered its being 
important however to socialise one’s children in terms of Kurdish customs and 
traditions. Simultaneously it must be noted that when speaking of their children 
the interviewees tend to consider Sweden to be the present and future homeland 
for them and their children.  
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7.6 Transnational Actors 
At the same time, as being a diasporic group the political generation are embedded 
in a transnational network, since Kurds are dispersed into various countries all 
over the world and tend to operate at a global and a local level at the same time. 
By doing so their both sustaining solidarity with co-ethnic members of the group 
worldwide and adjusting to the social and political culture in the countries in 
which they reside. From the mid-1990s Kurdish personalities, institutes and or-
ganisations increasingly began to collaborate in trans-national networks. These 
networks are extending across Europe, North America and the Middle East.  
New technology facilitated communication between the Kurds in the dias-
pora and the Middle East. Diaspora Kurds have played a significant role in the 
establishment of a "Kurdish cyber-space". Today the Kurds have access to a myr-
iad of TV- and radio-channels broadcasting in Kurdish and other Middle Eastern 
languages. In addition numerous Kurdish webpages have been set up. The Kurdish 
TV-channel MED-TV was established in London 1995 and reaches about 16 mil-
lion viewers (Watts 2004a p. 131; see also Khayati 2008).  
The escalating violence in Turkey in the 1990s influenced the commitments 
of many of them belonging to the generation. Many became involved in Human 
Rights organisations, political parties in their new home country, solidarity groups 
and other organisations that operated globally. The interviewees were generally 
staunch supporters of Turkish accession to the European Union. When Turkey 
applied for full membership in the EU in 1987 many of them, like many other 
Kurds in Europe many engaged with the human rights situation in Turkey.  
 
Marginalized Actors 
Far from all the accounts of diasporic activism were positive, however. Many ex-
amples that were provided indicated the Kurds to find the impact of their efforts to 
marginal and very much limited. In several other studies, relations between refu-
gees and those who remained in the original home country have been discussed. 
Many of those interviewed had concerns about the developments in the pro-
Kurdish political space in Turkey. As X put it: 
Why had they [the PKK] been struggling for 15 years? Our party (...) we 
thought [realised] at the start that an armed struggle could have [negative 
implications for] the Kurdish people [and that] we would be hit hard if we 
commenced an armed struggle [against the Turkish state]. And now this has 
probably come true. It would have been better if the Kurds in Turkey had 
created a Kurdish labour party, as in the 1970’s when we issued journals, 
also in Kurdish, thousands of them in Kurdish. Now, when you are abroad, 
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you cannot reach the people in Kurdistan. They cannot get our publications 
in Kurdistan. In my opinion, nothing has advanced in these 20 years. 
(L)	  	  
Under diasporic conditions Kurdish activists became separated from the political 
struggle that developed inside the home country. As I interpret the quotation above 
taken from L's account it became impossible to advise younger generations of 
politicians in Turkey and the activists who had escaped the country no longer had 
any appreciable influence on the political mobilisation in the Kurdish resistance 
that persisted and began to evolve anew a few years after the coup. Thus, the PKK 
became the most influential political group, and, according to many of the inter-
viewees there were no actors there who could provide an alternative. Their strug-
gle became separated from the one in the homeland. Olson (2007 p. 221) declares 
that political or nationalist movements in the exile "never are a by-product" of the 
movement that is active in the home country. Rather the exiles’ struggle is about 
"putting together fragments" of the movement as it developed in the home country, 
as a model of it.  
R described this separation between the struggle inside the original home 
country and the struggle outside as being a dilemma. She regard it as if there were 
two different struggles being carried out. The one in the homeland. The second is 
the one that has emerged outside Turkey, where exiled pro-Kurdish activists con-
tinue to champion their cause, although under completely different conditions than 
those of their countrymen inside Turkey. Interestingly enough, R points out that 
other organisations could scarcely be as "effective" as the PKK. Inside Turkey the 
Kurdish movement became radicalised and increasingly militant. Virtually all of 
the moderate Kurdish voices were abroad or in prison during the 1980s (see Watts 
2010). 
Brought to the Agenda 
Many of the accounts of diasporic activism by members of the generation in ques-
tion could be labeled as "success" stories, telling about a Kurdish community that 
had worked to bring the Kurdish issue to the political agenda. M noted for exam-
ple that this had contributed to making the Kurds visible and thus strengthened 
their position: 
Turkey cannot stop [the Kurds] or say that: 'No there are no Kurds, and 
Kurds do not have any rights, and so on'. Once Germany's ... ambassador in 
Turkey was asked about the PKK by [Turkish] journalists who wanted 
Germany to make the PKK illegal. He said: 'Okay, the PKK are terrorists. 
We do say so. The PKK are terrorists. But this is a Kurdish question.' One of 
the journalists replied that: 'No, there is no Kurdish question'. He [the 
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ambassador] said: 'Maybe in Turkey there’s no Kurdish question. But in 
Germany there is a Kurdish question.' 
(M) 
What M said in this anecdote sums up what many persons express when diasporic 
activism and its impact are brought up in interviews. As Kurdish immigrants and 
refugees become established residents, or even citizens, in their countries of set-
tlement, their issues become issues also in these countries, and a subject for dia-
logue with representatives of the original home country. As in the example above, 
the Kurdish issue could not be neglected or be dismissed as "a matter of terrorism" 
when the German embassador to Turkey brought it up publicly. Many of those 
interviewed noted that the diasporic context had facilitated the Kurdish issue and 
had brought it onto the agenda of international forums and organisations. Over the 
years, many politicians and well-known personalities from various Western Euro-
pean countries have committed themselves to the Kurdish issue. 
The late Swedish foreign minister Anna Lindh was known for her bringing 
up the situation of the Kurds in her contacts with Turkish authorities and when she 
travelled to Diyarbakir. Also the French president’s wife, Danielle Mitterand, was 
committed to the human rights of the Kurds. The Kurdish issue has drawn the 
attention of many different organisations and governments (Watts 2004; Khayati 
2008). 
Building Networks 
A further matter that was distinguished in the accounts was the mobilizing poten-
tial of the Kurds and the prospects of Kurds from many different countries uniting 
in the diasporic context. B’s account challenged those who declared the Kurdish 
movement to be weak because of splinterings and divisions. On the contrary, he 
emphasized the Kurds being "indeed well organized" and continuing their efforts 
in diasporic settings: 
It is very easy to come together and form organisations ... . To make use of 
the opportunities that are provided in a democracy. Talking on TV about the 
matters involved, for example, is very important ... to make people 
conscious.. and it is easy to communicate with people within the country, 
with friends and with relatives, and it is also possible to organize people in 
Kurdistan itself, and to create opinion in Europe supporting the Kurdish 
cause. Activities carried on within the diaspora is thus important, in 
particular for those of us from the Turkish part. We have institutes, like the 
present one, for example. Those in Turkey do not have such opportunities. 
(B) 
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B mentions the diasporic setting having provided the Kurds with resources and 
opportunities that they did not have in their home countries in the Middle East. In 
the different Kurdish diasporic settings there are networks that operate from local 
to global levels and consist of a diverse spectrum of actors ranging from individu-
als to the major Kurdish political parties, NGOs and institutes. In diasporic set-
tings Kurdish organisations have established networks that extend across state 
boundaries and continents (Emanuelsson 2005). Many of those interviewed par-
ticipated in transnational networks of this kind. In the accounts participants pro-
vided I was often told that the informants were going to conferences abroad, being 
involved in projects together with Kurds in other countries, and also going to 
spend a period in someone of the Kurdish institutes abroad. Many were involved 
in projects in Iraki Kurdistan and several had travelled there.  
Towards an Integrated Kurdish Community 
S emphasize the opportunities and advantages that are provided in diasporic set-
tings of being able to organize Kurds from different parts of Kurdistan:  
 
For example, I understand the South Kurdish dialect much better now. I am 
[a teacher] in South Kurdish. Yes, I began to study to become a teacher in 
domestic languages here ... . We were only a few people at the time. There 
were students who were as old as my father, former lawyers. And my option 
was about developing ... to participate and to raise the status of the Kurdish 
language. It was because of that ... that I visited Syrian Kurdistan, Iraqi 
Kurdistan and ... I have felt a sense of belonging there, very much. I felt at 
home in Erbil, in Qamishli, and in Duhok. I did not feel foreign as you do 
sometimes in other countries. This is thanks to my contacts with my 
compatriots that I have come to know here in Sweden. 
(S)	  
Many of the participants told similar stories about what their opportunities of mee-
ting with Kurds from other parts of Kurdistan had meant to them. It was often told 
by those that were interviewed of their working together with Kurds from different 
countries in various organisations, how personal relations are built to Kurds from 
various parts of Kurdistan, a number of those interviewed also telling of their ha-
ving become acquainted with the Soranî dialect of Kurdish spoken in Iraq and 
Iran. This in turn had the consequence of Kurds from various parts of Kurdistan 
being able to come together and communicate in Kurdish and become acquainted 
with the various Kurdish dialects.  
As was mentioned earlier, there were many who had travelled to Kurdistan. 
Kurds have always attempted to organize and cooperate across state boundaries. B 
and T told of how Kurds from Syria and Iraq came to Turkey to help people there 
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organize, bringing books in Kurdish with them. The idea of Kurds in diasporic 
settings being integrated into a broader Kurdish community is not without compli-
cations, however. Wahlbeck (1999) found in his research on Kurdish refugees in 
Finland and Great Britain that the Kurds he interviewed socialised mainly with 
Kurds from their countries of origin and participated in networks "based on social 
relations in their countries of origin" (ibid. p. 142).  
In my research many said that they had established contacts within the 
broader Kurdish community, and although there were language-barriers and dif-
ferences in what they had experienced it seems that many had their closest circle 
of friends among people from Turkey. The diasporic arena has helped in establish-
ing contacts, through different organisations and networks, however between 
Kurds in many different countries. 
7.7 Closing of the Chapter 
This chapter has examined accounts of pro-Kurdish activism and the direction it 
has taken in the diasporic setting of Sweden by those members of the political 
generation in question. To many of them the exile had become an arena for re-
orientation and for new directions to take in the struggle on behalf of Kurds gener-
ally. From the accounts one can see that the diasporic political landscape is com-
plex, a myriad of new associations having been established and a number of new 
issues have been brought to the agenda within a recent period of time. A general 
view that can be gleaned from the accounts is that the Kurds have consolidated 
their position in the diasporic settings involved. The repertoires of political and 
symbolic actions available have been adapted to local conditions and require-
ments, and actions and debates they have participated in have been oriented to 
both their home countries and their countries of settlement. In Sweden, for exam-
ple, it has been possible for Kurds to expand and strengthen their symbolic capital, 
particularly through immigrant policies and cultural policies having provided re-
sources of many kind. At the same time, just how effective the influence of the 
diaspora has been in this direction has been debated among members of this gen-
eration. 
On the one hand, there are examples to be found in the accounts of limits and 
difficulties of diasporic actions, and in various of them diasporic activism is con-
sidered as being "marginal" and diasporic activists as being limited to the role of 
being little more than "observers". This point of view could be summarised as 
follows: although in the diasporic setting the Kurdish issue have been brought to 
the agenda to a very considerable extent, there is very little real influence over 
political developments in Turkey. For example, persecution in Turkey has contin-
ued during the exile of those who have left, as became evident when Mehmet 
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Uzun was prosecuted in Istanbul, and it can readily appear that their activism has 
little in the way of positive effects for the Kurds in Turkey.  
On the other hand there are accounts in which the narrators depict their activ-
ism in terms of being progressive and challenging, taking the role of being "spear-
heads", and thus contributing appreciably to the advancement of the Kurdish 
movement, as to be seen, for example, in the dynamic development of organisa-
tions and the expansion of language and literature that has taken place in the dias-
poric setting.  
Thus, the themes of Suffering and Strenght that were taken up in Chapter 6 
are also to be seen in the narratives included in this chapter on the diasporic set-
ting. However, since the generation here describes their activism in terms of being 
active subjects, two further themes can be added: Emancipation and Challenge.   
In some of the accounts, the political careers of those belonging to the gen-
eration can be described as representing an Emancipatory project, which in some 
cases also develops into an educational project when the narrators aim to reveal 
the history and the situation of the suppressed and subordinated Kurdish people in 
various of their home countries. These narrators focus on the history of the Kurds 
and on matters of their present situation and their rights, language and culture ex-
pressing aspirations of making the Kurds themselves, and the world in general, 
conscious of their situation and their rights.  
In other accounts members the generation describe themselves as Challeng-
ers. These accounts tell of a generation that acted as pioneers, their in many re-
spects breaking new grounds and entering new arenas in which their Kurdish iden-
tities and those of generations to come could be manifested. The generation of 
prime interest here challenged existing barriers and continued with this in their 
exile, also challenging the idea of a homogeneous Turkish nation and in Sweden 
the idea of a victimized Kurdish diaspora and political generation of refugees. 
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PART IV  
Beyond Victims 
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Chapter 8 
Towards Triumph? 
8.1 Recapitulation 
This thesis is about a generation of pro-Kurdish activists from Turkey who ended 
up in political exile in Sweden. The aim here was to analyse and describe how 
their pro-Kurdish nationality was maintained and expanded in a diasporic setting 
through exploring, by means of interviewing, their narratives on Kurdishness and 
their strategies of activism. The method employed there was qualitative and em-
pirically based. It was investigated how the members of the political generation of 
our concerns, from their exiled position perceived of Kurdishness, of the situation 
of the Kurds, and the prospects of Kurdish activism in exile generally. Thus, the 
analysis has evolved around the specific experiences of these members of the gen-
eration, its being concentrated on two key themes: "nationality" and "diaspora". 
The intention here has neither been to systematically map out the activism and 
organisations of Kurdish activists, nor to contribute systematically to the knowl-
edge of the history, strategies and actions of such central actors as Kurdish politi-
cal parties or institutes. Rather the empirical part of the thesis concentrates on how 
the generation members included in the thesis narrated and coped with its Kurdish 
national identities and politics of belonging. Thus, the analysis of these interviews 
takes the shape of a political narrative in the sense suggested by Molly Andrews 
(see Andrews 2007). The narratives told by these Kurdish political refugees from 
Turkey can be seen as being counter-narratives in the sense that they challenges 
the public Turkish narrative that has cultivated the myth of Turkey being an ethni-
cally homogeneous country, the Kurdish issue there having been referred to essen-
tially in terms of its being "a socio-economic" problem, a question of "back-
wardness", or in more recent decades, a "security matter" (see Yeğen 2011).  
At the same time their narratives have been counter-narratives to the one-
sided picture of refugees and diasporic people as victimized people often provided 
(Cohen 1997; Tölölyan 2007). As will be discussed later on in this chapter, the 
narratives of this political generation are much more multi-faceted and complex. 
In the following I will recapitulate briefly the contents of the thesis as a who-
le so as to illuminate the diachronic dimension of the narratives. 
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Part I outlines the aim, problem and theoretical framework of the thesis. The aim 
has been to describe and analyse how diasporic Kurdish identities are manifested 
in a particular political generation of Kurds from Turkey. The research questions 
posed revolve around the question of how this generation presents itself, what it 
means to them to be Kurdish, how they relate to the country of origin and the 
country of settlement, and how they conceive of their pro-Kurdish activism in 
Sweden. Since diasporic communities all over the world are involved in the politi-
cal developments and nation building processes in their home countries, members 
of diasporic communities tend to organise along ethnic or national lines. Kurds, 
Sikhs and Palestinians are examples of stateless nations that have active diasporic 
communities. Kurdish diasporic communities have been established to consider-
able extent worldwide and are involved in political and cultural processes at 
global, transnational, national and local levels.  
The introductory chapter makes clear that a social constructivist position is 
taken as point of departure. The idea that social identities are created in opposition 
to a "constitutive other" is central to the work. 
Molly Andrews’s perspectives on political narratives has essentially inspired 
the narrative approach undertaken here. Furthermore, the theoretical perspectives 
guiding this work are centered around the concepts of sociological generation, 
diaspora and long-distance nationalism.  
Part II outlines the historical, social and political setting in which the genera-
tion in question took shape. In the historical chapters, a number of key factors are 
defined that appear to have influenced the members of this generation during their 
formative years. The narratives take their point of departure in a certain course of 
events that took place in post-war period Turkey when the country underwent a 
process of socio-economic and political changes. These courses of events can be 
seen as crucial to understanding the worldview of the generation’s members and 
the mould of the movement of pro-Kurdish activism in which they participated. 
During this period of time the public and political space was highly "ethnicized". 
There was an immensely strong repression that was directed, in their everyday life, 
at the people involved and that the generation of their parents had also suffered 
from. The generation of their parents shared a trauma that was silenced, their hav-
ing had their own lived memories of the Kurdish rebellions that took place in the 
early years of the republic, and hence of the massacres, banishments and repres-
sive measures that followed in their aftermath. In many cases they were frightened 
of addressing the subject even in private circles.  
In the formative years of the members of the generation of central interest 
here, Turkey was a country in which there were vast economic inequalities and 
huge social differences between its Western parts and Kurdistan. From the 1950s 
onwards Turkey underwent an increasing urbanization, there being migration 
flows that went from the eastern parts of the country to the metropolies in Western 
Turkey. There were state resources directed at education in Kurdistan in Turkey, 
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such that the school system, which had hitherto been neglected in that part of the 
country, expanded. Hence, the members of the generation were generally better 
educated than their parents and a greater number of them attended school. Thus, a 
new and increasingly better-educated generation of Kurds was faced with the 
enormous differences between the Western parts of the country and Kurdistan. 
The constitution that was ratified July 9, 1961, allowed for a more liberal political 
climate to evolve and contributed to partly restructuring the political scene in the 
country. In the constitution a body of civil rights for all citizens of Turkey was 
recognized, such as the freedom to establish political parties and the freedom to 
organize and arrange meetings. During this period new currents were able to enter 
the political space in the country, such as the liberal and left-wing movement and 
the ultra-nationalist movement in Turkey. Still in force were the paragraphs 141 
and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code from 1926, in terms of which political organis-
ing and the dissemination of propaganda that could, "destroy or weaken the na-
tionalist feeling" of Turkey were strictly forbidden.144 
Since there were limits to the liberalisation process, however, the public and 
political spaces in Turkey remained highly "ethnicized". This, in turn, sparked a 
resistance and a political consciousness among the Kurds. In the 1960s various 
Kurds became committed to the Turkish left wing movement. A break came, how-
ever, around the time of the military coup in 1971 and afterwards, the Kurdish 
movement becoming increasingly radicalised, as Kurdish activists became influ-
enced more and more by nationalism, Marxist thoughts and left-wing ideologies 
that predominated at universities and in oppositional movements of this period.  
Nationalism was a further injection, the Turkish branch of KDP having orga-
nized Kurds from more conservative circles ever since 1965. During the decades 
in question a Kurdish movement developed that operated clandestinely but ap-
peared in public through cultural and youth organisations and publishing houses. 
This movement took place in the atmosphere of inflamed political turmoil and 
dreadlock that characterised Turkey in the 1970s.  
Thus, the pro-Kurdish activists who participated in this movement can be dis-
tinguished as having been an "active" generation and a generational unit that was 
better educated than its contemporaries who did not devote themselves to pro-
Kurdish activism. Also, they came together under perticular political circum-
stances, were sensitive to social and ethnic injustices, and became gradually pre-
pared to take the risk of attempting to extend the limits of what it was possible to 
express in the public sphere in Turkey. 
The military coup d'état of September 12, 1980, marks a dramatic breakpoint 
and can be considered as being a shared trauma in the political as well as the eve-
                                                     
144 Quotation from KHRP 1997 p. 7. 
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ryday life of the members of this generation, whether they were inside Turkey or 
not at the time. The coûp dealt a severe blow to the movement that was to be se-
verely decimated. Many Kurdish activists were considered, together with hordes 
of other people, as being political dissidents and were arrested, tortured and 
imprisoned for years to come, there being protracted mass trials that continued on 
into the 1990s. Many of the people belonging to the political generation were 
forced to leave the country. 
The escape from Turkey to a life in exile in Sweden for the group studied 
here, marked a shift in scenery, and in the political lives of the members of the 
generation involved, who then became refugee immigrants. In their new home 
country a popular discourse was dominant, telling of Sweden being an ethnically 
homogeneous nation, which it in fact never was. The public and political contexts 
the generation members were faced with in Sweden were different from those in 
Turkey, and involved new openings as well as challenges. The political climate 
allowed for immigrant groups to organize and establish their own associations. In 
Sweden new guidelines for a policy of integration of immigrants were adopted in 
the mid-1970s, based on the three principles of "equality", "freedom of choice" 
and "partnership". 
The intention was to facilitate integration in the social, political and cultural 
life, as well as making it feasible for immigrants and minorities to maintain "their" 
language and cultural heritage. An important feature of this policy was the mother 
tongue reform, carried out in 1976, under which Swedish municipalities received 
state subsidies so as to provide language training for children in schools and pre-
schools. A second feature of importance for the generation was the providing of 
subsidies for immigrant literature that up to 1999 were generously distributed 
among immigrant authors, aimed at supporting publication in languages "that were 
lacking a literature in their own language" (Gröndahl 2002 p. 359). In Northern 
Kurdish literature the Kurmancî and Zazakî dialects spoken by many of the gen-
eration members became, as Gröndahl puts it, “a targeted language for these poli-
cies" (ibid. p. 360).  
However, in Sweden members of the generation were also faced with eth-
nicized and racial imagined boundaries, xenophobic attitudes, and other mecha-
nisms of exclusion. Being Kurdish they were also faced with the negative image of 
Kurds that was spread through the media following the murders of two dropouts 
from the PKK in the early 1980s and a number of violent incidents, which resulted 
in a group of Kurds affiliated with the party being held in communal arrest. The 
negative image in the media and in the public debate became accentuated with the 
assassination of the Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986, when the Stock-
holm Chief of Police linked the murder with the PKK, which resulted in several 
Kurds being arrested and interrogated by the Swedish police. 
In part III the discussion revolves thematically around two key themes, those 
of "ethnicity/nationality" and "diaspora".  
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Chapter 6 concerns narratives that can be described as being informed by a 
"backward look", in the sense that it is told in these of who the interviewees are 
and about their past, many of the accounts conveying a sense of nostalgia. The 
chapter is arranged in two main themes "Victimisation" and "National Romanti-
cism".  
In several of the stories Kurds are described in terms of being a suffering 
people. In these stories actions and thoughts are framed, dealing with various dif-
ficulties and sacrifices that the Kurds have experienced. Several of the stories are 
exemplifying how Kurds have been persecuted, neglected and quitened, and how 
they have been forced to escape their homeland and been dispersed to several 
countries. It is also told about how the homeland has been exploited and devas-
tated. In particular, these stories deal with experiences specific to the political 
generation and as such emphasising the situation of the Kurds in Turkey at the 
time when the interviewees were living in that country. In these stories the scene is 
often located to the original home country, situated in the childhood of the inter-
viewees or in a historical perspective. The moral of the stories seems to be to draw 
attention to the experiences of suffering and sacrifices. The theme of suffering is 
also employed to capture the life in exile, in particular the time, or the years, fol-
lowing immediately after the escape from Turkey. These stories reveal a longing 
for the past that is often expressed in sentimental and idealistic terms. 
In addition, there are accounts, informed by national romanticism, concerned 
with the idea of a nation being an imagined community, one based on the idea of 
there being a common "us" that marks a boundary in relation to "the other", the 
nation thus not being a universal community, but rather the existence of other na-
tions organized according to similar principles being presupposed, a vital ingredi-
ent in the creation of nations being to maintain borders against perceived others. It 
is important to emphasize, however, as a variety of commentators have noted (An-
derson 1991; Billig 1999; Eriksen 1993; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawmn 1990; Smith 
1986, 1991, 1995), that the borders in question are porous and in flux.  
When conceptions of "us" and of Kurdishness are discussed in the narratives 
that were studied, a tension between "the universal" and "the particular" could be 
distinguished. First, many presented initially, in very general terms or with refer-
ence to standardised or academic definitions of nationality, the meaning and the 
conception of Kurdishness. Implicitly, this can be interpreted as the stories being 
situated in a broader framework, or a larger narrative, about a world in which all 
people, i.e. all nations, have a right of self-determination. Hence, the interviewees' 
accounts can be interpreted in this respect as being pretentions to equality, to a 
legitimate right to their views. Otherwise, the thoughts of belonging that were to 
be found among the members of the generation included in the thesis were highly 
(original) homeland orientated. Furthermore, accounts of the specific situation of 
the Kurdish people in general were emphasized. These accounts concern the long 
Kurdish history and comprise the history and people of all Kurdistan. They could 
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perhaps be situated in a larger narrative of the Kurdish people’s aspirations for 
recognition and to their right of self-determination. 
Another major tendency in their reflections on Kurdishness, was to lean on 
experiences of theirs that were specific for the generation, often referring to social, 
cultural or political life in Kurdistan in Turkey and the position of the Kurds in the 
Turkish Republic. Many of these accounts are retrospective and concern the cir-
cumstances under which the interviewees grew up and/or became politically ac-
tive. However, some of their stories refer to the contemporary situation in Turkey. 
The conceptions of an "us" that is not universal necessarily involves the concep-
tion of "the other", who is not included in the community and whom the national 
identity is defined in opposition to. "Others" are generally not explicitly defined in 
the accounts, however. In some respect the interviewees were defining their na-
tional identities in opposition to Turkish nationality, the Turkish state policies 
being defined in terms of being "repressive" and exclusive of the Kurds. A ten-
dency was that when the members of the generation spoke of their national aspira-
tions and belonging, it was essentially in terms of "inclusiveness" and "benign 
nationalism", as for example describing Kurdistan as a country in which many 
people live, whereas Turkish nationalism is referred to in terms of "chauvinism" 
and "exclusiveness". 
At the time when the interviews were conducted most of the informants had 
been residing in Sweden for about 20 years or more. However, interestingly to 
note, not much of their experience of being a Kurd in Sweden were touched upon 
in the accounts. As in previous studies, the interviewees did not define their identi-
ties as their being in opposition to Swedes or to Swedish society. In this respect 
the results are similar to what can be seen in other studies of Kurds in Sweden 
(Alinia 2004; Khayati 2008). Rather, there were some accounts in which the inter-
viewees dissociated themselves, or took a distance, from their attributed national-
ity, and from how Kurdish nationality is portrayed in Swedish society. Some of 
the interviewees pointed out that their social identities stemmed from various 
sources, only one of which was nationality. In some cases the fluidity of national 
identities was emphasized, as for example by one interviewee who considered his 
daughter to be "both Swedish and Kurdish", noting at the same time that it was 
difficult to "determine precisely where Kurdishness ends and where Swedishness 
begins".  
The accounts of their belonging oscillated between that of their exposure to 
negative forces and circumstances, and that of their ability to survive. The first 
theme portrayed Kurds as being victims of historical and political circumstances, 
these accounts bringing forward their own and others experiences of repression 
and of belonging to an unrecognized and even denied nationality. Other accounts 
emphasised the persistence of the Kurds, a people who had survived all the atroci-
ties they have been going through over the years, as well as their incessant prepar-
edness to struggle for their rights and their being able to resist and survive during a 
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long history of suppression. All in all, the perhaps clearest tendency that can be 
distinguished in the accounts of their belonging is the complexity of the Kurdish 
nation-building process, or processes, generally and the complex situation of the 
Turkish Kurds in particular. Also the accounts suggest the members of the genera-
tion to have a pragmatic view of nationality and their homeland orientation. This 
attitude becomes obvious, for example in discussion of the language issue. It sho-
uld be noted, however, that their understanding of Kurdishness seemed moulded to 
a high degree by the situation in Turkey. An example of this was that at least some 
of the interviewees alluded to their belonging to the Kurdish community as being 
an active choice.  
Others provided examples of how Kurdishness to them and to many of their 
relatives had long meant a belonging that was communicated differently in private 
and in public spheres, or was undercommunicated in public spheres. Also among 
those who underscored the importance of language as a marker of national belong-
ing, there was a tolerance they showed toward those who had not learned, or never 
gotten to know, Kurdish. At the same time, however, they expressed a fear regard-
ing that language being threatened in Turkey, which could also be interpreted as 
their being very disturbed at Kurdish identity being so threatened. One can also 
note that the members of this generation tended to communicate a both tolerant 
and "benign" nationalist view. 
Chapter 7 broadens the scope of the analysis, the emphasis shifting from their 
thoughts of being Kurdish to their discussing the direction this takes in a diasporic 
setting. Their stories are also "forward-looking". These stories complicates and 
challenges stereotypical assumptions about of what it means to be a diasporic 
Kurd in the sense that a greater variation and diversity of experiences of life in the 
diasporic setting are revealed. The accounts revolve around the three basic themes 
of Re-Orientation, Challenges and Challengers. In this chapter it is shown that the 
diasporic political landscape is exceedingly complex and is difficult to obtain a 
detailed overview of, since there are a myriad of actors involved. Numerous Kurd-
ish parties and organisations have been established, re-established or even closed 
down.  
To many of the members of the political generation the diasporic setting has 
served as a platform for reorientation. These stories can be characterised as being 
forward-looking in the sense that they promotes appreciations of opportunities 
given in the diasporic setting and illuminates the challenges of present life. In rea-
ding through and reflecting on the narratives it becomes obvious that many of the 
interviewees perceive of the Kurds having organised successfully and consolidated 
their positions in exile. In addition examples are provided of both actions and 
statements that are directed at the general public in the country of settlement and 
beyond, showing members of the generation to have established contacts with a 
diversity of actors at both state and non-state levels. Thus, the Kurdish issue is not 
limited to its being an internal matter in Turkey or in any other Middle Eastern 
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country hosting large Kurdish populations. Rather, it is intimated that the Kurdish 
issue has become a concern for the governments of the countries of settlement as 
well as its having become an international issue that the Turkish regime cannot 
avoid or part from. In particular, where Turkey is a country with the ambition of 
entering the European Union (EU) a dialogue concerning minority issues in the 
country has been required of them. Politically, the members of the generation have 
organized and established contacts with state and non-state actors. Symbolic re-
sources and symbolic politics have been expanded in the diasporic setting, this 
having been particularly important for the Kurds from Turkey. 
A question of relevance is that of how the generation regards the achieve-
ments and the strategies of the Kurdish diaspora. Here one can distinguish two 
positions concerning how place and space are referred to in the participants’ ac-
counts. First, there are accounts in which the narrators take the position of spear-
heads, placing themselves and the diasporic activism in the centre, points to dias-
poric activism being of crucial importance to Kurdish interests. In these accounts, 
the Kurds having strengthened their position within the diasporic settings they are 
in and their having been successful in expanding their language and their literature 
is emphasized.  
In addition the importance and impact of diasporic Kurdish activism on the 
Kurdish movement in Turkey and for the Kurds in that country are emphasized, 
though not exaggerated. In this case the narrators can be seen as transnational or as 
transnational actors. In contrast to these stories however, one finds stories in which 
it is argued that the diasporic activism is marginal. According to these accounts 
diasporic activism is attributed more to the status of those in question of being 
observers, their emphasizing the spatial distance involved when looking at the role 
of diasporic pro-Kurdish activism and its impact on the situation of the Kurds in 
Turkey, their tending to describe their impact as being very much limited, or sim-
ply their having only a slight impact on the Kurdish issue generally.  
In the accounts of these narrators the meaning and importance that place is 
assigned appears to be greater than in the case of the others. This highlights the 
meaning of place and territory that was discussed in Chapter 2, where the useful-
ness of the diaspora concept for analysing refugee communities was pointed out. 
This does not imply that some of the broader applications of diaspora that have 
been employed in recent decades can not be very fruitful. Such approaches have 
contributed to broadening the concept of diaspora by pointing to alternative ways 
of looking upon diasporas in an increasingly globalized world. However, as I have 
argued, those with an approach of this sort tend to regard a diaspora more in the 
sense of being a social formation. Diasporas have from time to time been consid-
ered to be an anomaly in a world of nation states. "Rootlessness" and "Homeless-
ness" are common metaphors used to characterize the diasporic condition, alluding 
to the perceived distance from the "original" home country and to the members of 
a diaspora not being entirely assimilated into the society of settlement. Diaspora is 
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a problematical concept, one that has both similarities with and differences from 
the concept of nation. In connection with both these concepts, it is often asserted 
that a central ingredient of them is the conception of a homeland, although in the 
diasporic conception of things it could be an open question whether the homeland 
is territorialized or is de-territorialized, and among scholars it is sometimes de-
bated whether, and to what extent, spaces other than the space of origin and the 
territory this represents is central to the identity formation associated with a dias-
pora (Malkki 1995b). Clifford argues for example as follows:  
Decentred, lateral connections may be as important as those formed around a 
teleology of origin/return. And a shared ongoing history of displacement, 
suffering, adaption or resistance may be as important as the projection of a 
specific origin. 
(Clifford 1994 p. 306)	  	  
From the narratives that were collected it becomes obvious that the people belong-
ing to the political generation in question did not really perceive of themselves as 
being embedded in a transnational network. Rather, they described the diasporic 
experience taking a position dual in its orientation, on the one hand a homeland 
orientation as well as a trauma, and on the other hand stressing the dynamics of the 
diasporic setting. This paves the way, however, to a transnational space.  
Thus one result of the thesis is that, although there is a spatial separation be-
tween the members of the generation and their original home country, this is per-
ceived as a "trauma" and by many as having a marginalizing effect, despite there 
still being strong links to the original home country. In the diasporic situation, the 
homeland orientation continued to be important to them belonging to the political 
generation of our concerns.  
Thus, the people belonging to the political generation were not unaffected by 
the situation in their original home country. They had left the country in a chaotic 
situation, since the situation for the Kurds deteriorated after 1980. If the year 1980 
can be seen as a shared experienced trauma for the members of the generation, the 
1980s and 1990s became at least as traumatic for many of the Kurds who re-
mained in Turkey. The repression they were faced with continued for many years 
and the very existence of Kurds was publicly denied in Turkey up to 1991. The 
situation deteriorated seriously in the 1980s when the PKK instigated an armed 
struggle against the Turkish state. In the 1990s the conflict intensified, and the 
violence escalated as some 4,000 villages in Kurdistan in Turkey were burned to 
the ground by the security forces, on the pretext that the villagers were harbouring 
PKK soldiers.  
The civil war in Turkish Kurdistan in the 1990s led to enormous migration 
flows extending from the countryside to cities in Southeastern Turkey, and from 
the Eastern to the Western parts of the country. This, in turn, produced hundreds of 
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thousands of internally displaced persons (IDP's) in the country. The incessant and 
escalating repression during this period was a cause of concern for the generation. 
It influenced their political commitments and matters they carried out in Swedish 
society, and certainly contributed to the picture of the Kurds as it was presented in 
the country of settlement. In time, however, the situation of the Kurds in Sweden 
became more focused, an increasing number of activities on their part also being 
adressed to a Swedish or a Swedish-Kurdish audience. One example of this is the 
Kurdish library in Stockholm. Among its activities one find those essentially 
aimed at a Kurdish audience, such as language classes in Kurmancî and lectures 
given in Kurdish. At the same time, however, the library has arranged numerous 
events directed at a "mixed" audience, such as exhibitions of Kurdish rugs and 
Kurdish flowers, exhibitions in which all Kurdish and Kurdish-Swedish associa-
tions were invited to participate during 1997, and releases of Kurdish books with 
presentations in Swedish. 
How were nation building and the diasporic experience combined among 
members of the generation? What aspirations developed in the diasporic setting? 
In the introductory chapter I referred to the various positions taken by scholars 
concerning whether or not nationalist sentiments are strengthened in diasporic 
settings (Alinia 2004; Emanuelsson 2005; Khayati 2008; Sheikhmous 2000; Uçar-
lar 2009; Wahlbeck 1999; van Bruinessen 2000). This is a discussion that is not 
contained to the Kurdish issue itself, rather its often being argued there that na-
tionalism and aspirations for national independence became more radical outside 
the original home country. This is a matter that has been discussed, for example, 
by Anderson (1991) and Hobsbawm (1990 p. 104). 
In the narratives collected for the thesis there is a tendency for the positions 
to oscillate in these regards. On the one hand the interviewees showed sensitivity 
for nationalist sentiments. For example many expressed nostalgic, essentialist and 
national romantic views in their accounts of their childhood and their homestead 
and in their references to Kurdish history. In these accounts their childhood and 
their homestead were depicted in terms suggesting them to be fixed or frozen in a 
sense, as if Kurdish life in the original homeland were going on in the same "tradi-
tional" way as it always had throughout history, without any external influences or 
changes.  
Among the interviewees one finds those who emphasize the importance of 
"preserving their culture and language". In some of the accounts essentialist stan-
ces appear unintended, for example in the account presented by G, in which he 
motivates his never intending to join a Swedish political party. Thus, nationalist 
stances are expressed not only when old memories are referred to but also in ac-
counts refering to contemporary life and practices. T gives expression to a more 
critical attitude, his arguing in favour of a Kurdish nation state and intimating that 
this is a standpoint that is restrained and "not really allowed" for the Kurds to ex-
  
283 
press, or perhaps rather that the Kurdish nationalist discourse has accommodated 
itself to the expectations of others. 
On the other hand there are accounts which support anti-essentialist ideas and 
values. In these accounts diasporic activism is motivated by arguments such as that 
Kurds should be granted equal rights because of this being a fundamental human 
right, the desire of creating a modern Kurdish language and literature also being 
expressed, along with the desire for world literature and classical works being 
translated into Kurdish so as to make world literature known to the Kurds and 
making it part of their education and values, together with the desire that chil-
dren’s’ literature be translated into Kurdish.  
Thus, the narratives collected for this thesis partly support and partly compli-
cate positions concerning how Kurdish national identities are formed and devel-
oped in a diasporic setting. It has been rightly emphasized by some scholars (for 
example Emanuelsson 2005) that Kurdish parties and organizations have not been 
promoting a policy of political independence since 1999, when the PKK withdrew 
from their party program their claims for the establishment of an independent 
Kurdish state, and instead since then has been advocating simply autonomy for the 
Kurds. Its also being the case that nationalism has accommodated to the various 
diasporic settings in which many Kurds live today and to the contemporary global 
political debate. However, I would argue, aspirations and accounts expressed in 
informal settings should not be underestimated, since nationalism has an enormous 
mobilizing potential. In addition generation-specific experiences are important to 
consider here, as well as the specific conditions that exist and circumstances pre-
sent in the country of origin. There are no expressions of extremist nationalist 
views in the accounts that were given, although several of them adhere to an es-
sentialist and historicist nationalist discourse. 
8.2 Becoming Challengers 
What do we learn from the narratives? What patterns can be uncovered in them? 
What are the underlying plots and motives in the narratives? More precisely, what 
do the narratives teach us regarding the generation of political refugees and pro-
Kurdish activists studied in this thesis? A characteristic of comprehensive narra-
tives is that they contain numerous "smaller" and competing undercurrents all 
contributing to the dominating narrative. A generation narrative is necessarily 
complex and can involve many different threads and patterns, told by persons who 
one rightfully considers as being active subjects. The variances and different 
viewpoints that are to be found among the narratives help to complicate and chal-
lenge the stereotype picture of the political generation as victims. So does the in-
consistencies and variances between sequences that are to be found in individual 
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stories. The one-sided victimisation discourse that often is ascribed to the first 
generation of refugees and diasporas thus needs to be challenged. 
In Part III I suggest that the narrative of this generation instead should be 
seen as one of a generation of reluctant victims, since as political refugees they on 
one hand have objected to political repression and been forced to escape their 
home country, but at the same time offered resistance in the original home country 
and then continued the struggle abroad. At least four different themes can be dis-
cerned in the narratives. 
One theme that can be distinguished in the overall narrative is about Suffer-
ing. Constituting a first generation of Kurdish migrants and political refugees, 
many of the stories are about repression, persecution and the existential dilemmas 
of being separated from ones original home country. Many of the narrators express 
their concerns about the situation of the Kurds in the country of origin, and for the 
future of the Kurds and the Kurdish language. In some of the accounts the Kurds 
are depicted as being incessantly threatened and persecuted. These accounts also 
tell of a struggle against injustices and for recognition of the Kurds. 
A second theme, contrasting with the first theme, is one about Strength, 
which appears as an sub-current. This is the narrative of a persistent generation 
that resisted and challenged the established political structures in their original 
home country, and who belong to a people who have survived and who have 
shown themselves capable of withstanding the difficulties with which they have 
been faced throughout centuries of injustices and oppression. It has also been poin-
ted out how well Kurds have managed to organise and to reorganise. This is a 
more optimistic strand, one that points to a dynamic contemporary and future situ-
ation for the Kurds.  
A third theme, likewise a sub-current, is one describing the political life of 
the generation in terms of its being a project of Emancipation. Emancipatory nar-
ratives aim not only at revealing to the audience the history and situation of an 
opressed and subordinate people, but also at dismantling the structures of opres-
sion. These narrators focus the history of the Kurds and facts concerning their 
present situation and their rights, their language and their culture, with the aim of 
liberating the Kurds. In these accounts the narrators tend to take the position of a) 
educating and mobilizing the Kurds, making the Kurdish masses aware of their 
situation and their rights, and b) enlightening the world regarding the situation of 
the Kurds and their aspirations. In these strands there is also room for alternative 
voices being heard, for alternative ways of being Kurdish, as well as various large-
ly untold stories, such as those of the Zazakî and of women. 
A fourth theme that can be distinguished is that of Challengers pointing to 
the story of the generation being one of success and advancement. Here, the gen-
eration is seen as being pioneers incessantly breaking new grounds. In such ac-
counts note is taken of how norms and values in Turkish political culture have 
been challenged, and how they have been successful in establishing contacts with 
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state and non-state actors and in bringing the Kurdish issue to the political agenda 
in Sweden, Turkey and international forum. In addition, it is asserted that the 
Kurds have consolidated their position in the diasporic setting and that the genera-
tion is both a highly conscious and a well-educated generation. Their main identity 
is no longer that of being victims. Rather they have become challengers. 
Edmunds and Turner (2002) have suggested that generations often play a cultur-
ally "generative" role in political life, their posing the question of what role a gen-
eration has from a short-term and from a middle-term perspective.  
Furthermore, these authors points out that the role of "active" generations in 
nationalist movements often challenges old structures and contributes to a new 
political culture. Although the influence of diasporic groups should certainly not 
be exaggerated, it is perhaps reasonable to suggest that the generation considered 
here contributed appreciably to challenging the public picture of Turkey, since it 
brought the Kurdish issue into the political space in Sweden, in other Western 
European countries and in the US. Attention was drawn to the Kurdish issue in the 
media, and through political channels to the situation of the Kurds in Turkey, so 
that it became one of the key issues in negotiations between Turkey and EU. In 
addition, a first generation of well educated women entered the political scene and 
helped to draw attention to the situation of Kurdish women. Thus Turkey cannot 
avoid being involved in a dialogue regarding the Kurdish issue. For the Kurdish 
diaspora in Sweden the considerable publishing of Kurdish literature and the mod-
ernizing of the language should be mentioned as well as efforts, among other 
things, within the area of human rights. Also important is the establishment of 
Kurdish institutes and associations such as the Kurdish library. 
The themes that have been brought up here generate many questions to ex-
plore further in future research. Certain questions of this sort concern the migra-
tion of women and the organising in which they became engaged in diasporic set-
tings, and the role of Internet in the mobilisation of the Kurdish diaspora. There 
are countless other questions, of course, to be explored. 
8.3 Epilogue : Whither the Political Generation? 
What role the generation studied here will have in a long-range perspective is an 
open question. It depends, for one thing, on developments in the diasporic com-
munity. During the last decade in Sweden, a new generation of artists and politi-
cians of Turkish Kurdish origin has entered the stage, for example. Also in Turkey 
much has changed. In 2002, when the interviews I conducted were finished, Tur-
key was a country at the crossroads. Since then developments there have continued 
to be dramatic. In 1999 the country was recognized as a candidate country for the 
European Union, in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria.  
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A process of accommodation and considerable effort aimed at amendment of the 
laws and the constitution in Turkey were initiated, a number of efforts having also 
been made to facilitate the use of the Kurdish language in practice. Negotiations, 
the Oslo Talks, have been initiated between the PKK and the Turkish government 
(see, for example, Todays Zaman 2012-06-18, Hürriyet Daily News 2012-09-24), 
with the aim to find a peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue.  
The political climate has been mitigated and various well-known Kurdish 
authors, such as Mahmud Baksi and Mehmed Uzun, have passed away and are 
now buried in the city of Diyarbekir. At Uzun´s funeral, that took place in that city 
on October 13, 2007, the ceremony was attended by tens of thousands of people, 
among them the author Yasar Kemal and the Swedish and the Greek vice councel-
lors in Turkey. Several of the interviewees have been able to return to Turkey for 
longer or shorter periods. Still, Turkey is to be considered a country "at the cross-
roads" and the Kurdish issue still being an inflamed one and the political space 
remaining ethnified. One example of this is the imprisoning of the author Muhar-
rem Erbey, that evoked protests among the Kurds who remain in the diasporic 
settings. As these lines are being written, news coming from Turkey reports of the 
year 2012 having been the bloodiest in 13 years and also of some 700 Kurdish 
political prisoners being on hunger strike in Turkish prisons (Studio Ett 2012-11-
01).  
Both in the diasporic setting and in Turkey a new generation of Kurdish ac-
tivists have taken the scene. In this new generation of Kurdish activists many 
women have acquired prominent positions as politicians, artists, journalists and in 
many other fields of society. 
The political generation of major concern here responded to the socio-
political structure in Turkey and the repression directed against the Kurds there at 
a time when the Kurdish situation was not a major issue in public debate. This 
generation has come to challenge public discourse concerning a homogeneous 
Turkish nation and in addition has come to challenge the diasporic victimization 
discourse that is so often taken for granted. As a consequence their position as a 
defeated political generation was challenged. Resistance in Turkey is growing, 
Kurds continuing to organise in protest and new narratives taking shape. However 
these will be told in part by new generations, from the vantage point of a different 
point in history, at a time in which the Kurdish issue will have appeared for some 
time in public debate in Turkey and have been followed for some time abroad, at 
the same time as one can hope that a solution to many of the present problems will 
have been found.  
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1: List of Interviewees 
 
Name Born Sex/Gender Arrival in 
Sweden 
Education Interview 
A 1950s M 1980s High School November 
2002 
B 1940s M 1960s 
1980s 
University March 2002 
C 1950s M 1980s University September 
2001 
D 1950s M 1980s University September 
2001 
E 1940s M 1970s University May 2002 
F 1930s M 1980s Other/Compulsory 
school 
November 
2002 
G 1950s M 1980s University March 2002 
H 1950s M 1980s High School September 
2002 
J 1950s F 1980s High School August 2001 
K 1950s F 1980s University December 
2002 
L 1930s M 1970s 
1980s 
University August 2001 
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Name Born Sex/Gender Arrival in 
Sweden 
Education Interview 
M 1950s M 1990s University November 
2001 
December 
2002 
N 1950s M 1980s University February 
2002 
O 1940s M 1980s High School March 2002 
P 1950s M 1980s High School November 
2002 
R 1950s F 1980s University March 2002 
S 1950s F 1980s University August 2001 
T 1960s M 1980s University August 2001 
March 2002 
U 1950s M 1980s University September 
2002 
V 1950s M 1980s University Jan 2002 
Feb 2002 
W 1950s M 1980s University August 2001 
Y 1950s M 1980s University August 2001 
Z 1950s M 1980s High School May 2002 
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Appendix 2: List of Informal discussions referred to in 
the thesis 
 
Ş 1950s  University July 2002 
Q 1930s  University July 2002 
Ü 1950s 1980s University March 2001 
X 1930s 1980s University July 2002 
Nedim 
Dağdeviren 
1950s 1980s University September 
2001/February 
2002 
 
 
I have, with one exception, not described details of the interviewees in order to 
enhance their anonymity. The exception is Nedim Dağdeviren who was inter-
viewed in his capacity of being the director of the Kurdish Library. 
 
  
310 
Appendix 3: Interview Questions 
General Background 
 
Personal background: Born, childhood, education, family, profession 
Political background: How did you become politically involved? How did you 
become involved with the Kurdish question?  
 
 
Political Opinions 
 
What are your opinion about the situation for the Kurds in Turkey today? What is 
your opinion about the negotiations between EU and Turkey? What do you think it 
will lead to for the Kurds? What is your opinion about the capture of Abdulla Öca-
lan? What do you think it will lead to for the Kurds? What do you think of the 
political openings regarding Kurdish language rights in Turkey? How important is 
the language? 
 
 
Identity 
 
What is the meaning of being Kurdish? How would you define a Kurd? What 
What does Kurdistan mean to you? Do you think there are differences between 
Kurds in exile and Kurds in Turkey? Kurds in Kurdistan and Western Turkey? If 
so what kind of differences. 
 
 
Diaspora/exile 
 
Are you still politically involved? How have you been involved in the Kurdish 
question in Sweden? How do you consider the position of Kurds in Swe-
den/Europe? How do you consider the role of the Kurdish Diaspora? How can you 
describe Kurdish women's organisation in the Kurdish movements/ in the dias-
pora? /Kurdish womens position in Sweden? 
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Appendix 4: List of Abbreviations 
 
AKP  Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
  Partisi) 
AKSA  Association of Kurdish Students Abroad (Yekitiya 
  Xwendevanên  li dervayi Welat) 
Ala Rizgarî  Flag of Liberation 
ANAP  Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) 
AP  Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) 
ARGK  Peoples Liberation Army of Kurdistan (Arteşa Riz-
  garîya Gele Kurdistan) 
AYÖD   Association for Higher Education in Ankara (Ankara 
  Yüksek Öğrenim Derneği) 
Azadî  Freedom 
Bahoz   Storm 
BDP  Peace and Democracy Party (Bariş ve Demokrasi 
  Partisi) 
CHP  Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) 
CUP  Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terraki 
  Cemyeti) 
DDKD  Revolutionary Cultural Associations of the East 
  (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Derneği) 
DDKO  Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths  
  (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları) 
DEP  Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi) 
DEHAP  Democratic Peoples Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi) 
DHKD  Revolutionary People's Cultural Association 
  (Devrimi Halk Kültür Derneği) 
DP  Democratic Party (Demokrasi Partisi) 
DYP  True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi) 
ERNK  Kurdistan National Liberation Front (Enîya Riz-
  garîya Netewayi Kurdistan) 
HADEP  People's Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Par-
  tisi) 
HEP  People's Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi) 
HEVRA  Association of Kurdish Revolutionaries from Turkey 
  in Europe (Komela Şoreşvanên Kurdên Tirkiye li 
  Ewrupa)  
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HRK  Kurdistan Freedom Brigades (Hêzên Rizgarîya 
  Kurdistan) 
GAP  Southeast Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu 
  Projesi) 
Kawa  The blacksmith Kawa was a legendary Kurdish folk 
  hero. Kawa was also the name of a Kurdish political 
  party in the 1970s. 
KADEK  Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (Kon-
  greye Gele Kurdistan) 
KCK  Union of Communities in Kurdistan (Koma Civakên 
  Kurdistan) 
KDP  Kurdistan Democratic Party (Partîya Demokrat 
  Kurdistan) 
KDP-Iran  Kurdistan Democratic Party Iran (Partîya Demokrat 
  Kurdistan Iran) 
KDPT  Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey 
KHRP  Kurdish Human Rights Project 
Khoybun  Independence 
KİP  Kurdistan Workers Party (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi) 
KSSE  Kurdistan Student's Association in Europe (Komeley 
  Xwendekarani Kurdistan li Ewrupa) 
KR  Kurdish Federation (Kurdiska Riksförbundet) 
KRG  Kurdistan Regional Government (the regional gov-
  ernment of Iraqi Kurdistan) 
KUK  National Liberators of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Ulusal 
  Kurtuluşçular) 
MHP  National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) 
OHAL  Emergency Rule Law (Olağanüstü Hal) 
ÖDP  Freedom and Solidarity Party (Özgürlük ve  
  Dayanışma Partisi) 
ÖZDEP  Freedom and Democracy Party (Özgürlük ve De
  mokrasi Partisi) 
PKK  Kurdistan Workers Party (Partîye Karkarên-y-
  Kurdistan) 
RP  Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) 
PPKK  Vanguard Party of Kurdistan Workers (Partîya 
  Peşeng a Karkarên a Kurdistan) 
PSK  Kurdistan Socialist Party (Partîya Sosyalist a Kurd
  istan) 
PUK  Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Yekyetî Niştîmanî 
  Kurdistan) 
Rizgarî  Liberation  
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Serxwêbun  Independence 
SHP  Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat 
  Halkçi Partisi) 
SIL  The Government's Teaching Material Authority 
  (Svenska institutet för läromedel) 
Tekoşer  Fighter 
Tekoşin  Struggle 
TİP  Workers Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) 
TKDP  Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party (Türkiye Kurdis
  tan Demokratik Partisi) 
TOBB  Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of 
  Turkey 
TKSP  Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party (Türkiye Kurdis
  tan Demokratik Partisi) 
YTP  New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi) 
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Appendix 5: List of Tables 
Table    Page 
 
Table 3a Chronology ca 1839 - 1923  118 
Table 3b The generation during this period 118 
Table 4a Chronology ca 1919 - 1939  144 
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Appendix 6: Notes on Spelling and Pronounciation 
 
Kurdish 
 
a  a, as in father 
c  j, as in jam 
ç  ch, as in church 
ê  like é in French passé 
i  neutral like e in paper 
î  like ea in please 
j  as in French, jardin, jambon 
ş  sh, as in ship 
u  like u in church 
û  like oo in food 
x  like ch in German acht 
w  like w in war 
 
 
Turkish 
c   as j in jam 
ç  ch, as in church 
ı  like a in gentleman 
j  like the s in measure 
g  hard g 
ğ  soft g, as in neighbour 
ö  like the ir in bird, urge 
u  as in put 
ü  as in French tu 
 
 
 
